Eruvin 44
אוֹ אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. אוֹ דִילְמָא, בִּדְלָא מָלוּ גַּבְרֵי עָסְקִינַן, וְקָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אוֹ אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר?
or is the halakha not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel? Or perhaps we are dealing with a case where the space between Neḥemya and the Shabbat limit could not be filled with people who had established an eiruv and were permitted to establish a human partition for Neḥemya. In that case, there were enough people to establish partitions from where Neḥemya was standing to within two cubits from the limit, and the dilemma that Rav Ḥisda raised was: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that someone who went two cubits outside of his Shabbat limit may reenter it, or is the halakha not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer?
פְּשִׁיטָא בִּדְלָא מָלוּ גַּבְרֵי עָסְקִינַן, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בִּדְמָלוּ גַּבְרֵי עָסְקִינַן, מַאי תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ? הָאָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּדִיר וְסַהַר וּסְפִינָה! אֶלָּא וַדַּאי בִּדְלָא מָלוּ גַּבְרֵי עָסְקִינַן, וּדְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: This is obvious that we are dealing with a case where the space between Neḥemya and the Shabbat limit could not be filled with people, as if it should enter your mind that we are dealing with a case where the space between Neḥemya and the Shabbat limit could be fully filled with people, what is Rav Ḥisda’s dilemma? Didn’t Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel with regard to a pen, a stable, and a boat? Rather, we must be dealing with a case where the space between Neḥemya and the Shabbat limit could not be filled with people, and the dilemma that he raised was about the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״יִכָּנֵס״. מַאי ״יִכָּנֵס״ — לָאו בְּלֹא מְחִיצָה?!
The Gemara comments: This interpretation is also precise and implicit in Rav Naḥman’s answer, for Rav Naḥman said to Rav Ḥisda: Establish a human partition for him, and let him reenter his Shabbat limit. Doesn’t the statement: Let him reenter, mean that he may reenter even without a partition along those two additional two cubits, i.e., that after he passes through the human partitions, he would still need to cross the remaining two cubits on his own without the benefit of a partition?
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא: נָפַל דּוֹפְנָהּ — לֹא יַעֲמִיד בָּהּ אָדָם בְּהֵמָה וְכֵלִים. וְלֹא יִזְקוֹף אֶת הַמִּטָּה לִפְרוֹס עָלֶיהָ סָדִין, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין אֹהֶל עֲרַאי בַּתְּחִילָּה בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection to the opinion of Rava with regard to the principle of making a human partition on Shabbat, from a baraita: If the wall of a sukka fell on a Festival or on Shabbat, thus rendering the sukka unfit for the mitzva, one may not position people, animals or utensils there in its place in order to form a wall, nor may one turn a bed upright in order to spread a sheet over it, which will thereby serve as a partition, because one may not make a temporary tent for the first time on a Festival, and, needless to say, this is prohibited on Shabbat. This indicates that a human partition may not be erected on Shabbat.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לִי מֵהָא, וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא לָךְ מֵהָא: עוֹשֶׂה אָדָם אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ דּוֹפֶן כְּדֵי שֶׁיֹּאכַל וְיִשְׁתֶּה וְיִשַׁן. וְיִזְקוֹף אֶת הַמִּטָּה וְיִפְרוֹס עָלֶיהָ סָדִין כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּפּוֹל חַמָּה עַל הַמֵּת וְעַל הָאוֹכָלִין.
Rava said to him: You state to me that this is prohibited from this baraita, but I can state to you that it is permitted from this other baraita: A person may position his fellow as a wall, so that he may eat, drink, and sleep in a sukka, and he is likewise permitted to turn a bed upright in order to spread a sheet over it, so that the sun should not beat down on a corpse, or on food.
קַשְׁיָין אַהֲדָדֵי! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָא — רַבָּנַן, דִּתְנַן: פְּקַק הַחַלּוֹן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: בִּזְמַן שֶׁקָּשׁוּר וְתָלוּי — פּוֹקְקִין בּוֹ, וְאִם לָאו — אֵין פּוֹקְקִין בּוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ פּוֹקְקִין בּוֹ.
The Gemara comments: If so, these two baraitot contradict one another. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this baraita that teaches that it is prohibited reflects the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, whereas this other baraita that teaches that it is permitted reflects the opinion of the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna: With regard to a window shutter that is not fixed to the wall with hinges, Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is tied to the wall and hangs from the window, one may shut the window with it; but if not, one may not shut the window with it, since one may not erect a tent, even a temporary one, on Shabbat. But the Rabbis say: In either case, one may shut the window with it. This indicates that the Rabbis permit constructing a temporary wall of this sort on Shabbat, and they also permit the construction of a temporary wall in the case of a sukka.
