הוריות ד׳

הוריות ד׳

וְלָא מִבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צִבּוּר מַיְיתֵי, דִּמְפַרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא. אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין, דְּלָא מְפַרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא – אִי הֲוָה שָׁאֵיל, הֲווֹ אָמְרִין לֵיהּ.

And it is not necessary to state this according to the one who said that the congregation brings the offering, as in that case the matter, that the court reversed its ruling, is publicized among the congregation. But even according to the one who said that the court brings the offering, where the matter is not publicized that the court reversed its ruling, if he had asked, they would have told him that the court reversed its ruling. Therefore, it could be said that he associated his action with himself and did not associate it with the court, and he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר אָבִין, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר זְבִידָא: מָשָׁל דְּסוֹמְכוֹס לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְאָדָם שֶׁהֵבִיא כַּפָּרָתוֹ בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת, סָפֵק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם נִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ, סָפֵק מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁכָה נִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ, שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin, and some say Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida, says: There is an analogy to illustrate the opinion of Sumakhos. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a person who brings his atonement offering during twilight, which is a time when there is uncertainty whether it is day or night, and there is uncertainty whether the offering atoned for him while it is still day, and the atonement was effective, and there is uncertainty whether it atoned for him after nightfall, and the atonement was not effective. The halakha is that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. Although typically one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering in a case where there is uncertainty whether he performed a transgression for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering, in this case, since the uncertainty relates to twilight, which is an uncertainty that can never be resolved, it is not a typical uncertainty and one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.

וְלָא מִבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין דְּלָא אִפַּרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צִבּוּר מְבִיאִין, דִּמְפַרְסְמָא מִלְּתָא, וַהֲווֹ אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ, דְּהָכָא בְּסָפֵק מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם סָפֵק מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁכָה, אִי שָׁאֵיל לָא אַשְׁכַּח אִינָשׁ דִּמְשַׁיֵּילֵּיהּ.

And it is not necessary to state this according to the one who said that the court brings the offering, which is the case when the matter is not publicized that the court reversed its ruling; but it can be stated even according to the one who said that the congregation brings the offering, which is the case when the matter is publicized that the court reversed its ruling, and if he had asked we would have said to him that the court reversed its ruling. This is because here, in a case where there is uncertainty whether it atoned for him while it is still day and there is uncertainty whether it atoned for him after nightfall, if he asks he would not find a person whom he could ask.

אָמַר לוֹ בֶּן עַזַּאי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִן הַיּוֹשֵׁב כּוּ׳. שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְבֶן עַזַּאי?

§ The mishna teaches that ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva: In what way is this person who went overseas different from one who sits in his house? Rabbi Akiva said to him: The difference is that with regard to one who sits in his house it would have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal, but with regard to that person who went overseas, it would not have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal. The Gemara asks: Rabbi Akiva said well to ben Azzai. How did a scholar of the caliber of ben Azzai fail to understand that distinction?

אָמַר רָבָא: הֶחְזִיק בַּדֶּרֶךְ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, לְבֶן עַזַּאי חַיָּיב – דְּהָא בְּבֵיתֵיהּ אִיתֵיהּ, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פָּטוּר – דְּהָא הֶחְזִיק בַּדֶּרֶךְ.

Rava said: The reference is not to one who already went to a country overseas; rather, it is a case of one who set out on the way but has not yet left his city in which there is a practical difference between them. According to ben Azzai he is liable, as it is in his home city where he is located at this time and there is no difference between him and one who is sitting in his house. According to Rabbi Akiva he is exempt, as he has already set out on his way. Even though he is still in his home city, he is preoccupied with his travels and his status is like one who has already gone overseas.

הוֹרוּ לוֹ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל הַגּוּף. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – וְלֹא שֶׁיֵּעָקֵר הַמִּצְוָה כּוּלָּהּ. כֵּיצַד? אָמְרוּ: אֵין נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֵין עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – וְלֹא שֶׁתִּתְעַלֵּם מִצְוָה כּוּלָּהּ. הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין.

