Gittin 20
אִי מִשּׁוּם כְּרִיתוּת דְּאִית בַּהּ – הָא בָּעֵינָא ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ – לִשְׁמָהּ, וְלֵיכָּא.
If there is a concern that the Torah scroll can effect a divorce due to the verses concerning severance of marriage that there are in it, as it is written: “And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1), this is also not problematic, since it is required, as it states: “And he writes her.” This indicates that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake, i.e., it must be written for the express intent of being used to effect divorce between this specific man and this specific woman, and this is not so in the case of a Torah scroll.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, לֵיחוּשׁ דִּילְמָא אַקְדֵּים וִיהַב לֵיהּ זוּזָא לְסָפְרָא מֵעִיקָּרָא; הָא בָּעֵינַן ״שִׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ, שֵׁם עִירוֹ וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ״, וְלֵיכָּא.
And if you would say that there is reason to be concerned that perhaps he first gave a dinar to the scribe at the outset, when he wrote the Torah scroll, and told him to write the verses discussing divorce for his wife’s sake, isn’t there a need for other things to be written in a bill of divorce as well, as the mishna (80a) teaches: If the scribe changed his name or her name, the name of his city or the name of her city, then the bill of divorce is invalid. The validity of a bill of divorce depends upon these details being written, and they are not in the Torah scroll.
וְרַב יוֹסֵף מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? שֶׁאֵין מֵי מֵילִין עַל גַּבֵּי מֵי מֵילִין.
The Gemara asks: But if so, what is Rav Yosef teaching us with his statement? It seems obvious that there is no reason why a Torah scroll could be used as a bill of divorce. The Gemara says: He is teaching us that gall water is not permanent when applied on top of gall water. The novel idea is that there is no need to be concerned that the scribe wrote a bill of divorce in gall water on the outside of the Torah scroll.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: גֵּט שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, וְהֶעֱבִיר עָלָיו קוּלְמוֹס לִשְׁמָהּ, בָּאנוּ לְמַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבָּנַן.
§ Rav Ḥisda says: If a bill of divorce was written not for her sake, and the scribe passed over it with a reed pen, meaning that he wrote on top of what was already written, for her sake, then here we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis.
דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה צָרִיךְ לִכְתּוֹב אֶת הַשֵּׁם, וְנִתְכַּוֵּין לִכְתּוֹב ״יְהוּדָה״ וְטָעָה וְלֹא הֵטִיל בּוֹ דָּלֶת, מַעֲבִיר עָלָיו קוּלְמוֹס וּמְקַדְּשׁוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין הַשֵּׁם מִן הַמּוּבְחָר.
As it is taught in a baraita: If a scribe writing a Torah scroll was at a point in the text that he needed to write the name of God, spelled yod, heh, vav, heh; and he erred and intended to write Yehuda, spelled yod, heh, vav, dalet, heh, but he made a mistake when writing Yehuda and did not place a dalet in the word, thereby unintentionally writing the name of God in the correct place, then he should pass over it with a reed pen. He writes over what was written and sanctifies it with the intention that he is writing the name of God. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Even if he adds a second layer of ink, the name has not been written in the optimal manner. According to Rabbi Yehuda, one can supply the intention of writing the name of God for its own sake even when adding a second layer of writing over the first, while according to the Rabbis one cannot. The same dispute would presumably apply in the case of a bill of divorce.
אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: דִּילְמָא לָא הִיא; עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, דְּבָעֵינָא זֶה אֵלִי וְאַנְוֵהוּ, וְלֵיכָּא; אֲבָל הָכָא לָא.
Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Perhaps that is not so, and the Rabbis say only there, in the case of a Torah scroll, that one may not write the name of God in this manner, because it is required that one perform anything sacred, including the writing of a Torah scroll, in accordance with the verse: “This is my God, and I will glorify Him” (Exodus 15:2). This verse requires that mitzvot be performed in a way that is glorious and aesthetically pleasing, and rewriting in this manner is not considered beautiful. But here, with regard to a bill of divorce, there is no requirement that the bill of divorce be written beautifully, and therefore writing over the bill of divorce is acceptable according to the Rabbis as well.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: יָכֵילְנָא לְמִיפְסְלִינְהוּ (לְכוּלֵּי) [לְכוּלְּהוּ] גִּיטֵּי דְּעָלְמָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב ״וְכָתַב״, וְהָכָא אִיהִי קָא כָּתְבָה לֵיהּ; וְדִילְמָא אַקְנוֹיֵי אַקְנוֹ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן?
§ Rav Ḥisda said: I am able to invalidate all the bills of divorce in the world. Most bills of divorce are written in a way that they could be declared invalid. If one were to be particular about certain details, then there would be no valid bills of divorce. Rava said to him: What is the reason that you could invalidate them? If we say: Most bills of divorce are invalid because it is written in the Torah: “And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and here, in the case of most bills of divorce, she writes it for him, as it is customary for a woman to pay a scribe to write the bill of divorce, but then perhaps it could be maintained that the Sages transferred the ownership of the bill of divorce to him, and it is considered as if he wrote it.
וְאֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנָתַן״, וְהָכָא לָא יָהֵיב לַהּ מִידֵּי?! דִּלְמָא נְתִינַת גֵּט הִיא! תֵּדַע, דִּשְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: כְּתָבוֹ עַל אִיסּוּרֵי הֲנָאָה – כָּשֵׁר.
But rather, you might say that it is because it is written: “And gives” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which is usually understood to mean that the item given must have some monetary value, and here in the case of most bills of divorce he doesn’t give her anything of value. Perhaps the mere giving of the bill of divorce is the giving mentioned in the Torah, even if it does not have any monetary value. Know that it is not a requirement that the bill of divorce have monetary value, as the Sages sent this message from there, from Eretz Yisrael: If he wrote a bill of divorce on items from which benefit is forbidden, then although the bill of divorce is completely lacking monetary value, the bill of divorce is valid.
גּוּפָא – שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: כְּתָבוֹ עַל אִיסּוּרֵי הֲנָאָה – כָּשֵׁר. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״עַל הֶעָלֶה שֶׁל זַיִת״! דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי עָלֶה שֶׁל זַיִת, דַּחֲזֵי לְאִיצְטְרוֹפֵי.
§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: The Sages sent this message from there, from Eretz Yisrael: If he wrote a bill of divorce on items from which benefit is forbidden, the bill of divorce is valid. Rav Ashi said: We, too, learn in the mishna that a bill of divorce may be written on an olive leaf, which has virtually no monetary value. This teaches that the bill of divorce need not have any value on its own, and even forbidden items, which have no value at all, may be used as the base on which the bill of divorce is written. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps an olive leaf is different, because it can combine with more leaves, and they will add up to have monetary value. However, an item from which one is prohibited from benefiting lacks value entirely, even in large quantities.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כְּתָבוֹ עַל אִיסּוּרֵי הֲנָאָה – כָּשֵׁר. נְפַק לֵוִי, דַּרְשַׁהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי, וְלָא קַלְּסוּהּ. מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּים, וְקַלְּסוּהּ. אַלְמָא הִלְכְתָא כְּוָתֵיהּ.
With regard to the same halakha, the Gemara quotes an additional source. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the scribe wrote a bill of divorce on items from which benefit is forbidden, it is valid. Levi went out and expounded upon this halakha in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they did not praise him. He then expounded this halakha in the name of the majority, as an unattributed halakha, and they praised him. Apparently, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Therefore, when he stated the halakha in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, an individual, which may have led the listeners to think that it was a minority opinion and not the accepted halakha, they did not praise him.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְכָתַב״ – וְלֹא חָקַק. לְמֵימְרָא דַּחֲקִיקָה לָאו כְּתִיבָה הִיא?! וּרְמִינְהוּ: עֶבֶד שֶׁיָּצָא בִּכְתָב שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי טַבְלָא, וּפִינְקָס, יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. אֲבָל לֹא בִּכְתָב שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי כִּיפָּא וְאַנְדּוּכְתַּרִי!
§ The Sages taught that it is said in the Torah with regard to a bill of divorce: “And he writes her a scroll of severance,” in order to emphasize that one must write the document and not chisel it. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that chiseling is not writing? And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in a baraita: If a slave is emancipated through a bill of manumission that was written by being chiseled on a slate [tavla] or on a tablet [pinekas], then he goes free. However, he does not go free through writing on a cap or on an embroidered adornment. If the master embroidered the bill of manumission onto a cloth and gave it to the slave, this is not considered to be like the writing of a document. In any case, the baraita teaches that a bill of manumission that is chiseled onto a slate is valid.
אָמַר עוּלָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לָא קַשְׁיָא – הָא דְּחַק תּוֹכוֹת, הָא דְּחַק יְרֵיכוֹת.
Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: It is not difficult. This case, where the document is not valid because engraving is not considered to be writing, occurs when the scribe chiseled the area surrounding the letters, i.e., he chiseled on the surface around the shape of the letters, leaving the letters raised on the tablet. This case, where the document is valid because chiseling is considered to be writing, occurs when he chiseled the parts of the letters, i.e., he chiseled the shape of the letters themselves onto the slate. Since he formed the letters directly, it is considered like writing.
וְתוֹכוֹת – לָא?! וּרְמִינְהוּ: לֹא הָיָה כְּתָבוֹ שׁוֹקֵעַ, אֶלָּא בּוֹלֵט – כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב. וְהָא דִּינְרֵי זָהָב תּוֹכוֹת הֵן!
The Gemara asks: And if he chiseled the area surrounding the letters, is this not considered to be writing at all? And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught: The writing of the High Priest’s frontplate was not embedded, i.e., it was not carved into the frontplate; rather, it protruded like the form on gold dinars. And isn’t the shape on gold dinars formed by chiseling the area surrounding the letters, by applying pressure around the shape, so that the image and writing protrudes, and yet this is considered to be writing?
כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב, וְלֹא כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב. כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב – דְּבוֹלֵט; וְלֹא כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב – דְּאִילּוּ הָתָם תּוֹכוֹת, הָכָא יְרֵיכוֹת.
The Gemara answers: It means that the frontplate was fashioned like the form of gold dinars but not entirely like the form of gold dinars. It was fashioned like the form of gold dinars in that the writing protrudes, but it was not fashioned like the form of gold dinars entirely, as there, in the case of gold dinars, they chiseled the area surrounding the letters. Here, when making the frontplate, the inscription was done by chiseling the parts of the letter, i.e., they would carve the letters from the back of the frontplate so that they protruded from the front. Since the letters were carved directly, it was considered to be writing.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: רוּשְׁמָא – מִיחְרָץ חֲרִיץ, אוֹ כַּנּוֹפֵי מְכַנֵּיף? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִיחְרָץ חֲרִיץ.
With regard to this issue, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does the press that forms a metal coin carve out the background in the metal and the image of the coin is formed on its own, or does it compress the metal inward toward the empty space in the press and the letters are formed through this? He said to him: It carves out the background.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: לֹא הָיָה כְּתָבוֹ שׁוֹקֵעַ, אֶלָּא בּוֹלֵט כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מִיחְרָץ חֲרִיץ –
He raised an objection to his opinion based on what was taught earlier: The writing of the High Priest’s frontplate was not embedded, i.e., it was not carved into the frontplate; rather, it protruded like the form on gold dinars. And if it enters your mind to say that a press only carves out the background,
הָא בָּעֵינָא ״מִכְתַּב״, וְלֵיכָּא! כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב, וְלֹא כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב. כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב – דְּבוֹלֵט; וְלֹא כְּדִינְרֵי זָהָב – דְּאִילּוּ הָתָם, מִגַּוַּאי; וְהָכָא – מֵאַבָּרַאי.
isn’t there a need to write it, as the verse states with regard to the frontplate: “Wrote upon it a writing, like the engravings of a signet” (Exodus 39:30), and there is no writing here? The Gemara answers: It means that the frontplate was fashioned like the form of gold dinars but not entirely like the form of gold dinars. It was fashioned like the form of gold dinars in that the writing protrudes. But it was not fashioned like the form of gold dinars entirely, as there, in the case of gold dinars, the pressing of the stamp is done from the inside, by pushing back the surrounding area to allow the form to be visible, and here, when fashioning the frontplate, it was done from the outside, by applying pressure to the opposite side so that the letters were pushed outward. Since the letters were carved directly, it was considered to be writing.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: כָּתַב לָהּ גֵּט עַל טַס שֶׁל זָהָב, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הִתְקַבְּלִי גִּיטִּיךְ וְהִתְקַבְּלִי כְּתוּבָּתִךְ״, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נִתְקַבְּלָה גִּיטָּהּ וְנִתְקַבְּלָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In the case of a husband who wrote for her a bill of divorce on a plate [tas] of gold and said to her: Receive your bill of divorce and also receive the payment of your marriage contract through this act, as the piece of gold is worth enough to pay for the value of her marriage contract, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Her bill of divorce has been received and the payment of her marriage contract has been received.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: ״הִתְקַבְּלִי גִּיטִּיךְ, וְהַשְּׁאָר לִכְתוּבָּתִךָ״ – נִתְקַבְּלָה גִּיטָּהּ, וְהַשְּׁאָר לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ.
Rava raised an objection to his statement from a baraita: If a husband gave his wife a bill of divorce on an oversized paper and said to her: Receive your bill of divorce, and the remainder of the paper, on which nothing is written, is designated for the payment of your marriage contract, then her bill of divorce has been received and the remainder should be for the payment of her marriage contract.
טַעְמָא דְּאִיכָּא שְׁאָר, הָא לֵיכָּא שְׁאָר – לֹא!
The Gemara explains the objection: This indicates that the reason why the material upon which the bill of divorce is written may also serve as the payment for her marriage contract is that there is the remainder of the paper, on which the bill of divorce was not written. If there is not the remainder of the paper, then no, the bill of divorce may not serve as payment of the marriage contract. This is because the husband must give the bill of divorce to his wife for it to become hers. If so, even if the bill of divorce was written on a plate of gold, if there was no part of the plate of gold other than the space where the bill of divorce was written, it should not serve as payment of her marriage contract.
הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁאָר; וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא שְׁאָר, אִי אָמַר לַהּ – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא.
Rav Naḥman responded: The same is true although there is no remainder of the paper, and he wrote the bill of divorce on the entire paper. And by stating the halakha in a case where there was an additional part of the paper, the baraita teaches us this: Although there is the remainder of the paper upon which nothing is written, if he explicitly said to her that it should be for the payment of her marriage contract, yes, it is considered to be a payment for her marriage contract. If he did not say this explicitly, then no, it is not for the payment of her marriage contract, and he must give her the value of her marriage contract in its entirety through a separate payment.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אַוֵּירָא דִמְגִילְּתָא הוּא.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? If he did not explicitly say that the remainder of the paper is designated toward the payment of her marriage contract, then the remainder is considered to be the margin around the border of the scroll, and all of the paper constitutes the bill of divorce. Therefore, it is necessary to inform her that the remainder of the paper is for the payment of her marriage contract.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ וְהַנְּיָיר שֶׁלִּי״ – אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּחְזִירִי לִי אֶת הַנְּיָיר״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.
The Sages taught: If the husband said to his wife: Behold this is your bill of divorce, but the paper on which it is written is still mine, then she is not divorced, as he must give her the actual bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Since the paper still belongs to him, it is as if he had given her only the writing. But if he said to her: Behold this is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me, then she is divorced. The bill of divorce belongs entirely to her, and the returning of the paper is only a stipulation that must be fulfilled later.
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: בֵּין שִׁיטָה לְשִׁיטָה וּבֵין תֵּיבָה לְתֵיבָה, מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If he said that the paper between each line or between each word in the bill of divorce will still belong to him but the paper where the words are written will be hers, what is the halakha? A solution is not found for this question, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ ״דְּסֵפֶר״ אֶחָד אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשָׁה סְפָרִים! לָא צְרִיכָא, דִּמְעוֹרֶה.
The Gemara asks: Why isn’t a solution offered for Rav Pappa’s question? Let him derive an answer to this question from elsewhere, as the Merciful One speaks of one scroll in regard to the bill of divorce in the Torah: “And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and not two or three scrolls. If the woman receives only the paper on which the words are written but the rest of the paper belongs to the man, then this is not viewed as a single scroll. Rather, it is multiple scrolls, thereby invalidating it. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to discuss the question in a case where the letters are intertwined, meaning that they were written in such a manner that even if the paper between them was removed, the writing in the bill of divorce would remain attached as a single entity.
בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הָיוּ מוּחְזָקִים בְּעֶבֶד שֶׁהוּא שֶׁלּוֹ – וְגֵט כָּתוּב עַל יָדוֹ, וַהֲרֵי הוּא יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יָדָהּ, מַהוּ?
Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If the judges had a presumption that a slave was his, i.e., that it belonged to the husband; and the bill of divorce that this man gave his wife was written on that slave’s hand; and now the slave emerges from her possession, i.e., he is with the woman, what is the halakha with regard to this bill of divorce?
מִי אָמְרִינַן אַקְנוֹיֵי אַקְנִי לַהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא, הוּא מִנַּפְשֵׁיהּ עָיֵיל?
The Gemara explains the elements of the question: Do we say that the husband transferred the slave to his wife? Therefore, it is as though he gave her the bill of divorce in the proper manner, as is explained in the mishna, and she is divorced. Or perhaps we say that he, the slave, entered the possession of the woman on his own, because he prefers to be under her ownership rather than under her husband’s ownership, in which case the husband did not give him to the woman at all, and she is not divorced, as the husband needs to give the bill of divorce to the woman?
אָמַר רָבָא: וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דִּכְתָב שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהִזְדַּיֵּיף הוּא! וּלְרָבָא, קַשְׁיָא מַתְנִיתִין ״עַל הַיָּד שֶׁל עֶבֶד״!
Rava said: And let Rami bar Ḥama derive an answer to his question from a different reason, that writing on a person’s body is writing that can be forged, as it is easily erased and replaced with other writing, and a bill of divorce that is written in a manner susceptible to forgery is invalid. The Gemara clarifies: But according to Rava, who raised this challenge, the mishna is difficult, as it taught that a bill of divorce may be written on a slave’s hand.
בִּשְׁלָמָא מַתְנִיתִין לְרָבָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, בְּעֵדֵי מְסִירָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא. אֶלָּא לְרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא קַשְׁיָא!
The Gemara responds: Granted, the mishna is not difficult for Rava, as it is possible to say that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband gave her the slave with witnesses present who observe the transmission of a legal document. In other words, they were present when the slave, who has the legal document written on him, was given to the woman. And it is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who holds that the essential witnesses are those who witness the delivery, and since they witnessed the delivery, she is divorced. However, for Rami bar Ḥama it is difficult. In his case, there were no witnesses to the transfer of the slave, so the possibility that the writing was forged should invalidate it.
לְרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא – בִּכְתוֹבֶת קַעֲקַע. הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, מַתְנִיתִין (לְרָבָא) נָמֵי לָא תִּיקְשֵׁי – בִּכְתוֹבֶת קַעֲקַע.
The Gemara answers: According to Rami bar Ḥama it is also not difficult, as he did not ask his question in a case where the bill of divorce was written on the slave with ink but with regard to a case where it was written as a tattoo, so the writing certainly cannot be erased and forged. The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this, the mishna, which deemed valid a bill of divorce that was written on the hand of the slave, will not be difficult for Rava either, as it is also stating the halakha with regard to a case where it was written as a tattoo.
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַגּוֹדְרוֹת, אֵין לָהֶן חֲזָקָה.
In any case, Rami bar Ḥama’s question remains unresolved. If so, what halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on that which Reish Lakish says: With regard to livestock, there is no presumption of ownership, since they wander from place to place. Therefore, a person cannot claim that his mere possession of livestock demonstrates ownership, because they may have wandered into his property on their own. The same halakha should apply to a slave. If there are no witnesses who saw the transfer to the woman, then her mere possession of the slave should not serve as proof that the slave, and by extension the bill of divorce, was given to her, and consequently the woman is not divorced.
בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הָיוּ מוּחְזָקִין בְּטַבְלָא שֶׁהִיא שֶׁלָּהּ – וְגֵט כָּתוּב עָלֶיהָ; וַהֲרֵי הִיא יוֹצְאָה מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן אַקְנוֹיֵי אַקְנִיתַהּ לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא (אִשָּׁה) לָא יָדְעָה לְאַקְנוֹיֵי?
Rami bar Ḥama raises another dilemma: If the judges had a presumption that a slate was hers, and a bill of divorce was written on it, and now this slate emerges from his possession, and he wants to divorce his wife by giving her the slate, what is the halakha? Do we say that she transferred the ownership of the slate to him, and he may give it to her as a bill of divorce, and the divorce takes effect? Or perhaps a woman does not understand how to transfer an object that will be given back to her, and she believes it is a formality and not an actual legal transfer. If this were to be the case, they would not be divorced, as the slate did not in fact belong to the husband.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: אַף הוּא הֵעִיד עַל כְּפָר קָטָן שֶׁהָיָה בְּצַד יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, וְהָיָה בּוֹ זָקֵן אֶחָד, וְהָיָה מַלְוֶה לְכׇל בְּנֵי הַכְּפָר, וְכוֹתֵב בִּכְתַב יָדוֹ וַאֲחֵרִים חוֹתְמִים, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים וְהִכְשִׁירוּהוּ. וְאַמַּאי? הָא בָּעֵינָא ״סֵפֶר מִקְנָה״, וְלֵיכָּא!
Abaye said: Come and hear a proof based on what is stated in a mishna (Eduyyot 2:3): Even he, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who was quoted earlier in this mishna, testified about a small village that was adjacent to Jerusalem, and there was an old man there who would lend money to all the residents of the village. And he would write the documents in his handwriting and others would sign. And the incident came before the Sages and they deemed it valid. And why did they deem it valid? Isn’t there a need to fulfill this verse: “I took the deed of purchase” (Jeremiah 32:11), requiring that the document itself be transferred from the seller to the buyer, and this is not the case here, as the document attesting to the loan was in the possession of the creditor the entire time?
אֶלָּא לָאו, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן אַקְנוֹיֵי מַקְנֵה לְהוּ!
Rather, is it not because we say that he certainly transferred the ownership of the documents to them in a legally binding manner, although he knew that they would be returned to him immediately afterward. The same should apply in this case, and the assumption should be that the woman transferred ownership of the slate to the husband, and he then gave it back to her.
אָמַר רָבָא: וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא
Rava said: And what is the difficulty? How can one prove anything from the mishna? Perhaps
