זבחים י״ח

זבחים י״ח

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״חוּקָּה״–״חוּקָּה״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה.

The verse states “statute” with regard to those who drank wine, and it likewise states “statute” with regard to the priestly vestments (Exodus 28:43) and with regard to the washing of the hands and feet (Exodus 30:21). One therefore derives by verbal analogy that the halakha in all three cases is the same. If so, there is already a source for the halakha that one who lacks the requisite priestly vestments disqualifies the service.

אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי עֲבוֹדָה דְּזָר חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה, אֲבָל עֲבוֹדָה דְּאֵין זָר חַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה – אֵימָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara responds: If one derived the halakha only from there, I would say: This matter, i.e., that the rites of one who lacks the requisite vestments are disqualified, applies only to a rite for which a non-priest is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, since that is the topic of the passage discussing those who drank wine. But with regard to a rite for which a non-priest is not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, I will say that they are not subject to this halakha. Therefore, the verse (Exodus 29:9) teaches us that the halakha applies to all rites.

אַשְׁכְּחַן מְחוּסַּר בְּגָדִים, שְׁתוּיֵי יַיִן מְנָלַן? אָתְיָא ״חוּקָּה״–״חוּקָּה״ מִמְּחוּסַּר בְּגָדִים.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that one lacking the requisite vestments disqualifies all rites, even those for which a non-priest is not liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven; from where do we derive that the halakha is the same for those who drank wine, as the passage in Leviticus (10:9–10) addresses only rites for which a non-priest receives the death penalty? The Gemara responds: It is derived by verbal analogy between the word “statute” used there and the word “statute” from the verses discussing one lacking the requisite vestments.

וְהָא תַּנָּא ״וּלְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין וְגוֹ׳״ קָא נָסֵיב לַהּ! מִקַּמֵּי דְּלֵיקוּם גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the tanna of the aforementioned baraita derive that the rites of those who drank wine are disqualified from the verse: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common” (Leviticus 10:10), and not by verbal analogy to a priest lacking the requisite vestments? The Gemara responds: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common” is the source of this halakha only before the verbal analogy stands. Once the verbal analogy is derived, it is the source of the halakha with regard to those who drank wine as well.

וְהָא תַּנָּא מְחוּסַּר בְּגָדִים הוּא דְּקָא יָלֵיף מִשְּׁתוּיֵי יַיִן! הָכִי קָאָמַר: מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא נֶחְלְקוּ בֵּין מְחוּסַּר בְּגָדִים – לִשְׁתוּיֵי יַיִן וְשֶׁלֹּא רָחוּץ יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״חוּקָּה״–״חוּקָּה״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה.

The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t the tanna of the baraita derive the halakha with regard to one lacking the requisite vestments itself from the case of those who drank wine? The Gemara responds: Actually, the disqualification of rites performed by one who drank wine is derived from the case of one lacking vestments. And this is what the tanna is saying: From where is it derived that there is no distinction between one lacking the requisite vestments and those who drank wine and one whose hands and feet are not washed, and that all three disqualify all rites? The verses state the word: “Statute,” “statute,” in order to derive a verbal analogy.

אֶלָּא ״לְהַבְדִּיל״ לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְרַב – דְּרַב לָא מוֹקֵים אָמוֹרָא עֲלֵיהּ מִיּוֹמָא טָבָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, מִשּׁוּם שִׁכְרוּת.

The Gemara asks: But if the halakha that one who drank wine disqualifies the service is derived from the verbal analogy, why do I need the verse: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common”? The Gemara responds: The verse is necessary in accordance with the custom of Rav, as Rav would not place an interpreter before him, i.e., he would not lecture in public, from the time that he drank wine on one Festival day until the other, the second Festival day, due to drunkenness. Rav was concerned that he would not issue a proper ruling, because it was customary to drink wine on the Festivals, and the verse states: “And that you may put difference between the holy and the common, and between the impure and the pure. And that you may teach the children of Israel all the statutes which the Lord has spoken” (Leviticus 10:10–11), indicating that one who drank wine may not issue a halakhic ruling.

אַכַּתִּי מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא?! מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא: ״וְנָתְנוּ בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן״ – בְּכִיהוּנּוֹ; לִימֵּד עַל כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל שֶׁלָּבַשׁ בִּגְדֵי כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט וְעָבַד, עֲבוֹדָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה!