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling to abolish the entire essence of the mitzva, that is not a valid ruling, and the court is exempt from bringing an offering. The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the matter is hidden from the eyes of the congregation” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that there is liability only when a single matter is hidden but not in a case where they will abolish the entire mitzva. How so? If the court said: There is no prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, or there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, or there is no prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, one might have thought that the judges would be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “And the matter is hidden,” and not that the entire mitzva will be hidden. Accordingly, if the judges issued that ruling, they are exempt from bringing an offering.

אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר, יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פָּטוּר, יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָּטוּר – יָכוֹל יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף.

But if the judges said: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge is exempt; or if they said: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt; or if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt, one might have thought that the judges would be exempt. Therefore, the verse states: “And the matter is hidden,” from which it is derived that there is liability only for a matter, a single detail, but not for the entire essence. In this case, since they ruled to abolish only a detail of the mitzva, the judges are liable.

אָמַר מָר: יָכוֹל יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין. וְאִי בְּקִיּוּם מִקְצָת וּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת פְּטוּרִין, וּבַעֲקִירַת כָּל הַגּוּף פְּטוּרִין – בְּמַאי חַיָּיבִין? תַּנָּא הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, אֵימָא: ״דָּבָר״ כּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא מַשְׁמַע! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״.

The Gemara analyzes the latter clause of the baraita. The Master said: One might have thought that the judges would be exempt. The Gemara asks: But if in a case of sustaining a portion of the mitzva and nullifying a portion of the mitzva the judges are exempt, and in a case of abolishing the entire essence of the mitzva the judges are exempt, as explained in the first clause of the baraita, in what case would they be liable? The Gemara answers: This is what is difficult for the tanna: Say that the term “matter” is referring to the entire matter, and the judges are liable even if they ruled to abolish the entire mitzva. Therefore, the verse states: “And the matter is hidden [venelam davar].”

מַאי מַשְׁמַע? אָמַר עוּלָּא: קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר״.

The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? Ulla said: Read into the verse as though the letter mem, the last letter in the word venelam, is also appended to the beginning of the word davar, resulting in the phrase: Venelam middavar, meaning: Part of the matter is hidden, from which it is derived that there is liability for nullification of part of the matter, and not for abolishing the entire matter.

חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְעָשׂוּ אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת״, ״מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת״ – וְלֹא כׇּל מִצְוֹת. מִצְוֹת תַּרְתֵּי מַשְׁמַע! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: ״מִצְוַת״ כְּתִיב.

Ḥizkiyya said that the verse states: “And they performed one of all the mitzvot” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is inferred that one is liable for nullification for a portion of all the mitzvot and not for nullification of all the mitzvot. The Gemara asks: The term mitzvot is plural, which indicates at least two. If that is the source, there should be liability even if the judges issue a ruling abolishing the entire essence of one mitzva, as one mitzva is a portion of two mitzvot. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Although the word is vocalized in the plural, as mitzvot, the word mitzvat is written, without a second vav, as though it were in the singular.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: יָלֵיף ״דָּבָר״ ״דָּבָר״ מִזָּקֵן מַמְרֵא, דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּזָקֵן מַמְרֵא: ״כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר… לֹא תָסוּר מִן הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל״, מָה מַמְרֵא – ״מִן הַדָּבָר״ וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר, אַף בְּהוֹרָאָה – ״דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף.

Rav Ashi said: The tanna derives a verbal analogy, learning the meaning of the term “matter” written in the context of the erroneous ruling from the term “matter” written in the context of the rebellious elder. As it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “If there shall be a matter [davar] too hard for you…You shall not turn aside from the matter [haddavar] that they shall declare unto you, to the right nor to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:8–11). Just as one becomes a rebellious elder only when his dispute with the Sages is with regard to a portion of the matter and not an entire matter, so too, with regard to an erroneous ruling of the court, the error of the judges must be with regard to a portion of the matter and not the entire essence of the matter.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ. אֲבָל בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ – פְּטוּרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? זִיל קְרִי בֵּי רַב הוּא.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A court is not liable to bring an offering unless it issues an erroneous ruling concerning a matter with which the Sadducees do not agree. The Sadducees do not accept the Oral Torah, and they interpret the Written Torah literally. The court is liable only for a matter that is not explicitly written in the Torah or that does not clearly stem from that which is written in the Torah. But with regard to an erroneous ruling concerning a matter with which the Sadducees agree, the judges are exempt. What is the reasoning for this exemption? It is a topic that you could go learn in a children’s school. Since the matter the judges ruled upon is so obvious, their ruling simply exhibits ignorance, and is not deemed a ruling.

