Bava Batra 84

Bava Batra 84

דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִילּוּ לָא אוֹנִיתַן – לָא הֲוָה מָצֵית הָדְרַתְּ בָּךְ; הַשְׁתָּא דְּאוֹנִיתָן, מָצֵית הָדְרַתְּ בָּךְ?! וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: יָפוֹת וְנִמְצְאוּ רָעוֹת – לוֹקֵחַ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, וְלֹא מוֹכֵר.

the buyer can say to the seller: If you had not exploited me, you would not be able to renege on the sale, and I would receive the profit. Now that you have exploited me, can you renege on the sale and benefit? And similarly, the tanna of the mishna also taught: If the seller sold him wheat while claiming that the wheat was good, and it is found to be bad, the buyer can renege on the sale. This implies that the buyer can renege but not the seller, even in a situation where the seller would want to renege on the sale, e.g., if the item became more expensive.

וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מָכַר לוֹ שָׁוֶה שֵׁשׁ – בְּחָמֵשׁ, וְהוּזְלוּ וְעָמְדוּ עַל שָׁלֹשׁ, מִי נִתְאַנָּה? מוֹכֵר. מוֹכֵר יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, וְלֹא לוֹקֵחַ; דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִילּוּ לָא אוֹנִיתַן – לָא הֲוָה מָצֵית הָדְרַתְּ בָּךְ; הַשְׁתָּא מָצֵית הָדְרַתְּ בָּךְ?! וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: רָעוֹת וְנִמְצְאוּ יָפוֹת – מוֹכֵר יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, וְלֹא לוֹקֵחַ.

And similarly, Rav Ḥisda says: If he sold him an item that was worth six dinars for five dinars, and its price was reduced and its value now stood at three dinars, who was exploited in this case? The seller; therefore, the seller, but not the buyer, can renege on the sale. The reason is that the seller can say to him: If you had not exploited me, you would not be able to renege on the sale. Now that you have exploited me, can you renege on the sale? And similarly, the tanna of the mishna also taught: If the seller sold him bad wheat and it is found to be good, the seller can renege on the sale, but not the buyer.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? מַתְנִיתִין הִיא! אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דִּלְמָא דְּרַב חִסְדָּא – תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מָצוּ הָדְרִי בְּהוּ, וּמַתְנִיתִין הָא אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן – דְּלוֹקֵחַ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: What is Rav Ḥisda teaching us? It is all already taught in the mishna. The Gemara answers: If the halakha were derived from the mishna alone, I would say that perhaps in the cases brought by Rav Ḥisda, both the buyer and the seller are able to renege on the sale. The reason is that this is a case of exploitation, as the item was sold for more than its value, and therefore as long the buyer can renege on the sale, the sale is not complete. Consequently, as the seller lost out as well, he can also renege on the sale. And as for the mishna, it comes to teach us that if the seller said that he is selling good wheat and it is found to be bad, the buyer can renege on the sale, as this is considered a case of exploitation.

דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב: ״רַע רַע יֹאמַר הַקּוֹנֶה״.

It is necessary to teach this, as it might enter your mind to say that this is not a case of exploitation because it is written: “It is bad, it is bad, says the buyer; but when he is gone his way, then he boasts” (Proverbs 20:14). In other words, it is the usual manner of sellers to praise their merchandise, while buyers disparage it. Therefore, the mishna teaches that the buyer can renege on the sale if the item was found to be bad, and the seller can change his mind if it was found to be good.

שְׁחַמְתִּית וְנִמְצֵאת לְבָנָה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מִדְּקָתָנֵי ״לְבָנָה״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הַאי שִׁמְשָׁא סוּמַּקְתִּי הִיא. תֵּדַע, דְּקָא סָמְקָא צַפְרָא וּפַנְיָא. וְהַאי דְּלָא קָא חָזֵינַן כּוּלֵּיהּ יוֹמָא – נְהוֹרִין הוּא דְּלָא בָּרִי.

