Kiddushin 5
וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאַף בִּשְׁטָר? וְדִין הוּא: וּמָה כֶּסֶף, שֶׁאֵין מוֹצִיא – מַכְנִיס, שְׁטָר, שֶׁמּוֹצִיא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּכְנִיס?
The baraita continues to discuss the modes of betrothal: And from where is it derived that a woman can be acquired even by means of a document? The Gemara answers: This is a logical derivation, made by an a fortiori inference: And if money, which does not release a woman from her husband, nevertheless can bring her into a husband’s domain by betrothal, is it not logical that a document, which releases a woman from her husband in the form of a bill of divorce, can bring her into a husband’s domain by betrothal?
מָה לְכֶסֶף, שֶׁכֵּן פּוֹדִין בּוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. תֹּאמַר שְׁטָר, שֶׁאֵין פּוֹדִין בּוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנָתַן הַכֶּסֶף וְקָם לוֹ״!
The Gemara refutes this claim: What is unique about money is that it can effect acquisition in many contexts, as one can redeem with it consecrated property and second tithe. Will you say that the same also applies to a document, with which one cannot redeem consecrated property and second tithe? The proof that one may redeem consecrated property only by means of money is that it is written: “And he will give the money and it will be assured to him” (see Leviticus 27:19). Consequently, this halakha cannot be derived by logical reasoning.
אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ – מַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָה לִיצִיאָה: מָה יְצִיאָה בִּשְׁטָר – אַף הֲוָיָה נָמֵי בִּשְׁטָר. וְאַקֵּישׁ נָמֵי, יְצִיאָה לַהֲוָיָה: מָה הֲוָיָה בַּכֶּסֶף – אַף יְצִיאָה בְּכֶסֶף!
Therefore, the verse states: “And she leaves his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). This verse juxtaposes becoming, i.e., betrothal, to leaving, i.e., divorce. Just as leaving is performed through a document, i.e., a bill of divorce, so too, becoming can be performed through a document. The Gemara asks: And let one also juxtapose leaving to becoming, in the opposite direction: Just as becoming is performed through money, so too, leaving can be effected through money.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: יֹאמְרוּ: כֶּסֶף מַכְנִיס, כֶּסֶף מוֹצִיא, סָנֵיגוֹר יֵעָשֶׂה קָטֵיגוֹר? אִי הָכִי, שְׁטָר נָמֵי יֹאמְרוּ: שְׁטָר מוֹצִיא, שְׁטָר מַכְנִיס, קָטֵיגוֹר יֵעָשֶׂה סָנֵיגוֹר?
Abaye says: If so, people will say: Money brings in and money releases; if so, can an advocate [saneigor] become a prosecutor [kateigor]? It is improper for the same mode that draws man and woman together to be used for the termination of their relationship. The Gemara asks: If so, then with regard to a document too, they will say: A document brings in and a document releases; if so, can a prosecutor become an advocate?
מִילֵּי דְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא לְחוֹד וּמִילֵּי דְּהַאי שְׁטָרָא לְחוֹד. הָכָא נָמֵי, הַאי כַּסְפָּא לְחוֹד וְהַאי כַּסְפָּא לְחוֹד! טִיבְעָא מִיהָא חַד הוּא.
The Gemara answers: The words of this betrothal document are discrete, i.e., distinct, and the words of this divorce document are discrete, i.e., the two documents differ in content. The Gemara asks: Here too, this money is discrete and this money is discrete, as one coin is for the betrothal and a different coin is used for the divorce. The Gemara answers: In any event, the coin itself is one, i.e., there is no noticeable difference between the coin used for betrothal and one that would be used for divorce. The same cannot be said with regard to documents, as particular texts serve specific purposes, and the same document could not be used for both betrothal and divorce.
רָבָא אָמַר: אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ בִּכְתִיבָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, וְאֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּכֶסֶף. וְאֵימָא: בִּכְתִיבָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת – וְאֵינָהּ מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בִּכְתִיבָה! הָא כְּתִיב ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ מַקִּישׁ וְכוּ׳.
Rava said: The halakha that a woman cannot be divorced by means of money is derived from a different source. The verse states: “And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). This indicates that a woman is divorced only through writing and she is not divorced through money. The Gemara asks: But as this point is not stated explicitly and is inferred from the verse, one can instead say the following interpretation: She is divorced through writing, and she is not betrothed through writing. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. It is written: “And she leaves and becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which juxtaposes betrothal to divorce, indicating that betrothal can be effected with a document.
וּמָה רָאִיתָ? מִסְתַּבְּרָא קָאֵי בְּגֵירוּשִׁין מְמַעֵט גֵּירוּשִׁין, קָאֵי בְּגֵירוּשִׁין וּמְמַעֵט קִידּוּשִׁין?!
The Gemara asks: And what did you see that you interpreted the verses in this manner? One can say the reverse, that the juxtaposition between betrothal and divorce teaches that in both cases money is effective, while the verse: “And he writes her,” means that she can be divorced but not betrothed through writing. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that when the verse is referring to divorce it excludes a different mode of divorce. Would a verse be referring to divorce and exclude a mode of betrothal?
וּלְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּאַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהַאי קְרָא לִדְרָשָׁא אַחֲרִינָא, שֶׁאֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּכֶסֶף מְנָא לֵיהּ? אָמַר קְרָא: ״סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת״ – סֵפֶר כּוֹרְתָהּ, וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר כּוֹרְתָהּ.
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where does he derive that a woman cannot be divorced through money? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “A scroll of severance,” which teaches: A scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband, and nothing else severs her from him.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״כְּרִיתֻת״, מַאי עָבְדִי לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְדָבָר הַכּוֹרֵת בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ,
The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, what do they do with this verse: “A scroll of severance”? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They require it for the halakha that a document of divorce must be a matter that entirely severs him from her. The text of the bill of divorce must completely terminate the relationship between them.
כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתִּי יַיִן״, ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ לְעוֹלָם״ – אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. ״כָּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.
This is as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Gittin 5:12) that if a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? מִכָּרֵת כְּרִיתֻת קָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ. וְרַבָּנַן? כָּרֵת כְּרִיתֻת לָא מַשְׁמַע לְהוּ.
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this requirement that a bill of divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife? The Gemara answers that he derives it from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.
חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי! הֵי תֵּיתֵי? לָא לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּשְׁטָר, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן הֲנָאָתָן מְרוּבָּה.
§ The Gemara asks: It has been shown that one mode of betrothal cannot be derived from another mode of betrothal, as explained in the baraita, but why not let one be derived from the other two methods? The Gemara answers: This is not possible, as, which method will be derived from the others? If you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be betrothed through a document, and one can derive this mode of acquisition from these modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse and money, this claim can be refuted. What is unique about these other modes is that their benefit is great, relative to a document, as a woman experiences no enjoyment upon receiving a document.
לָא נִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּבִיאָה, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן קִנְיָנָן מְרוּבֶּה.
And if you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be acquired through sexual intercourse, and one can derive this mode from these modes of acquisition, i.e., money and a document, this too is not possible, as, what is unique about these modes of betrothal is that their acquisition is great. In other words, these modes of acquisition apply in many other situations. Therefore, one cannot derive the unusual acquisition of sexual intercourse from these methods.
לָא נִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּכֶסֶף, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ.
If you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be acquired through money, and one can derive this mode from these other modes of acquisition, this is also not possible, as what is unique about these is that they apply against her will. A yavam acquires a yevama through intercourse even against her will, while a document releases a woman from marriage without her consent in the case of a bill of divorce.
וְכִי תֵּימָא כֶּסֶף נָמֵי בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ, בְּאָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה – בְּאִישׁוּת מִיהָא לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן.
And if you would say that money also applies against her will, in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, whose father can sell her to a master without her consent, enabling one to therefore derive from the other two modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse and a document, that a woman can be acquired through money, this opinion can be refuted as well: In any event, with regard to marriage, we do not find a case in which a woman can be acquired through money against her will. Consequently, none of these modes of acquisition can be derived from any of the others.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: חוּפָּה קוֹנָה מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה כֶּסֶף שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל בִּתְרוּמָה – קוֹנֶה, חוּפָּה שֶׁמַּאֲכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתִּקְנֶה?
§ Rav Huna says: The ceremony of the wedding canopy effects acquisition of the woman, as is derived through an a fortiori inference: If money, which does not enable the wife to partake of teruma, as the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest may not yet partake of teruma, effects acquisition of a woman for betrothal, is it not logical that a wedding canopy, which enables her to partake of teruma, as once a woman has entered the wedding canopy it is permitted for her to partake of teruma due to her husband the priest, should also effect acquisition of a woman by her husband?
וְכֶסֶף אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל? וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, אֲרוּסָה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכֹהֵן כִּי יִקְנֶה נֶפֶשׁ קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״, וְהַאי ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ הוּא״.
The Gemara asks: And does betrothal money not enable a woman to partake of teruma? But didn’t Ulla say: By Torah law the daughter of a non-priest who is betrothed to a priest may partake of teruma immediately upon her betrothal, as it is stated: “But if a priest buy any soul, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), and this woman is considered the acquisition of his money.
וּמַה טַּעַם אָמְרוּ אֵינָהּ אוֹכֶלֶת – גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִמְזְגוּ לָהּ כּוֹס בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ וְתַשְׁקֶנּוּ לְאָחִיהָ וְלַאֲחוֹתָיהּ.
And what is the reason that the Sages said that she may not partake of teruma? It is a rabbinic decree lest they pour her a cup of teruma wine in her father’s house, where she is staying before her marriage, and she give to her brothers and sisters to drink, as it is prohibited for them to partake of teruma. If so, by Torah law a woman may partake of teruma once she has been betrothed with money. Consequently, the above a fortiori inference that entering a wedding canopy can effect betrothal is invalid.
אֶלָּא פְּרֵיךְ הָכִי: וּמָה כֶּסֶף שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוֹמֵר – קוֹנֶה,
Rather, the Gemara emends Rav Huna’s statement and says that he refutes the opinion that entering a wedding canopy does not effect betrothal as follows: If money, which does not complete the acquisition of a woman, as a young woman remains under her father’s authority with regard to certain issues, nevertheless effects acquisition of her for the stage of betrothal,
חוּפָּה שֶׁגּוֹמֶרֶת – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתִּקְנֶה? מָה לְכֶסֶף, שֶׁכֵּן פּוֹדִין בּוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת וּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. בִּיאָה תּוֹכִיחַ.
is it not logical that a wedding canopy, which completes the marriage, since it entirely removes a young woman from her father’s authority, can effect acquisition for betrothal on its own? The Gemara rejects this claim: What is unique about money is that it can effect acquisition in many contexts, as one can redeem with it consecrated property and second tithe. This is not so with regard to a wedding canopy, which is ineffective in effecting any acquisition other than marriage. Therefore, in the case of betrothal, money can effect betrothal while a wedding canopy cannot. The Gemara counters: The halakha of sexual intercourse proves otherwise, as this act serves to effect acquisition of a woman despite the fact that it is not a valid mode of acquisition in any other case.
מָה לְבִיאָה, שֶׁכֵּן קוֹנָה בִּיבָמָה. כֶּסֶף יוֹכִיחַ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין: לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן: שֶׁקּוֹנִין בְּעָלְמָא וְקוֹנִין כָּאן, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא חוּפָּה שֶׁקּוֹנָה בְּעָלְמָא, וְקוֹנָה כָּאן.
The Gemara counters: What is unique about sexual intercourse is that it effects acquisition of a yevama, whereas a yavam does not acquire her via a wedding canopy. The Gemara answers: Money proves otherwise, as money cannot be used to acquire a yevama, and yet it is a valid mode for acquiring a woman. And the derivation has reverted to its starting point: The aspect of this mode, money, is not like the aspect of that mode, intercourse, and the aspect of that mode, intercourse, is not like the aspect of this mode, money. Their common denominator is that they generally effect acquisition, and they effect acquisition here, with regard to betrothal. Likewise, I will bring the mode of a wedding canopy, which generally effects acquisition, rendering a woman as married, and therefore it should also effect acquisition here.
מָה לְצַד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן הֲנָאָתָן מְרוּבָּה. שְׁטָר יוֹכִיחַ. מָה לִשְׁטָר, שֶׁכֵּן מוֹצִיא בְּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל. כֶּסֶף וּבִיאָה יוֹכִיחוּ.
The Gemara rejects this: What about the fact that the common denominator of money and intercourse is that their benefit, i.e., pleasure, is great? The Gemara says: The case of a document proves otherwise, as no great pleasure is derived from receiving a document, and yet it can be used to acquire a woman. The Gemara answers: What is unique about a document is that it can release a Jewish woman from her husband in the form of a bill of divorce. The Gemara answers: Money and intercourse prove otherwise, as they do not release a woman and yet they are valid modes of acquisition for betrothal.
וְחָזַר הַדִּין: לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן: שֶׁקּוֹנִין בְּעָלְמָא וְקוֹנִין כָּאן – אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא חוּפָּה, שֶׁקּוֹנָה בְּעָלְמָא וְקוֹנָה כָּאן.
And once again, the derivation has reverted to its starting point: The aspect of this mode is not like the aspect of that mode, and the aspect of that mode is not like the aspect of this mode. Their common denominator is that they generally effect acquisition and they effect acquisition here, with regard to betrothal. Likewise, I will bring the mode of a wedding canopy, which generally effects acquisition, and therefore it should also effect acquisition here.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ. וְרַב הוּנָא – כֶּסֶף מִיהָא בְּאִישׁוּת לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ.
The Gemara again rejects this claim: What about the fact that the common denominator of all three modes of acquisition is that they are effective in certain situations against her will? A bill of divorce, sexual intercourse in the case of a yevama, and money with regard to a Hebrew maidservant all effect acquisition of a woman against her will. Therefore, the mode of a wedding canopy cannot be derived from these methods, as a wedding canopy is effective only when the woman enters it willingly. And in response to this claim Rav Huna would answer: In any event, with regard to marriage, we have not found a case in which a woman can be acquired through money against her will. Consequently, it is possible to learn from the modes of money, a document, and intercourse that a wedding canopy likewise effects betrothal.
אָמַר רָבָא: שְׁתֵּי תְשׁוּבוֹת בַּדָּבָר. חֲדָא, דְּ״שָׁלֹשׁ״ תְּנַן וְ״אַרְבַּע״ לָא תְּנַן.
Rava said: There are two refutations of this matter, i.e., it is possible to refute Rav Huna’s opinion in two ways. One opinion is that we learned in the mishna that a woman can be acquired through three modes of acquisition, and we did not learn that there are four modes. This indicates that there are no other ways to acquire a woman apart from the three listed in the mishna.
וְעוֹד: כְּלוּם חוּפָּה גּוֹמֶרֶת אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי קִידּוּשִׁין, וְכִי גָּמְרִינַן חוּפָּה שֶׁלֹּא עַל יְדֵי קִידּוּשִׁין מֵחוּפָּה שֶׁעַל יְדֵי קִידּוּשִׁין?
And furthermore, Rava disagrees with the main point of the proof, which was based on the fact that a wedding canopy completes a marriage: Doesn’t entering a wedding canopy complete a marriage only by means of an act of betrothal, which precedes the wedding canopy? And can one derive that entering a wedding canopy effects acquisition without betrothal from the case of entering a wedding canopy that effects acquisition by means of betrothal? Consequently, entering a wedding canopy alone cannot effect a betrothal.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּקָאָמְרַתְּ ״שָׁלֹשׁ״ תְּנַן וְ״אַרְבַּע״ לָא תְּנַן – תַּנָּא מִילְּתָא דִּכְתִיבָא בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי, מִילְּתָא דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא בְּהֶדְיָא לָא קָתָנֵי.
Abaye said to Rava in response to his two claims: With regard to that which you said, that we learned in the mishna three modes and we did not learn that there are four modes, this is no proof, as the tanna teaches only a matter that is explicitly written in the Torah, and does not teach a matter that is not explicitly written in the Torah, such as a wedding canopy.
וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ ״כְּלוּם חוּפָּה גּוֹמֶרֶת אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי קִידּוּשִׁין״ – רַב הוּנָא נָמֵי הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה כֶּסֶף שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוֹמֵר אַחַר כֶּסֶף – קוֹנֶה, חוּפָּה שֶׁגּוֹמֶרֶת אַחַר כֶּסֶף – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתִּקְנֶה?
And with regard to that which you said: Doesn’t entering a wedding canopy complete a marriage only by means of an act of betrothal, this is also what Rav Huna is saying, i.e., Rav Huna incorporates this claim into his reasoning: If money, which does not complete a marriage after money, i.e., after a woman has been betrothed through money an additional monetary gift cannot render her a fully married woman, effects acquisition of the woman in the form of betrothal, is it not logical that entering a wedding canopy, which is more powerful than money in that it completes a marriage after money, should effect acquisition and be used to perform betrothal by itself?
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד בְּכֶסֶף? נָתַן לָהּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְאוֹרֶסֶת לִי״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲבָל הִיא שֶׁנָּתְנָה, וְאָמְרָה הִיא: ״הֲרֵינִי מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לְךָ״, ״הֲרֵינִי מְאוֹרֶסֶת לְךָ״, ״הֲרֵינִי לְךָ לְאִינְתּוּ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.
§ After discussing the sources for the modes of acquisition listed in the mishna, the Gemara analyzes these halakhot in greater detail. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:1): How is betrothal performed through money? If a man gave a woman money or an item worth money, and he said to her: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to me, or: You are to me as a wife, then she is betrothed. But if she is the one who gave the money to him, and she said: I am hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to you, or: I am hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to you, or: I am hereby to you as a wife, then she is not betrothed.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: טַעְמָא דְּנָתַן הוּא וְאָמַר הוּא, הָא נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֲבָל הִיא שֶׁנָּתְנָה לוֹ וְאָמְרָה הִיא – לָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין. טַעְמָא דְּנָתְנָה הִיא וְאָמְרָה הִיא, הָא נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין!
Rav Pappa objects to this: This baraita contains an internal contradiction. The first part of the baraita states: If a man gave a woman money and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me, from which it may be inferred that the reason the woman is betrothed is that he gave her money and he said the appropriate formula. This leads to the conclusion that if he gave her money and she said the formula, she is not betrothed. Now say the latter clause of the baraita: But if she is the one who gave the money to him, and she said: I am hereby betrothed to you, then it is not a valid betrothal. Rav Pappa infers: The reason that it is not a valid betrothal is that she gave money to him and she said the appropriate formula, from which it may be inferred that if he gave money to her and she said the appropriate formula, then this is a valid betrothal.
רֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, סֵיפָא כְּדִי נַסְבַהּ. וְתָנֵי סֵיפָא מִילְּתָא דְּסָתְרָא לַהּ לְרֵישָׁא?
The Gemara explains: The first clause of the baraita is exact, and therefore it is correct to infer that which was not explicitly stated from this ruling. By contrast, the latter clause of the baraita was cited for no reason, i.e., it was simply formulated in the opposite manner of the first clause, and the baraita is not exact in the wording of this case. Therefore, one should not analyze this clause too carefully and infer halakhot from it. The Gemara asks: And would the baraita teach in the latter clause a matter that contradicts the first clause?
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: נָתַן הוּא וְאָמַר הוּא – פְּשִׁיטָא דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין. נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנָּתְנָה הִיא וְאָמְרָה הִיא, וְלָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין. וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: נָתַן הוּא וְאָמַר הוּא – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. נָתְנָה הִיא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – סְפֵיקָא הִיא וְחָיְישִׁינַן מִדְּרַבָּנַן.
Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation in favor of the following. This is what the baraita is saying: If he gave the money and he said the formula, it is obvious that it is a valid betrothal. If he gave the money and she said the formula, it is considered as though she gave the money and she said the formula, and therefore it is not a valid betrothal. And if you wish, say a different explanation of the baraita: If he gave the money and he said the formula, she is betrothed. If she gave the money and she said the formula, she is not betrothed at all. If he gave the money and she said the formula, the ruling is uncertain, and by rabbinic law we are concerned that this might actually be a betrothal.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּקִידּוּשִׁין, נָתַן לָהּ כֶּסֶף וְשָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְאוֹרֶסֶת״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ (לִי) לְאִינְתּוּ״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. ״הֲרֵינִי אִישֵּׁךְ״, ״הֲרֵינִי בַּעְלֵיךְ״, ״הֲרֵינִי אֲרוּסֵיךְ״ – אֵין כָּאן בֵּית מֵיחוֹשׁ.
The Gemara continues to discuss the language of betrothal. Shmuel says: With regard to betrothal, if he gave her money or an item worth money, and said to her: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet], or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset], or: You are hereby as a wife, then she is betrothed. If he said: I am hereby your man, or: I am hereby your husband, or: I am hereby your betrothed, then there is no room for concern here. In these cases there is no possibility that it might be a valid betrothal, as betrothal is effective only if its formulation defines the relationship in terms of the woman’s connection to the man, not the reverse.
וְכֵן בְּגֵירוּשִׁין, נָתַן לָהּ וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְשׁוּלַּחַת״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. ״אֵינִי אִישֵּׁךְ״, ״אֵינִי בַּעְלֵיךְ״, ״אֵינִי אֲרוּסֵיךְ״ – אֵין כָּאן בֵּית מֵיחוֹשׁ.
And similarly, with regard to divorce, if a husband gave his wife a bill of divorce and said to her: You are hereby sent away, or: You are hereby divorced, or: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, then she is divorced. If he said: I am not your man, or: I am not your husband, or: I am not your betrothed, then there is no room for concern, as a bill of divorce is effective only if its formulation defines the relationship in terms of the woman’s connection to the man, not the reverse.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכִיחוֹת, הָוְיָין יָדַיִם?
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Is this to say that Shmuel holds that ambiguous intimations, i.e., incomplete expressions that can be understood only from their context, are considered like unambiguous intimations? In the cases listed by Shmuel, the woman is betrothed despite the fact that the man did not say: You are hereby betrothed to me, but merely: You are hereby betrothed. The statement itself does not include the detail that the speaker intends to betroth her to himself, and yet Shmuel maintains that the betrothal is valid.
וְהָתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר ״אֱהֵא״ – הֲרֵי זֶה נָזִיר. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: וְדִילְמָא ״אֱהֵא בְּתַעֲנִית״ קָאָמַר? וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, וְהוּא שֶׁהָיָה נָזִיר עוֹבֵר לְפָנָיו. טַעְמָא דִּנְזִיר עוֹבֵר לְפָנָיו, הָא לָאו הָכִי – לָא!
Rav Pappa asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nazir 2a) that one who says: I shall be, is a nazirite? And we discussed this ruling: But perhaps he meant to say: I will be in a fast? And Shmuel said that this mishna is referring to a particular set of circumstances, that he said: I shall be, when a nazirite was passing before him. In that context it is clear the individual meant that he too will be a nazirite. Rav Pappa analyzes this statement: The reason that he is a nazirite is only due to the fact that a nazirite passes before him. But if this were not the case, no, his statement would not be considered a naziriteship vow. This indicates that according to Shmuel, ambiguous intimations are not considered like unambiguous intimations.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמַר ״לִי״. אִי הָכִי, מַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? הָנֵי
The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? Shmuel is referring to a case where he said the formulation and added the phrase: To me. For example, he said to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me. The Gemara asks: If so, what is Shmuel teaching us? If the man stated the full formula it is obvious that she is betrothed, as he used the standard expression of betrothal. The Gemara answers: These