תְּנַן: יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם, הָא כְּתִיב ״וְסָפְרָה לָּהּ״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁסּוֹפֶרֶת אֶחָד לְאֶחָד!

The Gemara cites proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge is exempt. The Gemara asks: And why should they be liable in that case? The halakha of a woman who observes a day for a day that she experiences a discharge is written in the Torah with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood during the eleven-day interval between menstrual periods: “And she shall count for herself” (Leviticus 15:28); this teaches that she counts one clean day for one day that she experiences a discharge. Since it is written in the Torah, even the Sadducees would agree.

דְּאָמְרִי: הַעֲרָאָה שַׁרְיָא, גְּמַר בִּיאָה הוּא דַּאֲסִירָא. הָא נָמֵי כְּתִיב: ״אֶת מְקוֹרָהּ הֶעֱרָה״!

The Gemara answers: The judges did not issue an erroneous ruling with regard to the halakha of a woman who observes a day for a day. Rather, the mishna is discussing a case where they said: The initial stage of intercourse [ha’ara’a] is permitted with a menstruating woman; it is the completion of the act of intercourse that is prohibited. The Gemara asks: That halakha is also written: “He has uncovered [he’era] her fount” (Leviticus 20:18), indicating that the first stage of intercourse with a menstruating woman is also prohibited.

דְּאָמְרִי: כְּדַרְכָּהּ – אֲסִירָא, שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – שַׁרְיָא. הָא כְּתִיב: ״מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה״!

The Gemara says: Rather, it is a case where they said: Intercourse with her in the typical manner is prohibited, but intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, is permitted. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: “The manners in which one lies with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), in the plural, indicating that both intercourse in a typical manner and intercourse in an atypical manner are manners in which one lies with a woman?

דְּאָמְרִי: כְּדַרְכָּהּ – אָסוּר אֲפִילּוּ הַעֲרָאָה, בְּשֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – גְּמַר בִּיאָה הוּא דְּאָסוּר, אֲבָל הַעֲרָאָה שַׁרְיָא. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ נִדָּה נָמֵי!

The Gemara says: Rather, it is a case where they said: With regard to intercourse in a typical manner, even the initial stage of intercourse is forbidden. With regard to intercourse in an atypical manner, it is completion of the act of intercourse that is forbidden, but the initial stage of intercourse is permitted. The Gemara asks: If so, then even in a case where they issued a ruling permitting the initial stage of intercourse in an atypical manner in the case of a menstruating woman, the judges should also be liable. Why does the mishna cite the case specifically with regard to a woman who observes a day for a day?

אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וּדְאָמְרִי: הַעֲרָאָה בְּאִשָּׁה דָּוָה הוּא דִּכְתִיבָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּאָמְרִי: זָבָה לָא הָוְיָא אֶלָּא בִּימָמֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל יְמֵי זוֹבָהּ״.

The Gemara says: Rather, actually, the reference is to a ruling permitting the initial stage of intercourse in a typical manner, and the judges said: In the case of the prohibition of the initial stage of intercourse, it is with regard to an afflicted woman, who experienced the discharge of blood during her menstrual period, that it is written, not with regard to one who experiences the discharge during the eleven days between the end of one menstrual period and the expected start of another. And if you wish, say instead that they said: A woman assumes the status of a zava, i.e., one who experiences a discharge of blood for three consecutive days during those eleven days, only if she experienced the discharge during the day, not at night, as it is written: “All the days of her discharge” (Leviticus 15:26).

תְּנַן: יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? הוֹצָאָה הָא כְּתִיבָא: ״לֹא תוֹצִיאוּ מַשָּׂא מִבָּתֵּיכֶם״!

The Gemara offers proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda by citing Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. The Gemara asks: And why should they be liable in that case? With regard to carrying out into the public domain, isn’t it written: “Neither carry a burden out of your houses on Shabbat” (Jeremiah 17:22), and the Sadducees agree to that prohibition.

[דְּאָמְרִי הוֹצָאָה הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הַכְנָסָה מוּתָּר. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא], דְּאָמְרִי: הוֹצָאָה וְהַכְנָסָה הוּא דַּאֲסִירָא, מוֹשִׁיט וְזוֹרֵק שְׁרֵי.

The Gemara answers: It is a case where the judges said: It is carrying an object out to the public domain that is prohibited, but carrying an object into the private domain is permitted. And if you wish, say instead that the judges said: It is carrying an object out to the public domain and carrying an object into the private domain that is prohibited. But passing or throwing an object from domain to domain is permitted.

תְּנַן: יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה הָא כְּתִיבָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְאֵל אַחֵר״!

The Gemara cites proof against the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: The judges are liable if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt. The Gemara asks: And why should they be liable in that case? With regard to one who bows to an idol, isn’t it written in the Torah, as it is written: “You shall not bow to another god” (Exodus 34:14)?

דְּאָמְרִי: כִּי אֲסִירָא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ – שַׁרְיָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, דְּאָמְרִי: הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה גּוּפַהּ כְּדַרְכָּהּ הוּא דַּאֲסִיר, דְּאִית בַּהּ פִּשּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם, הָא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה דְּלֵית בַּהּ פִּשּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם – שַׁרְיָא.

The Gemara answers that the reference is to a case where the judges said: When bowing is forbidden is when it represents the typical manner of worship of that idol. But when bowing is not its typical manner of worship, it is permitted. And if you wish, say instead that the reference is to a case where the judges said: With regard to bowing itself, it is when it is performed in its typical manner that it is prohibited. What is the typical manner of bowing? It is bowing that has in its performance extension of the arms and legs, as it was practiced in the Temple. But bowing that does not have in its performance extension of the arms and legs is permitted.

בָּעֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵין חֲרִישָׁה בְּשַׁבָּת, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּקָא מוֹדוּ בְּכוּלְּהוּ מִלְּתָא, כְּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּקָא עָקְרִיִין לֵיהּ לַחֲרִישָׁהּ כׇּל עִיקָּר, כַּעֲקִירַת גּוּף דָּמֵי?

§ Apropos the ruling of a court to nullify a mitzva, Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: If the court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against plowing on Shabbat, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that since the judges agree to the application of the entire matter of prohibitions on Shabbat and their ruling is exclusively with regard to plowing, its status is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the judges are abolishing the principal category of labor of plowing in its entirety, it is tantamount to abolishing the essence of the mitzva of Shabbat.

תָּא שְׁמַע: יֵשׁ נִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה אֲבָל הַבָּא עַל שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? הָא עָקְרִיִין לְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם כׇּל עִיקָּר!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge, in its entirety? Apparently, nullification of one category of halakha in a mitzva is not tantamount to abolition of the essence of an entire mitzva.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב יוֹסֵף: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם דְּקָאָמְרִין כִּדְשַׁנִּין.

The Gemara rejects this: Rav Yosef could say to you: The ruling concerning a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is as we stated, as we explained earlier. The reference is not to abolition of the entire halakha of the woman who observes a day for a day, but rather to a case where the judges ruled that the initial stage of intercourse is permitted.

תָּא שְׁמַע: יֵשׁ שַׁבָּת בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פָּטוּר. וְאַמַּאי? הָא עָקְרִיִין לְהוֹצָאָה כׇּל עִיקָּר!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of the principal category of labor of carrying out in its entirety?

הָתָם נָמֵי כִּדְשַׁנִּין.

The Gemara rejects this: That too is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only a portion of the labor, e.g., throwing or passing an item from domain to domain.

תָּא שְׁמַע: יֵשׁ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בַּתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה פָּטוּר. אַמַּאי? וְהָא עָקְרִיִין לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה כׇּל עִיקָּר!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt. And why should the court be liable in that case? But didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of bowing in its entirety?

אָמְרִי: הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיָה נָמֵי כִּדְשַׁנִּין.