The Gemara asks: Still, is the disqualification of rites performed by one lacking the requisite vestments derived from here, i.e., from the verse: “And you shall gird them with belts, Aaron and his sons” (Exodus 29:9)? It is derived from there: “And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put fire upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:7). The superfluous term “the priest” serves to indicate that he may serve only in his priestly state. The verse therefore teaches that with regard to a High Priest who wore the vestments of an ordinary priest and performed sacrificial rites, his service is disqualified.

אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי עֲבוֹדָה דִּמְעַכְּבָא כַּפָּרָה, אֲבָל עֲבוֹדָה דְּלָא מְעַכְּבָא כַּפָּרָה – לָא.

The Gemara responds: If one derived the halakha only from there, I would say: This matter applies only to service that is indispensable for effecting atonement. But service that is not indispensable for effecting atonement, e.g., putting fire upon the altar, is not subject to the halakha. Therefore, the verse (Leviticus 1:7) indicates that the halakha applies even to rites that are not indispensable.

וְאַכַּתִּי מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא?! מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא: ״וְעָרְכוּ בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֲנִים אֵת הַנְּתָחִים וְגוֹ׳״ – ״הַכֹּהֲנִים״ בְּכִיהוּנָן; מִכָּאן לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט שֶׁלָּבַשׁ בִּגְדֵי כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, וְעָבַד – עֲבוֹדָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה!

The Gemara asks: But still, is the halakha derived from here, i.e., from all of the previous sources? It is derived from there: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall lay the pieces, and the head, and the fat, in order upon the wood that is on the fire, which is upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:8). The superfluous term “the priests” serves to indicate that the priests may serve only in their priestly state. From here one derives that with regard to an ordinary priest who wore the vestments of the High Priest and performed sacrificial rites, his service is disqualified.

אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי חִיסּוּר, אֲבָל יִיתּוּר – לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara responds: If one derived the halakha only from there, I would say: This matter applies only to a lack of vestments, e.g., a High Priest who wore fewer than his requisite eight vestments, but an excess of vestments, e.g., an ordinary priest who wore more than his requisite four, is not subject to the halakha. This verse therefore teaches us that the halakha applies even to an excess of vestments.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָיוּ מְרוּשָּׁלִין, מְסוּלָּקִין, מְשׁוּחָקִים – וְעָבַד; עֲבוֹדָתוֹ כְּשֵׁירָה. לָבַשׁ שְׁנֵי מִכְנָסַיִם, שְׁנֵי אַבְנֵטִים, חָסֵר אַחַת, יָתֵר אַחַת, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ רְטִיָּה עַל מַכַּת בְּשָׂרוֹ תַּחַת בִּגְדוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁהָיוּ

§ The Sages taught: If the priest’s vestments were dragging on the ground, or raised up [mesulakin] far from the ground, or frayed, and the priest performed sacrificial rites while wearing them, his service is valid. If he wore two pairs of trousers or two belts, or if he was lacking one of his requisite vestments, or if he wore one extra vestment, or in a case where a priest had a bandage on a wound on his body under his vestment such that the bandage acted as an interposition between the vestments and his skin, or if he wore vestments that were

מְטוּשְׁטָשִׁין אוֹ מְקוֹרָעִין – וְעָבַד; עֲבוֹדָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.

soiled or ripped, and he performed sacrificial rites, his service is disqualified.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְרוּשָּׁלִין – כְּשֵׁרִין, מְסוּלָּקִין – פְּסוּלִין. וְהָתַנְיָא מְסוּלָּקִין כְּשֵׁרִין! אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן שֶׁסִּילְקָן עַל יְדֵי אַבְנֵט, כָּאן דְּלֵיתְנִיהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא כְּלָל.

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If the vestments are dragging on the ground, they are fit, but if they are raised up above the ground, they are unfit. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the above baraita that even if the vestments were raised up they are fit? Rami bar Ḥama says: This is not difficult. Here, the baraita deems them fit in a case where the priest raised them up by his belt, although they were initially the proper length; there, Shmuel deems them unfit in a case where they do not initially cover the priest’s feet at all.

רַב אָמַר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה – פְּסוּלִין.

Rav says: In both this case and that case, whether they were dragging or raised up, they are unfit.

רַב הוּנָא אִיקְּלַע לְאַרְגִּיזָא, רְמָא לֵיהּ בַּר אוּשְׁפִּיזְכָנֵיהּ: מִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מְרוּשָּׁלִין כְּשֵׁרִין וּמְסוּלָּקִין פְּסוּלִין?! וְהָתַנְיָא: מְסוּלָּקִין – כְּשֵׁרִין! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בַּר מִינַּהּ דְּהַהִיא, דְּשַׁנְּיַיהּ רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא.

The Gemara recounts: Rav Huna happened to come to Argiza. The son of his innkeeper [oshpizekhaneih] raised a contradiction before him: Did Shmuel actually say that if the vestments are dragging on the ground, they are fit, but if they are raised up above the ground, they are unfit? But isn’t it taught in the baraita that even if the vestments were raised up they are fit? Rav Huna said to him: Raise a contradiction from any source apart from this baraita, as Rami bar Ḥama already answered that it does not contradict Shmuel’s statement, as it applies only to vestments that were initially the proper length.

אֶלָּא לְרַב – קַשְׁיָא! וְכִי תֵּימָא: מַאי מְרוּשָּׁלִין – מְסוּלָּקִין עַל יְדֵי אַבְנֵט, וְאַבְנֵט מֵיגָז אָגֵיז; אֶלָּא מְסוּלָּקִין קַשְׁיָא!

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the baraita pose a difficulty for Rav, who deems the vestments unfit even if they were dragging? And if you would say: What is the meaning of the word: Dragging, in the baraita? It means that they would initially drag but were raised up by a belt to the proper length, and they are fit since the belt effectively trims them, but then the term: Raised up, in the baraita poses a difficulty. Why should the baraita deem raised vestments fit? If the baraita is referring to vestments that were initially the proper length and were then raised up by a belt, then shouldn’t they be unfit as the belt trims them?

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, רַב חֲדָא תָּנֵי: מְרוּשָּׁלִין שֶׁסִּילְּקָן עַל יְדֵי אַבְנֵט – כְּשֵׁרִין.

Rabbi Zeira says: Rav taught the baraita not as referring separately to both dragging and raised vestments, but as one statement referring to vestments that are simultaneously dragging and raised, i.e., dragging vestments that the priest raised up by his belt to the proper height are fit. But if they were above or below their proper height for any reason, they are unfit.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מִדִּיפְתִּי: מְרוּשָּׁלִין שֶׁלֹּא סִילְּקָן – תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עַל אַרְבַּע כַּנְפוֹת כְּסוּתְךָ״ – אַרְבַּע וְלֹא שָׁלֹשׁ. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא אַרְבַּע וְלֹא חָמֵשׁ? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״אֲשֶׁר תְּכַסֶּה בָּהּ״ – הֲרֵי בַּעֲלַת חָמֵשׁ אָמוּר; הָא מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים אַרְבַּע? אַרְבַּע וְלֹא שָׁלֹשׁ. וּמָה רָאִיתָ לְרַבּוֹת בַּעֲלַת חָמֵשׁ וּלְהוֹצִיא בַּעֲלַת שָׁלֹשׁ? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי בַּעֲלַת חָמֵשׁ – שֶׁיֵּשׁ בִּכְלַל חָמֵשׁ אַרְבַּע, וּמוֹצִיא אֲנִי בַּעֲלַת שָׁלֹשׁ – שֶׁאֵין בִּכְלַל שָׁלֹשׁ אַרְבַּע.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti says: The case of dragging vestments that the priest did not raise is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “On the four corners of your garment” (Deuteronomy 22:12), from which it can be inferred: Four, but not three, i.e., a three-cornered garment is exempt from the obligation of ritual fringes. One may ask: Or perhaps it is only specifying four, but not five? When it says in the same verse: “With which you cover yourself,” a garment of five corners is mentioned as obligated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of: “Four corners”? It means four, but not three. And what did you see that led you to include a garment of five corners and to exclude a garment of three corners? I include a garment of five corners as four is included in five, and I exclude a garment of three corners as four is not included in three.

וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״עַל אַרְבַּע כַּנְפוֹת כְּסוּתְךָ״ – אַרְבַּע וְלֹא שָׁלֹשׁ, אַרְבַּע וְלֹא חָמֵשׁ. מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: יָתֵר כְּמַאן דְּאִיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, וּמָר סָבַר: כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי?

And it is taught in another baraita that the verse states: “On the four corners of your garment,” from which it may be inferred: Four, but not three, and also four, but not five, i.e., only a four-cornered garment is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes. Rabbi Yirmeya continues: What, is it not that these tanna’im disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, who deems a five-cornered garment exempt, holds that an extra item is considered as though it exists and cannot be ignored, and one Sage, who deems it obligated, holds that it is considered as though it does not exist and the garment has only four corners? Accordingly, the first Sage deems a dragging priestly vestment unfit, since one cannot ignore the extra fabric, while the second Sage deems it fit since the extra fabric is treated as immaterial.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּמַאן דְּאִיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי; וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא: ״אֲשֶׁר תְּכַסֶּה בָּהּ״.

The Gemara responds: No, everyone agrees that an extra piece of a garment is considered as though it exists, and therefore dragging vestments are unfit. And according to the tanna of the second baraita, it is different here, with regard to ritual fringes, as the Merciful One amplifies the halakha to obligate even five-cornered garments with the words “with which you cover yourself.”

וְאִידַּךְ, הַאי ״אֲשֶׁר תְּכַסֶּה בָּהּ״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וּרְאִיתֶם אֹתוֹ״ – פְּרָט לִכְסוּת לַיְלָה. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא פְּרָט לִכְסוּת סוֹמֵא? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֲשֶׁר תְּכַסֶּה בָּהּ״ – הֲרֵי כְּסוּת סוֹמֵא אָמוּר, הָא מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים ״וּרְאִיתֶם אֹתוֹ״? פְּרָט לִכְסוּת לַיְלָה.

The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who deems five-cornered garments exempt, what does he do with this verse: “With which you cover yourself”? The Gemara responds: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that you may look upon it” (Numbers 15:39). The phrase: “That you may look upon it,” serves to exclude a night garment from the obligation of ritual fringes, as the fringes on such a garment cannot be seen. One might ask: Or is it only to exclude the garment of a blind person, who is unable to see the ritual fringes? When it states in the verse: “With which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12), the obligation of ritual fringes for the garment of a blind person is mentioned. If so, how do I realize the meaning of the phrase: “That you may look upon it”? It serves to exclude a night garment.

וּמָה רָאִיתָ לְרַבּוֹת כְּסוּת סוֹמֵא וּלְהוֹצִיא כְּסוּת לַיְלָה? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי כְּסוּת סוֹמֵא – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָהּ בִּרְאִיָּה אֵצֶל אֲחֵרִים, וּמוֹצִיא אֲנִי כְּסוּת לַיְלָה – שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְאִיָּה אֵצֶל אֲחֵרִים.

The baraita continues: And what did you see that led you to include the garment of a blind person and to exclude a night garment and not the reverse? I include the garment of a blind person because it is at least visible to others, and I exclude a night garment because it is not visible, even to others.

וְאִידַּךְ – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵ״אֲשֶׁר״. וְאִידַּךְ – ״אֲשֶׁר״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who derives that a five-cornered garment requires ritual fringes from the phrase: “With which you cover yourself,” from where does he derive that the garment of a blind person requires ritual fringes? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the word “which” in the phrase, as that term itself connotes an amplification of the halakha. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage do with this word? The Gemara responds: He does not interpret the word “which” as an amplification.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: בַּד – שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שֶׁל בּוּץ; ״בַּד״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ חֲדָשִׁים; ״בַּד״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁזוּרִים; ״בַּד״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ חוּטָן כָּפוּל שִׁשָּׁה; ״בַּד״ – שֶׁלֹּא יִלְבַּשׁ שֶׁל חוֹל עִמָּהֶן.

§ The Sages taught with regard to the priestly vestments that the term: “Linen [bad ]” (Leviticus 6:3), used in the verse indicates several properties of the garments: The verse states “linen” to indicate that they must be made of fine linen [butz]; “linen,” that they must be new; “linen,” that their thread must be twisted of several plies; “linen,” that their thread must be folded six times; “linen,” that the priest may not wear non-sacred clothes along with them.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: בִּשְׁלָמָא שֶׁיְּהוּ שֶׁל בּוּץ – הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: בּוּץ אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא לָא. אֶלָּא ״בַּד״ שֶׁיְּהוּ חֲדָשִׁים – חֲדָשִׁים אִין, שְׁחָקִין לָא?! וְהָתַנְיָא: מְשׁוּחָקִין – כְּשֵׁרִים!

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Granted, the statement that they must be of fine linen is understood; this requirement teaches us that if they are of fine linen they are fit, but if they are of something else they are not. But with regard to the statement: Linen, that they must be new, one can infer that if they are new they are fit but if they are frayed they are not. But isn’t it taught in the baraita (18a) that even if they were frayed they are fit?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, ״בַּד״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ חוּטָן כָּפוּל שִׁשָּׁה?! ״בַּד״ – חַד חַד לְחוֹדֵיהּ מַשְׁמַע! אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: בְּגָדִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בָּהֶן ״בַּד״ – צְרִיכִין שֶׁיְּהוּ שֶׁל בּוּץ, חֲדָשִׁים, שְׁזוּרִין, שֶׁיְּהֵא חוּטָן כָּפוּל שִׁשָּׁה; יֵשׁ מֵהֶן לְמִצְוָה, יֵשׁ מֵהֶן לְעַכֵּב.

Rav Yosef said to him: And according to your reasoning that the baraita intends to derive all of these requirements from the word linen, such that all of these requirements are indispensable, how can one understand the requirement: Linen, that their thread must be folded six times? The word bad itself means each one on its own (see Exodus 30:34). Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: Those garments with regard to which it is stated: Linen, must be made of fine linen, and they must be new and twisted, and their thread must be folded six times. Some of these requirements constitute a mitzva ab initio, and some of them are indispensable.

מִמַּאי דְּהַאי ״בַּד״ – כִּתָּנָא הוּא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵף בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: דָּבָר הָעוֹלֶה מִן הַקַּרְקַע בַּד בְּבַד.

The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this material bad is produced from the flax plant? Rabbi Yosef, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: The verse is referring to an item that grows from the ground with each stalk growing on its own [bad bevad], i.e., it does not split into multiple stalks. The flax plant fulfills this criterion.

אֵימָא עַמְרָא! עַמְרָא מִיפְּצֵל. כִּיתָּנָא נָמֵי מִיפְּצֵל! עַל יְדֵי לָקוּתָא מִיפְּצֵיל.

The Gemara asks: Why not say that it is wool? The Gemara responds: The individual wool fibers split into smaller fibers. The Gemara rejects this: But flax also splits. The Gemara responds: It splits only by being struck. Wool, by contrast, splits naturally.

רָבִינָא אָמַר מֵהָכָא: ״פַּאֲרֵי פִשְׁתִּים יִהְיוּ עַל רֹאשָׁם, וּמִכְנְסֵי פִשְׁתִּים יִהְיוּ עַל מׇתְנֵיהֶם, לֹא יַחְגְּרוּ בַּיָּזַע״.

Ravina says that the identity of bad is derived from here: The verse states with regard to the priestly vestments: “They shall have linen [pishtim] crowns upon their heads, and shall have linen breeches upon their loins; they shall not gird themselves with yaza” (Ezekiel 44:18). The word pishtim is clearly referring to flax.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרָבִינָא: וְהָא עַד דַּאֲתָא יְחֶזְקֵאל – מְנָלַן? וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: דָּבָר זֶה – מִתּוֹרַת מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ לֹא לָמַדְנוּ, מִדִּבְרֵי יְחֶזְקֵאל בֶּן בּוּזִי לָמַדְנוּ: ״כׇּל בֶּן נֵכָר עֶרֶל לֵב וְעֶרֶל בָּשָׂר לֹא יָבֹא אֶל מִקְדָּשִׁי לְשָׁרְתֵנִי״; עַד שֶׁבָּא יְחֶזְקֵאל מְנָלַן? אֶלָּא גְּמָרָא גְּמִירִי לַהּ – וַאֲתָא יְחֶזְקֵאל וְאַסְמְכֵיהּ אַקְּרָא; הָכָא נָמֵי גְּמָרָא גְּמִירִי לַהּ כּוּ׳.

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: But before Ezekiel came, from where did we derive the identity of bad? Ravina responded: And according to your reasoning, one could ask the same of that which Rav Ḥisda said with regard to the prohibition against Temple service by one who is uncircumcised or an apostate: We did not learn this following matter from the Torah of Moses, our teacher; we learned it from the words of Ezekiel, son of Buzi: “No stranger, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My Sanctuary to serve Me” (Ezekiel 44:9). Until Ezekiel came, from where did we derive this? Rather, this halakha is learned as a tradition and therefore was observed for generations, and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse. Here too, it is learned as a tradition, and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse.

מַאי ״לֹא יַחְגְּרוּ בַּיָּזַע״? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא יַחְגְּרוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמְּזִיעִין. כִּדְתַנְיָא: כְּשֶׁהֵם חוֹגְרִין, אֵין חוֹגְרִין לֹא לְמַטָּה מִמׇּתְנֵיהֶן, וְלֹא לְמַעְלָה מֵאַצִּילֵיהֶן, אֶלָּא

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase in the verse: “They shall not gird themselves with yaza”? Abaye said: They shall not gird themselves in a place in which people sweat [mezi’in]. As it is taught in a baraita: When they gird themselves with the belt, they may not gird themselves below their loins nor above their elbows, but rather