Gittin 12
דִּלְמָא לָא הִיא; עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּמִיגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֵי מַפְקַר לְהוּ לְנִכְסֵיהּ, וְהָוֵי עָנִי וַחֲזֵי לֵיהּ – וּמִיגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לֵיהּ לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ; אֲבָל הָכָא, לָא.
Perhaps that is not so. Perhaps this is not the point of dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. There are two ways to explain why this might not be the case. First, it is possible that Rabbi Eliezer states his opinion only there, when the person took possession of the pe’a despite not being eligible to collect it for himself, since if the one who collected the produce desired, he could declare his property ownerless and become a poor person, and then the produce would have been fit for him to retain for himself. And since he could have acquired the pe’a for himself, he can likewise acquire it for another as well. However, here, where he seizes property on behalf of a creditor, he cannot seize this property for himself. Consequently, Rabbi Eliezer does not rule that he can do so when it is against the interests of another person.
וְעַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תְלַקֵּט לְעָנִי״ – לֹא תְלַקֵּט לוֹ לְעָנִי; אֲבָל הָכָא, לָא.
Second, one can argue from the opposite perspective: The Rabbis state their opinion only there, that one cannot acquire on behalf of the poor person, as it is written: “The corner of your field you shall not reap and the gleaning of your harvest you shall not gather; for the poor you shall leave them” (Leviticus 23:22), and the Sages expounded this verse by reading it as though there were no break in the middle: You shall not gather for the poor, i.e., the poor person must collect the produce for himself. However, here, where one seizes property on behalf of a creditor, this verse does not apply, and therefore the Rabbis did not rule that the action of the third party is ineffective. Consequently, it is possible that the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis is not with regard to the issue of whether one can seize property on behalf of a creditor in a case where it is to the detriment of others.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הַאי ״לֹא תְלַקֵּט״ – מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְהַזְהִיר לְעָנִי עַל שֶׁלּוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Eliezer, with regard to this verse: “You shall not gather,” what does he do with it? How does he interpret this phrase, from which the Rabbis derived that one may not collect pe’a on behalf of a poor person? The Gemara answers: He requires it to warn a poor person with regard to his own field, i.e., if a poor person had a field of his own he is not permitted to gather pe’a from it for himself, his poverty notwithstanding.
שֶׁאִם יִרְצֶה שֶׁלֹּא לָזוּן כּוּ׳: שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד: ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״?
§ The mishna taught: As, if the master wishes not to sustain his slave he is allowed to act accordingly. The Gemara comments: Conclude from the mishna that the master is legally able to say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״צֵא מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיךָ״.
The Gemara rejects this claim: This is not a conclusive proof, as with what are we dealing here, in the mishna? We are dealing with a case where he said to the slave: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. In other words, I will not provide for you; rather, you must work and earn money for your sustenance on your own. However, this does not mean that a master can force his slave to work for him without providing him with sustenance.
דִּכְווֹתַהּ גַּבֵּי אִשָּׁה – דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״?! אִשָּׁה אַמַּאי לָא? אִשָּׁה – בִּדְלָא סָפְקָא.
The Gemara asks: If so, in the corresponding situation in the mishna with regard to a wife, will one explain that he could have said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself? The mishna rules that one cannot exempt himself from his obligation to provide sustenance for his wife. In the case of a wife, why may he not do so? It is certainly permitted for a husband to stipulate with his wife that she will keep her earnings and not receive sustenance from him, yet it is clear in the mishna that there is a difference between a slave and a wife with regard to his ability to refuse to provide sustenance. The Gemara answers: The wife mentioned in the mishna is one whose earnings are not sufficient for her sustenance, and in that case the husband may not stipulate in this manner.
עֶבֶד נָמֵי בִּדְלָא סָפֵיק! עַבְדָּא דִּנְהוֹם כְּרֵסֵיהּ לָא שָׁוֵיא, לְמָרֵיהּ וּלְמָרְתֵיהּ לְמַאי מִיתְבְּעֵי?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, the case of the slave also is referring to a situation where his earnings are not sufficient for his sustenance, and he is unable to sustain himself. Nevertheless, his master can refuse to sustain him. Therefore, one can conclude from the mishna that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you. The Gemara explains: A slave who is not worth the bread that he consumes, for what is he needed by his master or his mistress? If the value of his labor does not even pay for the cost of his sustenance why is he needed at all? The mishna certainly does not refer to a case of this kind. By contrast, with regard to a wife, the marriage does not depend on her ability to provide for herself by means of her earnings. Consequently, one cannot prove from the mishna that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you.
תָּא שְׁמַע: עֶבֶד שֶׁגָּלָה לְעָרֵי מִקְלָט אֵין רַבּוֹ חַיָּיב לְזוּנוֹ, וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁמַּעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו לְרַבּוֹ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמַר לוֹ: ״צֵא מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיךָ״.
The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 2:8): With regard to a slave who unintentionally killed someone and was exiled to one of the cities of refuge, his master is not required to sustain him. And not only that, but his earnings in his city of refuge belong to his master. Conclude from the baraita that a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you, as in the case of a slave exiled to a city of refuge the master is entitled to his earnings despite not providing for him. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the master said to him: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.
אִי הָכִי, מַעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו אַמַּאי לְרַבּוֹ? לְהַעְדָּפָה.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if the master said this to the slave, then why do his earnings belong to his master? After all, his master stipulated that he should sustain himself. The Gemara answers: This halakha is referring to his surplus earnings, i.e., if the slave works and earns more than the cost of his sustenance, his surplus income belongs to the master.
הַעֲדָפָה, פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, כֵּיוָן דְּכִי לֵית לֵיהּ לָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ, כִּי אִית לֵיהּ נָמֵי לָא לִישְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that any surplus belongs to the master, as he owns the slave? The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that since, when he does not work enough the master does not give him all he needs to eat, then when he has a surplus from his work the master should also not take it. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that despite this consideration the surplus belongs to the master.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא לְעָרֵי מִקְלָט? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״וָחָי״ – עָבֵיד לֵיהּ חִיּוּתָא טְפֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: And what is different with regard to a slave who was exiled to one of the cities of refuge, concerning whom the baraita was stated? According to this reasoning, the surplus should belong to the master no matter where the slave is located. The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that as the verse states with regard to one who is exiled to a city of refuge: “And that fleeing to one of these cities he might live” (Deuteronomy 4:42), one should act for him so that he has extra life, i.e., in this specific case the slave should be allowed to retain any additional amount he earns. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that no special obligation of this kind applies even if the slave had been exiled to a city of refuge.
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּלְתָה לְעָרֵי מִקְלָט – בַּעְלָהּ חַיָּיב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ; מִכְּלָל דְּלָא אֲמַר לַהּ, דְּאִי אֲמַר לַהּ, בַּעְלַהּ אַמַּאי חַיָּיב?
The Gemara raises another difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of that baraita teaches: However, with regard to a woman who was exiled to one of the cities of refuge, her husband is obligated in her sustenance, by inference the baraita is dealing with a case where he did not say to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, which is why he must sustain her. As, if he said this to her, why is her husband obligated to provide her with sustenance?
וּמִדְּסֵיפָא דְּלָא אֲמַר לַהּ, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי דְּלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ!
And from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is speaking about a case where he did not say this to her, it may be inferred that the first clause is also dealing with a situation where he did not say to the slave: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. The two clauses of the baraita must be referring to similar cases or they would not be taught together.
לְעוֹלָם דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ, וְאִשָּׁה בִּדְלָא סָפְקָה.
The Gemara rejects this claim: Actually, the baraita is referring to a case where the master said to the slave: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, and the husband issued a similar statement to his wife. However, in the case of a woman it is referring to a situation when her earnings are not sufficient for her sustenance.
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם אָמַר לָהּ ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״ – רַשַּׁאי, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּלָא אֲמַר לַהּ! הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְאִם מַסְפֶּקֶת, וְאָמַר לַהּ: ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״ – רַשַּׁאי.
The Gemara raises an objection: But from the fact that the last clause teaches: And if the husband said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, he is permitted to act accordingly, it may be inferred that the first half of the last clause is referring to a case where he did not say this to her. The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita is saying: And if her earnings suffice to pay for her sustenance, and he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, it is permitted for him to say that.
מַסְפֶּקֶת, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״כׇּל כְּבוּדָּה בַת מֶלֶךְ פְּנִימָה״, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: If the baraita is referring to a case where her earnings suffice, what is the purpose of stating this halakha with regard to one who was exiled to a city of refuge? The same halakha applies to all wives. The Gemara answers: It is necessary, lest you say that in light of the verse: “All glorious is the king’s daughter within the palace” (Psalms 45:14), from which it is derived that it is improper for a wife to spend too much time outside her home, this woman’s husband should be concerned that while his wife is in a city of refuge she should not work out of the home, but only in the home. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that there is no need to be concerned about this matter, and her husband may say to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, even in a city of refuge.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי – רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל הָעֶבֶד לוֹמַר לְרַבּוֹ בִּשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת: ״אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי, אוֹ הוֹצִיאֵנִי לְחֵירוּת״. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הָרְשׁוּת בְּיַד רַבּוֹ.
With regard to the question of whether a master can decide to cease providing sustenance for his slave while the slave continues to serve him, the Gemara suggests: Let us say that this matter is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A slave can say to his master in years of famine: Either sustain me from your property or emancipate me. And the Rabbis say: His master has permission to retain his ownership over him without sustaining him.
מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: יָכוֹל, וּמָר סָבַר: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל?
What, is it not correct to say that they disagree about this issue, that one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that a master can say to his slave that he should work for him and he will not sustain him. Consequently, he is not required to emancipate him even when he cannot provide for him. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the master cannot say this, and therefore he is required to free him.
וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! הַאי ״אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי אוֹ הוֹצִיאֵנִי לְחֵירוּת״?! ״אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי אוֹ תֵּן לִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַי בְּפַרְנָסָתִי״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! וְעוֹד: מַאי שְׁנָא בִּשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת?
The Gemara responds: And can you understand the dispute that way? If so, this expression: Either sustain me or emancipate me, is inaccurate, as the baraita should have said: Either sustain me or give me my earnings for my sustenance. And furthermore, if the dispute concerns this general issue, what is different about years of famine? The same dispute should apply in all years.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּאָמַר לוֹ ״צֵא מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיךָ״, וּבִשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת לָא סָפֵק;
Rather, with what are we dealing here? This baraita is referring to a case where the master said to the slave: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, and subsequently, during years of famine, the slave’s earnings do not suffice to provide himself with sustenance, as prices are higher than usual.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי אוֹ הוֹצִיאֵנִי לְחֵירוּת, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּחָזוּ לִי אִינָשֵׁי וּמְרַחֲמִין עֲלַי. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מַאן דִּמְרַחֵם אַבְּנֵי חָרֵי, אַעֶבֶד נָמֵי רַחוֹמֵי מְרַחֵם.
And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that in this case the slave can say to his master: Either sustain me or emancipate me, so that people will see me in my helpless state, and they will have mercy on me and provide me with charity. And the Rabbis hold that this is not a justification for emancipating a slave, as those who have mercy on freemen will also have mercy on a slave. Consequently, it is not necessary for the slave to be emancipated for him to receive help from generous people. According to this interpretation, the baraita has no bearing on the question as to whether a master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ, אוֹתוֹ הָעֶבֶד לֹוֶה וְאוֹכֵל, וְעוֹשֶׂה וּפוֹרֵעַ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד: ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״!
The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from a statement that Rav said: In the case of one who consecrates the hands of his slave, so that all the work he does becomes Temple property, preventing the slave from working on his own behalf, then that slave borrows and eats, and afterward performs work and repays what he borrowed, as will be explained. Conclude from Rav’s statement that the master is able to say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you. In this case the master has prevented his slave from working for himself, and yet he is not required to provide for him.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּמַעֲלֶה לוֹ מְזוֹנוֹת. אִי הָכִי, לְמַאי
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? This is referring to a case where the master provides sustenance for him. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, for what reason
לֹוֶה וְאוֹכֵל? לְהַעְדָּפָה.
does he find it necessary to borrow and eat? After all, his master provides for him. The Gemara answers: This is referring to surplus food, i.e., additional food that the slave wants to eat.
וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ הֶקְדֵּשׁ: עַד הַשְׁתָּא סַגִּי לָךְ בְּלָא הַעֲדָפָה, וְהַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי תִּיסְגֵּי לָךְ בְּלָא הַעֲדָפָה! הֶקְדֵּשׁ גּוּפֵיהּ נִיחָא לֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלַשְׁבַּח עַבְדֵּיהּ.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, let the Temple treasurer say to him: Until now it was enough for you without a surplus; now too it should be enough for you without a surplus. Why do you seek more now? Consequently, the consecration should apply to this surplus as well. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to the Temple treasury itself that he work and eat more, so that the value of its slave will be enhanced when he consumes this extra amount, as he will become stronger.
עוֹשֶׂה וּפוֹרֵעַ, קַמָּא קַמָּא קָדֵישׁ לֵיהּ! בְּפָחוֹת פָּחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
§ It was stated that the slave borrows and eats and afterward performs work and repays the loan. The Gemara asks: But his work immediately becomes consecrated, as his hands have been consecrated. How, then, can he repay this loan? The Gemara answers: The slave performs work of less than the value of one peruta. Anything worth less than one peruta does not become consecrated. Therefore he can collect these small sums and repay his debt little by little.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא; דְּאָמַר רַב: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ – אוֹתוֹ הָעֶבֶד עוֹשֶׂה וְאוֹכֵל, דְּאִי לָא עַבְדָּא מַאן פָּלַח לֵיהּ.
The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable that Rav is referring to a case where the master provides sustenance for him. As Rav says: With regard to one who consecrates the hands of his slave, that slave works and eats, as, if the slave does not work for himself, who will work and provide for him? This ruling indicates that Rav maintains that consecration does not apply to the slave’s hands.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא הָךְ בְּמַעֲלֶה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל, וְהָא בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מַעֲלֶה, שַׁפִּיר.
The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that this earlier halakha that Rav said, that the slave borrows and repays, refers to a situation where his master provides sustenance for him, and this is because in general he cannot say to him: Work for me but I will not sustain you, and this second halakha is referring to a case where his master does not provide him with sustenance, and therefore he cannot consecrate the slave’s hands, it is well, as there is no contradiction between the two statements of Rav.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ הָךְ בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מַעֲלֶה, וְיָכוֹל, דְּאִי לָא עַבְדָּא מַאן פָּלַח לֵיהּ?! מַאן דְּבָעֵי נִיפְלְחֵיהּ!
However, if you say that this first halakha is also speaking of a case where his master does not provide sustenance for him, and the consecration is effective because he can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you, then what is the meaning of the statement: As, if the slave does not work for himself who will work for him? Let whoever desires work for him, i.e., the slave will be compelled to sustain himself from charity, but this is not the master’s concern.
אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rather, must one not conclude from here that Rav holds that a master cannot say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you? The Gemara comments: Indeed conclude from here that this is the case.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַקּוֹטֵעַ יַד עַבְדּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – נוֹתֵן שִׁבְתּוֹ וּרְפוּאָתוֹ לְרַבּוֹ, וְאוֹתוֹ הָעֶבֶד נִיזּוֹן מִן הַצְּדָקָה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד: ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״!
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another source concerning the same dilemma, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who severs the hand of another’s slave must give compensation for his loss of livelihood, i.e., compensation for the slave’s inability to work as a result of his injury, and the slave’s medical costs to his master. And that slave, who can no longer work, is sustained from charity. Conclude from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the master is able to say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you, as otherwise the master would not receive compensation for his time in the form of payment for the slave’s earnings while the slave lives off of charity.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּמַעֲלֶה לוֹ מְזוֹנוֹת. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי נִיזּוֹן מִן הַצְּדָקָה? לְהַעְדָּפָה.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? This is referring to a case where his master provides sustenance for him. The Gemara asks: If so, why is he sustained from charity? He already has sustenance. The Gemara answers: This is referring to surplus food, i.e., additional food that the slave wants to eat.
אִי הָכִי, ״נִיזּוֹן״?! ״מִתְפַּרְנֵס״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ יָכוֹל! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, the phrase: Sustained from charity, is imprecise, as it indicates that he is provided only with enough for his basic needs. It should have said: He earns a living from charity. Rather, must one not conclude from his statement that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the master can say to his slave: Work for me but I will not sustain you? The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from his statement that this is the case.
אֲמַר מָר: נוֹתֵן שִׁבְתּוֹ וּרְפוּאָתוֹ לְרַבּוֹ. שִׁבְתּוֹ, פְּשִׁיטָא! רְפוּאָתוֹ אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara discusses the aforementioned halakha. The Master says earlier: He must give compensation for the slave’s loss of livelihood and his medical costs to his master. The Gemara comments: With regard to compensation for loss of livelihood, it is obvious that this is the halakha, as the master incurs the loss when his slave does not work, and therefore it was necessary for the Sages to mention only that the compensation for his medical costs goes to his master.
רְפוּאָתוֹ דִּידֵיהּ הִיא, דְּבָעֵי אִיתַּסּוֹיֵי בֵּהּ! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאַמְדוּהּ לְחַמְשָׁא יוֹמֵי, וַעֲבַדוּ לֵיהּ סַמָּא חָרִיפָא וְאִתַּסִּי בִּתְלָתָא יוֹמֵי; מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: צַעֲרָא – דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara comments: Why is the payment for his medical costs given to his master? Shouldn’t the compensation for his medical costs belong to him, as he needs to be healed with it? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where doctors estimated that the blow or wound would heal in five days and they made a strong medicine for him, and he was healed in three days instead of five. Lest you say: Since the pain suffered by the slave by taking the strong medicine that caused a decrease in the costs of healing was his, the money should belong to him, Rabbi Yoḥanan therefore teaches us that this is not the case, as even this money belongs to the master, not the slave.
תַּנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אָמַרְנוּ לוֹ לְמֵאִיר: וַהֲלֹא זְכוּת הוּא לָעֶבֶד שֶׁיּוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי רַבּוֹ לְחֵירוּת! אָמַר לָנוּ: חוֹב הוּא לוֹ – שֶׁאִם הָיָה עֶבֶד כֹּהֵן, פּוֹסְלוֹ מִן הַתְּרוּמָה. אָמַרְנוּ לוֹ: וַהֲלֹא מָה אִם יִרְצֶה שֶׁלֹּא לְזוּנוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לְפַרְנְסוֹ, רַשַּׁאי!
§ With regard to the discussion in the mishna between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:5) that Rabbi Elazar said: We said to Meir: But isn’t it in the interest of a slave to leave his master to freedom? He said to us: It is to his detriment, as if he were the slave of a priest, then by emancipating him the master thereby disqualifies him from partaking of teruma. We said to him: But what would be if the master wishes not to sustain him and not to provide him with a living? He is permitted to do so. Therefore, the slave does not lose out when he is emancipated, as he was not guaranteed sustenance in any event.
אָמַר לָנוּ: וּמָה אִילּוּ עֶבֶד כֹּהֵן שֶׁבָּרַח, וְאֵשֶׁת כֹּהֵן שֶׁמָּרְדָה עַל בַּעְלָהּ – הֲלֹא אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה; וְזֶה – אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל. אֲבָל אִשָּׁה – חוֹב הוּא לָהּ, שֶׁכֵּן פֹּסְלָהּ מִן הַתְּרוּמָה וּמַפְסִידָהּ מִן הַמְּזוֹנוֹת.
Rabbi Meir said to us: Even if the master is not obligated to provide for him, it is still permitted for the slave to partake of teruma. The proof for this is the following case: And what would be if there were the slave of a priest, who fled from his master, or in the case of the wife of a priest, who rebelled against her husband, i.e., she refused to fulfill her obligations as a married woman? Are they not permitted to partake of teruma, although not the teruma belonging to the master or husband? They are permitted to partake of teruma. But this slave who was emancipated may not partake of teruma at all, even teruma that belongs to other priests. But in any event, in the case of a woman, a bill of divorce is to her detriment, as it disqualifies her from partaking of teruma and causes her to lose her sustenance.
מַאי קָאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ, וּמַאי קָא מַהְדַּר לְהוּ? הָכִי קָאָמַר לְהוּ: הֲשַׁבְתּוּנִי עַל הַמְּזוֹנוֹת, מַה תְּשִׁיבוּנִי עַל הַתְּרוּמָה?
The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What did the Rabbis say to Rabbi Meir, and what did he respond to them? In other words, the two sides do not appear to be discussing the same issue, as the Rabbis refer to sustenance while Rabbi Meir talks about teruma. The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Meir is saying to them: You have answered me about sustenance, that the master is not required to provide for his slave. However, what will you answer me about teruma?
וְכִי תֵּימְרוּ: אִי בָּעֵי, זָרֵיק לֵיהּ גִּיטָּא וּפָסֵיל לֵיהּ; שָׁבֵיק לֵיהּ וְעָרֵיק וְאָזֵיל לְעָלְמָא.
And if you were to say that the acceptance of the document by the agent is not to the slave’s detriment, as in any event if the master desires, he can throw the bill of manumission within four cubits of the slave and thereby disqualify him from partaking of teruma; the slave can prevent this from occurring by leaving his master, and escaping and going out to the world. If he acts in this manner his master will be unable to emancipate him, and he can continue partaking of teruma.