§ The mishna teaches that if the seller said that he was selling reddish-brown [sheḥamtit] wheat and it is found to be white, both the seller and the buyer can renege on the sale. The Gemara assumes that sheḥamtit means the color of the sun [ḥama]. Therefore, Rav Pappa said: From the fact that the mishna teaches: White, in contrast to sheḥamtit, and there are two types of wheat, one white and the other red, conclude from the mishna that this sun is red, not white. Know that this is the case, as it reddens in the morning and evening. And the reason that we do not see the red color all day is because our eyesight is not strong and we cannot discern the redness of the sun.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״וּמַרְאֵהוּ עָמֹק מִן הָעוֹר״ – כְּמַרְאֵה חַמָּה עֲמוּקָּה מִן הַצֵּל. וְהָתָם לָבָן הוּא! כְּמַרְאֵה חַמָּה – וְלֹא כְּמַרְאֵה חַמָּה; כְּמַרְאֵה חַמָּה – דַּעֲמוּקָּה מִן הַצֵּל, וְלֹא כְּמַרְאֵה חַמָּה – דְּאִילּוּ הָתָם לָבָן, וְהָכָא אָדוֹם.

The Gemara raises an objection to this claim: With regard to a verse that speaks of leprosy: “And, behold, if its appearance is deeper than the skin” (Leviticus 13:30), the Sages explain: This means that it is like the appearance of the sun, which is deeper than the shadow. But there, leprosy is white and yet it is likened to the sun. The Gemara answers: There, it means that it has an appearance like the sun in certain respects, but it is not like the appearance of the sun in all respects. It is like the appearance of the sun in that it is deeper than the shadow, and it is not entirely like the appearance of the sun, as there the leprous spot is white, and here the sun is red.

וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק דַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא – הָא קָא סָמְקָא צַפְרָא וּפַנְיָא! בְּצַפְרָא – דְּחָלְפָא אַבֵּי וַורְדֵי דְּגַן עֵדֶן, בְּפַנְיָא – דְּחָלְפָא אַפִּתְחָא דְגֵיהִנָּם. וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי אִיפְּכָא.

The Gemara asks: And according to that which entered our mind initially, that the sun is white, doesn’t it redden in the morning and evening? The Gemara answers: In the morning it becomes red as it passes over the site of the roses of the Garden of Eden, whose reflections give the light a red hue. In the evening the sun turns red because it passes over the entrance of Gehenna, whose fires redden the light. And there are those who say the opposite in explaining why the sun is red in the morning and the evening, i.e., in the morning it passes over the entrance of Gehenna, while in the evening it passes over the site of the roses of the Garden of Eden.

יַיִן וְנִמְצָא חוֹמֶץ – שְׁנֵיהֶן יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזוֹר בָּהֶן. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי הִיא וְלָא רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא:

§ The mishna teaches: If the seller sold wine and it is found to be vinegar, both the seller and the buyer can renege on the sale. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? As it is taught in a baraita:

יַיִן וָחוֹמֶץ – מִין אֶחָד הוּא. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי מִינִין. אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן – עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן מַעֲשֵׂר וּתְרוּמָה, וְכִדְרַבִּי אִלָּעָא –

Wine and vinegar are one type of food, which means that if, for example, one separated teruma from one of these with the intention that it should exempt the other, his action is effective. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are two types of food. Apparently, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the baraita. The Gemara rejects this claim: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only with regard to the issue of whether one can separate tithe and teruma from wine to redeem vinegar and vice versa. And the Rabbis hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ela.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אִלְעָא: מִנַּיִן לַתּוֹרֵם מִן הָרָעָה עַל הַיָּפָה, שֶׁתְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלֹא תִשְׂאוּ עָלָיו חֵטְא בַּהֲרִימְכֶם אֶת חֶלְבּוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ״.

As Rabbi Ela says: From where is it derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor–quality produce for superior–quality produce, i.e., in order to fulfill the obligation of separating teruma from the high-quality produce, that his teruma is valid teruma? As it is stated: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing as you have set apart from it its best” (Numbers 18:32).

