Makkot 16
מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק, וְכׇל הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק – לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. He violates the oath by failing to perform an action, rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged, because the forewarning in this case is an uncertain forewarning. One cannot properly forewarn him before he takes the oath, because as long as time remains in the day he can still eat the loaf at a later time and fulfill the oath; and any uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning.
וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְלֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר, וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר וְגוֹ׳״, בָּא הַכָּתוּב לִיתֵּן עֲשֵׂה אַחַר לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דָּיֵיק הָכִי: טַעְמָא דְּבָא הַכָּתוּב, הָא לֹא בָּא הַכָּתוּב – לוֹקֶה, אַלְמָא: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
The Gemara adds: And both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: It is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover flesh after the prohibition against leaving over the flesh, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yoḥanan inferred this from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda: The reason he is not flogged is that the verse comes and positions the mitzva after the prohibition; but if the verse had not come and positioned the mitzva after the prohibition, he would have been flogged. Apparently, uncertain forewarning is characterized as forewarning, as he can be forewarned not to leave over the flesh of the offering, even though he would not be flogged were he to burn it.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דָּיֵיק הָכִי: טַעְמָא דְּבָא הַכָּתוּב, הָא לֹא בָּא הַכָּתוּב – לוֹקֶה, אַלְמָא: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו.
And Reish Lakish inferred this: The reason he is not flogged is that the verse comes and positions the mitzva after the prohibition; but if the verse had not come and positioned the mitzva after the prohibition, he would have been flogged. Apparently, one is flogged even for violating a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the prohibition without performing an action.
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ נָמֵי, הָא וַדַּאי הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הוּא!
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish too, this is certainly a case of uncertain forewarning; why, then, does he not conclude based on Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that uncertain forewarning is characterized as forewarning?
סָבַר לַהּ כְּאִידַּךְ תַּנָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא: הִכָּה זֶה וְחָזַר וְהִכָּה זֶה, קִילֵּל זֶה וְחָזַר וְקִילֵּל זֶה, הִכָּה שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת אוֹ קִילֵּל שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with the opinion of the other tanna in the name of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman was divorced and remarried soon after, and a son was born seven months after her remarriage and nine months after her divorce, it is unclear whether he is the son of the first husband or of the second husband. In that case, if this son struck this husband of his mother, and then struck that husband, or if he cursed this husband and then cursed that one, and likewise if he struck both of them simultaneously or cursed both of them simultaneously, he is liable for striking or cursing his father. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cursed or struck both of them simultaneously he is liable, but if he cursed or struck them one after the other, even if he was forewarned prior to cursing or striking each one, he is exempt. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that one is not flogged after uncertain forewarning; since in this case it is impossible to determine which of them is the father, inevitably the forewarning is uncertain.
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן נָמֵי, הָא וַדַּאי לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא!
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan too, this is certainly a case of a prohibition that does not involve an action. Why, then, does he not conclude based on Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that one is flogged for violating a prohibition of that kind?
סָבַר לַהּ כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: כׇּל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, לָאו שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – לוֹקִין עָלָיו, לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו, חוּץ מִן הַנִּשְׁבָּע, וּמֵימִר, וְהַמְקַלֵּל אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בַּשֵּׁם.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with that which was cited in his name, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: With regard to any prohibition in the Torah, if it is a prohibition that involves an action, one is flogged for its violation; if it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation, except for one who takes a false oath, one who substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, saying: This animal is substituted for that one, and one who curses another invoking the name of God. In those three instances, the perpetrator is flogged even though he performed no action.
קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
The Gemara asks: Although the difficulties that were raised with regard to the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish were answered, the apparent contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Yehuda to another statement of Rabbi Yehuda is difficult. The Gemara cited contradictory statements of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to lashes both in the case of a prohibition that does not involve an action and in the case of uncertain forewarning.
אִי לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ – תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אִי לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְרַבֵּיהּ.
The Gemara answers: If it is according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, the contradiction may be resolved with the explanation that the two sources reflect the opinions of two tanna’im, who disagree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. If it is according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the contradiction is not difficult, as this baraita reflects his opinion, that one is flogged for violating a prohibition that involves an action, and that baraita reflects the opinion of his teacher, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who holds that one is not flogged for violating a prohibition that involves an action.
תְּנַן הָתָם: הַנּוֹטֵל אֵם עַל הַבָּנִים, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לוֹקֶה, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּחַ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מְשַׁלֵּחַ וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ קוּם עֲשֵׂה – אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא זֹאת וְעוֹד אַחֶרֶת.
§ We learned in a mishna there (17a): With regard to one who takes the mother bird with her fledglings, thereby violating the Torah prohibition: “You shall not take the mother with her fledglings; you shall send the mother, and the fledglings you may take for yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged for taking the mother bird, and he does not send the mother, and the Rabbis say: He sends the mother and is not flogged, as this is the principle: With regard to any prohibition that entails a command to arise and perform a mitzva, one is not liable to receive lashes for its violation. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: We have only this mitzva and another where one would be flogged if not for the relevant mitzva.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הֵיכָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכִי תַּשְׁכַּח. נְפַק דָּק וְאַשְׁכַּח, דְּתַנְיָא: אוֹנֵס שֶׁגֵּירַשׁ, אִם יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא – מַחְזִיר וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה, וְאִם כֹּהֵן הוּא – לוֹקֶה וְאֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר.
Rabbi Elazar said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Which is that other mitzva? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: You will know when you discover it yourself. Rabbi Elazar went out, examined the matter, and discovered the answer, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a rapist who divorced the woman he raped, if he is a non-priest, he remarries her, and he is not flogged for violating the prohibition: “He may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). And if he is a priest, he is flogged for violating the prohibition, and he does not remarry her.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּתָנֵי קִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ.
The Gemara states: This works out well according to the one who teaches that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged for violating a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva is whether he fulfilled the mitzva or did not fulfill the mitzva, and if he does not fulfill the mitzva immediately when he is instructed to do so, he is flogged when he fails to do so.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּתָנֵי בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ, בִּשְׁלָמָא גַּבֵּי שִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, אֶלָּא אוֹנֵס בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
But according to the one who teaches that the criterion for determining whether one is flogged in that case is whether he nullified the mitzva or did not nullify the mitzva, and one is flogged only if he performed an action that renders it impossible to fulfill the mitzva, granted, with regard to the sending away of the mother bird from the nest, you can find a situation where he nullifies the mitzva, e.g., if he killed the mother bird. But in the case of a rapist, if the criterion is whether he nullified the mitzva or he did not nullify it, how can you find a situation where the man is flogged because he nullified any possibility of remarrying her?
אִי דְּקַטְלַהּ – קָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ! אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי מָחוֹזְנָאָה: כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל לָהּ קִידּוּשִׁין מֵאַחֵר. אָמַר רַב: אִי שַׁוֵּויתֵיהּ שָׁלִיחַ – אִיהִי קָא מְבַטְּלָא לֵיהּ, אִי לָא שַׁוֵּויתֵיהּ שָׁלִיחַ – כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ? וְלָא כְּלוּם הִיא!
If he cannot remarry her because he killed her, he will be executed, not flogged, based on the principle: He receives the greater punishment. Rav Shimi of Meḥoza said: He nullifies the possibility of remarriage in a case where he received, on her behalf, the money for betrothal from another, thereby ensuring that his own remarriage to her is no longer an option. Rav said: That is not a viable solution; if his ex-wife designated him as an agent to receive the money of betrothal on her behalf, it is she who nullifies the possibility of fulfilling the mitzva for him, as a woman is betrothed only with her consent, and he is not liable at all. If she did not designate him as an agent, is it in his power to accept betrothal on behalf of a woman who did not designate him to do so? His action is nothing, and the betrothal does not take effect.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ בָּרַבִּים. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּדַּר בָּרַבִּים אֵין לוֹ הֲפָרָה, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? (דְּמַדִּירַהּ לַהּ) [כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ] עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים. דְּאָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הִלְכְתָא, נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּדַּר בָּרַבִּים – יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה, עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים – אֵין לוֹ הֲפָרָה.
Rather, Rav Shimi of Neharde’a said: He nullifies the possibility of remarriage in a case where he vowed in public that it is prohibited for him to derive benefit from her, and it is consequently prohibited for him to marry her. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that a vow that was taken in public has no nullification; he is flogged, since by taking that vow he has rendered remarriage impossible. But according to the one who says that even a vow taken in public has the possibility of nullification, what can be said? He can nullify the vow and remarry her. The Gemara answers: The reference is to a case where he vows on the basis of the consent of the public that it is prohibited for him to derive benefit from her, as Ameimar says that the halakha is: A vow that was taken in public has the possibility of nullification; a vow that was taken on the basis of the consent of the public has no nullification.
וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָא אִיכָּא (סִימָן גָּזֵל מַשְׁכֹּן וּפֵאָה), גָּזֵל, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר ״לֹא תִגְזֹל״, ״וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת הַגְּזֵלָה״. מַשְׁכּוֹן, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר ״לֹא תָבֹא אֶל בֵּיתוֹ לַעֲבֹט עֲבֹטוֹ״, ״הָשֵׁב תָּשִׁיב לוֹ הָעֲבוֹט כְּבֹא הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ״.
The Gemara questions Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: And are there no more prohibitions that entail fulfillment of a positive mitzva for which one is flogged? But aren’t there others? Before stating its challenges, the Gemara provides a mnemonic for the cases that it will cite: Robbery, collateral, and pe’a. The Gemara elaborates: Isn’t there the case of robbery, where the Merciful One states: “You shall not rob” (Leviticus 19:13), and also states: “And he shall return the stolen item” (Leviticus 5:23)? Isn’t there the case of collateral, where the Merciful One states: “You shall not come into his house to fetch his pledge” (Deuteronomy 24:10), and He then states: “You shall return to him the pledge when the sun sets” (Deuteronomy 24:13)?
וּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּקִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ, וּבִיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ! הָתָם כֵּיוָן דְּחַיָּיב בְּתַשְׁלוּמִין – אֵין לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם.
The Gemara continues: And you find that one is liable to receive lashes in those cases both if the criterion is whether he fulfilled the mitzva or did not fulfill the mitzva, and if the criterion is whether he nullified the mitzva or he did not nullify it. According to the first criterion, he is flogged if he fails to return the stolen item or the collateral; according to the second criterion, he is flogged if he destroys the stolen item or the collateral. The Gemara answers: There, in both those cases, he is not flogged, since he is liable to remit monetary payment for the stolen item or the collateral, as the principle is: One is not both flogged and liable to pay restitution for one transgression.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: הָא אִיכָּא מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל גֵּר, וּמֵת הַגֵּר!
Rabbi Zeira objects to this: But isn’t there a case where he is not liable to pay, e.g., if he appropriated the collateral of a convert and the convert died with no heirs. In that case, there is no payment, and nevertheless, he is not flogged.
הָתָם, גַּבְרָא בַּר תַּשְׁלוּמִין הוּא, וְשִׁיעְבּוּדָא דְּגֵר הוּא דְּקָא פָקַע.
The Gemara answers: There, the man who appropriated the collateral is liable to remit monetary payment, and it is only that the lien of the convert on the property has lapsed, as there is no one to receive payment. Therefore, he is not flogged, based on the principle: One is not both flogged and liable to pay restitution.
וְהָא אִיכָּא פֵּאָה, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר ״לֹא תְכַלֶּה פְּאַת וְגוֹ׳״ ״לֶעָנִי וְלַגֵּר תַּעֲזֹב אֹתָם וְגוֹ׳״,
The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the case of pe’a, where there is a prohibition, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not wholly reap the corner of your field” (Leviticus 23:22), followed by the mitzva: “To the poor and the convert you shall leave them” (Leviticus 23:22)?
דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּקִיְּימוֹ וְלֹא קִיְּימוֹ, בִּיטְּלוֹ וְלֹא בִּיטְּלוֹ! דִּתְנַן: מִצְוַת פֵּאָה לְהַפְרִישׁ מִן הַקָּמָה. לֹא הִפְרִישׁ מִן הַקָּמָה – מַפְרִישׁ מִן הָעוֹמָרִין. לֹא הִפְרִישׁ מִן הָעוֹמָרִין – מַפְרִישׁ מִן הַכְּרִי, עַד שֶׁלֹּא מֵירַח. מֵירְחוֹ – מְעַשֵּׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ!
And you find one liable to receive lashes in those cases both if the criterion is whether he fulfilled the mitzva or did not fulfill the mitzva, and if the criterion is whether he nullified the mitzva or he did not nullify it, as we learned in a baraita: The mitzva of pe’a is to separate it from the standing grain still growing from the ground. If he did not separate it from the standing grain, but reaped the entire field, he separates a portion from the sheaves as pe’a. If he did not separate it from the sheaves, he separates it from the pile where one places the kernels after threshing, before he smooths the pile. Once he smooths the pile, the produce is considered grain from which one is obligated to separate terumot and tithes. If he already smoothed the pile before designating the pe’a, he tithes the grain in the pile and then gives the pe’a to the poor person. Once he grinds the kernels into flour, he no longer separates pe’a.
כִּדְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: אַף מַפְרִישׁ מִן הָעִיסָּה. וּלְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, דַּאֲכַל עִיסָּה!
Apparently, it is possible to nullify the possibility of fulfilling the mitzva of leaving pe’a by grinding the grain; why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan omit this case from his list of prohibitions rectified by a positive mitzva for which one is flogged? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: One separates pe’a even from the dough. He maintains that the possibility of fulfilling the mitzva of pe’a is never nullified, as one may separate pe’a even after grinding and kneading. The Gemara challenges: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, you also find a way to nullify the possibility of fulfilling the mitzva, in a case where one ate the dough.
אֶלָּא, ״זֹאת וְעוֹד אַחֶרֶת״ – אַהָא, אֲבָל אוֹנֵס – לָא. דְּהֵיכָא אָמְרִינַן עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים אֵין לוֹ הֲפָרָה – לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, אֲבָל לִדְבַר מִצְוָה – יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה.
Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous understanding of the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan: We have only this mitzva and another where one would be flogged if not for the relevant mitzva. The term: This, is in reference to the sending away of the mother bird, and the term: Another, is in reference to this halakha of pe’a. But in the case of a rapist, no, the possibility of remarrying the rape victim whom he divorced is not nullified, even if he vows on the basis of the consent of the public. Where do we say that a vow on the basis of the consent of the public has no nullification? It is only in a case where one seeks nullification of the vow for the purpose of a matter that is optional, i.e., not a mitzva; but if one seeks nullification of the vow for the purpose of a matter that is a mitzva, even a vow taken on the basis of the consent of the public has the possibility of nullification. In the case of the rapist, he could seek nullification of his vow to enable him to fulfill the mitzva of remarrying his divorcée, and therefore the vow can be nullified.
כִּי הָא דְּהָהוּא מַקְרֵי דַרְדְּקֵי דַּהֲוָה פָּשַׁע בְּיָנוֹקֵי, אַדְּרֵיהּ רַב אַחָא, וְאַהְדְּרֵיהּ רָבִינָא, דְּלָא אִשְׁתְּכַח דְּדָיֵיק כְּווֹתֵיהּ.
The Gemara relates an incident that proves this point. As this happened in that incident where there was a certain teacher of children who was negligent in his supervision of the children, and Rav Aḥa vowed on the basis of the consent of the public that he would no longer be allowed to teach children. And nevertheless Ravina restored him to his position, because no other teacher was found who was as accurate as he. Apparently, even a vow taken on the basis of the consent of the public has the possibility of nullification, if that nullification is sought in order to fulfill a mitzva.
וְהָאוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הַאי מַאן דַּאֲכַל בִּינִיתָא דְּבֵי כְרָבָא – מַלְקִינַן לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״שֶׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ עַל הָאָרֶץ״. הָהוּא דַּאֲכַל בִּינִיתָא דְּבֵי כְרָבָא וְנַגְּדֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה.
§ The mishna teaches: And one who eats unslaughtered animal or bird carcasses, or tereifot, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, is liable to receive lashes. Rav Yehuda says: One who eats a fish-like creature found in the furrows of a field formed by a plow [binnita devei kerava], we flog him due to violation of the prohibition: “Creeping animals that creep on the ground…shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41). The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who ate a fish-like creature found in the furrows of a field formed by a plow, and Rav Yehuda flogged him.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָכַל פּוּטִיתָא – לוֹקֶה אַרְבָּעָה.
Abaye says: One who ate a putita, a creeping animal found in the sea, is flogged with four sets of lashes. There are two prohibitions stated with regard to creeping animals in the sea: “And any that do not have fins and scales in the seas and in the rivers…you shall not eat of their flesh” (Leviticus 11:10–11), and: “And any that do not have fins and scales you shall not eat” (Deuteronomy 14:10). In addition, there are two other prohibitions stated with regard to creeping animals in general: “You shall not render yourselves detestable with any creeping animal that creeps, neither shall you render yourselves impure with them” (Leviticus 11:43), for a total of four.
נְמָלָה – לוֹקֶה חָמֵשׁ, מִשּׁוּם ״שֶׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ עַל הָאָרֶץ״.
If one ate an ant, he is flogged with five sets of lashes. In addition to the two prohibitions stated with regard to repugnant creatures in general, he is also flogged for violating the prohibitions: “Creeping animals that creep on the ground…shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41), and: “And all creeping animals that creep on the ground, you shall not eat them” (Leviticus 11:42), and: “Neither shall you render yourselves impure with any manner of creeping things that crawls upon the ground” (Leviticus 11:44).
צִרְעָה – לוֹקֶה שֵׁשׁ, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁרֶץ הָעוֹף.
If one ate a wasp, he is flogged with six sets of lashes. In addition to the five prohibitions violated by one who eats an ant, he is flogged with an additional set of lashes due to violation of the prohibition with regard to winged creeping creatures: “And all winged creeping creatures are impure for you, they may not be eaten” (Deuteronomy 14:19).
אָמַר רַב אַחַאי: הַמְשַׁהֶה אֶת נְקָבָיו עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תְשַׁקְּצוּ״. אָמַר רַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: הַאי מַאן דְּשָׁתֵי בְּקַרְנָא דְּאוּמָּנָא קָא עָבַר מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תְשַׁקְּצוּ״.
Rav Aḥai says: One who delays relieving himself through his orifices when the need arises violates the prohibition of: “You shall not make your souls detestable” (Leviticus 20:25). Rav Beivai bar Abaye says: One who drinks from the horn of a bloodletter through which blood has passed violates the prohibition of: “You shall not make your souls detestable.”
אָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא: רִיסֵּק תִּשְׁעָה נְמָלִים וְהֵבִיא אֶחָד חַי וְהִשְׁלִימָן לִכְזַיִת – לוֹקֶה שֵׁשׁ, חָמֵשׁ – מִשּׁוּם בְּרִיָּה, וְאֶחָד – מִשּׁוּם כְּזַיִת נְבֵילָה. רָבָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁנַיִם וְהוּא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ אַחַד וְהוּא. וְלָא פְּלִיגִי, הָא – בְּרַבְרְבֵי, וְהָא – בְּזוּטְרֵי.
Rava bar Rav Huna says: If one crushed nine ants and brought another one that was alive and thereby completed their measure to an olive-bulk and ate them, he is flogged with six sets of lashes: Five for eating an entity for which one is flogged five times as stated above with regard to one who eats an ant, and one for eating an olive-bulk of an unslaughtered carcass all together. Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if he ate two crushed ants and the ant that was alive, he is flogged with six sets of lashes. Rav Yosef says: Even if he ate one crushed ant and the ant that was alive. The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree; this case, where Rava and Rav Yosef say that he is flogged for eating one or two crushed ants and one that is alive, is referring to large ants, which together amount to an olive-bulk. And that case, where Rava bar Rav Huna mentions nine ants, is referring to small ants, as a greater number of ants is required to constitute an olive-bulk and render him liable. Consequently, there is no halakhic dispute in this case.
״אָכַל טֶבֶל וּמַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן״ כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: אָכַל טֶבֶל שֶׁל מַעְשַׂר עָנִי – לוֹקֶה.
§ The mishna teaches that among those flogged is one who ate untithed produce or first-tithe produce whose teruma of the tithe was not taken. Rav says: If one ate untithed produce from which teruma and first tithe were separated and poor man’s tithe was not separated, he is flogged.
כְּמַאן – כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הַטֶּבֶל שֶׁלֹּא הוּרַם מִמֶּנּוּ כׇּל עִיקָּר; הוּרַם מִמֶּנּוּ תְּרוּמָה גְּדוֹלָה וְלֹא הוּרַם מִמֶּנּוּ מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן, מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, וַאֲפִילּוּ מַעְשַׂר עָנִי, מִנַּיִן?
The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion did Rav issue this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: One might have thought that one is liable for eating only untithed produce from which no gifts were taken at all; but if teruma gedola was taken from the produce, but first tithe was not taken from it, or if the first tithe was separated but not second tithe, or even if only poor man’s tithe was not separated, from where is it derived that the halakhic status of the produce is that of untithed produce and one is liable for eating it?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְגוֹ׳״ וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְאָכְלוּ בִשְׁעָרֶיךָ וְשָׂבֵעוּ״, מָה לְהַלָּן מַעְשַׂר עָנִי, אַף כָּאן מַעְשַׂר עָנִי, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא תוּכַל״.
The baraita continues: It is derived as the verse states: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain or of your wine or of your oil” (Deuteronomy 12:17), and there it states: “And you shall give to the Levite, to the convert, to the orphan, and to the widow, and they shall eat within your gates and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12). Just as there, with regard to the phrase “and they shall eat within your gates,” it is referring to poor man’s tithe, here too, “you may not eat within your gates” is referring to produce in which there is poor man’s tithe, as it has not yet been separated, and the Merciful One states a prohibition: You may not eat it.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: כְּתַנָּאֵי, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין צָרִיךְ לִקְרוֹת אֶת הַשֵּׁם עַל מַעְשַׂר עָנִי שֶׁל דְּמַאי, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים:
Rav Yosef said: This matter is subject to a dispute between tanna’im. Rabbi Eliezer says: One need not separate by means of calling the name upon poor man’s tithe of doubtfully tithed produce [demai]. With regard to produce purchased from an am ha’aretz, i.e., one who is unreliable with regard to tithes, there is a rabbinic ordinance requiring one to separate first and second tithe and teruma of the tithe from it. Nevertheless, one is not required to separate poor man’s tithe from that produce, because poor man’s tithe is a monetary debt owed to the poor, and in a case of uncertainty, the principle is: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Rabbi Eliezer holds that failure to separate poor man’s tithe does not accord the produce the status of untithed produce. And the Rabbis say:
