Bava Metzia 92
וּמְהַלֵּךְ כְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.
but a worker who was walking is considered like one who was performing his labor. Yet, since one who was performing labor on this vine may not eat from another vine, he would not be entitled to eat while walking if not for the ordinance of the Sages.
וּבַחֲמוֹר כְּשֶׁהִיא פּוֹרֶקֶת. כְּשֶׁהִיא פּוֹרֶקֶת מֵהֵיכָן אָכְלָה! אֵימָא עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא פּוֹרֶקֶת. תְּנֵינָא לְהָא, דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: חֲמוֹר וְגָמָל אוֹכְלִים מִמַּשּׂאוֹי שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּיהֶן, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִטּוֹל בְּיָדוֹ וְיַאֲכִילֵם.
§ The mishna teaches: And with regard to a donkey, it is permitted to eat when it is being unloaded. The Gemara is puzzled by this statement: From where can it eat when it is being unloaded? Since the load is being removed from the animal at the time, how can the donkey eat from it? Rather, you should say: It may eat until it is unloaded. As long as it is bearing its load the donkey may eat from the food on its back. The Gemara comments: We learn in the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: A donkey and a camel may eat from the load on their backs, provided that the owner of the animal does not take some of the food in his hand and feed them.
מַתְנִי׳ אוֹכֵל פּוֹעֵל קִישּׁוּת אֲפִילּוּ בְּדִינָר, כּוֹתֶבֶת וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּדִינָר. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר חַסָּמָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא יֹאכַל פּוֹעֵל יָתֵר עַל שְׂכָרוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים מַתִּירִין. אֲבָל מְלַמְּדִין אֶת הָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא רַעַבְתָן וִיהֵא סוֹתֵם אֶת הַפֶּתַח בְּפָנָיו.
MISHNA: A laborer may eat cucumbers while he works, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it, according to the strict letter of the law. But one teaches a person not to be a glutton and thereby close the opening to other job offers in his face. When people hear of his greed they will be reluctant to hire him.
גְּמָ׳ חֲכָמִים הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ אֲבָל מְלַמְּדִין: לְתַנָּא קַמָּא לֵית לֵיהּ ״מְלַמְּדִין״. לְרַבָּנַן אִית לְהוּ ״מְלַמְּדִין״.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The statement of the Rabbis is identical to the statement of the first tanna. A mishna would not repeat the exact same opinion. The Gemara explains: The practical difference between them concerns the statement: But one teaches a person not to be a glutton. According to the first tanna, he does not accept the notion that one teaches a person not to be a glutton. According to the Rabbis, they do accept this principle that one teaches a person not to be a glutton.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּרַב אַסִּי. דְּאָמַר רַב אַסִּי: אֲפִילּוּ לֹא שְׂכָרוֹ אֶלָּא לִבְצוֹר אֶשְׁכּוֹל אֶחָד – אוֹכְלוֹ. וְאָמַר רַב אַסִּי: אֲפִילּוּ לֹא בָּצַר אֶלָּא אֶשְׁכּוֹל אֶחָד – אוֹכְלוֹ.
If you wish, say instead that the practical difference between them concerns a halakha taught by Rav Asi. As Rav Asi says: Even if he hired him to harvest only one cluster, the laborer may eat. And Rav Asi further said: Even if he harvested only one cluster, he may eat it.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אִיכָּא לְמִיתַּב לְכֵלָיו שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת. אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיתַּב לְכֵלָיו שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – אֵימָא לִיתֵּב בְּרֵישָׁא, וַהֲדַר לֵיכוֹל.
