A bor of less than ten handbreadths does not kill. If so, why did Rav Nachman rule that an animal that had fallen into a pit less than ten handbreadths (six) and was then slaughtered, was not kosher for eating as he must have been a treifa (going to die anyway)? Rava brings our Mishna and two other tannaitic sources to raise a difficulty with Rav Nachman’s ruling. In cases where two people own the bor or a responsible for it, who assumes responsibility? How is it possible to have a bor owned by two people? At what point does the responsibility shift from one to the other?
Bava Kamma 51
12.23.2023 | י״א בטבת תשפ״ד
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Bava Kamma
Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.
Bava Kamma 51
לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא. אִי הָכִי, הוּזַּק בּוֹ חַיָּיב? הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין הֶבֶל לְמִיתָה, וְיֵשׁ הֶבֶל לִנְזָקִין.
Rav Naḥman responds: No, he is exempt here because there are not sufficient fumes to cause death, in accordance with the opinion of Rav. Nevertheless, the impact from hitting the ground is sufficient to cause death, and therefore an ox that fell into a water channel is suspected of being a tereifa. Rava again challenges him: If so, then how is the statement: If the animal was injured by it, he is liable, to be explained? There are not sufficient fumes? Rav Naḥman said to him: There are not sufficient fumes to cause death, but there are sufficient fumes to cause injury.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: בֵּית הַסְּקִילָה הָיָה גָּבוֹהַּ שְׁתֵּי קוֹמוֹת. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְקוֹמָה שֶׁלּוֹ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שָׁלֹשׁ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ יֵשׁ חֲבָטָה בְּפָחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה, לְמָה לִי כּוּלֵּי הַאי?
Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Sanhedrin 45a): The structure from which the punishment of stoning was implemented was a height of two people, and it is taught in that regard in a baraita: When the two-person height of the structure is combined with his height, i.e., the height of the one being stoned, there is a total height equal to that of three people. Rava explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that there is an impact capable of causing death in a pit less than ten handbreadths deep, why do I need all of this height?
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ – נַעֲבֵיד עֲשָׂרָה! אֶלָּא כְּרַב נַחְמָן – דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ״ – בְּרוֹר לוֹ מִיתָה יָפָה.
Rav Naḥman answered him: And according to your reasoning, let us make the structure a minimal ten handbreadths. Why must it have a height of two people? Rather, no proof can be brought from here, since the reason is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that the verse states: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), teaching that even with regard to a condemned prisoner, select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. Therefore, the structure used for stoning is constructed sufficiently high that he dies quickly, without any unnecessary suffering.
אִי הָכִי, נַגְבַּהּ טְפֵי! מִשּׁוּם דְּמִינַּוַּול.
The Gemara asks: If so, let us raise the structure even more, so that his death will be even less painful. The Gemara answers: This is not done, because if he fell from a greater height, his organs would be crushed and he would become completely disfigured, which is certainly not a way one would prefer to die.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: ״כִּי יִפֹּל הַנֹּפֵל מִמֶּנּוּ״; ״מִמֶּנּוּ״ – וְלֹא בְּתוֹכוֹ.
Rava again raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman: The Torah requires constructing a parapet on the roof of one’s house to prevent anyone from falling to his death, as the verse states (Deuteronomy 22:8): “You shall not bring blood upon your house, if any man falls from it.” The term “from it” teaches that liability exists only for falling from the roof of the house, but not onto the roof of a house.
כֵּיצַד? הָיְתָה רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גָּבוֹהַּ מִמֶּנּוּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל מִתּוֹכָהּ לְתוֹכוֹ – פָּטוּר. עֲמוּקָּה מִמֶּנּוּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל מִתּוֹכוֹ לְתוֹכָהּ – חַיָּיב.
How is this so? If an area in the public domain was ten handbreadths higher than a private house and the owner did not construct a fence between his house and the public domain, and someone fell from inside the public domain onto the house, the owner of the house is exempt. By contrast, if the public domain was ten handbreadths lower than the house, and the owner did not construct a fence on his roof, and someone fell from the roof of the house into the public domain, he is liable.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ יֵשׁ חֲבָטָה בְּפָחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה, לְמָה לִי עֲשָׂרָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי בַּיִת, דְּכׇל פָּחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה – לָאו בַּיִת הוּא.
And if it enters your mind that there is a sufficiently strong impact to cause death even at a height of less than ten handbreadths, why do I need the roof to be ten handbreadths high for there to be a requirement to construct a parapet? Rav Naḥman said to him: The halakha of the parapet for the roof of a house is different, since any structure less than ten handbreadths is not classified as a house, and only a house requires a parapet.
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי דְּהָוֵי מֵאַבָּרַאי עֲשָׂרָה, דַּל מִינֵּיהּ תִּקְרָה וּמַעֲזִיבָה – מִגַּוַּאי לָא הָוֵי עֲשָׂרָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּגוֹן דְּחַק מִגַּוַּאי.
Rava objects: If that is so, i.e., if the requirement to build a parapet is limited to a house that is ten handbreadths high, then also now, where the house is ten handbreadths higher than the public domain when measured from the outside, remove the height of the ceiling and the plaster, which is an additional layer on top of the ceiling. When measured from the inside in this manner, its height is not ten. According to you, then, it is not classified as a house. Rav Naḥman said to him: It is a case where he hollowed out an extra space inside in the floor of the house so that its height would be ten handbreadths.
אִי הָכִי, כִּי לָא הָוֵי נָמֵי מֵאַבָּרַאי עֲשָׂרָה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּהָוֵי מִגַּוַּאי עֲשָׂרָה כְּגוֹן דְּחַק בַּהּ טְפֵי!
Rava challenges him: If so, in a situation where the house is not ten handbreadths from the outside as well, you can find a scenario where it is ten handbreadths from the inside, such as where he hollowed out extra space in the floor, thereby transforming it into a house with the required height. Why, then, would a person be exempt in this case?
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, סָבַר: מִכְּרֵיסָא דְתוֹרָא לְאַרְעָא כַּמָּה הָוֵי – אַרְבְּעָה; אֲרִיתָּא דְּדַלָּאֵי כַּמָּה הָוֵי – שִׁיתָּא; הָא עַשְׂרָה. אִישְׁתְּכַח דְּכִי קָא מִחֲבַט – מֵעֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּקָא מִחֲבַט.
The Gemara answers: Rather, the previous explanation must be entirely rejected, and this is the reasoning of Rav Naḥman when he ruled that one must suspect that the ox’s organs were crushed upon falling into the water channel. He maintains the following argument: How far is the distance from the stomach of the ox to the ground? It is four handbreadths. How deep is the water channel? It is six handbreadths. This totals ten handbreadths. Therefore, it transpires that when the ox hits the ground, it is from a height of ten handbreadths that it hits the ground, since it landed on its stomach and not on its feet.
אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי: מָה בּוֹר שֶׁהוּא כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, אַף כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים; בְּשִׁיתָּא נָמֵי סַגְיָא!
The Gemara asks: But with regard to the mishna, which teaches: Just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths deep, why not say that a pit with six handbreadths would also be sufficient?
אָמְרִי: מַתְנִיתִין – דְּאִיגַּנְדַּר לְבוֹר.
The Sages said in reply: The mishna is referring to a case where the animal rolled into the pit, in which case the pit would be required to have a depth of ten handbreadths. By contrast, if it fell while walking, the extra height from the ground to its stomach is included in calculating the ten handbreadths.