The Sages say: Bowing, too, is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only an aspect of bowing, not to abolish the prohibition against bowing in its entirety.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, מַהוּ? בְּמַאי טָעוּ? בְּהָדֵין קְרָא: ״בֶּחָרִישׁ וּבַקָּצִיר תִּשְׁבֹּת״, בִּזְמַן דְּאִיכָּא חֲרִישָׁה – אִיכָּא שַׁבָּת, וּבִזְמַן דְּלֵיכָּא חֲרִישָׁה – לֵיכָּא שַׁבָּת.

Apropos rulings to nullify a mitzva or part of a mitzva, Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, what is the halakha? Before seeking to resolve that dilemma, the Gemara asks: With regard to what matter did they err that resulted in that ruling? They erred with regard to this verse written with regard to Shabbat: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), which the judges interpreted to mean: During a time when there is plowing, i.e., in all years of the Sabbatical cycle other than the Sabbatical Year, there is a prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. But during a time when there is no plowing, i.e., during the Sabbatical Year, there is no prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat.

מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דִּמְקַיְּימִין לַהּ בִּשְׁאָר שְׁנֵי שָׁבוּעַ, כְּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּקָא עָקְרִיִין לֵיהּ בִּשְׁבִיעִית, כַּעֲקִירַת הַגּוּף דָּמֵי?

The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma. Do we say: Since one fulfills the mitzva of Shabbat during the rest of the years of the Sabbatical cycle, nullifying Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the court is abolishing Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to abolishing the entire essence of the mitzva?

אָמַר רָבִינָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: נָבִיא שֶׁנִּתְנַבֵּא לַעֲקוֹר דָּבָר מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה – חַיָּיב. לְבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וּלְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר: הַיּוֹם עוֹבְדָהּ, וּלְמָחָר בַּטְּלָה – חַיָּיב, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: אֵין שַׁבָּת בַּשְּׁבִיעִית כְּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת וְקִיּוּם מִקְצָת דָּמֵי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Ravina said: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: In the case of a prophet who prophesies to abolish a matter of the matters of the Torah, he is deemed a false prophet and is liable to be executed through strangulation. If he prophesies for the nullification of part and the fulfillment of part of a matter in the Torah, Rabbi Shimon says he is exempt from execution. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and revoke its status tomorrow, everyone agrees that he is liable, as with regard to idol worship, even a ruling to nullify part of the mitzva involves a severe prohibition. Learn from it that in a case where a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it.

מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין, וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ, וְאָמַר לָהֶן: ״טוֹעִין אַתֶּם״, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן גֵּר אוֹ מַמְזֵר אוֹ נָתִין, אוֹ זָקֵן שֶׁלֹּא רָאוּי לְבָנִים – הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר.

MISHNA: If the court issued a ruling, and one of the judges knew that they erred and he said to them: You are mistaken; or if the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court was not there for that session of the Sanhedrin, or if one of the judges was disqualified from serving as a judge, e.g., because he was a convert, or a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer], or a Gibeonite, or an old man no longer able to father children, this court is exempt, because they have not rendered a full-fledged ruling.

שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר כָּאן ״עֵדָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״עֵדָה״, מֶה ״עֵדָה״ הָאֲמוּרָה לְהַלָּן – כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה, אַף ״עֵדָה״ הָאֲמוּרָה כָּאן – עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה.

This is derived by means of a verbal analogy, as “assembly” is stated here with regard to a court that issues an erroneous ruling: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13), and “assembly” is stated there with regard to the halakha of one who commits murder unwittingly: “And the assembly shall judge between the one who struck and the blood redeemer” (Numbers 35:24). Just as in the “assembly” stated there, with regard to the unwitting murderer, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, so too, in the “assembly” stated here, with regard to the court that issued an erroneous ruling; the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings.

גְּמָ׳ אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם – מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ הוֹרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁהַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ פְּטוּרִין? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָיָה לָהֶם לִלְמוֹד וְלֹא לָמְדוּ, לֹא הָיָה מוּפְלָא שֶׁל בֵּית דִּין שָׁם נָמֵי פְּטוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָיָה לָהֶם לִלְמוֹד וְלֹא לָמְדוּ.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: Or if the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the court is exempt. From where do we derive this halakha? Rav Sheshet said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason did the Sages say: If the court issued a ruling with regard to a matter with which the Sadducees agree, the judges are exempt? It is due to the fact that it was incumbent upon them to learn that halakha that is written explicitly in the Torah, and they did not learn it. Similarly, in a case where the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the judges are also exempt, as it was incumbent upon them to learn and they did not learn.

נֶאֱמַר שָׁם ״עֵדָה״ וְנֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״עֵדָה״, עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ כּוּלָּן רְאוּיִן לְהוֹרָאָה. וְהָתָם מְנָלַן? דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהִתְיַצְּבוּ שָׁם עִמָּךְ״ – ״עִמָּךְ״ בְּדוֹמִין לָךְ.

The mishna teaches: “Assembly” is stated there and “assembly” is stated here…the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings. The Gemara asks: And there, from where do we derive that all the judges must be fit to issue rulings? The Gemara answers that this is as Rav Ḥisda says that the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term “with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, in the sense that they must be fit to issue rulings.

וְאֵימָא: ״עִמָּךְ״ לִשְׁכִינָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנָשְׂאוּ אִתָּךְ״ – ״אִתָּךְ״ בְּדוֹמִין לָךְ.

The Gemara challenges: And say that the term “with you,” means that they shall be like Moses in that they will all be fit for the Divine Presence to rest upon them. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that it is derived as the verse states in the context of the advice that Yitro gave to Moses: “And they shall judge the people at all times…and ease your burden from upon you and bear it with you” (Exodus 18:22). “With you” is interpreted to mean: Similar to you.

מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שׁוֹגְגִין, וְעָשׂוּ כָּל הַקָּהָל שׁוֹגְגִין – מְבִיאִין פַּר. מְזִידִין, וְעָשׂוּ שׁוֹגְגִין – מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. שׁוֹגְגִין, וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין.

MISHNA: If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling unwittingly and the entire congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of their ruling, the court brings a bull, as it is stated in the Torah with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, as they knew that their ruling was incorrect, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the congregation brings a female lamb or a female goat as an individual sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, i.e., with the knowledge that the ruling of the court was erroneous, these people are exempt from bringing an offering.

גְּמָ׳ שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין. הָא שׁוֹגֵג דּוּמְיָא דְּמֵזִיד – חַיָּיב, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? שֶׁהוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, these people are exempt. The Gemara infers: But if the person performed a transgression unwittingly in a manner similar to that of an intentional transgression, the court is liable. And what are the circumstances of that performance? It is a case where the court issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for a person with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat.

לֵימָא, תִּפְשׁוֹט הָא דְּבָעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא! אָמַר לָךְ, מִשּׁוּם דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא: מְזִידִין וְעָשׂוּ שׁוֹגְגִין, תְּנָא סֵיפָא: שׁוֹגְגִין וְעָשׂוּ מְזִידִין.

The Gemara suggests: If so, let us say: Resolve from here that which Rami bar Ḥama raises as a dilemma (2a) with regard to this case, a dilemma that remained unresolved. The Gemara rejects this: Rami bar Ḥama could say to you that the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this inference, as due to the fact that the tanna taught the first clause of the mishna: If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly, he taught the latter clause employing a similar style: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally.

מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ כׇּל הַקָּהָל אוֹ רוּבָּן עַל פִּיהֶן – מְבִיאִין פַּר. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – מְבִיאִין פַּר וְשָׂעִיר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׁבָטִים – מְבִיאִין שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר פָּרִים. וּבַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – מְבִיאִין שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר פָּרִים וּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר שְׂעִירִים.

MISHNA: If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling and the entire congregation or a majority thereof performed a transgression on the basis of their ruling, the judges bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering. And if the erroneous ruling involved idol worship, the judges bring a bull and a goat, as it is written in the Torah (see Numbers 15:24); this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not the court that brings the offering, it is the people. Twelve tribes, each of which performed a transgression, bring twelve bulls, i.e., each tribe brings one, and for idol worship they bring twelve bulls and twelve goats, as each tribe is a congregation.