The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for Rav Asi to state both of these halakhot, despite their apparent similarity. As, had he taught us only this first one, one might have thought that he may eat because there is no other food to place in the homeowner’s vessels, as he was hired to harvest only a single cluster. The Torah permits him to eat, and if he is not allowed to eat that cluster, what else is there for him to eat? But if there is produce left over to place in the homeowner’s vessels, as in the second case, one might say that he should first place some in the vessels and then eat.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא – דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְקַיּוֹמֵי לְבַסּוֹף, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר לְקַיּוֹמֵי לְבַסּוֹף – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
And had Rav Asi taught us only this second case, one might have said that the reason he may eat is that ultimately it is possible to fulfill the requirement to place produce in the owner’s vessels, i.e., he can eat and still perform the task. But in a situation where ultimately it is not possible to fulfill his task, since if he were to eat the only cluster he was hired to harvest there would be nothing left for him to do, one might say that he may not eat. Therefore, both halakhot are necessary.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּרַב. דְּאָמַר רַב: מָצָאתִי מְגִילַּת סְתָרִים בֵּי רַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְכָתוּב בָּהּ: אִיסִי בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי תָבֹא בְּכֶרֶם רֵעֶךָ״ – בְּבִיאַת כׇּל אָדָם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
The Gemara returns to the dispute of the mishna: If you wish, say that the practical difference between the opinions of the first tanna and the Rabbis concerns a halakha taught by Rav. As Rav says: I found a concealed scroll, a document that lists halakhot in shortened form so that they will not be forgotten. Rav discovered this document in Rabbi Ḥiyya’s house, and it was written in it: Isi ben Yehuda says that with regard to the verse: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure” (Deuteronomy 23:25), the verse is speaking of the entry of any person who passes alongside a vineyard, not only a laborer.
וְאָמַר רַב: לָא שְׁבַק אִיסִי חַיֵּי לְכׇל בְּרִיָּה.
And Rav said in response: Isi has not left any livelihood for any entity, as many people might pass by and consume all the fruit of one’s vineyard. The first tanna agrees with Rav, while the Rabbis accept Isi ben Yehuda’s opinion that by right even one who is not a laborer may eat.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא: דִּלְמָא בְּעוֹשִׂין בִּסְעוּדָּתָם, דְּעָבְדוּ וְאָכְלוּ? אָמַר לִי: אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, נִיחָא לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ (לְאוֹגַר אָגוֹרֵי) [דְּנוֹגַר אֲגִירֵי] וְנִיקְטְפֵיהּ לְפַרְדֵּיסֵיהּ, וְלָא נֵיתוֹ כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא (וְאָכְלוּ לֵיהּ).
Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Kahana, and I suggested that perhaps Isi ben Yehuda was referring to laborers who perform labor for their meal; that is, they voluntarily enter his vineyard to perform labor and eat. In other words, Isi ben Yehuda did not mean that anyone may help themselves to produce. Rather, if one chooses to perform labor in the vineyard of another, he may eat from his grapes even if he was not hired by the owner. Rav Kahana said to me: Even so, a person prefers to hire laborers to pluck the fruit of his orchard, rather than have everyone come and eat it, as he fears that people he did not hire might not perform the work properly.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: פּוֹעֵל מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל, אוֹ מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל?
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a laborer who eats while performing labor, does he eat from his own property, i.e., is the food he eats in addition to his wages and therefore considered his private property, or does he eat from the property of Heaven? In other words, perhaps the Torah granted him the right to eat the food with which he works as a special privilege, but it does not belong to him.
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? דְּאָמַר: תְּנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי וּבָנַי. אִי אָמְרַתְּ: מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל – יָהֲבִינַן לְהוּ, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל – לְדִידֵיהּ זַכִּי לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא, לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו – לָא זַכִּי לְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא, מַאי?
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference raised by this dilemma? The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where he says: I myself will not eat, but I will give the produce to my wife and children in my stead. If you say that he eats from his own property, we give them the food, as it belongs to him, but if you say that he eats from the property of Heaven, the Merciful One entitles the laborer himself to eat, but the Merciful One does not entitle his wife and children to do so. What, then, is the halakha?
תָּא שְׁמַע: אוֹכֵל פּוֹעֵל קִישּׁוּת וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּדִינָר, כּוֹתֶבֶת וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּדִינָר. אִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל – אֲגִיר בְּדַנְקָא אָכֵיל בְּזוּזָא?! וְאֶלָּא מַאי – מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל, סוֹף סוֹף אֲגִיר בְּדַנְקָא אָכֵיל בְּזוּזָא! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר – רַחֲמָנָא זַכִּי לֵיהּ, הָכָא נָמֵי רַחֲמָנָא זַכִּי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: A laborer may eat cucumbers, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. If you say that he eats from his own property, is it possible that he was hired for one-sixth of a dinar and yet he may eat an amount worth a whole dinar? Would the Torah have granted him ownership over such a large sum relative to his wages? The Gemara refutes this argument: Rather, what then will you say? Will you say that he eats from the property of Heaven? Ultimately, in that case too he was hired for one-sixth of a dinar and yet in practice he may eat an amount worth a dinar. Rather, what have you to say? That the Merciful One entitles him to eat more than his wages. Here too, one can likewise say that the Merciful One entitles him to possess more than his wages.
תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר חַסָּמָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא יֹאכַל פּוֹעֵל יוֹתֵר עַל שְׂכָרוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים מַתִּירִין. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל, וּמָר סָבַר מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל.
The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from another statement from the mishna: Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it. What, is it not the case that they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma, holds that he eats from his own property, and therefore he may not eat an amount worth more than he earns, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that he eats from the property of Heaven?
לָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל, וְהָכָא ״בִּכְנַפְשְׁךָ״ קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: כְּנַפְשְׁךָ בִּדְבַר שֶׁמּוֹסֵר נַפְשׁוֹ עָלָיו,
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; it is possible that everyone agrees that he eats from his own property, and here they disagree with regard to the meaning of a term in the verse: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure [kenafshekha]” (Deuteronomy 23:25). One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that “at your own pleasure [kenafshekha],” which literally means: In accordance with your soul, is referring to a matter for which he hands over his soul, i.e., the laborer acquires the fruit by virtue of the risks he accepts upon himself as part of his work.
וּמָר סָבַר כְּנַפְשְׁךָ: מָה נַפְשְׁךָ, אִם חָסַמְתָּ – פָּטוּר, אַף פּוֹעֵל אִם חָסַמְתָּ – פָּטוּר.
And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that the term “kenafshekha” means: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt, as you yourself do not have to eat, so too, with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt. This indicates that there are cases in which a worker is not entitled to eat.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נָזִיר שֶׁאָמַר ״תְּנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי וּבָנַי״ – אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל – אַמַּאי אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם ״לָךְ לָךְ״ אָמְרִין נְזִירָא: ״סְחוֹר סְחוֹר לְכַרְמָא לָא תִּקְרַב״.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If a nazirite who is working in a vineyard says: Give the grapes to my wife and my children, as he is prohibited from eating them himself, they do not listen to him. But if you say that a laborer eats from his own property, why should they not listen to him? The Gemara answers: There, the reason is different, due to the well-known proverb concerning a nazirite: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go round, go round; do not approach a vineyard. It is prohibited for a nazirite to eat any of the products of the vine. To keep a nazirite away from temptation, the Sages attempt to deter him from accepting work in a vineyard by not allowing him to give the fruit to his family. Consequently, this halakha is due to the concern about a possible transgression and has nothing to do with the rights of a laborer.
תָּא שְׁמַע: פּוֹעֵל שֶׁאָמַר ״תְּנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי וּבָנַי״ – אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל – אַמַּאי אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? מַאי פּוֹעֵל – נָזִיר. וְהָתַנְיָא ״נָזִיר״, וְהָתַנְיָא ״פּוֹעֵל״! מִידֵּי גַּבֵּי הֲדָדֵי תַּנְיָין?
Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to a laborer who said: Give the produce to my wife and my children, they do not listen to him. But if you say that he eats from his own property, why should they not listen to him? The Gemara refutes this argument: In this particular context, what is the meaning of a laborer? It means a nazirite laborer. The Gemara questions this response: But isn’t it taught in one baraita concerning the case of a nazirite, and isn’t it taught in another baraita concerning the case of a laborer? Apparently, these are two different halakhot. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Were these baraitot taught alongside one another, such that one can deduce a halakha from the change in wording? These are two separate baraitot, and therefore no inference can be drawn from the difference in terminology, and both may be referring to a nazirite laborer.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מִנַּיִן לְפוֹעֵל שֶׁאָמַר ״תְּנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי וּבָנַי״ שֶׁאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאֶל כֶּלְיְךָ לֹא תִתֵּן״. וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָכִי נָמֵי נָזִיר, אִי הָכִי מִשּׁוּם ״אֶל כֶּלְיְךָ לֹא תִּתֵּן״, מִשּׁוּם ״לָךְ לָךְ״ אָמְרִין נְזִירָא הוּא!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from another baraita: From where is it derived with regard to a laborer who said: Give the produce to my wife and my children, that they do not listen to him? As it is stated: “But you shall not put any in your vessel” (Deuteronomy 23:25). And if you would say that so too, this is referring to a nazirite, if so, the reason is not due to the verse: “But you shall not put any in your vessel”; rather, it is due to the principle: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, do not approach a vineyard.
אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָתָנֵי לַהּ בִּלְשׁוֹן פּוֹעֵל – קָא נָסֵיב לֵהּ קְרָא דְּפוֹעֵל.
The Gemara refutes this proof: Yes, it is indeed so. This baraita is discussing a nazirite, and since it teaches the halakha by utilizing the language of a laborer, without specifying that he is a nazirite, it cites the verse that is stated with regard to a laborer. In fact, the actual source for the halakha is a decree due to naziriteship, while the practice is permitted to any other laborer.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֵל לְקַצּוֹת בִּתְאֵנִים
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma’asrot 2:7): With regard to one who hires a laborer to prepare figs for drying,
הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל וּפָטוּר מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאוֹכֵל אֲנִי וּבְנִי״, אוֹ ״שֶׁיֹּאכַל בְּנִי בִּשְׂכָרִי״ – הוּא אוֹכֵל וּפָטוּר, וּבְנוֹ אוֹכֵל וְחַיָּיב.
this laborer may eat and is exempt from separating tithe. Since the Torah granted him permission to eat, he may do so while he is working without separating tithes, as is the case with regard to gifts due to the poor. But if the laborer stipulated: On the condition that I and my sons may eat, or that my son may eat for my wages, he himself may eat and is exempt from separating tithes, as he is permitted to eat by Torah law, and his son may eat but is obligated to separate tithes.
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל, בְּנוֹ אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּמִקָּח.
And if you say he eats from his own property, why is his son obligated? A son may eat from his father’s table without rendering the food subject to tithes. Ravina said: The reason is because it looks like a sale. Although the produce belongs to the laborer by Torah law, when he makes a deal involving his son it has the appearance of a transaction. Therefore, he must separate tithes to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of observers.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֵל לַעֲשׂוֹת בְּנֶטַע רְבָעִי שֶׁלּוֹ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לֹא יֹאכֵלוּ. וְאִם לֹא הוֹדִיעָם – פּוֹדֶה וּמַאֲכִילָן.
The Gemara cites yet another relevant source: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): In the case of one who hires a laborer to perform labor with his fourth-year produce, such laborers may not eat the fruit, as all fruit of the fourth year of a tree must be taken and consumed in Jerusalem. And if he did not inform them beforehand that they were working with fourth-year produce, they are considered to have been hired under false pretenses. Consequently, he must redeem the fruit and feed them.
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל – אַמַּאי פּוֹדֶה וּמַאֲכִילָן? אִיסּוּרָא לָא זַכִּי לְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא! הָתָם מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּמִקָּח טָעוּת.
And if you say that the laborer eats from the property of Heaven, why must the owner redeem the fruit and feed them? The Merciful One certainly did not entitle them to transgress a prohibition. Even if by Torah law the laborer is granted a personal right to eat, this applies only to permitted food. The Gemara explains: There, the reason is because it looks like a mistaken transaction, as they accepted employment under the assumption that they would be permitted to eat the fruit. He is therefore obligated to compensate them.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: נִתְפָּרְסוּ עִגּוּלָיו, נִתְפַּתְּחוּ חָבִיּוֹתָיו – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לֹא יֹאכֵלוּ, וְאִם לֹא הוֹדִיעָן – מְעַשֵּׂר וּמַאֲכִילָן. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל, אַמַּאי מְעַשֵּׂר וּמַאֲכִילָן? אִיסּוּרָא לָא זַכִּי לְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא!
The Gemara suggests another proof: But now state the latter clause of that same mishna: If his cakes, in which he had earlier preserved his figs, broke apart and crumbled, so that they must be preserved once again, or if his barrels of wine opened and he hired laborers to reseal them, these laborers may not eat. The reason is that the figs and wine were already subject to tithes, from which point a laborer may not eat them. And if the owner did not inform them that it is prohibited for them to consume the food, he must tithe the food and feed them. But if you say he eats from the property of Heaven, why must he tithe the food and feed them? The Merciful One certainly did not entitle them to transgress a prohibition.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָכָא נָמֵי מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּמִקָּח טָעוּת. בִּשְׁלָמָא נִתְפָּרְסוּ עִגּוּלָיו – מִיחֲזֵי כְּמִקָּח טָעוּת. אֶלָּא נִתְפַּתְּחוּ חָבִיּוֹתָיו, מַאי מִקָּח טָעוּת אִיכָּא? מִידָּע יָדַע דְּאִיטְּבִיל לְהוּ לְמַעֲשֵׂר!
And if you would say: Here too, is it because it looks like a mistaken transaction, that explanation is not tenable. Granted, in the case where his cakes broke apart, this does look like a mistaken transaction, as the laborers were unaware that the figs had been preserved once already, and they mistakenly thought that the fruit had not yet reached the stage at which it would become subject to tithes. But with regard to the other case, when his barrels opened, what mistaken transaction is there here? They certainly know that the wine had already been rendered untithed produce with regard to tithes, as wine is subject to tithes as soon as it has been collected into the pit alongside the winepress.
אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: שֶׁנִּתְפַּתְּחוּ חָבִיּוֹתָיו לַבּוֹר. וְהָתַנְיָא: יַיִן מִשֶּׁיֵּרֵד לַבּוֹר!
Rav Sheshet said: This is referring to a case where his barrels opened in such a manner that the wine once again fell into the pit from which it came. The laborers therefore assumed that the owner was not yet obligated to set aside tithes. The Gemara raises a difficulty against this explanation: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that wine is immediately subject to tithes from when it descends into the pit?
כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר מִשֶּׁיְּקַפֶּה, דַּאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: לָא הֲוָה יָדְעִינַן. וְנֵימָא לְהוּ: אִיבְּעִי לְכוּ אַסּוֹקֵי אַדַּעְתַּיְיכוּ דִּלְמָא מְקַפֶּה! בְּאַתְרָא דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּנָגֵיד אִיהוּ מְקַפֶּה!
The Gemara answers: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that wine is subject to tithes only from when one starts to remove the seeds and the waste floats to the top, which occurs after the wine has already descended into the pit. The reason for this halakha is that the laborers can say to him: We did not know that the wine had already been removed from the pit. The Gemara asks: But let us say to them: It should have entered your minds that perhaps its waste had already floated. The Gemara responds: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a place where that same man who pulls the wine from the pit is also the one who floats its waste. Consequently, it was reasonable for the laborers to assume that they had been hired to perform both tasks.
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּתָנֵי רַב זְבִיד בִּדְבֵי רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא: יַיִן מִשֶּׁיֵּרֵד לַבּוֹר וִיקַפֶּה, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מִשֶּׁיְּשַׁלֶּה בֶּחָבִיּוֹת. אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא שֶׁלֹּא נִתְפַּתְּחוּ חָבִיּוֹתָיו לַבּוֹר, דַּאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: לָא הֲוָה יָדְעִינַן דִּמְשַׁלֵּי.
The Gemara adds: And one can reach a different conclusion now that Rav Zevid has taught the following version of the above dispute, heard from the school of Rabbi Hoshaya: Wine is subject to tithes from when it descends into the pit and its waste floats. And Rabbi Akiva says: It is subject to tithes from when he drains the waste from the barrels. They would pour all of the wine into a barrel, before draining and removing the waste after fermentation. With this in mind, you can even say that the barrels were not opened into the pit, but simply opened up, as the laborers can say to him: We did not know that he had already drained the waste.
וְנֵימָא לְהוּ: אִיבְּעִי לְכוּ אַסּוֹקֵי אַדַּעְתַּיְיכוּ דִּלְמָא מְשַׁלֵּי! בְּאַתְרָא דְּהָהוּא דְּשָׁרֵיק הָהוּא מְשַׁלֵּי.
The Gemara poses a question: But let us say to them: It should have entered your minds that perhaps its waste had already been drained. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a place where that same man who plugs the barrel with a stopper is also the one who drains its waste, and therefore they assumed they had been hired to perform both tasks.
תָּא שְׁמַע: קוֹצֵץ אָדָם עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַל יְדֵי בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים, עַל יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים, וְעַל יְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן דַּעַת. אֲבָל אֵינוֹ קוֹצֵץ לֹא עַל יְדֵי בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים, וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים, וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי בְּהֶמְתּוֹ – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן דַּעַת.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (93a): A man can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, or on behalf of his wife, with their agreement, because they have the basic level of mental competence, i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights. But he cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor son or daughter, nor on behalf of his minor Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, nor on behalf of his animal, as they do not have the basic level of mental competence.
קָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ בְּמַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי אֵינוֹ קוֹצֵץ, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל – קְטַנִּים נָמֵי נִקּוֹץ לְהוּ!
The Gemara analyzes this mishna: It might enter your mind that all these examples involve cases where the father, master, or husband, depending on the case, provides his children, slaves, or wife with food, and they assist him in his work. Granted, if you say that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, it is due to that reason that he may not stipulate this on behalf of minors, as the Torah also entitled minors themselves to eat when they work, and they cannot waive their rights. But if you say that a laborer eats from his own property, and the food he consumes is a monetary obligation, let him be allowed to stipulate on behalf of minors as well. Since in a case where a father provides sustenance for his children he keeps the profits of their labor, he should be entitled to stipulate this concerning their payment.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּשֶׁאֵין מַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת. אִי הָכִי, גְּדוֹלִים נָמֵי! גְּדוֹלִים יָדְעִי וְקָא מָחֲלִי.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a situation in which the father does not provide his children with food. Therefore, he does not keep the profits of their labor and has no right to make stipulations concerning the terms of their employment. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, in the case of adult children and slaves too, the father or master should not be able to stipulate in this manner. Since he does not provide them with food, why should he be able to waive their rights? The Gemara responds: Adults are aware of the stipulation and forgive their rights to the food. He can stipulate this only with their agreement.
וְהָא תָּנֵא רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא: קוֹצֵץ אָדָם עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעַל יְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא עַל יְדֵי בְּהֶמְתּוֹ. וְעַל יְדֵי בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים, אֲבָל לֹא עַל יְדֵי בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים. וְקוֹצֵץ עַל יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הַכְּנַעֲנִים, בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים וּבֵין קְטַנִּים.
The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Hoshaya teach in a baraita: A person can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and on his wife’s behalf, but not on behalf of his animal; and he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, but not on behalf of his minor son or daughter; and he can stipulate this on behalf of his Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, whether they are adults or minors. This contradicts the ruling of the previous mishna that one cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor slave.
מַאי לָאו, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּמַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת, וּבְהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל, וּמָר סָבַר מִשֶּׁל שָׁמַיִם הוּא אוֹכֵל?! לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִשֶּׁלּוֹ הוּא אוֹכֵל, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – בְּשֶׁאֵין מַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת, וּבָרַיְיתָא – בְּמַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת.
What, is it not correct to say that this and that, both sources, are referring to cases where the master provides the slaves with food, and they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, the tanna of the mishna, holds that a laborer eats from his own property, and therefore he can relinquish the rights of his minor slave, and one Sage, of the baraita, holds that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, and therefore he cannot relinquish the rights of his minor slave? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No; everyone agrees that a laborer eats from his own property, and it is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where he does not provide the slaves with food, as stated previously, and the baraita is referring to a case where he provides them with food.
בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתַּהּ – בְּמַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת? אִי הָכִי קְטַנִּים נָמֵי נִקּוֹץ לְהוּ! צַעֲרַיְיהוּ דִּבְנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים לָא זַכִּי לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.
The Gemara asks: To what case did you interpret the baraita to be referring? Did you interpret it as referring to a case where he provides the slaves with food? If so, let him also be allowed to stipulate on behalf of his minor children that they receive no food, as presumably the baraita is referring to a case where he provides his minor children with food. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One does not entitle him to waive the suffering of his minor son and daughter. His young children will suffer if they are prevented from eating the food they see before them.
בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתָּא לְמַתְנִיתִין – בְּשֶׁאֵין מַעֲלֶה לָהֶן מְזוֹנוֹת,
The Gemara further asks: To what case did you interpret the baraita to be referring? Did you interpret it as referring to a case where he does not provide the slaves with food?