וְהָא: אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין אֹהֶל עֲרַאי בַּתְּחִילָּה בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּשַׁבָּת. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא לְהוֹסִיף, שֶׁרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין מוֹסִיפִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּשַׁבָּת. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מוֹסִיפִין בְּשַׁבָּת, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּיוֹם טוֹב!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t it stated with regard to this dispute: Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: All agree that one may not make a temporary tent for the first time on a Festival, and, needless to say, this is prohibited on Shabbat. The Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only with regard to adding a temporary tent to a permanent structure, as in the case of a window shutter. As Rabbi Eliezer says: One may not add a temporary tent to a permanent structure even on a Festival; and, needless to say, this is prohibited on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: One may add a temporary tent to a permanent structure on Shabbat, and needless to say, this is permitted on a Festival. This indicates that there is no opinion that grants license to construct a temporary wall for the first time.
אֶלָּא לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הָא — כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא: עֲשָׂאָהּ לִבְהֵמָה דּוֹפֶן לַסּוּכָּה, רַבִּי מֵאִיר פּוֹסֵל, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַכְשִׁיר.
Rather, the Gemara resolves the contradiction differently: This is not difficult, as this baraita that permits the positioning of an animal or a person as a wall was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and this baraita that prohibits it was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who positions an animal to serve as the wall of a sukka, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit, out of concern that the animal might leave, whereas Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּקָא פָּסֵיל הָתָם — אַלְמָא לָא מְחִיצָה הִיא, הָכָא שָׁרֵי, דְּלָאו מִידֵּי קָא עָבֵיד.
Rabbi Meir, who deems the wall unfit there, with regard to a sukka, apparently holds that a partition established from a living creature is not a partition and he would here, in the case of Shabbat, rule that it is permitted to construct such a wall, as he is not doing anything, since it is not considered actual construction.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּקָא מַכְשִׁיר הָתָם — אַלְמָא מְחִיצָה הִיא, הָכָא אָסַר.
However, Rabbi Yehuda, who deems the wall to be fit there, with regard to a sukka, apparently holds that it is a proper partition; and he would here, in the case of Shabbat, prohibit the construction of such a partition.
וְתִיסְבְּרָא? אֵימַר דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּהֵמָה. אָדָם וְכֵלִים מִי שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: And how can you understand it in that manner? Say that you heard that Rabbi Meir deemed the sukka to be unfit in the case where an animal was used to serve as a partition, but did you hear that he deemed the sukka to be similarly unfit if a person or utensils were used as walls? The reason that an animal may not be used as a partition, according to his opinion, is because it might leave. This concern does not apply to people or utensils, since a person is under his own control and can remain standing, and utensils do not move themselves. Since the baraita validates partitions established with people and utensils as well as animals, it cannot be based on the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
וְתוּ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר — לְהוֹסִיף נָמֵי אָסַר.
And furthermore, even if you do not differentiate as above, and instead assume that the consideration that the animal might leave is pertinent, according to whose opinion does Rabbi Meir state his opinion with regard to constructing a temporary tent on Shabbat? If it is according to the opinion of his teacher Rabbi Eliezer, this is difficult, as he even prohibited adding a window shutter, i.e., a temporary tent, to a permanent structure.
אֶלָּא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, אֵימַר דְּאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן לְהוֹסִיף, לְכַתְּחִילָּה מִי אֲמוּר?
Rather, you must say that he stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. However, even according to their opinion, say that the Rabbis only said that one is permitted to add a temporary tent to a permanent structure; but did they say that it is permitted to construct a partition or a tent for the first time?
אֶלָּא: הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן. וְכֵלִים אַכֵּלִים לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא — בְּדוֹפֶן שְׁלִישִׁית, הָא — בְּדוֹפֶן רְבִיעִית.
Rather, say that both this baraita and that baraita follow the opinion of the Rabbis, and this is the resolution of the various contradictions: With regard to the contradiction between the one ruling concerning utensils and the other ruling concerning utensils, this is not difficult, as this ruling that prohibits the construction of an additional wall refers to the third wall of a sukka, which renders it fit for the mitzva; whereas this other ruling that permits the construction of an additional wall refers to the fourth wall of a sukka, which is insignificant, as a sukka need not have four walls.
דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: נָפַל דּוֹפְנָהּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
This interpretation is also precise in the wording of the baraita, as the baraita that prohibits the construction of an additional wall uses the following phrase: If its wall fell. This indicates a wall that is significant, i.e., a wall that renders it fit for use, rather than any wall, as stated in the baraita that permits it. The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that the correct resolution is to differentiate between the third and fourth wall of a sukka.
אֶלָּא אָדָם אַאָדָם קַשְׁיָא!
However, with regard to the contradiction between the one ruling concerning a person and the other ruling concerning a person, it is difficult, for one baraita states that one may not use a person as the wall of a sukka, while the other says that one may use a person as a wall and even states explicitly that he may do this: So that he may eat, drink and sleep in the sukka. That implies that this is permitted even if it is the third wall that is missing.
אָדָם אַאָדָם נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן — לְדַעַת, כָּאן — שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת.
The Gemara answers: With regard to the contradiction between the one ruling concerning a person and the other ruling concerning a person, it is also not difficult. Here, where it is prohibited, the baraita refers to a case where that person knowingly served as a partition; whereas here, where it is permitted, it refers to a case where that person unknowingly served as a partition, which is not the usual manner of building. This is not the case with regard to utilizing a utensil as a partition. Since the utensil lacks knowledge, it is considered a partition regardless of how it is placed, and it is prohibited in all cases.
וְהָא דְּרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִילַאי, לְדַעַת הֲוָה! שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת הֲוָה.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: However, the case involving Rabbi Neḥemya, son of Rabbi Ḥanilai, was a case where people knowingly served as a partition, as the people were instructed to go out and serve as a human partition. The Gemara answers: In fact, that was a case where people unknowingly served as a partition, i.e., they were unaware why they were called, and were made into a partition without their knowledge.
רַב חִסְדָּא, מִיהָא לְדַעַת הֲוָה! רַב חִסְדָּא, שֶׁלֹּא מִן הַמִּנְיָן הֲוָה.
The Gemara asks: However, Rav Ḥisda, who gathered the people to that spot, was in any case present knowingly. The Gemara answers: While Rav Ḥisda was there knowingly, he was not among the designated people who served as a partition.
הָנְהוּ בְּנֵי גְנָנָא דְּאַעִילוּ מַיָּא בִּמְחִיצָה שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם. נַגְּדִינְהוּ שְׁמוּאֵל. אֲמַר: אִם אָמְרוּ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, יֹאמְרוּ לְדַעַת?!
The Gemara relates that there were these members of a wedding party who engaged the many people present to bring water in on Shabbat from a public domain to a private domain through walls comprised of people who knew that they were being used as partitions for that purpose. Shmuel instructed that they should be flogged. He said with regard to this matter: If the Sages said that a partition is effective when the people act unknowingly, does this mean that they would also say that this is permitted ab initio when they knowingly serve as a partition?
הָנְהוּ זִיקֵי דַּהֲוָה שַׁדְיָין בְּרִיסְתְּקָא דְמָחוֹזָא, בַּהֲדֵי דַּאֲתָא רָבָא מִפִּירְקֵיהּ, אַעְלִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ. לְשַׁבְּתָא אַחֲרִיתִי בָּעֵי עַיְּילִינְהוּ, וַאֲסַר לְהוּ, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ כִּלְדַעַת — וְאָסוּר.
The Gemara relates that there were once these flasks lying in the market [ristaka] of Meḥoza on Shabbat and could not be moved. When Rava was coming from his discourse accompanied by a throng of people, his attendants brought the flasks into his house, as the crowd of people created human partitions, upon which the attendants capitalized for this purpose. On another Shabbat they wanted to bring them in again, but Rava prohibited them from doing so, reasoning: This is like the case where the people knowingly served as partitions, for presumably the people now knew that they were being used for this purpose, and it is therefore prohibited.
לֵוִי, אַעִילוּ לֵיהּ תִּיבְנָא, זְעֵירִי — אַסְפַּסְתָּא, רַב שִׁימִי בַּר חִיָּיא — מַיָּא.
The Gemara further relates that Levi was brought straw through human partitions comprised of people who were unknowingly used for this purpose, and in the same manner Ze’eiri was brought fodder [aspasta], and Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya was brought water.
מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁיָּצָא בִּרְשׁוּת, וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״כְּבָר נַעֲשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה״ — יֵשׁ לוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה לְכׇל רוּחַ.
MISHNA: With regard to one who was permitted to leave his Shabbat limit, i.e., he went out to testify that he had seen the new moon or for some life-saving purpose, and they said to him along the way: The action has already been performed, and there is no need for you to travel for that purpose, he has two thousand cubits in each direction from the location where he was standing when this was told to him.
אִם הָיָה בְּתוֹךְ הַתְּחוּם — כְּאִילּוּ לֹא יָצָא. כׇּל הַיּוֹצְאִים לְהַצִּיל — חוֹזְרִין לִמְקוֹמָן.
If he was within his original limit, it is considered as if he had not left his limit, and he may return to his original location. The Sages formulated a principle: All who go out to battle and save lives may return to their original locations on Shabbat.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״אִם הָיָה בְּתוֹךְ הַתְּחוּם כְּאִילּוּ לֹא יָצָא״? אָמַר רַבָּה, הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם הָיָה בְּתוֹךְ תְּחוּם שֶׁלּוֹ — כְּאִילּוּ לֹא יָצָא מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ דָּמֵי.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: If he was within his original limit, it is considered as if he had never left? Given that he has not left his original boundary, it is clear that he remains within his original limit. Rabba said: The mishna is saying as follows: If he was within his original limit, it is considered as if he had never left his house. He is allowed to walk two thousand cubits in each direction from his house.
פְּשִׁיטָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וְעָקַר — עָקַר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: It is obvious that if he remained within his limit, he is considered as if he were in his house. Why is this statement necessary? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that, since he moved from his place with intention to leave his limit and go elsewhere, he moved and nullified his original place of residence. If so, his original place of residence would no longer determine his Shabbat limit, and instead he would have two thousand cubits in each direction from the location where he was standing when he was told that he need not travel. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that it is nonetheless considered as if he had never left his house.
רַב שִׁימִי בַּר חִיָּיא אָמַר, הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם הָיוּ תְּחוּמִין שֶׁנָּתְנוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים מוּבְלָעִין בְּתוֹךְ הַתְּחוּם שֶׁלּוֹ, כְּאִילּוּ לֹא יָצָא מִתְּחוּמוֹ.
Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said that the mishna is saying as follows: If he left his original Shabbat limit, but the new limit of two thousand cubits in each direction that the Sages granted him is subsumed within his original limit, so that if he walks those two thousand cubits, he can return to within his original limit, then it is as if he had never left his original limit, and he may return to his house.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר הַבְלָעַת תְּחוּמִין מִילְּתָא הִיא, וּמָר סָבַר לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא.
The Gemara comments: With regard to what principle do Rabba and Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya disagree? One Sage, Rav Shimi, holds that the subsuming of Shabbat limits, i.e., if one’s original limit is subsumed within the new limit, one may pass from one to the other, is something significant and may be relied upon, whereas this Sage, Rabba, holds that it is nothing significant and cannot be relied upon.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַבָּה: וְאַתְּ לָא תִּסְבְּרָא דְּהַבְלָעַת תְּחוּמִין מִילְּתָא הִיא? וּמָה אִילּוּ שָׁבַת בִּמְעָרָה, שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ אַרְבַּעַת אֲלָפִים וְעַל גַּגָּהּ פָּחוֹת מֵאַרְבַּעַת אֲלָפִים אַמָּה — לֹא נִמְצָא מְהַלֵּךְ אֶת כּוּלָּהּ, וְחוּצָה לָהּ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה?
Abaye said to Rabba: Do you not hold that the subsuming of Shabbat limits is something significant? And what if he established residence in a cave that has entrances at its two ends, which on the inside of the cave is four thousand cubits across, but atop its roof it is less than four thousand cubits across? Is it not the case that he may walk the entire length of the roof and two thousand cubits outside it in either direction? The entire interior of the cave is considered as if it were four cubits, and he is permitted to walk another two thousand cubits in each direction from each of its entrances. Consequently, he is permitted to walk along the roof, two thousand cubits from the eastern entrance in the direction of the western entrance and vice versa. However, since the distance across the roof is less than four thousand cubits, these two limits are subsumed within one another, and he is permitted to walk the entire length of the roof, given that when two limits are subsumed within one another, one may pass from one to the other.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין הֵיכָא דְּשָׁבַת בָּאֲוִיר מְחִיצּוֹת מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, לְהֵיכָא דְּלֹא שָׁבַת בַּאֲוִיר מְחִיצּוֹת מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם?
Rabba said to Abaye: Do you not distinguish between a case where the person established residence within the airspace of partitions before Shabbat while it was still day, as in the case of the cave, and a case where he did not establish residence within the airspace of partitions before Shabbat while it was still day, as in the case of the mishna? The principle governing the Shabbat limits being subsumed in one another only applies in the former case, where both of the Shabbat limits were established before Shabbat, but not in the latter case, where the two limits were established at different times, one before Shabbat and one on Shabbat.
וְהֵיכָא דְּלֹא שָׁבַת, לָא?
Abaye raised a difficulty: And in a case where he did not acquire his place of residence within those partitions before Shabbat, does the principle governing the subsuming of limits not apply?