מַתְנִי׳ בּוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין; עָבַר עָלָיו הָרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא כִּסָּהוּ, וְהַשֵּׁנִי וְלֹא כִּסָּהוּ – הַשֵּׁנִי חַיָּיב.
MISHNA: If a pit belonging to two partners was uncovered and the first partner passed by it and did not cover it, and then the second passed by it and did not cover it, the second is liable for any damage caused by means of the pit.
גְּמָ׳ אָמְרִי: בּוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? הָנִיחָא אִי סְבִירָא לַן כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ – חַיָּיב; מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּחָצֵר שֶׁל שְׁנֵיהֶם וּבוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵיהֶם, וְהִפְקִירוּ רְשׁוּתָן וְלֹא הִפְקִירוּ בּוֹרָן.
GEMARA: The Sages say: How can you find such a case of a pit belonging to two partners? This works out well if we hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that one who digs a pit on his own property and then declares the property, but not the pit, ownerless, is liable for damage. According to him, you find such a case where the courtyard belongs to both of them and the pit belongs to both of them, and they renounced ownership of their property but did not renounce ownership of their pit. In that case, both are responsible for any damage caused.
אֶלָּא אִי סְבִירָא לַן בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ פָּטוּר; הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּחַיָּיב עֲלֵיהּ – בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וּבִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בּוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
But if we hold that one who digs a pit on his own property and then declares the property, but not the pit, ownerless, is exempt from liability for damage caused, how can you find a case of a pit for which a person is liable? It can only be a case where it is located in the public domain, and how can you find a case of a pit belonging to two partners in the public domain?
אִי דְּשַׁוּוֹ שָׁלִיחַ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: ״זִיל כְּרִי לַן״, וַאֲזַל כְּרָה לְהוּ – אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה! וְאִי דִּכְרָה הַאי חַמְשָׁה וְהַאי חַמְשָׁה – נִסְתַּלְּקוּ לְהוּ מַעֲשֵׂה רִאשׁוֹן!
If they both jointly appointed an agent and said to him: Go dig a pit for us, and he went and dug a pit for both of them, then neither is liable. This is because there is no agency for transgression, and the digger is solely responsible. And if this partner dug a pit five handbreadths deep and this partner dug five further handbreadths deep, the significance of the initial act of digging performed by the first partner has been removed. Now all responsibility rests with the second partner, who deepened the pit to ten handbreadths, which is the minimum depth for which one is liable for an animal’s death. Therefore, this is also not treated as a jointly owned pit.
הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי – וְלִנְזָקִין, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי – וּלְמִיתָה, וּלְרַבָּנַן – בֵּין לְמִיתָה בֵּין לִנְזָקִין; הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
The Gemara notes: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and you find in a case of damage that both would be liable, as the Gemara will soon explain. Therefore, it qualifies as a case of a pit belonging to two partners. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first partner is not held liable at all in a case where the pit causes an animal’s death; and according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first partner is not held liable both in a situation where it causes death and in a situation where it merely causes damage. If so, how, can you find an instance of a pit belonging to partners?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָקְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן חוּלְיָא בְּבַת אַחַת, וְהִשְׁלִימוּ לַעֲשָׂרָה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is referring to a case where they both extracted a chunk of earth from the bottom of the pit simultaneously, and thereby completed it to a depth of ten handbreadths. This, then, would constitute a pit belonging to both of them.
מַאי רַבִּי וּמַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לַעֲשָׂרָה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַחַר אַחֲרוֹן לְמִיתָה, וְאַחַר שְׁנֵיהֶם לִנְזָקִין.
Having mentioned the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis, the Gemara inquires: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who digs a pit nine handbreadths deep, and another person came and completed the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, the latter individual alone is liable for an injury or death caused by the pit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One follows the latter for restitution for death caused by the pit. The latter is solely liable, since only a pit of ten handbreadths renders a person liable for an animal’s death. And one follows both of them for restitution for damage caused by the pit.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִפְתַּח״ וְ״כִי יִכְרֶה״ – אִם עַל פְּתִיחָה חַיָּיב, עַל כְּרִיָּיה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לְהָבִיא כּוֹרֶה אַחַר כּוֹרֶה, שֶׁסִּילֵּק מַעֲשֵׂה רִאשׁוֹן.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? As the verse states: “If a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit” (Exodus 21:33), it raises the question: If he is liable for opening a covered pit that has already been dug, then is it not all the more so that he should be liable for digging a new pit? What, then, does that latter phrase add? Rather, the verse serves to include the case of one person who begins to dig a pit and after he does so, a second person continues to dig. By subsequently stating: “If a man shall dig a pit,” the Torah teaches that a new pit is effectively created by the second digger, whose digging removed, i.e., rendered irrelevant, the action of the first digger and who bears full responsibility for the pit.
וְרַבִּי אָמַר לָךְ: הָנְהוּ מִיצְרָךְ צְרִיכִי, כִּדְאָמְרִינַן. וְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי מִיצְרָךְ צְרִיכִי!
And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi could have said to you: These two clauses in the verse are both necessary, and the second clause cannot serve to teach the halakha of the sole liability of the second digger. The reason they are necessary is as we said earlier (50a), where interpretations were cited according to both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: And don’t the Rabbis also agree that they are necessary for those interpretations? If so, what is the source of their opinion that responsibility for the pit rests solely with the second partner?
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן – אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בּוֹר״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם.
Rather, the previous explanation must be rejected, and this is the reason of the Rabbis: The verse states: “If a man shall dig a pit,” indicating that one person is liable, but not two. Therefore, if two people jointly created the pit, the second bears responsibility and not the first.
וְרַבִּי – הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: ״כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בּוֹר״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹר בּוֹר.
The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi understand the phrase “if a man shall dig a pit”? The Gemara answers: He requires that phrase to teach another halakha. The phrase “if a man shall dig a pit” indicates that a person who digs a pit is liable, but one is not liable if his ox digs a pit.
וְרַבָּנַן – תְּרֵי ״אִישׁ בּוֹר״ כְּתִיבִי.
The Gemara asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that the combination of words: Man and pit, is written twice: “If a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit.” From one phrase, the halakha is derived that a person must do the digging, and not an animal. From the second phrase, the halakha is derived that one person bears responsibility for the damage, and not two people.
וְרַבִּי – אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתַב הַאי, כְּתַב הַאי.
The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derive from this repetition? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, since the Torah wrote this first clause using this wording, it similarly wrote this second clause in the same fashion. The repetition is for stylistic reasons, and is not meant to teach a new halakha.
וּמִמַּאי דִּלְחַיּוֹבֵי בָּתְרָא? דִּלְמָא לְחַיּוֹבֵי קַמָּא!
The Gemara continues to ask about the opinion of the Rabbis: And even if they derive from the verse that only one person is liable for damage caused through the pit, from where do they know that the Torah intends to render specifically the latter one liable for the damage? Perhaps it is to render the first one who started the digging liable for the damage.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – הַהוּא דְּקָא עָבֵיד מִיתָה.
The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to suggest this, since the verse states: “And the carcass shall be for him” (Exodus 21:34). This indicates that it is the one who causes the death, i.e., the second one, who is liable, and not the first. This is because it is the second one who completed digging the necessary depth for causing death, and not the first.
וְהַאי ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רָבָא: שׁוֹר פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין שֶׁנָּפַל לְבוֹר – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – בְּמִי שֶׁהַמֵּת שֶׁלּוֹ!
The Gemara asks: But isn’t this clause: “And the carcass shall be for him,” necessary for that which Rava states? As Rava says: With regard to a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, the pit’s owner is exempt, as it is stated: “And the carcass shall be for him.” Evidently, the verse is stated with regard to a case where the carcass belongs to him. This ox, which was consecrated and subsequently disqualified, does not fully belong to anybody, since its use is restricted. Since this verse serves to teach Rava’s ruling, it cannot serve to teach about the liability of the second digger.
אָמְרִי: וְלָאו מִמֵּילָא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, דִּבְהָהוּא דַּעֲבַד מִיתָה עָסְקִינַן?
The Sages said in response: And can’t you learn from the words and emphasis of the verse by itself that we are dealing with the one who caused the animal’s death, even if these words are also used to derive Rava’s ruling? Therefore, the verse can serve as a source for both rulings.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר עֲשָׂרָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לְעֶשְׂרִים, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לִשְׁלשִׁים – כּוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין. וּרְמִינְהוּ: אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר עֲשָׂרָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְסִיֵּיד וְכִיֵּיד – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב.
On a similar subject, the Sages taught: In a case of one who digs a pit to a depth of ten handbreadths, and another comes and completes the depth to twenty handbreadths by digging an additional ten handbreadths, and another comes and completes it to thirty, they are all liable for any damage caused by this pit. The Gemara comments: And one can raise a contradiction against this from a baraita: In a case of one who digs a pit to a depth of ten handbreadths, and another came and plastered it and cemented [vekhiyyeid] it, the latter is liable for damage, and not the first.
לֵימָא הָא רַבִּי, וְהָא רַבָּנַן?
Shall we say that this baraita, which teaches that they are all liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds both liable for digging, and this baraita, which holds the latter liable, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold only the last one liable?
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן; עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב, אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּלָא עֲבַד קַמָּא שִׁיעוּר מִיתָה; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד קַמָּא שִׁיעוּר מִיתָה – אֲפִילּוּ רַבָּנַן מוֹדוּ דְּכוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין.
Rav Zevid said: Both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The way the first baraita accords with their opinion is that the Rabbis say that the last one is liable only where the first one did not make the pit of sufficient measurement to cause death, but dug less than ten handbreadths. But where the first one made a pit of sufficient measurement to cause death, such as in this case, where the first one dug ten handbreadths himself and it was subsequently deepened further by others, even the Rabbis concede that they are all liable.
וְהָא סִיֵּיד וְכִיֵּיד, דְּקָא עֲבַד קַמָּא שִׁיעוּר מִיתָה, וְקָתָנֵי: אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב! אָמְרִי: הָתָם – שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בּוֹ הֶבֶל לְמִיתָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהוֹסִיף בָּהּ הֶבֶל לְמִיתָה.
The Gemara asks: But in the second baraita, where he plastered and cemented it, the first made a pit of sufficient measurement to cause death, and nevertheless, the baraita teaches that the last person is liable. They said in response: There it is referring to a case where the pit did not have fumes capable of leading to death, since it was very wide. And then the other came, and by narrowing it with plaster and cementing it, he added to it the characteristic of having fumes capable of leading to death.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי; הָךְ דְּקָתָנֵי: כּוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין – שַׁפִּיר; הָא דְּקָתָנֵי: אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב – כְּגוֹן שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בּוֹ הֶבֶל לֹא לְמִיתָה וְלֹא לִנְזָקִין, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהוֹסִיף בּוֹ הֶבֶל בֵּין לְמִיתָה בֵּין לִנְזָקִין.
There are those who say that this is what Rav Zevid said: Both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. This first baraita, which teaches: They are all liable, fits well with his opinion. That second baraita, which teaches: The last one alone is liable, is referring to a case where the pit did not have sufficient fumes in it that were capable of leading to either death or damage, and then another person came and by narrowing it with plaster and cementing it, he added to it the characteristic of having fumes capable of leading to both death and damage.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִנִּיחַ אֶבֶן עַל פִּי הַבּוֹר, וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לַעֲשָׂרָה – בָּאנוּ לְמַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי וְרַבָּנַן.
Elaborating on this subject, Rava says: With regard to one who placed a stone at the opening of a pit less than ten handbreadths deep and brings the pit to a depth of ten handbreadths by raising the ground next to the opening of the pit, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis concerning whether only the second or both are responsible for damage caused.
פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, לְמַטָּה הוּא דְּהַבְלָא דִידֵיהּ קָא קָטֵיל לֵיהּ, אֲבָל לְמַעְלָה – דְּלָא הַבְלָא דִידֵיהּ קָא קָטֵיל, אֵימָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? This is precisely the case they are disputing, so what does Rava’s statement add to this? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that there is a distinction between a person deepening a pit at the bottom, in which case it is his lethal fumes that he caused that kill the animal, but if he added to the pit at the top, where it is not his lethal fumes that kill the animal, say that he would not be liable. Rava’s statement teaches us that the last one is liable, and this case is subject to dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis as to whether only the last one or both are liable.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: טָם טֶפַח, וְסִילֵּק אֲבָנָיו, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: מַאי דַּעֲבַד – שַׁקְלֵיהּ;
Rava raises the following dilemma: If someone dug another handbreadth in a pit that was nine handbreadths deep, so that it reached a depth of ten handbreadths, and subsequently closed up that handbreadth inside the pit, or if he removed his stones that he had placed at the opening of the pit so that the depth of the pit was reduced to less than ten handbreadths, what is the halakha? Do we say that what he did to increase the depth of the pit to ten handbreadths, he has removed, and restored the initial situation that existed before he dug the extra handbreadth, causing responsibility for damage to revert solely to the original digger?
אוֹ דִלְמָא, נִסְתַּלְּקוּ מַעֲשֵׂה רִאשׁוֹן, וְקָמָה לַיהּ כּוּלַּיהּ בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
Or perhaps, by closing it up, he removed the action of the first digger, since he has removed the ability of the pit to cause death? If so, it moves entirely into his possession and he now assumes full responsibility for the pit of nine handbreadths. The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָּא: בּוֹר שְׁמוֹנָה, וּמֵהֶן שְׁנֵי טְפָחִים מַיִם – חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֹּל טֶפַח דְּמַיָּא – כִּתְרֵי דְיַבָּשָׁה דָּמֵי.
§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Shmuel bar Marta says: With regard to a pit that is eight handbreadths deep and two handbreadths of it contain water, one is liable for it. What is the reason? Each handbreadth of water is like two handbreadths of dry space. Therefore, the pit is effectively ten handbreadths in depth and contains a sufficient quantity of lethal fumes to render its owner liable.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה וּמֵהֶן טֶפַח אֶחָד מַיִם, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נְפִישִׁי מַיָּא – לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעַמִּיק טְפֵי – אִית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a pit is nine handbreadths deep, and from that measurement, one handbreadth contains water, what is the halakha? Is this case equivalent to the previous one? Do we say that since there is not as large a quantity of water as in the case stated by Rabba bar bar Ḥana, the pit does not have a sufficient quantity of lethal fumes to render the digger liable? Or perhaps it can be argued that since the pit is deeper than the one in the previous case, it does have lethal fumes, despite containing less water?
בּוֹר שִׁבְעָה, וּמֵהֶן שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים מַיִם, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דִּנְפִישִׁי מַיִם טְפֵי – אִית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא עַמִּקָא – לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא? תֵּיקוּ.
Similarly, the following question can be raised: What is the halakha if a pit is seven handbreadths deep and three of the handbreadths contain water? Do we say that since there is a much larger quantity of water in this case, it is equivalent to a pit of ten handbreadths and therefore has lethal fumes, or perhaps since it is not as deep, it does not have a sufficient quantity of lethal fumes to render the digger liable? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב שֵׁיזְבִי מֵרַבָּה: הִרְחִיבָהּ מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי מִיעֵט הַבְלָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַדְּרַבָּה, הֲרֵי קֵירַב הֶזֵּיקָא!
Rav Sheizevi asked the following question of Rabba: If one widened the opening of a pit that was already ten handbreadths deep, what is the halakha? Rabba said to him: By doing so, he has actually reduced the lethal fumes and has not worsened the situation. Therefore, he should not be liable. Rav Sheizevi said to him: On the contrary, by widening the opening of the pit, he has brought the potential for damage closer to an animal that might fall inside.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן; אִי בְּהַבְלָא מִיית – הֲרֵי מִיעֵט הַבְלָא, אִי בְּחַבְטָה מִיית – הֲרֵי קֵירַב הֶזֵּיקָא. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן; אִי מֵהַהִיא גִּיסָא נְפַל – הֲרֵי קֵירַב הֶזֵּיקָא, וְאִי מֵאִידַּךְ גִּיסָא נְפַל – הֲרֵי מִיעֵט הַבְלָא.
Rather, Rav Ashi said concerning this question: Let us see: If the animal died because of the lethal fumes, the one who widened the pit should be exempt, since he reduced the lethal fumes. But if the animal died because of the impact, he should be liable, since he has brought the potential for damage closer to it. There are those who say that Rav Ashi said: Let us see: If the animal fell on that side that he widened, then his action has brought the potential for damage closer, and so he should be liable. But if the animal fell on the other side, he should bear no responsibility, since he reduced the lethal fumes.
אִיתְּמַר: בּוֹר שֶׁעוֹמְקָהּ כְּרׇחְבָּהּ – רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, דְּאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מָנִי – חַד אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם יֵשׁ בָּהּ הֶבֶל, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רׇחְבָּהּ יָתֵר עַל עוֹמְקָהּ; וְחַד אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אֵין בָּהּ הֶבֶל, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא עוֹמְקָהּ יָתֵר עַל רׇחְבָּהּ.
It was stated: With regard to a pit whose depth is equal to its width, Rabba and Rav Yosef both say a ruling in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who says it in the name of Rabbi Mani, but each present it differently. One of them says: A pit always contains a quantity of lethal fumes sufficient for liability, unless its width is greater than its depth. Therefore, when they are equal, the digger is liable. And one says: A pit never contains a quantity of lethal fumes sufficient for liability, unless its depth is greater than its width. Consequently, when they are equal, the digger is exempt.
עָבַר עָלָיו הָרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא כִּסָּהוּ. וְרִאשׁוֹן מֵאֵימַת מִיפְּטַר? רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, דְּאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מָנִי – חַד אָמַר: מִשֶּׁמַּנִּיחוֹ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ, וְחַד אָמַר: מִשֶּׁיִּמְסוֹר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ.
§ The mishna teaches that if the first partner passed by the pit and did not cover it, and then the second also passed by it and did not cover it, the second is liable. The Gemara asks: And from what point is the first exempt from responsibility for the pit? Rabba and Rav Yosef both say a ruling in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who says it in the name of Rabbi Mani, but each one presents it differently: One says: From the time he leaves the other partner using it, and one says: The first is absolved of responsibility only when he conveys to him his bucket, with which he will draw water from the pit.
כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמְדַלֶּה מַיִם מִן הַבּוֹר, וּבָא חֲבֵירוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ: הַנַּח לִי, וַאֲנִי אֲדַלֶּה מַיִם; כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִנִּיחוֹ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ – פָּטוּר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: מִשֶּׁיִּמְסוֹר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ.
The Gemara notes: This dispute is like a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who draws water from a cistern, and his friend comes and says to him: Leave me and I will draw water, once the first person leaves the second person while the second is using the cistern, the first is now exempt if he did not cover it. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: The first person is not absolved of responsibility until the time when he conveys his bucket to the second person.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה –
The Gemara clarifies the dispute: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains that there is a legal concept of designation. According to this principle, a situation in which certain aspects were not initially clearly defined can become clarified retroactively after a certain action or event occurs. The halakha treats all the aspects as being clearly defined and identifiable from the outset.
הַאי מִדִּידֵיהּ קָא מְמַלֵּא, וְהַאי מִדִּידֵיהּ קָא מְמַלֵּא. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין בְּרֵירָה.
In this case, the water is considered divided between the partners even before they draw it. When they do draw it, it is treated as if this one were filling from his part, the location of which has now been determined retroactively, and this one were filling from his part. Therefore, as long as the first partner has not conveyed his bucket to the second, he, as an owner of a defined part of the water, has not absolved himself of responsibility for the cistern. And by contrast, the Rabbis maintain that there is no designation and they both have the right to draw water from the cistern. Therefore, as soon as the second partner is left alone to draw water, he is responsible for the cistern and all the water it contains, even without conveying the bucket.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁנָּדְרוּ הֲנָאָה זֶה מִזֶּה – אֲסוּרִין לִיכָּנֵס לֶחָצֵר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: זֶה נִכְנָס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְזֶה נִכְנָס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ.
Ravina said: And in this regard, they follow their lines of reasoning in an analogous case, as we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 45b): With regard to the case of partners that vowed not to derive any benefit from each other, it is prohibited for them to enter their jointly owned courtyard, as this would violate their vows. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: It is permitted for them to enter the courtyard, since this one enters into his portion of the courtyard and that one enters into his portion.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה – הַאי לִדְנַפְשֵׁיהּ עָיֵיל, וְהַאי לִדְנַפְשֵׁיהּ עָיֵיל. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין בְּרֵירָה.
The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains that there is retroactive designation, and retroactively the section of the courtyard that each one enters becomes the portion that belongs to him. Therefore, this one enters his part, and that one enters his part. By contrast, the Rabbis maintain that there is no retroactive designation, and each portion of the courtyard belongs jointly to both.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הַמּוֹכֵר בּוֹר לַחֲבֵירוֹ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁמָּסַר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ – קָנָה. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי בְּכַסְפָּא – לִיקְנֵי בְּכַסְפָּא! אִי בַּחֲזָקָה – לִיקְנֵי בַּחֲזָקָה!
§ Having mentioned this halakha concerning conveying a bucket to transfer responsibility for the pit, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to one who sells a cistern to another, once the seller conveys his bucket to the buyer for drawing water from the cistern, the buyer acquires the cistern. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? How does conveying the bucket serve to effect acquisition of the cistern? If he is acquiring the cistern by means of paying money, let him acquire it with money that he paid. If he is acquiring the cistern by means of taking possession, then let him acquire it by taking possession, which is accomplished by using it.
לְעוֹלָם בַּחֲזָקָה, וּבָעֵי לְמֵימַר לֵיהּ: ״לֵךְ חֲזֵק וּקְנֵי״; וְכֵיוָן שֶׁמָּסַר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ, כְּמַאן דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״לֵךְ חֲזֵק וּקְנֵי״ דָּמֵי.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the case is where the cistern was acquired through taking possession, and in that case, the seller usually must say to him: Go, take possession, and thereby acquire it for yourself. And in this case, when he conveys his bucket to him, he is like one who says to him: Go, take possession, and thereby acquire it. Therefore, once he begins drawing water from the cistern, he has acquired it through taking possession.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר בַּיִת לַחֲבֵירוֹ,
The Gemara cites a related ruling: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: If one sells a house to another,
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Bava Kamma 51
לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא. אִי הָכִי, הוּזַּק בּוֹ חַיָּיב? הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין הֶבֶל לְמִיתָה, וְיֵשׁ הֶבֶל לִנְזָקִין.
Rav Naḥman responds: No, he is exempt here because there are not sufficient fumes to cause death, in accordance with the opinion of Rav. Nevertheless, the impact from hitting the ground is sufficient to cause death, and therefore an ox that fell into a water channel is suspected of being a tereifa. Rava again challenges him: If so, then how is the statement: If the animal was injured by it, he is liable, to be explained? There are not sufficient fumes? Rav Naḥman said to him: There are not sufficient fumes to cause death, but there are sufficient fumes to cause injury.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: בֵּית הַסְּקִילָה הָיָה גָּבוֹהַּ שְׁתֵּי קוֹמוֹת. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְקוֹמָה שֶׁלּוֹ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שָׁלֹשׁ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ יֵשׁ חֲבָטָה בְּפָחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה, לְמָה לִי כּוּלֵּי הַאי?
Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Sanhedrin 45a): The structure from which the punishment of stoning was implemented was a height of two people, and it is taught in that regard in a baraita: When the two-person height of the structure is combined with his height, i.e., the height of the one being stoned, there is a total height equal to that of three people. Rava explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that there is an impact capable of causing death in a pit less than ten handbreadths deep, why do I need all of this height?
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ – נַעֲבֵיד עֲשָׂרָה! אֶלָּא כְּרַב נַחְמָן – דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ״ – בְּרוֹר לוֹ מִיתָה יָפָה.
Rav Naḥman answered him: And according to your reasoning, let us make the structure a minimal ten handbreadths. Why must it have a height of two people? Rather, no proof can be brought from here, since the reason is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that the verse states: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), teaching that even with regard to a condemned prisoner, select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. Therefore, the structure used for stoning is constructed sufficiently high that he dies quickly, without any unnecessary suffering.
אִי הָכִי, נַגְבַּהּ טְפֵי! מִשּׁוּם דְּמִינַּוַּול.
The Gemara asks: If so, let us raise the structure even more, so that his death will be even less painful. The Gemara answers: This is not done, because if he fell from a greater height, his organs would be crushed and he would become completely disfigured, which is certainly not a way one would prefer to die.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: ״כִּי יִפֹּל הַנֹּפֵל מִמֶּנּוּ״; ״מִמֶּנּוּ״ – וְלֹא בְּתוֹכוֹ.
Rava again raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman: The Torah requires constructing a parapet on the roof of one’s house to prevent anyone from falling to his death, as the verse states (Deuteronomy 22:8): “You shall not bring blood upon your house, if any man falls from it.” The term “from it” teaches that liability exists only for falling from the roof of the house, but not onto the roof of a house.
כֵּיצַד? הָיְתָה רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גָּבוֹהַּ מִמֶּנּוּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל מִתּוֹכָהּ לְתוֹכוֹ – פָּטוּר. עֲמוּקָּה מִמֶּנּוּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל מִתּוֹכוֹ לְתוֹכָהּ – חַיָּיב.
How is this so? If an area in the public domain was ten handbreadths higher than a private house and the owner did not construct a fence between his house and the public domain, and someone fell from inside the public domain onto the house, the owner of the house is exempt. By contrast, if the public domain was ten handbreadths lower than the house, and the owner did not construct a fence on his roof, and someone fell from the roof of the house into the public domain, he is liable.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ יֵשׁ חֲבָטָה בְּפָחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה, לְמָה לִי עֲשָׂרָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי בַּיִת, דְּכׇל פָּחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה – לָאו בַּיִת הוּא.
And if it enters your mind that there is a sufficiently strong impact to cause death even at a height of less than ten handbreadths, why do I need the roof to be ten handbreadths high for there to be a requirement to construct a parapet? Rav Naḥman said to him: The halakha of the parapet for the roof of a house is different, since any structure less than ten handbreadths is not classified as a house, and only a house requires a parapet.
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי דְּהָוֵי מֵאַבָּרַאי עֲשָׂרָה, דַּל מִינֵּיהּ תִּקְרָה וּמַעֲזִיבָה – מִגַּוַּאי לָא הָוֵי עֲשָׂרָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּגוֹן דְּחַק מִגַּוַּאי.
Rava objects: If that is so, i.e., if the requirement to build a parapet is limited to a house that is ten handbreadths high, then also now, where the house is ten handbreadths higher than the public domain when measured from the outside, remove the height of the ceiling and the plaster, which is an additional layer on top of the ceiling. When measured from the inside in this manner, its height is not ten. According to you, then, it is not classified as a house. Rav Naḥman said to him: It is a case where he hollowed out an extra space inside in the floor of the house so that its height would be ten handbreadths.
אִי הָכִי, כִּי לָא הָוֵי נָמֵי מֵאַבָּרַאי עֲשָׂרָה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּהָוֵי מִגַּוַּאי עֲשָׂרָה כְּגוֹן דְּחַק בַּהּ טְפֵי!
Rava challenges him: If so, in a situation where the house is not ten handbreadths from the outside as well, you can find a scenario where it is ten handbreadths from the inside, such as where he hollowed out extra space in the floor, thereby transforming it into a house with the required height. Why, then, would a person be exempt in this case?
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, סָבַר: מִכְּרֵיסָא דְתוֹרָא לְאַרְעָא כַּמָּה הָוֵי – אַרְבְּעָה; אֲרִיתָּא דְּדַלָּאֵי כַּמָּה הָוֵי – שִׁיתָּא; הָא עַשְׂרָה. אִישְׁתְּכַח דְּכִי קָא מִחֲבַט – מֵעֲשָׂרָה הוּא דְּקָא מִחֲבַט.
The Gemara answers: Rather, the previous explanation must be entirely rejected, and this is the reasoning of Rav Naḥman when he ruled that one must suspect that the ox’s organs were crushed upon falling into the water channel. He maintains the following argument: How far is the distance from the stomach of the ox to the ground? It is four handbreadths. How deep is the water channel? It is six handbreadths. This totals ten handbreadths. Therefore, it transpires that when the ox hits the ground, it is from a height of ten handbreadths that it hits the ground, since it landed on its stomach and not on its feet.
אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי: מָה בּוֹר שֶׁהוּא כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, אַף כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית – עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים; בְּשִׁיתָּא נָמֵי סַגְיָא!
The Gemara asks: But with regard to the mishna, which teaches: Just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths deep, why not say that a pit with six handbreadths would also be sufficient?
אָמְרִי: מַתְנִיתִין – דְּאִיגַּנְדַּר לְבוֹר.
The Sages said in reply: The mishna is referring to a case where the animal rolled into the pit, in which case the pit would be required to have a depth of ten handbreadths. By contrast, if it fell while walking, the extra height from the ground to its stomach is included in calculating the ten handbreadths.
מַתְנִי׳ בּוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין; עָבַר עָלָיו הָרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא כִּסָּהוּ, וְהַשֵּׁנִי וְלֹא כִּסָּהוּ – הַשֵּׁנִי חַיָּיב.
MISHNA: If a pit belonging to two partners was uncovered and the first partner passed by it and did not cover it, and then the second passed by it and did not cover it, the second is liable for any damage caused by means of the pit.
גְּמָ׳ אָמְרִי: בּוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? הָנִיחָא אִי סְבִירָא לַן כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ – חַיָּיב; מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּחָצֵר שֶׁל שְׁנֵיהֶם וּבוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵיהֶם, וְהִפְקִירוּ רְשׁוּתָן וְלֹא הִפְקִירוּ בּוֹרָן.
GEMARA: The Sages say: How can you find such a case of a pit belonging to two partners? This works out well if we hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that one who digs a pit on his own property and then declares the property, but not the pit, ownerless, is liable for damage. According to him, you find such a case where the courtyard belongs to both of them and the pit belongs to both of them, and they renounced ownership of their property but did not renounce ownership of their pit. In that case, both are responsible for any damage caused.
אֶלָּא אִי סְבִירָא לַן בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ פָּטוּר; הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּחַיָּיב עֲלֵיהּ – בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וּבִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בּוֹר שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
But if we hold that one who digs a pit on his own property and then declares the property, but not the pit, ownerless, is exempt from liability for damage caused, how can you find a case of a pit for which a person is liable? It can only be a case where it is located in the public domain, and how can you find a case of a pit belonging to two partners in the public domain?
אִי דְּשַׁוּוֹ שָׁלִיחַ תַּרְוַיְיהוּ, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: ״זִיל כְּרִי לַן״, וַאֲזַל כְּרָה לְהוּ – אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה! וְאִי דִּכְרָה הַאי חַמְשָׁה וְהַאי חַמְשָׁה – נִסְתַּלְּקוּ לְהוּ מַעֲשֵׂה רִאשׁוֹן!
If they both jointly appointed an agent and said to him: Go dig a pit for us, and he went and dug a pit for both of them, then neither is liable. This is because there is no agency for transgression, and the digger is solely responsible. And if this partner dug a pit five handbreadths deep and this partner dug five further handbreadths deep, the significance of the initial act of digging performed by the first partner has been removed. Now all responsibility rests with the second partner, who deepened the pit to ten handbreadths, which is the minimum depth for which one is liable for an animal’s death. Therefore, this is also not treated as a jointly owned pit.
הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי – וְלִנְזָקִין, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי – וּלְמִיתָה, וּלְרַבָּנַן – בֵּין לְמִיתָה בֵּין לִנְזָקִין; הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
The Gemara notes: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and you find in a case of damage that both would be liable, as the Gemara will soon explain. Therefore, it qualifies as a case of a pit belonging to two partners. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first partner is not held liable at all in a case where the pit causes an animal’s death; and according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first partner is not held liable both in a situation where it causes death and in a situation where it merely causes damage. If so, how, can you find an instance of a pit belonging to partners?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָקְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן חוּלְיָא בְּבַת אַחַת, וְהִשְׁלִימוּ לַעֲשָׂרָה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is referring to a case where they both extracted a chunk of earth from the bottom of the pit simultaneously, and thereby completed it to a depth of ten handbreadths. This, then, would constitute a pit belonging to both of them.
מַאי רַבִּי וּמַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לַעֲשָׂרָה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַחַר אַחֲרוֹן לְמִיתָה, וְאַחַר שְׁנֵיהֶם לִנְזָקִין.
Having mentioned the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis, the Gemara inquires: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who digs a pit nine handbreadths deep, and another person came and completed the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, the latter individual alone is liable for an injury or death caused by the pit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One follows the latter for restitution for death caused by the pit. The latter is solely liable, since only a pit of ten handbreadths renders a person liable for an animal’s death. And one follows both of them for restitution for damage caused by the pit.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִפְתַּח״ וְ״כִי יִכְרֶה״ – אִם עַל פְּתִיחָה חַיָּיב, עַל כְּרִיָּיה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לְהָבִיא כּוֹרֶה אַחַר כּוֹרֶה, שֶׁסִּילֵּק מַעֲשֵׂה רִאשׁוֹן.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? As the verse states: “If a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit” (Exodus 21:33), it raises the question: If he is liable for opening a covered pit that has already been dug, then is it not all the more so that he should be liable for digging a new pit? What, then, does that latter phrase add? Rather, the verse serves to include the case of one person who begins to dig a pit and after he does so, a second person continues to dig. By subsequently stating: “If a man shall dig a pit,” the Torah teaches that a new pit is effectively created by the second digger, whose digging removed, i.e., rendered irrelevant, the action of the first digger and who bears full responsibility for the pit.
וְרַבִּי אָמַר לָךְ: הָנְהוּ מִיצְרָךְ צְרִיכִי, כִּדְאָמְרִינַן. וְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי מִיצְרָךְ צְרִיכִי!
And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi could have said to you: These two clauses in the verse are both necessary, and the second clause cannot serve to teach the halakha of the sole liability of the second digger. The reason they are necessary is as we said earlier (50a), where interpretations were cited according to both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: And don’t the Rabbis also agree that they are necessary for those interpretations? If so, what is the source of their opinion that responsibility for the pit rests solely with the second partner?
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן – אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בּוֹר״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם.
Rather, the previous explanation must be rejected, and this is the reason of the Rabbis: The verse states: “If a man shall dig a pit,” indicating that one person is liable, but not two. Therefore, if two people jointly created the pit, the second bears responsibility and not the first.
וְרַבִּי – הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: ״כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בּוֹר״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹר בּוֹר.
The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi understand the phrase “if a man shall dig a pit”? The Gemara answers: He requires that phrase to teach another halakha. The phrase “if a man shall dig a pit” indicates that a person who digs a pit is liable, but one is not liable if his ox digs a pit.
וְרַבָּנַן – תְּרֵי ״אִישׁ בּוֹר״ כְּתִיבִי.
The Gemara asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that the combination of words: Man and pit, is written twice: “If a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit.” From one phrase, the halakha is derived that a person must do the digging, and not an animal. From the second phrase, the halakha is derived that one person bears responsibility for the damage, and not two people.
וְרַבִּי – אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתַב הַאי, כְּתַב הַאי.
The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derive from this repetition? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, since the Torah wrote this first clause using this wording, it similarly wrote this second clause in the same fashion. The repetition is for stylistic reasons, and is not meant to teach a new halakha.
וּמִמַּאי דִּלְחַיּוֹבֵי בָּתְרָא? דִּלְמָא לְחַיּוֹבֵי קַמָּא!
The Gemara continues to ask about the opinion of the Rabbis: And even if they derive from the verse that only one person is liable for damage caused through the pit, from where do they know that the Torah intends to render specifically the latter one liable for the damage? Perhaps it is to render the first one who started the digging liable for the damage.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – הַהוּא דְּקָא עָבֵיד מִיתָה.
The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to suggest this, since the verse states: “And the carcass shall be for him” (Exodus 21:34). This indicates that it is the one who causes the death, i.e., the second one, who is liable, and not the first. This is because it is the second one who completed digging the necessary depth for causing death, and not the first.
וְהַאי ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רָבָא: שׁוֹר פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין שֶׁנָּפַל לְבוֹר – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – בְּמִי שֶׁהַמֵּת שֶׁלּוֹ!
The Gemara asks: But isn’t this clause: “And the carcass shall be for him,” necessary for that which Rava states? As Rava says: With regard to a disqualified consecrated ox that fell into a pit, the pit’s owner is exempt, as it is stated: “And the carcass shall be for him.” Evidently, the verse is stated with regard to a case where the carcass belongs to him. This ox, which was consecrated and subsequently disqualified, does not fully belong to anybody, since its use is restricted. Since this verse serves to teach Rava’s ruling, it cannot serve to teach about the liability of the second digger.
אָמְרִי: וְלָאו מִמֵּילָא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, דִּבְהָהוּא דַּעֲבַד מִיתָה עָסְקִינַן?
The Sages said in response: And can’t you learn from the words and emphasis of the verse by itself that we are dealing with the one who caused the animal’s death, even if these words are also used to derive Rava’s ruling? Therefore, the verse can serve as a source for both rulings.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר עֲשָׂרָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לְעֶשְׂרִים, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לִשְׁלשִׁים – כּוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין. וּרְמִינְהוּ: אֶחָד הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר עֲשָׂרָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְסִיֵּיד וְכִיֵּיד – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב.
On a similar subject, the Sages taught: In a case of one who digs a pit to a depth of ten handbreadths, and another comes and completes the depth to twenty handbreadths by digging an additional ten handbreadths, and another comes and completes it to thirty, they are all liable for any damage caused by this pit. The Gemara comments: And one can raise a contradiction against this from a baraita: In a case of one who digs a pit to a depth of ten handbreadths, and another came and plastered it and cemented [vekhiyyeid] it, the latter is liable for damage, and not the first.
לֵימָא הָא רַבִּי, וְהָא רַבָּנַן?
Shall we say that this baraita, which teaches that they are all liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds both liable for digging, and this baraita, which holds the latter liable, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold only the last one liable?
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן; עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב, אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּלָא עֲבַד קַמָּא שִׁיעוּר מִיתָה; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דַּעֲבַד קַמָּא שִׁיעוּר מִיתָה – אֲפִילּוּ רַבָּנַן מוֹדוּ דְּכוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין.
Rav Zevid said: Both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The way the first baraita accords with their opinion is that the Rabbis say that the last one is liable only where the first one did not make the pit of sufficient measurement to cause death, but dug less than ten handbreadths. But where the first one made a pit of sufficient measurement to cause death, such as in this case, where the first one dug ten handbreadths himself and it was subsequently deepened further by others, even the Rabbis concede that they are all liable.
וְהָא סִיֵּיד וְכִיֵּיד, דְּקָא עֲבַד קַמָּא שִׁיעוּר מִיתָה, וְקָתָנֵי: אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב! אָמְרִי: הָתָם – שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בּוֹ הֶבֶל לְמִיתָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהוֹסִיף בָּהּ הֶבֶל לְמִיתָה.
The Gemara asks: But in the second baraita, where he plastered and cemented it, the first made a pit of sufficient measurement to cause death, and nevertheless, the baraita teaches that the last person is liable. They said in response: There it is referring to a case where the pit did not have fumes capable of leading to death, since it was very wide. And then the other came, and by narrowing it with plaster and cementing it, he added to it the characteristic of having fumes capable of leading to death.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי; הָךְ דְּקָתָנֵי: כּוּלָּן חַיָּיבִין – שַׁפִּיר; הָא דְּקָתָנֵי: אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב – כְּגוֹן שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בּוֹ הֶבֶל לֹא לְמִיתָה וְלֹא לִנְזָקִין, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהוֹסִיף בּוֹ הֶבֶל בֵּין לְמִיתָה בֵּין לִנְזָקִין.
There are those who say that this is what Rav Zevid said: Both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. This first baraita, which teaches: They are all liable, fits well with his opinion. That second baraita, which teaches: The last one alone is liable, is referring to a case where the pit did not have sufficient fumes in it that were capable of leading to either death or damage, and then another person came and by narrowing it with plaster and cementing it, he added to it the characteristic of having fumes capable of leading to both death and damage.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִנִּיחַ אֶבֶן עַל פִּי הַבּוֹר, וְהִשְׁלִימָהּ לַעֲשָׂרָה – בָּאנוּ לְמַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי וְרַבָּנַן.
Elaborating on this subject, Rava says: With regard to one who placed a stone at the opening of a pit less than ten handbreadths deep and brings the pit to a depth of ten handbreadths by raising the ground next to the opening of the pit, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis concerning whether only the second or both are responsible for damage caused.
פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, לְמַטָּה הוּא דְּהַבְלָא דִידֵיהּ קָא קָטֵיל לֵיהּ, אֲבָל לְמַעְלָה – דְּלָא הַבְלָא דִידֵיהּ קָא קָטֵיל, אֵימָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? This is precisely the case they are disputing, so what does Rava’s statement add to this? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that there is a distinction between a person deepening a pit at the bottom, in which case it is his lethal fumes that he caused that kill the animal, but if he added to the pit at the top, where it is not his lethal fumes that kill the animal, say that he would not be liable. Rava’s statement teaches us that the last one is liable, and this case is subject to dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis as to whether only the last one or both are liable.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: טָם טֶפַח, וְסִילֵּק אֲבָנָיו, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: מַאי דַּעֲבַד – שַׁקְלֵיהּ;
Rava raises the following dilemma: If someone dug another handbreadth in a pit that was nine handbreadths deep, so that it reached a depth of ten handbreadths, and subsequently closed up that handbreadth inside the pit, or if he removed his stones that he had placed at the opening of the pit so that the depth of the pit was reduced to less than ten handbreadths, what is the halakha? Do we say that what he did to increase the depth of the pit to ten handbreadths, he has removed, and restored the initial situation that existed before he dug the extra handbreadth, causing responsibility for damage to revert solely to the original digger?
אוֹ דִלְמָא, נִסְתַּלְּקוּ מַעֲשֵׂה רִאשׁוֹן, וְקָמָה לַיהּ כּוּלַּיהּ בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
Or perhaps, by closing it up, he removed the action of the first digger, since he has removed the ability of the pit to cause death? If so, it moves entirely into his possession and he now assumes full responsibility for the pit of nine handbreadths. The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָּא: בּוֹר שְׁמוֹנָה, וּמֵהֶן שְׁנֵי טְפָחִים מַיִם – חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֹּל טֶפַח דְּמַיָּא – כִּתְרֵי דְיַבָּשָׁה דָּמֵי.
§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Shmuel bar Marta says: With regard to a pit that is eight handbreadths deep and two handbreadths of it contain water, one is liable for it. What is the reason? Each handbreadth of water is like two handbreadths of dry space. Therefore, the pit is effectively ten handbreadths in depth and contains a sufficient quantity of lethal fumes to render its owner liable.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה וּמֵהֶן טֶפַח אֶחָד מַיִם, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נְפִישִׁי מַיָּא – לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעַמִּיק טְפֵי – אִית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a pit is nine handbreadths deep, and from that measurement, one handbreadth contains water, what is the halakha? Is this case equivalent to the previous one? Do we say that since there is not as large a quantity of water as in the case stated by Rabba bar bar Ḥana, the pit does not have a sufficient quantity of lethal fumes to render the digger liable? Or perhaps it can be argued that since the pit is deeper than the one in the previous case, it does have lethal fumes, despite containing less water?
בּוֹר שִׁבְעָה, וּמֵהֶן שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים מַיִם, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דִּנְפִישִׁי מַיִם טְפֵי – אִית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא עַמִּקָא – לֵית בֵּיהּ הַבְלָא? תֵּיקוּ.
Similarly, the following question can be raised: What is the halakha if a pit is seven handbreadths deep and three of the handbreadths contain water? Do we say that since there is a much larger quantity of water in this case, it is equivalent to a pit of ten handbreadths and therefore has lethal fumes, or perhaps since it is not as deep, it does not have a sufficient quantity of lethal fumes to render the digger liable? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב שֵׁיזְבִי מֵרַבָּה: הִרְחִיבָהּ מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי מִיעֵט הַבְלָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַדְּרַבָּה, הֲרֵי קֵירַב הֶזֵּיקָא!
Rav Sheizevi asked the following question of Rabba: If one widened the opening of a pit that was already ten handbreadths deep, what is the halakha? Rabba said to him: By doing so, he has actually reduced the lethal fumes and has not worsened the situation. Therefore, he should not be liable. Rav Sheizevi said to him: On the contrary, by widening the opening of the pit, he has brought the potential for damage closer to an animal that might fall inside.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן; אִי בְּהַבְלָא מִיית – הֲרֵי מִיעֵט הַבְלָא, אִי בְּחַבְטָה מִיית – הֲרֵי קֵירַב הֶזֵּיקָא. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן; אִי מֵהַהִיא גִּיסָא נְפַל – הֲרֵי קֵירַב הֶזֵּיקָא, וְאִי מֵאִידַּךְ גִּיסָא נְפַל – הֲרֵי מִיעֵט הַבְלָא.
Rather, Rav Ashi said concerning this question: Let us see: If the animal died because of the lethal fumes, the one who widened the pit should be exempt, since he reduced the lethal fumes. But if the animal died because of the impact, he should be liable, since he has brought the potential for damage closer to it. There are those who say that Rav Ashi said: Let us see: If the animal fell on that side that he widened, then his action has brought the potential for damage closer, and so he should be liable. But if the animal fell on the other side, he should bear no responsibility, since he reduced the lethal fumes.
אִיתְּמַר: בּוֹר שֶׁעוֹמְקָהּ כְּרׇחְבָּהּ – רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, דְּאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מָנִי – חַד אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם יֵשׁ בָּהּ הֶבֶל, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רׇחְבָּהּ יָתֵר עַל עוֹמְקָהּ; וְחַד אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אֵין בָּהּ הֶבֶל, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא עוֹמְקָהּ יָתֵר עַל רׇחְבָּהּ.
It was stated: With regard to a pit whose depth is equal to its width, Rabba and Rav Yosef both say a ruling in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who says it in the name of Rabbi Mani, but each present it differently. One of them says: A pit always contains a quantity of lethal fumes sufficient for liability, unless its width is greater than its depth. Therefore, when they are equal, the digger is liable. And one says: A pit never contains a quantity of lethal fumes sufficient for liability, unless its depth is greater than its width. Consequently, when they are equal, the digger is exempt.
עָבַר עָלָיו הָרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא כִּסָּהוּ. וְרִאשׁוֹן מֵאֵימַת מִיפְּטַר? רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, דְּאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מָנִי – חַד אָמַר: מִשֶּׁמַּנִּיחוֹ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ, וְחַד אָמַר: מִשֶּׁיִּמְסוֹר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ.
§ The mishna teaches that if the first partner passed by the pit and did not cover it, and then the second also passed by it and did not cover it, the second is liable. The Gemara asks: And from what point is the first exempt from responsibility for the pit? Rabba and Rav Yosef both say a ruling in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who says it in the name of Rabbi Mani, but each one presents it differently: One says: From the time he leaves the other partner using it, and one says: The first is absolved of responsibility only when he conveys to him his bucket, with which he will draw water from the pit.
כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַמְדַלֶּה מַיִם מִן הַבּוֹר, וּבָא חֲבֵירוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ: הַנַּח לִי, וַאֲנִי אֲדַלֶּה מַיִם; כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִנִּיחוֹ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ – פָּטוּר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: מִשֶּׁיִּמְסוֹר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ.
The Gemara notes: This dispute is like a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who draws water from a cistern, and his friend comes and says to him: Leave me and I will draw water, once the first person leaves the second person while the second is using the cistern, the first is now exempt if he did not cover it. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: The first person is not absolved of responsibility until the time when he conveys his bucket to the second person.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה –
The Gemara clarifies the dispute: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains that there is a legal concept of designation. According to this principle, a situation in which certain aspects were not initially clearly defined can become clarified retroactively after a certain action or event occurs. The halakha treats all the aspects as being clearly defined and identifiable from the outset.
הַאי מִדִּידֵיהּ קָא מְמַלֵּא, וְהַאי מִדִּידֵיהּ קָא מְמַלֵּא. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין בְּרֵירָה.
In this case, the water is considered divided between the partners even before they draw it. When they do draw it, it is treated as if this one were filling from his part, the location of which has now been determined retroactively, and this one were filling from his part. Therefore, as long as the first partner has not conveyed his bucket to the second, he, as an owner of a defined part of the water, has not absolved himself of responsibility for the cistern. And by contrast, the Rabbis maintain that there is no designation and they both have the right to draw water from the cistern. Therefore, as soon as the second partner is left alone to draw water, he is responsible for the cistern and all the water it contains, even without conveying the bucket.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁנָּדְרוּ הֲנָאָה זֶה מִזֶּה – אֲסוּרִין לִיכָּנֵס לֶחָצֵר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: זֶה נִכְנָס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְזֶה נִכְנָס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ.
Ravina said: And in this regard, they follow their lines of reasoning in an analogous case, as we learned in a mishna (Nedarim 45b): With regard to the case of partners that vowed not to derive any benefit from each other, it is prohibited for them to enter their jointly owned courtyard, as this would violate their vows. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: It is permitted for them to enter the courtyard, since this one enters into his portion of the courtyard and that one enters into his portion.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה – הַאי לִדְנַפְשֵׁיהּ עָיֵיל, וְהַאי לִדְנַפְשֵׁיהּ עָיֵיל. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין בְּרֵירָה.
The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains that there is retroactive designation, and retroactively the section of the courtyard that each one enters becomes the portion that belongs to him. Therefore, this one enters his part, and that one enters his part. By contrast, the Rabbis maintain that there is no retroactive designation, and each portion of the courtyard belongs jointly to both.
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הַמּוֹכֵר בּוֹר לַחֲבֵירוֹ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁמָּסַר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ – קָנָה. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי בְּכַסְפָּא – לִיקְנֵי בְּכַסְפָּא! אִי בַּחֲזָקָה – לִיקְנֵי בַּחֲזָקָה!
§ Having mentioned this halakha concerning conveying a bucket to transfer responsibility for the pit, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to one who sells a cistern to another, once the seller conveys his bucket to the buyer for drawing water from the cistern, the buyer acquires the cistern. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? How does conveying the bucket serve to effect acquisition of the cistern? If he is acquiring the cistern by means of paying money, let him acquire it with money that he paid. If he is acquiring the cistern by means of taking possession, then let him acquire it by taking possession, which is accomplished by using it.
לְעוֹלָם בַּחֲזָקָה, וּבָעֵי לְמֵימַר לֵיהּ: ״לֵךְ חֲזֵק וּקְנֵי״; וְכֵיוָן שֶׁמָּסַר לוֹ דׇּלְיוֹ, כְּמַאן דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״לֵךְ חֲזֵק וּקְנֵי״ דָּמֵי.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the case is where the cistern was acquired through taking possession, and in that case, the seller usually must say to him: Go, take possession, and thereby acquire it for yourself. And in this case, when he conveys his bucket to him, he is like one who says to him: Go, take possession, and thereby acquire it. Therefore, once he begins drawing water from the cistern, he has acquired it through taking possession.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר בַּיִת לַחֲבֵירוֹ,
The Gemara cites a related ruling: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: If one sells a house to another,
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