אִם אֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ, נְשִׂיאוּת חֵטְא לָמָּה? מִכָּאן לַתּוֹרֵם מִן הָרָעָה עַל הַיָּפָה, שֶׁתְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.

The verse is understood as indicating that one who sets aside inferior produce has sinned. It also demonstrates that if one did, in fact, set aside teruma from poor-quality produce in order to render permitted superior-quality produce, his action is effective and the inferior produce is sanctified as teruma. The reason is that if the inferior produce is not consecrated, why would one bear a sin? It should be considered as though he did nothing. From here it is derived with regard to one who separates teruma from poor–quality produce for superior–quality produce that his teruma is valid teruma. The Rabbis agree and hold that in the case of one who separates vinegar in order to redeem wine, his teruma is valid despite the difference in quality, as wine and vinegar are considered a single type of food.

אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּחַמְרָא וְלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּחַלָּא, וְאִיכָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּחַלָּא וְלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּחַמְרָא.

But with regard to buying and selling, everyone, including the Rabbis, agrees that wine and vinegar are two types of food, as they have different uses. There are those for whom wine is preferable and vinegar is not preferable, and there are those for whom vinegar is preferable and wine is not preferable.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת לַחֲבֵירוֹ, מָשַׁךְ וְלֹא מָדַד – קָנָה. מָדַד וְלֹא מָשַׁךְ – לֹא קָנָה. אִם הָיָה פִּיקֵּחַ – שׂוֹכֵר אֶת מְקוֹמָן.

MISHNA: This mishna discusses several methods of acquiring movable property. With regard to one who sells produce to another, if the buyer pulled the produce but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce through the act of acquisition of pulling. If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he has not acquired it, and either the seller or the buyer can decide to rescind the sale. If the buyer is perspicacious and wants to acquire the produce without having to pull it, and he wishes to do so before the seller could change his mind and decide not to sell, he rents its place, where the produce is located, and his property immediately effects acquisition of the produce on his behalf.

הַלּוֹקֵחַ פִּשְׁתָּן מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא קָנָה, עַד שֶׁיְּטַלְטְלֶנּוּ מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם. וְאִם הָיָה מְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע, וְתָלַשׁ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – קָנָה.

With regard to one who buys flax from another, because flax is usually carried around this purchaser has not acquired it until he carries it from place to place and acquires it by means of the act of acquisition of lifting. Pulling the flax is ineffective. And if it was attached to the ground, and he detached any amount, he has acquired it, as the Gemara will explain.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מָדַד וְהִנִּיחַ עַל גַּבֵּי סִימְטָא, קָנָה.

GEMARA: The mishna mentions several modes of acquisition without elaboration. It does not explain in which domain the act takes place, whether on the property of the seller or in the public domain. Likewise, it does not specify who performs these actions. The Gemara clarifies these details. Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If the seller measured the produce and placed it in an alleyway, which is not the public domain but a location where people can keep their belongings, then even if the buyer did not pull the produce, he acquires it.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי אַסִּי: שֶׁמָּא לֹא שָׁמַע רַבִּי אֶלָּא בְּמוֹדֵד לְתוֹךְ קוּפָּתוֹ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דָּמֵי הַאי מֵרַבָּנַן כִּדְלָא גָּמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי שְׁמַעְתָּא. מָדַד לְתוֹךְ קוּפָּתוֹ – מֵימְרָא בָּעֵי?!

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Perhaps my teacher heard this halakha from Rabbi Yoḥanan only with regard to one who measures into his basket, i.e., that of the buyer, in which case his possessions effect acquisition of the produce for him. But if the produce is placed on the floor of the alleyway, the buyer does not acquire the produce. Rabbi Asi said to him: This one of the Sages, i.e., Rabbi Zeira, seems like one who has not studied halakha. If he measured it into the basket of the buyer, is it necessary to say that he acquires it? If an item is placed in the buyer’s basket it is clearly acquired by him, regardless of the location of the basket. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement with regard to an alleyway must be referring to items placed on the floor of the alleyway.

קַיבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ, אוֹ לָא קַיבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי אָמַר רַבִּי: חֲצַר הַשּׁוּתָּפִין – קוֹנִין זֶה מִזֶּה. מַאי, לָאו עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע? לֹא, לְתוֹךְ קוּפָּתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Zeira accept this claim from Rabbi Asi, or did he not accept it from him? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rabbi Yannai says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to a courtyard belonging to partners, which is similar in status to an alleyway, the partners acquire from one another. What, is it not correct to say that there is no difference between placing items on the ground and in their basket, as a partner acquires an item even when it is placed upon the ground, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Asi? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is referring to a case where the item is measured into the basket of the buyer.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מָדַד וְהִנִּיחַ עַל גַּבֵּי סִימְטָא – לֹא קָנָה. קַשְׁיָין אַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ כָּאן בְּמוֹדֵד לְתוֹךְ קוּפָּתוֹ, כָּאן בְּמוֹדֵד עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara points out: So, too, Rabbi Zeira’s statement is reasonable, as Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one measured and placed an item in an alleyway, the buyer has not acquired it. Apparently, these two halakhot cited in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan are difficult, as they contradict each other, since earlier it was stated that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the buyer can acquire an item in this manner. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this apparent contradiction that here, i.e., in the statement cited by Rabbi Asi, he is referring to one who measures into the basket of the buyer, which effects acquisition; and there, i.e., in the statement of Rabbi Yaakov, he is referring to one who measures onto the ground, which does not effect acquisition. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מָדַד וְלֹא מָשַׁךְ – לֹא קָנָה. מַאי, לָאו בְּסִימְטָא? לֹא, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא רֵישָׁא: מָשַׁךְ וְלֹא מָדַד – קָנָה. מְשִׁיכָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מִי קָנְיָא?!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he does not acquire it. What, is it not referring to one who did so in an alleyway, which indicates that placing produce on the ground of an alleyway does not effect acquisition, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira? The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the mishna is referring to one who did so in the public domain. The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the first clause: If the buyer pulled the produce but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce. But does pulling in the public domain effect acquisition?

וְהָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מְסִירָה קוֹנָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּבְחָצֵר שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁל שְׁנֵיהֶן; מְשִׁיכָה קוֹנָה בְּסִימְטָא וּבְחָצֵר שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל שְׁנֵיהֶן; וְהַגְבָּהָה קוֹנָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם!

But don’t Abaye and Rava both say that passing effects acquisition in the public domain and in a courtyard that does not belong to either of them; pulling effects acquisition only in an alleyway or in a courtyard that belongs to both of them, but not in the public domain; and lifting effects acquisition in every place, even in the seller’s domain? This demonstrates that pulling in the public domain does not effect acquisition.

מַאי ״מָשַׁךְ״ נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי – מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לְסִימְטָא. אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אִם הָיָה פִּיקֵּחַ – שׂוֹכֵר אֶת מְקוֹמָן. וְאִי בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, מִמַּאן אָגַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְאִם בִּרְשׁוּת בְּעָלִים הִיא, אִם הָיָה פִּיקֵּחַ – שׂוֹכֵר אֶת מְקוֹמָן.

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the phrase: If he pulled it, that is taught in the mishna? It means that he pulled it from the public domain into an alleyway. The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause: If the buyer is perspicacious he rents its place, i.e., where the produce is located. The Gemara explains the difficulty: But if the mishna is referring to a spot in the public domain, from whom can he rent the place where the produce is located? The Gemara answers: The latter clause is referring to a separate halakha, and this is what the mishna is saying: And if the produce is in a domain that has an owner, if he is perspicacious he rents the place where the produce is located from the owner.

רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ:

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the manner in which an acquisition takes place. Rav and Shmuel both say: