There is halachic validity to various acts of children depending on their level of maturity. There are various stages mapped out in the Gemara for different acts. A minor however cannot appoint a messenger. If a man or woman appoints a messenger to deliver (man) or accept (woman) the get and specifies a location, if the messenger does it in a different location, is it valid? Does it depend if it was the man or the woman’s messenger? Does it depend on how the request was worded? If a woman appointed a messenger to accept her get, from what point is she not allowed to eat truma in the event that she was married to a kohen? What types of commands would be clear that a man intends to send messengers to write and deliver a get? Which wording does not indicate such?
Gittin 65
Share this shiur:
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Gittin 65
כְּעֵין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא תַּקּוּן.
they instituted parallel to Torah law, and they did not innovate novel halakhic models.
וְאִידַּךְ – כִּי אָמְרִינַן: כָּל דְּתַקּוּן רַבָּנַן כְּעֵין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא תַּקּוּן – בְּמִילְּתָא דְּאִית לַהּ עִיקָּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל מִילְּתָא דְּלֵית לַהּ עִיקָּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה – לָא.
And the other Sage, Rav Ḥinnana of Vardonia, why was he silent? He holds that when we say: All ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law, it is with regard to a matter that is rooted in the Torah, and upon which the Sages instituted an ordinance. However, with regard to a matter that is not rooted in the Torah, e.g., the halakhot of joining courtyards and merging alleyways, no, they did not institute the ordinances parallel to Torah law.
מֵתִיב רַב אַוְיָא: מַעֲרִימִין עַל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. כֵּיצַד? אוֹמֵר אָדָם לִבְנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים; לְעַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הָעִבְרִים: ״הֵא לָכֶם מָעוֹת הַלָּלוּ, וּפְדוּ בָּהֶן מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי זֶה״, וְאוֹכְלוֹ בְּלֹא חוֹמֶשׁ.
Rav Avya raises another objection to Shmuel’s opinion, according to Rav Ḥisda’s explanations, that a minor cannot acquire property on behalf of others, based on a mishna in tractate Ma’aser Sheni (4:4): One may employ artifice to exempt himself from the obligation to add one-fifth to the sum when redeeming second tithe, which the owner of the tithe is required to add. How so? A person says to his adult son or daughter, or to his Hebrew slave or his maidservant: Here you are, take money and redeem second tithe with it. After they redeem the second tithe, they give it to their father or master and he eats it without adding one-fifth.
הַאי שִׁפְחָה הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאַתְיָא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, מַאי בָּעֲיָא גַּבֵּיהּ? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּלָא אַתְיָא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּמַעֲשֵׂר בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה – דְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this maidservant? If she developed two pubic hairs, indicating that she reached majority, what is she doing with the owner of the produce? A Hebrew maidservant is emancipated when she reaches puberty. Rather, is the reference here not to a case where she did not yet develop two pubic hairs? Apparently, a minor can also acquire property on behalf of others. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? It is with tithes today, which is in effect by rabbinic law, and the Sages ruled leniently in matters of rabbinic law.
וְאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה מִי אִיכָּא?! וְהָתַנְיָא: אֵין עֶבֶד עִבְרִי נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג! אֶלָּא בְּעָצִיץ שֶׁאֵינוֹ נָקוּב – דְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara asks: And is there a Hebrew maidservant today? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The provision of a Hebrew slave is in practice only during a period when the Jubilee Year is in practice. Therefore, there have been no Hebrew slaves or maidservants since observance of the Jubilee Year ceased, before the destruction of the First Temple. Rather, it must be that the mishna is referring to a case where the produce grew in an unperforated pot, which one is obligated to tithe by rabbinic law.
אָמַר רָבָא, שָׁלֹשׁ מִדּוֹת בְּקָטָן: צְרוֹר וְזוֹרְקוֹ, אֱגוֹז וְנוֹטְלוֹ – זוֹכֶה לְעַצְמוֹ, וְאֵין זוֹכֶה לַאֲחֵרִים; וּכְנֶגְדָּן בִּקְטַנָּה – מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת לְמֵיאוּן.
Apropos the capacity of minors to acquire property, Rava says that there are three stages in the development of a minor: With regard to a minor who is given a pebble and he throws it away but when given a nut he takes it, he acquires property for himself but does not acquire property on behalf of others. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of intellectual development, after the death of her father she can be betrothed by her mother and her brother by rabbinic law, and can opt out of that betrothal through refusal.
הַפָּעוֹטוֹת – מִקָּחָן מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּרָן מִמְכָּר בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין; וּכְנֶגְדָּן בִּקְטַנָּה – מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי אָבִיהָ.
At the next stage of development are young children aged approximately six through eight, whose purchase is a purchase and whose sale is a sale, with regard to movable property. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of development, she is divorced by receipt of her bill of divorce, even if it is from betrothal by her father, which is by Torah law.
הִגִּיעוּ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים – נִדְרֵיהֶן נֶדֶר וְהֶקְדֵּשָׁן הֶקְדֵּשׁ; וּכְנֶגְדָּן בִּקְטַנָּה – חוֹלֶצֶת. וְלִמְכּוֹר בְּנִכְסֵי אָבִיו – עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא בֶּן עֶשְׂרִים.
The third stage of development is when they have reached the age of vows, when their vows are valid vows and their consecration is valid consecration. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of development, she performs ḥalitza to free herself from her levirate bond. And with regard to selling his father’s landed property, a minor cannot sell it until he will reach the age of twenty.
מַתְנִי׳ קְטַנָּה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ; לְפִיכָךְ, אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל לַחֲזוֹר – יַחְזוֹר. שֶׁאֵין קָטָן עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ.
MISHNA: In the case of a minor girl who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. Therefore, if the husband seeks to retract his decision before his wife receives the bill of divorce, he can retract it, as a minor does not designate an agent. Consequently, the agent is not an agent for receipt, and the divorce does not take effect when the husband hands the document to the agent. The agent is an agent for delivery, and the divorce takes effect when the bill of divorce enters the wife’s possession.
וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ אָבִיהָ: ״צֵא וְהִתְקַבֵּל לְבִתִּי גִּיטָּהּ״, אִם רָצָה לַחֲזוֹר – לֹא יַחְזוֹר.
And if her father said to the agent: Go out and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce on her behalf, then if the husband seeks to retract his decision, he cannot retract it. As a father can receive the bill of divorce on behalf of his minor daughter, he can designate an agent for receipt, and the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the document to the agent.
הָאוֹמֵר: ״תֵּן גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל. ״הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר.
With regard to one who says to an agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, if the agent deviated and gave it to her in another place the divorce is invalid. However, if he said to the agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, she is in such and such a place, without explicitly instructing the agent to give her the document there, and he gave it to her in another place the divorce is valid.
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְקִיבְּלוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל; רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר. ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לָהּ מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר.
With regard to the woman who when designating her agent for receipt said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, and he received it for her in another place, the divorce is invalid; and Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. If she said to him: Bring me my bill of divorce from such and such a place, and he brought it for her from another place, it is valid. Because he is an agent for delivery, the woman is not particular where he receives the bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect only when the bill of divorce reaches her possession.
גְּמָ׳ וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא דְּלָא פְּלִיג, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא דִּפְלִיג?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Elazar, what is different in the first clause, where the agent deviated from the husband’s instructions and delivered the bill of divorce in a different place, where he does not disagree with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna that the divorce is invalid, and what is different in the latter clause, where the agent deviated from the wife’s instructions and received the bill of divorce in a different place, where he disagrees with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna and deems the divorce valid?
אִיהוּ, דְּמִדַּעְתֵּיהּ מְגָרֵשׁ – קָפֵיד, אִיהִי, דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחַהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת – מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.
The Gemara answers: He, the husband, who divorces his wife of his own volition, insists that the divorce be effected in a certain place. However, she, the wife, who is divorced even against her will, is in no position to insist with regard to the manner in which the divorce will be effected, and is merely indicating a place for him to give her the bill of divorce.
מַתְנִי׳ ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי״ – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״, אֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה מִיָּד. ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר מִיָּד.
MISHNA: An Israelite woman married to a priest partakes of teruma. If she says to an agent: Bring me my bill of divorce, designating him as an agent for delivery, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. However, if she says: Receive my bill of divorce for me, thereby designating him as an agent for receipt, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma. Since the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the bill of divorce to the agent, the concern is that the agent encountered the husband nearby. If the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, then even if he received it elsewhere, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately.
גְּמָ׳ וְגִיטָּא מִיהָא הָוֵי? וְהָאָמְרַתְּ רֵישָׁא, לָא הָוֵי גִּיטָּא!
GEMARA: In this mishna, the first tanna apparently states that if the agent for receipt received the bill of divorce in a place other than the place designated by the woman for receipt, the bill of divorce is valid when the agent brings it to the designated place. The Gemara asks: And in any event, is it a valid bill of divorce? But didn’t you say in the first clause, i.e., in the previous mishna, that if the agent received the bill of divorce in another place, it is not a valid bill of divorce?
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטָּא בְּמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא, וְזִימְנִין דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ בְּבָבֶל״; וְהָכִי קָאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: מִשְׁקָל – כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ, שִׁקְלֵיהּ מִינֵּיהּ;
The Gemara asks: No, this halakha is necessary with regard to a case where she said to him: Receive the bill of divorce for me in the city of Mata Meḥasya, and sometimes you can find him in the city of Babylon. And this is what she is saying: When taking the bill of divorce, anywhere that you find him, take it from him,
גִּיטָּא לָא הָוֵי – עַד דְּמָטֵית לְמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא.
However, it is not a valid bill of divorce until you reach Mata Meḥasya.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר מִיָּד. פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּהָא מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ!
The mishna teaches that if the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, as she is merely indicating a place for him to receive the bill of divorce and not stipulating that the divorce is contingent upon receipt of the document in that place.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״זִיל לְמִזְרָח, דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּמִזְרָח״; וְקָא אָזֵל לְמַעֲרָב. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, בְּמַעֲרָב – הָא לֵיתֵיהּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דִּילְמָא בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָזֵיל מֵיגָס גָּאֵיס בֵּיהּ, וִיהַב לֵיהּ גִּיטָּא.
The Gemara answers: No, Rabbi Elazar’s ruling is necessary in a case where she said to him: Go to the east, as my husband is in the east, and the agent went to the west. Lest you say that since the husband is certainly not in the west and the agent will not find him there, the bill of divorce will certainly not take effect until later, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that perhaps while he was going west, the agent happened to encounter the husband, and the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent.
הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״עָרֵב לִי בִּתְמָרִים״, וְעֵירַב לוֹ בִּגְרוֹגְרוֹת; ״בִּגְרוֹגְרוֹת״, וְעֵירַב לוֹ בִּתְמָרִים; תָּנֵי חֲדָא: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב!
The Gemara cites a related halakha. With regard to one who says to his agent: Establish an eiruv of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf with dates, and he established an eiruv on his behalf with dried figs, or if said to his agent: Establish an eiruv on my behalf with dried figs, and he established an eiruv on his behalf with dates, it is taught in one baraita: His eiruv is a valid eiruv. And it is taught in another baraita: His eiruv is not a valid eiruv.
אָמַר רַבָּה: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבָּנַן, הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. הָא רַבָּנַן – דְּאָמְרִי: קְפִידָא; הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.
Rabba said: This is not difficult. This baraita, in which it is taught that it is not a valid eiruv, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that baraita, in which it is taught that it is a valid eiruv, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. He explains: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: When one gives instructions to his agent, there is insistence on his part that the agent implement those instructions without deviation. Failure to do so revokes his designation as his agent. And that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: She is merely indicating a place for him to receive the bill of divorce and not stipulating that the divorce is contingent on receipt of the document in that place. In the baraita as well, he was not particular as to what food should be used to establish the eiruv.
וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן; כָּאן בְּשֶׁלּוֹ, כָּאן בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.
And Rav Yosef said: Both this baraita and that baraita are the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: When one gives instructions to his agent, there is insistence on his part that the agent implement those instructions without deviation. However, not all deviations are equal. Here, where the baraita rules that it is a valid eiruv, the reference is to a case where the one who designated the agent instructed him to establish the joining of the courtyard with his dates or dried figs and the agent deviated and established the eiruv with the other type of fruit, but it belonged to the one issuing the instructions. There, where the baraita rules that it is not a valid eiruv, the reference is to a case where the one who designated the agent instructed him to establish the joining of the courtyard with the dates or dried figs of another, and the agent deviated and established the eiruv with the other type of fruit belonging to that other person. The eiruv is not valid because that other person authorized use of only a specific type of fruit.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא, הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״עָרֵב לִי בְּמִגְדָּל״ – וְעֵירַב לוֹ בְּשׁוֹבָךְ, ״בְּשׁוֹבָךְ״ – וְעֵירַב לוֹ בְּמִגְדָּל; דְּתַנְיָא חֲדָא: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב; הָתָם – מַאי שֶׁלּוֹ וְשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ אִיכָּא?
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: However, that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to his agent: Establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf in a tower, and he established the eiruv in a dovecote, or he said to the agent: Establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf in a dovecote, and he established the eiruv in a tower, it is taught in one baraita: His joining of Shabbat boundaries is a valid eiruv. And it is taught in another baraita: His joining of Shabbat boundaries is not a valid eiruv. There, what distinction between his fruit and fruit of another is there?
הָתָם נָמֵי, אִיכָּא פֵּירֵי דְמִגְדָּל וּפֵירֵי דְשׁוֹבָךְ.
The Gemara answers: There too, there is a distinction between fruit of the tower and fruit of the dovecote. In these baraitot the instruction did not relate to the location of the placement of the eiruv; rather, the instruction was related to the location of the fruit to be used in establishing the eiruv. In one baraita, the produce in both locations belongs to the one who designated the agent; in the other baraita, the produce in both locations belongs to another.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי״; ״גָּרְשׁוּהָ״; ״כִּתְבוּ אִיגֶּרֶת וּתְנוּ לַהּ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ.
MISHNA: With regard to a husband who says to two people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, or: Divorce her, or: Write a letter and give it to her, they should write the document and give it to her. In each of those cases his intent is clear. He is instructing them to effect her divorce.
״פַּטְּרוּהָ״; ״פַּרְנְסוּהָ״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּנִימוּס״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
However, one who said: Release her, or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law [nimus], or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing, as none of these expressions clearly expresses his desire to divorce his wife.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״שַׁלְּחוּהָ״; ״שִׁבְקוּהָ״; ״תָּרְכוּהָ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. ״פַּטְּרוּהָ״; ״פַּרְנְסוּהָ״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּנִימוֹס״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
GEMARA: The Sages taught that if the husband said: Send her, or: Separate her, or: Banish her, then all of these expressions convey his will to divorce her, and consequently, they should write the bill of divorce and give it to her. However, one who said: Release her [patruha], or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law, or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: ״פַּטְּרוּהָ״ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, ״פִּיטְרוּהָ״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן – דְּבַבְלָאָה הוּא, וְדָיֵיק בֵּין ״פִּיטְרוּהָ״ לְ״פַטְּרוּהָ״, תַּנָּא דִּידַן – דְּבַר אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא, לָא דָּיֵיק.
It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: If one said patruha, his statement stands, and they give her a bill of divorce. However, if one said pitruha, he said nothing. Rava said: Rabbi Natan, who is a Babylonian, distinguished between pitruha and patruha. Pitruha means exempt her, which is unrelated to divorce; patruha means release her, which is very much related to divorce. However, the tanna of our mishna, who is a resident of Eretz Yisrael, did not distinguish between these two expressions.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הוֹצִיאוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״עִזְבוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הַתִּירוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הַנִּיחוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הוֹעִילוּ לָהּ״, מַהוּ? ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּדָּת״, מַהוּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband said: Remove her, what is the halakha? If he said: Abandon her, what is the halakha? If he said: Unbind her, what is the halakha? If he said: Let her be, what is the halakha? If he said: Be useful for her, what is the halakha? If he said: Treat her according to the custom, what is the halakha?
פְּשׁוֹט מִיהָא חֲדָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּדָּת״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּנִימוֹס״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
The Gemara answers: Resolve at least one of these expressions, as it is taught in a baraita: One who said: Treat her according to the custom, or: Treat her according to the law, or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing and it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, the expression: Treat her according to the custom, is not an unequivocal instruction to effect divorce.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: הַיּוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר, וְאָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר: אַף הַמְפָרֵשׁ, וְהַיּוֹצֵא בִּשְׁיָירָא. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמְסוּכָּן.
MISHNA: At first the Sages would say: In the case of one who is taken out in a neck chain [kolar] to be executed and who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people should write the document and give it to his wife even though there was no explicit instruction to give it to her. They then said: Even with regard to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a far-off place and says: Write a bill of divorce to my wife, his intention is to write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if one who is dangerously ill gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.
גְּמָ׳ גְּנִיבָא יוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר הֲוָה, כִּי הֲוָה קָא נָפֵיק, אָמַר: הַבוּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי לְרַבִּי אֲבִינָא, מֵחַמְרָא דִּנְהַר פַּנְיָא. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא:
GEMARA: The Gemara relates: Geneiva was one who went out in a neck chain to be executed. When he was going out, he said to the people there as his dying bequest: Give four hundred dinars to Rabbi Avina from wine that I have in the city of Nehar Panya. Rabbi Zeira said:
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
I was inspired to start learning after attending the 2020 siyum in Binyanei Hauma. It has been a great experience for me. It’s amazing to see the origins of stories I’ve heard and rituals I’ve participated in my whole life. Even when I don’t understand the daf itself, I believe that the commitment to learning every day is valuable and has multiple benefits. And there will be another daf tomorrow!
Jerusalem, Israel
I started Daf during the pandemic. I listened to a number of podcasts by various Rebbeim until one day, I discovered Rabbanit Farbers podcast. Subsequently I joined the Hadran family in Eruvin. Not the easiest place to begin, Rabbanit Farber made it all understandable and fun. The online live group has bonded together and have really become a supportive, encouraging family.
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Richmond, CA, United States
Having never learned Talmud before, I started Daf Yomi in hopes of connecting to the Rabbinic tradition, sharing a daily idea on Instagram (@dafyomiadventures). With Hadran and Sefaria, I slowly gained confidence in my skills and understanding. Now, part of the Pardes Jewish Educators Program, I can’t wait to bring this love of learning with me as I continue to pass it on to my future students.
Pennsylvania, United States
Philadelphia, United States
A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!
HUNTINGTON, United States
In my Shana bet at Migdal Oz I attended the Hadran siyum hash”as. Witnessing so many women so passionate about their Torah learning and connection to God, I knew I had to begin with the coming cycle. My wedding (June 24) was two weeks before the siyum of mesechet yoma so I went a little ahead and was able to make a speech and siyum at my kiseh kallah on my wedding day!
Givat Shmuel, Israel
I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.
Mitspe, Israel
Los Angeles, United States
When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.
Minnesota, United States
I was inspired to start learning after attending the 2020 siyum in Binyanei Hauma. It has been a great experience for me. It’s amazing to see the origins of stories I’ve heard and rituals I’ve participated in my whole life. Even when I don’t understand the daf itself, I believe that the commitment to learning every day is valuable and has multiple benefits. And there will be another daf tomorrow!
Jerusalem, Israel
When we heard that R. Michelle was starting daf yomi, my 11-year-old suggested that I go. Little did she know that she would lose me every morning from then on. I remember standing at the Farbers’ door, almost too shy to enter. After that first class, I said that I would come the next day but couldn’t commit to more. A decade later, I still look forward to learning from R. Michelle every morning.
Ra’anana, Israel
See video
Raanana, Israel
Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!
Raanana, Israel
I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.
Elkins Park, United States
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Jerusalem, Israel
I began my Daf Yomi journey on January 5, 2020. I had never learned Talmud before. Initially it struck me as a bunch of inane and arcane details with mind bending logic. I am now smitten. Rabbanit Farber brings the page to life and I am eager to learn with her every day!
Highland Park, United States
Palo Alto, CA, United States
I’ve been learning since January 2020, and in June I started drawing a phrase from each daf. Sometimes it’s easy (e.g. plants), sometimes it’s very hard (e.g. korbanot), and sometimes it’s loads of fun (e.g. bird racing) to find something to draw. I upload my pictures from each masechet to #DafYomiArt. I am enjoying every step of the journey.
Ashdod, Israel
Raanana, Israel
Gittin 65
כְּעֵין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא תַּקּוּן.
they instituted parallel to Torah law, and they did not innovate novel halakhic models.
וְאִידַּךְ – כִּי אָמְרִינַן: כָּל דְּתַקּוּן רַבָּנַן כְּעֵין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא תַּקּוּן – בְּמִילְּתָא דְּאִית לַהּ עִיקָּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל מִילְּתָא דְּלֵית לַהּ עִיקָּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה – לָא.
And the other Sage, Rav Ḥinnana of Vardonia, why was he silent? He holds that when we say: All ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law, it is with regard to a matter that is rooted in the Torah, and upon which the Sages instituted an ordinance. However, with regard to a matter that is not rooted in the Torah, e.g., the halakhot of joining courtyards and merging alleyways, no, they did not institute the ordinances parallel to Torah law.
מֵתִיב רַב אַוְיָא: מַעֲרִימִין עַל מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. כֵּיצַד? אוֹמֵר אָדָם לִבְנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים; לְעַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הָעִבְרִים: ״הֵא לָכֶם מָעוֹת הַלָּלוּ, וּפְדוּ בָּהֶן מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי זֶה״, וְאוֹכְלוֹ בְּלֹא חוֹמֶשׁ.
Rav Avya raises another objection to Shmuel’s opinion, according to Rav Ḥisda’s explanations, that a minor cannot acquire property on behalf of others, based on a mishna in tractate Ma’aser Sheni (4:4): One may employ artifice to exempt himself from the obligation to add one-fifth to the sum when redeeming second tithe, which the owner of the tithe is required to add. How so? A person says to his adult son or daughter, or to his Hebrew slave or his maidservant: Here you are, take money and redeem second tithe with it. After they redeem the second tithe, they give it to their father or master and he eats it without adding one-fifth.
הַאי שִׁפְחָה הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאַתְיָא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, מַאי בָּעֲיָא גַּבֵּיהּ? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּלָא אַתְיָא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּמַעֲשֵׂר בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה – דְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this maidservant? If she developed two pubic hairs, indicating that she reached majority, what is she doing with the owner of the produce? A Hebrew maidservant is emancipated when she reaches puberty. Rather, is the reference here not to a case where she did not yet develop two pubic hairs? Apparently, a minor can also acquire property on behalf of others. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? It is with tithes today, which is in effect by rabbinic law, and the Sages ruled leniently in matters of rabbinic law.
וְאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה מִי אִיכָּא?! וְהָתַנְיָא: אֵין עֶבֶד עִבְרִי נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג! אֶלָּא בְּעָצִיץ שֶׁאֵינוֹ נָקוּב – דְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara asks: And is there a Hebrew maidservant today? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The provision of a Hebrew slave is in practice only during a period when the Jubilee Year is in practice. Therefore, there have been no Hebrew slaves or maidservants since observance of the Jubilee Year ceased, before the destruction of the First Temple. Rather, it must be that the mishna is referring to a case where the produce grew in an unperforated pot, which one is obligated to tithe by rabbinic law.
אָמַר רָבָא, שָׁלֹשׁ מִדּוֹת בְּקָטָן: צְרוֹר וְזוֹרְקוֹ, אֱגוֹז וְנוֹטְלוֹ – זוֹכֶה לְעַצְמוֹ, וְאֵין זוֹכֶה לַאֲחֵרִים; וּכְנֶגְדָּן בִּקְטַנָּה – מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת לְמֵיאוּן.
Apropos the capacity of minors to acquire property, Rava says that there are three stages in the development of a minor: With regard to a minor who is given a pebble and he throws it away but when given a nut he takes it, he acquires property for himself but does not acquire property on behalf of others. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of intellectual development, after the death of her father she can be betrothed by her mother and her brother by rabbinic law, and can opt out of that betrothal through refusal.
הַפָּעוֹטוֹת – מִקָּחָן מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּרָן מִמְכָּר בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין; וּכְנֶגְדָּן בִּקְטַנָּה – מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי אָבִיהָ.
At the next stage of development are young children aged approximately six through eight, whose purchase is a purchase and whose sale is a sale, with regard to movable property. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of development, she is divorced by receipt of her bill of divorce, even if it is from betrothal by her father, which is by Torah law.
הִגִּיעוּ לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים – נִדְרֵיהֶן נֶדֶר וְהֶקְדֵּשָׁן הֶקְדֵּשׁ; וּכְנֶגְדָּן בִּקְטַנָּה – חוֹלֶצֶת. וְלִמְכּוֹר בְּנִכְסֵי אָבִיו – עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא בֶּן עֶשְׂרִים.
The third stage of development is when they have reached the age of vows, when their vows are valid vows and their consecration is valid consecration. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of development, she performs ḥalitza to free herself from her levirate bond. And with regard to selling his father’s landed property, a minor cannot sell it until he will reach the age of twenty.
מַתְנִי׳ קְטַנָּה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ; לְפִיכָךְ, אִם רָצָה הַבַּעַל לַחֲזוֹר – יַחְזוֹר. שֶׁאֵין קָטָן עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ.
MISHNA: In the case of a minor girl who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. Therefore, if the husband seeks to retract his decision before his wife receives the bill of divorce, he can retract it, as a minor does not designate an agent. Consequently, the agent is not an agent for receipt, and the divorce does not take effect when the husband hands the document to the agent. The agent is an agent for delivery, and the divorce takes effect when the bill of divorce enters the wife’s possession.
וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ אָבִיהָ: ״צֵא וְהִתְקַבֵּל לְבִתִּי גִּיטָּהּ״, אִם רָצָה לַחֲזוֹר – לֹא יַחְזוֹר.
And if her father said to the agent: Go out and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce on her behalf, then if the husband seeks to retract his decision, he cannot retract it. As a father can receive the bill of divorce on behalf of his minor daughter, he can designate an agent for receipt, and the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the document to the agent.
הָאוֹמֵר: ״תֵּן גֵּט זֶה לְאִשְׁתִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל. ״הֲרֵי הִיא בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר.
With regard to one who says to an agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, if the agent deviated and gave it to her in another place the divorce is invalid. However, if he said to the agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, she is in such and such a place, without explicitly instructing the agent to give her the document there, and he gave it to her in another place the divorce is valid.
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְקִיבְּלוֹ לָהּ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל; רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר. ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וֶהֱבִיאוֹ לָהּ מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר – כָּשֵׁר.
With regard to the woman who when designating her agent for receipt said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, and he received it for her in another place, the divorce is invalid; and Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. If she said to him: Bring me my bill of divorce from such and such a place, and he brought it for her from another place, it is valid. Because he is an agent for delivery, the woman is not particular where he receives the bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect only when the bill of divorce reaches her possession.
גְּמָ׳ וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא דְּלָא פְּלִיג, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא דִּפְלִיג?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Elazar, what is different in the first clause, where the agent deviated from the husband’s instructions and delivered the bill of divorce in a different place, where he does not disagree with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna that the divorce is invalid, and what is different in the latter clause, where the agent deviated from the wife’s instructions and received the bill of divorce in a different place, where he disagrees with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna and deems the divorce valid?
אִיהוּ, דְּמִדַּעְתֵּיהּ מְגָרֵשׁ – קָפֵיד, אִיהִי, דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחַהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת – מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.
The Gemara answers: He, the husband, who divorces his wife of his own volition, insists that the divorce be effected in a certain place. However, she, the wife, who is divorced even against her will, is in no position to insist with regard to the manner in which the divorce will be effected, and is merely indicating a place for him to give her the bill of divorce.
מַתְנִי׳ ״הָבֵא לִי גִּיטִּי״ – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְיָדָהּ. ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי״, אֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה מִיָּד. ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״ – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ גֵּט לְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר מִיָּד.
MISHNA: An Israelite woman married to a priest partakes of teruma. If she says to an agent: Bring me my bill of divorce, designating him as an agent for delivery, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. However, if she says: Receive my bill of divorce for me, thereby designating him as an agent for receipt, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma. Since the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the bill of divorce to the agent, the concern is that the agent encountered the husband nearby. If the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, then even if he received it elsewhere, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately.
גְּמָ׳ וְגִיטָּא מִיהָא הָוֵי? וְהָאָמְרַתְּ רֵישָׁא, לָא הָוֵי גִּיטָּא!
GEMARA: In this mishna, the first tanna apparently states that if the agent for receipt received the bill of divorce in a place other than the place designated by the woman for receipt, the bill of divorce is valid when the agent brings it to the designated place. The Gemara asks: And in any event, is it a valid bill of divorce? But didn’t you say in the first clause, i.e., in the previous mishna, that if the agent received the bill of divorce in another place, it is not a valid bill of divorce?
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטָּא בְּמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא, וְזִימְנִין דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ בְּבָבֶל״; וְהָכִי קָאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: מִשְׁקָל – כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ, שִׁקְלֵיהּ מִינֵּיהּ;
The Gemara asks: No, this halakha is necessary with regard to a case where she said to him: Receive the bill of divorce for me in the city of Mata Meḥasya, and sometimes you can find him in the city of Babylon. And this is what she is saying: When taking the bill of divorce, anywhere that you find him, take it from him,
גִּיטָּא לָא הָוֵי – עַד דְּמָטֵית לְמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא.
However, it is not a valid bill of divorce until you reach Mata Meḥasya.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר מִיָּד. פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּהָא מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ!
The mishna teaches that if the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, as she is merely indicating a place for him to receive the bill of divorce and not stipulating that the divorce is contingent upon receipt of the document in that place.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: ״זִיל לְמִזְרָח, דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּמִזְרָח״; וְקָא אָזֵל לְמַעֲרָב. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, בְּמַעֲרָב – הָא לֵיתֵיהּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דִּילְמָא בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָזֵיל מֵיגָס גָּאֵיס בֵּיהּ, וִיהַב לֵיהּ גִּיטָּא.
The Gemara answers: No, Rabbi Elazar’s ruling is necessary in a case where she said to him: Go to the east, as my husband is in the east, and the agent went to the west. Lest you say that since the husband is certainly not in the west and the agent will not find him there, the bill of divorce will certainly not take effect until later, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that perhaps while he was going west, the agent happened to encounter the husband, and the husband gave the bill of divorce to the agent.
הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״עָרֵב לִי בִּתְמָרִים״, וְעֵירַב לוֹ בִּגְרוֹגְרוֹת; ״בִּגְרוֹגְרוֹת״, וְעֵירַב לוֹ בִּתְמָרִים; תָּנֵי חֲדָא: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב!
The Gemara cites a related halakha. With regard to one who says to his agent: Establish an eiruv of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf with dates, and he established an eiruv on his behalf with dried figs, or if said to his agent: Establish an eiruv on my behalf with dried figs, and he established an eiruv on his behalf with dates, it is taught in one baraita: His eiruv is a valid eiruv. And it is taught in another baraita: His eiruv is not a valid eiruv.
אָמַר רַבָּה: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבָּנַן, הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. הָא רַבָּנַן – דְּאָמְרִי: קְפִידָא; הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.
Rabba said: This is not difficult. This baraita, in which it is taught that it is not a valid eiruv, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that baraita, in which it is taught that it is a valid eiruv, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. He explains: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: When one gives instructions to his agent, there is insistence on his part that the agent implement those instructions without deviation. Failure to do so revokes his designation as his agent. And that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: She is merely indicating a place for him to receive the bill of divorce and not stipulating that the divorce is contingent on receipt of the document in that place. In the baraita as well, he was not particular as to what food should be used to establish the eiruv.
וְרַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: הָא וְהָא רַבָּנַן; כָּאן בְּשֶׁלּוֹ, כָּאן בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.
And Rav Yosef said: Both this baraita and that baraita are the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: When one gives instructions to his agent, there is insistence on his part that the agent implement those instructions without deviation. However, not all deviations are equal. Here, where the baraita rules that it is a valid eiruv, the reference is to a case where the one who designated the agent instructed him to establish the joining of the courtyard with his dates or dried figs and the agent deviated and established the eiruv with the other type of fruit, but it belonged to the one issuing the instructions. There, where the baraita rules that it is not a valid eiruv, the reference is to a case where the one who designated the agent instructed him to establish the joining of the courtyard with the dates or dried figs of another, and the agent deviated and established the eiruv with the other type of fruit belonging to that other person. The eiruv is not valid because that other person authorized use of only a specific type of fruit.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא, הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״עָרֵב לִי בְּמִגְדָּל״ – וְעֵירַב לוֹ בְּשׁוֹבָךְ, ״בְּשׁוֹבָךְ״ – וְעֵירַב לוֹ בְּמִגְדָּל; דְּתַנְיָא חֲדָא: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב; הָתָם – מַאי שֶׁלּוֹ וְשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ אִיכָּא?
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: However, that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to his agent: Establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf in a tower, and he established the eiruv in a dovecote, or he said to the agent: Establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries on my behalf in a dovecote, and he established the eiruv in a tower, it is taught in one baraita: His joining of Shabbat boundaries is a valid eiruv. And it is taught in another baraita: His joining of Shabbat boundaries is not a valid eiruv. There, what distinction between his fruit and fruit of another is there?
הָתָם נָמֵי, אִיכָּא פֵּירֵי דְמִגְדָּל וּפֵירֵי דְשׁוֹבָךְ.
The Gemara answers: There too, there is a distinction between fruit of the tower and fruit of the dovecote. In these baraitot the instruction did not relate to the location of the placement of the eiruv; rather, the instruction was related to the location of the fruit to be used in establishing the eiruv. In one baraita, the produce in both locations belongs to the one who designated the agent; in the other baraita, the produce in both locations belongs to another.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט וּתְנוּ לְאִשְׁתִּי״; ״גָּרְשׁוּהָ״; ״כִּתְבוּ אִיגֶּרֶת וּתְנוּ לַהּ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ.
MISHNA: With regard to a husband who says to two people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, or: Divorce her, or: Write a letter and give it to her, they should write the document and give it to her. In each of those cases his intent is clear. He is instructing them to effect her divorce.
״פַּטְּרוּהָ״; ״פַּרְנְסוּהָ״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּנִימוּס״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
However, one who said: Release her, or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law [nimus], or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing, as none of these expressions clearly expresses his desire to divorce his wife.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״שַׁלְּחוּהָ״; ״שִׁבְקוּהָ״; ״תָּרְכוּהָ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. ״פַּטְּרוּהָ״; ״פַּרְנְסוּהָ״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּנִימוֹס״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
GEMARA: The Sages taught that if the husband said: Send her, or: Separate her, or: Banish her, then all of these expressions convey his will to divorce her, and consequently, they should write the bill of divorce and give it to her. However, one who said: Release her [patruha], or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law, or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: ״פַּטְּרוּהָ״ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, ״פִּיטְרוּהָ״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן – דְּבַבְלָאָה הוּא, וְדָיֵיק בֵּין ״פִּיטְרוּהָ״ לְ״פַטְּרוּהָ״, תַּנָּא דִּידַן – דְּבַר אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא, לָא דָּיֵיק.
It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: If one said patruha, his statement stands, and they give her a bill of divorce. However, if one said pitruha, he said nothing. Rava said: Rabbi Natan, who is a Babylonian, distinguished between pitruha and patruha. Pitruha means exempt her, which is unrelated to divorce; patruha means release her, which is very much related to divorce. However, the tanna of our mishna, who is a resident of Eretz Yisrael, did not distinguish between these two expressions.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הוֹצִיאוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״עִזְבוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הַתִּירוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הַנִּיחוּהָ״, מַהוּ? ״הוֹעִילוּ לָהּ״, מַהוּ? ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּדָּת״, מַהוּ?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband said: Remove her, what is the halakha? If he said: Abandon her, what is the halakha? If he said: Unbind her, what is the halakha? If he said: Let her be, what is the halakha? If he said: Be useful for her, what is the halakha? If he said: Treat her according to the custom, what is the halakha?
פְּשׁוֹט מִיהָא חֲדָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כַּדָּת״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כְּנִימוֹס״; ״עֲשׂוּ לָהּ כָּרָאוּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
The Gemara answers: Resolve at least one of these expressions, as it is taught in a baraita: One who said: Treat her according to the custom, or: Treat her according to the law, or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing and it is not a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, the expression: Treat her according to the custom, is not an unequivocal instruction to effect divorce.
מַתְנִי׳ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: הַיּוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר, וְאָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר: אַף הַמְפָרֵשׁ, וְהַיּוֹצֵא בִּשְׁיָירָא. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמְסוּכָּן.
MISHNA: At first the Sages would say: In the case of one who is taken out in a neck chain [kolar] to be executed and who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people should write the document and give it to his wife even though there was no explicit instruction to give it to her. They then said: Even with regard to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a far-off place and says: Write a bill of divorce to my wife, his intention is to write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if one who is dangerously ill gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.
גְּמָ׳ גְּנִיבָא יוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר הֲוָה, כִּי הֲוָה קָא נָפֵיק, אָמַר: הַבוּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי לְרַבִּי אֲבִינָא, מֵחַמְרָא דִּנְהַר פַּנְיָא. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא:
GEMARA: The Gemara relates: Geneiva was one who went out in a neck chain to be executed. When he was going out, he said to the people there as his dying bequest: Give four hundred dinars to Rabbi Avina from wine that I have in the city of Nehar Panya. Rabbi Zeira said:
