עבודה זרה ס״ו

עבודה זרה ס״ו

חַמְרָא עַתִּיקָא בְּעִנְבֵי, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם. חַמְרָא חַדְתָּא בְּעִנְבֵי, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ, וְרָבָא אָמַר: בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם.

§ With regard to old wine used for a libation that fell onto grapes, all agree that the grapes are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them. With regard to new wine used for a libation, i.e., wine that had just been squeezed and has not yet fermented, that fell onto grapes, Abaye says that any amount renders the grapes forbidden, and Rava says that they are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ, בָּתַר טַעְמָא אָזְלִינַן, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חַד טַעְמָא הוּא, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִין בְּמִינוֹ, וּמִין בְּמִינוֹ בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ.

The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Abaye says that any amount renders them forbidden because he maintains that when categorizing substances in the context of the halakhot of mixtures we follow the flavor, and this wine and those grapes are of the same flavor, which renders it a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. And the principle is that in a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden.

וְרָבָא אָמַר: בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם, בָּתַר שְׁמָא אָזְלִינַן, וְהַאי שְׁמָא לְחוּד וְהַאי שְׁמָא לְחוּד, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ, וּמִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם.

And Rava says that the grapes are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them because he maintains that when categorizing substances in the context of the halakhot of mixtures we follow the name, and this wine has a discrete name, and those grapes have their own discrete name. And accordingly, this is a case of a substance in contact with a different type of substance. And the principle is that in a case of a substance in contact with a different type of substance, the mixture is forbidden only in a case where the forbidden item imparts flavor to it.

תְּנַן: יֵין נֶסֶךְ שֶׁנָּפַל עַל גַּבֵּי עֲנָבִים כּוּ׳. קָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתִּין: חַמְרָא חַדְתָּא בְּעִנְבֵי, מַאי לָאו בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם? לָא, בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ.

We learned in the mishna that in the case of wine used for a libation that fell on cracked grapes, the grapes are forbidden. It enters our mind that this is referring to new wine falling on grapes. What, is it not the intention of the mishna that they are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the grapes? If so, then it is the name that counts, as the flavor of the wine in this case is the same as the grapes. The Gemara rejects this premise: No, the mishna means that any amount of the wine renders the grapes forbidden.

הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁבַּהֲנָאָתוֹ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם — אָסוּר, כֹּל שֶׁאֵין בַּהֲנָאָתוֹ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם — מוּתָּר, מִכְּלָל דִּבְנוֹתֵן טַעַם עָסְקִינַן!

The Gemara challenges this explanation. But from the fact that the mishna teaches in the last clause: This is the principle: Anything that benefits from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is forbidden, and anything that does not benefit from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is permitted, by inference, we are dealing with a case where the forbidden item imparts flavor to the permitted item.

וְאַבָּיֵי, מַתְנִיתִין בְּחַמְרָא עַתִּיקָא בְּעִנְבֵי.

And how does Abaye explain this? In his opinion, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to old wine that fell onto grapes, which are not of the same flavor, so it is reasonable that the grapes are rendered forbidden by an amount that imparts flavor.

חַלָּא דְּחַמְרָא וְחַלָּא דְּשִׁיכְרָא, וַחֲמִירָא דְּחִיטֵּי וַחֲמִירָא דִּשְׂעָרֵי, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם, בָּתַר טַעְמָא אָזְלִינַן, וְהַאי טַעְמָא לְחוּד וְהַאי טַעְמָא לְחוּד, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ, וּמִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם.

This dispute between Abaye and Rava applies to another case as well. With regard to the case of wine vinegar and malt vinegar that became mixed together, and one is permitted and the other is forbidden, and also the case of leaven of wheat flour and leaven of barley flour that became mixed together, and one is permitted and the other is forbidden, Abaye says: The forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden in a case where it imparts flavor to the mixture, because we follow the flavor, and this flavor is discrete and that flavor is discrete, and therefore it becomes a mixture of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type. And a type of food mixed with food not of its own type is forbidden in a case where the forbidden food imparts flavor to the mixture.

וְרָבָא אָמַר: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ, בָּתַר שְׁמָא אָזְלִינַן, וְהַאי חַלָּא מִיקְּרֵי וְהַאי חַלָּא מִיקְּרֵי, וְהַאי חֲמִירָא מִיקְּרֵי וְהַאי חֲמִירָא מִיקְּרֵי, וַהֲוָה לֵיהּ מִין בְּמִינוֹ, וְכׇל מִין בְּמִינוֹ בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ.

And Rava says: Any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden, in accordance with his opinion that we follow the name, and this is called vinegar and that is called vinegar, and this is called leaven and that is called leaven, and therefore it becomes a mixture of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, and in any case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ דְּבָתַר טַעְמָא אָזְלִינַן? דְּתַנְיָא: תַּבְלִין שְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשָׁה שֵׁמוֹת, וְהֵן מִין אֶחָד, אוֹ מִין שְׁלֹשָׁה — אֲסוּרִין וּמִצְטָרְפִין. וְאָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: הָכָא בְּמִינֵי מְתִיקָה עָסְקִינַן, הוֹאִיל וּרְאוּיִן לְמַתֵּק בָּהֶן אֶת הַקְּדֵירָה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּתַר טַעְמָא אָזְלִינַן — כּוּלֵּי חַד טַעְמָא הוּא, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בָּתַר שְׁמָא אָזְלִינַן — הַאי שְׁמָא לְחוּד וְהַאי שְׁמָא לְחוּד!

Abaye says: From where do I say that we follow the flavor? As it is taught in a baraita: Forbidden spices that are known by two or three different names but are of the same species, or of three different species, are forbidden, and combine together to render a dish forbidden. And Ḥizkiyya says: The reason the three species combine to render the dish forbidden is that here we are dealing with types of sweet spices. Since they are all fit to sweeten the dish, they combine, as they impart the same kind of flavor. Abaye explains: Granted, if you say we follow the flavor, they are all considered the same flavor, and therefore they combine. But if you say we follow the name, why should they combine to render the dish forbidden? This name is discrete and that name is discrete.

וְרָבָא אָמַר לָךְ: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: מִנַּיִן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁמִּצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תֹאכַל כׇּל תּוֹעֵבָה״, כֹּל שֶׁתִּיעַבְתִּי לָךְ — הֲרֵי הוּא בְּבַל תֹּאכַל.

And Rava could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that all forbidden foods combine, whether or not they have the same name or the same flavor, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Meir: From where is it derived that any foods forbidden by the Torah that fall into a mixture combine with one another to render a mixture forbidden? As it is stated: “You shall not eat anything abominable” (Deuteronomy 14:3), which indicates that anything that I have made abominable, i.e., forbidden, to you, is prohibited for consumption, and therefore all of these prohibitions are actually a single general prohibition.

חַלָּא לְגוֹ חַמְרָא — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם. חַמְרָא לְגוֹ חַלָּא — אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ, וְרָבָא אָמַר: בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם.

With regard to forbidden vinegar that fell into a barrel of wine, all agree that the mixture is forbidden in a case where the forbidden vinegar imparts flavor to the mixture. In a case of forbidden wine that spilled into vinegar, since the sharper smell of the vinegar overwhelms the smell of the wine before it mixes in, Abaye says that any amount of the wine renders the mixture forbidden, and Rava says that it is forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the vinegar.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ,

The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Abaye says that any amount renders the mixture forbidden,

רֵיחֵיהּ חַלָּא וְטַעְמָא חַמְרָא — חַלָּא, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִין בְּמִינוֹ, וְכׇל מִין בְּמִינוֹ — בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ.

because a liquid whose smell is vinegar and its flavor is wine is considered vinegar, and the wine, when it spilled into the barrel of vinegar, took on the smell of vinegar from the moment it reached the airspace of the barrel, and it has therefore become a type of food mixed with food of its own type. And any type of forbidden food mixed with food of its own type renders the mixture forbidden by any amount.

רָבָא אָמַר: בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם, רֵיחֵיהּ חַלָּא וְטַעְמָא חַמְרָא — חַמְרָא, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ, וְכׇל מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם.

Rava says that the mixture is forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the vinegar, because a liquid whose smell is vinegar and its flavor is wine is considered wine, and it has therefore become a type of food mixed with food not of its own type. And any type of forbidden food mixed with food not of its own type renders the mixture forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to the mixture.

הַאי בַּת תִּיהָא, גּוֹי בִּדְיִשְׂרָאֵל — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, יִשְׂרָאֵל בִּדְגוֹי — אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אָסוּר, רָבָא אָמַר: מוּתָּר. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אָסוּר, רֵיחָא מִילְּתָא הִיא. רָבָא אָמַר: מוּתָּר, רֵיחָא לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא.

§ With regard to this bunghole [bat tiha], the hole in a barrel through which one can smell the wine, if a gentile smells a Jew’s wine through it, the wine is permitted, but for a Jew to smell a gentile’s wine through it, Abaye says that it is prohibited, whereas Rava says that it is permitted. Abaye says that it is prohibited because he holds that a smell is a substantial matter, a significant form of pleasure, and it is not permitted to derive benefit from a gentile’s wine. Rava says it is permitted because he holds that a smell is nothing; it is insignificant.

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, דְּרֵיחָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא? דִּתְנַן: תַּנּוּר שֶׁהִסִּיקוֹ בְּכַמּוֹן שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה וְאָפָה בּוֹ אֶת הַפַּת — הַפַּת מוּתֶּרֶת, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין טַעַם כַּמּוֹן אֶלָּא רֵיחָא כַּמּוֹן. וְאַבַּיֵּי? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּמִיקְלָא אִיסּוּרֵיהּ.

Rava says: From where do I say that a smell is nothing? It is as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 10:4): With regard to an oven that one lit with cumin stalks of teruma and baked bread in it, the bread is permitted because it has not absorbed the flavor of the cumin stalks but only the smell of the cumin stalks. This indicates that smell alone does not render a food forbidden. And how does Abaye explain this? He answers that it is different there, as the forbidden substance was burned. The smell of the forbidden cumin stalks entered the bread after the cumin stalks themselves were consumed by the fire, and a smell that is not from an extant substance is not forbidden. By contrast, in a case where the smell is from an extant source, it is forbidden.

אָמַר רַב מָרִי: כְּתַנָּאֵי, הָרוֹדֶה פַּת חַמָּה וּנְתָנָהּ עַל פִּי חָבִית שֶׁל יַיִן שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מַתִּיר בְּשֶׁל חִיטִּין, וְאוֹסֵר בְּשֶׁל שְׂעוֹרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַשְּׂעוֹרִים שׁוֹאֲבוֹת. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: רֵיחָא מִילְּתָא הִיא, וּמָר סָבַר: רֵיחָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא?

Rav Mari said: This dispute between Abaye and Rava is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a mishna (Terumot 10:3): With regard to one who detached a hot loaf of bread from the oven and placed it on the opening of a barrel of wine of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, Rabbi Meir deems the bread forbidden to non-priests, as in his opinion the smell of the wine renders the bread forbidden to them, and Rabbi Yehuda deems it permitted. Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted in a case of wheat bread but deems it forbidden in a case of barley bread, because the barley draws out the fumes of the wine. Rav Mari explains: What, is it not with regard to this matter that the Sages in the mishna disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a smell is a substantial matter, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that a smell is nothing?

לְרָבָא וַדַּאי תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, לְאַבָּיֵי מִי לֵימָא תַּנָּאֵי הִיא?

The Gemara remarks: According to the opinion of Rava, the dispute between him and Abaye is certainly parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as he must concede that Rabbi Meir holds that a smell is a substantial matter. But according to the opinion of Abaye, shall we say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im?

אָמַר לָךְ אַבָּיֵי: לָאו מִי אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בְּפַת חַמָּה וְחָבִית פְּתוּחָה —

The Gemara answers: Abaye could say to you that Rabbi Yehuda also holds that a smell is a substantial matter. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel,