If the burning is done in very small quantities and the thought the kohen has each time he burns a little bit is about eating a very small part of the remainder, is that pigul? A debate is brought regarding the case where one burns the kmitza and thinks about burning the frankincense at the wrong time, is that pigul or not? The third perek starts with an explanation of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a pigul thought about burning something that is meant to be eaten and eating something that is meant to be burned.
Menachot 17
08.27.2018 | ט״ז באלול תשע״ח
Share this shiur:
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Menachot 17
חֲרִיפֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא: הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי אֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּשִׁירַיִם וּלְבוֹנָה בְּמִילְּתָא קָיְימָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב לַהּ בִּלְבוֹנָה – כְּמָה דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ מַתִּיר דָּמֵי.
the sharp people in the city of Pumbedita: Burning renders burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day renders the meal offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render an offering piggul with intent occurring during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful alone with intent of piggul. The reason is that this statement applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, and the frankincense stands intact, i.e., he had no intent with regard to it. But here, when he had intent with regard to the frankincense while burning the handful, it is considered as though he had intent with regard to the entire permitting factor.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַקּוֹמֵץ וְנוֹתֵן בִּכְלִי, וְהַמּוֹלִיךְ וְהַמַּקְטִיר, לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.
Rava said: We learn this halakha in a mishna, as well (12a): This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it.
מַאי לָאו הַקְטָרָה דּוּמְיָא דְּהָנָךְ, מָה הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר, אַף הַקְטָרָה – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר?
Rava explains: What, is it not correct to say that the halakha with regard to burning is similar to these, i.e., the removal of the handful, its placement in a vessel, and the conveying? Accordingly, just as with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day or to burn the frankincense the next day, the halakha is that the offering is piggul, so too with regard to burning, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is piggul.
לָא, הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר; הַקְטָרָה – לֶאֱכוֹל אִין, לְהַקְטִיר לָא.
The Gemara rejects this comparison: No, with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is in fact piggul. But with regard to burning, if one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day, yes, it is piggul, but if one’s intent was to burn the frankincense the next day, it is not piggul.
יָתֵיב רַב מְנַשְּׁיָא בַּר גַּדָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָא אָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: ״מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר״ –
The Gemara relates that Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and while he was sitting he said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Burning does not render burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day does not render the offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful but not the frankincense with intent of piggul.
הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בְּהוּ בְּשִׁירַיִם, דְּקוֹמֶץ מַתִּיר דִּידְהוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּקוֹמֶץ לָאו מַתִּיר דִּלְבוֹנָה הוּא – לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Menashya bar Gadda explains that the reason is that this statement of Rabbi Meir applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, as the handful is their permitting factor. But here, as the handful is not a permitting factor of the frankincense, the offering cannot be rendered piggul through it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: עֲנִי מָרִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַב: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה.
Abaye said to Rav Menashya: Answer me, my Master, did Rav Ḥisda state this halakha in the name of Rav? Rav Menashya said to Abaye: Yes. The Gemara notes that it was also stated explicitly that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: Burning does not render burning piggul.
אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, שָׁחַט אֶחָד מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים לֶאֱכוֹל מִמֶּנּוּ לְמָחָר – הוּא פִּיגּוּל וַחֲבֵירוֹ כָּשֵׁר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵחֲבֵירוֹ לְמָחָר – שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָאו מַתִּיר דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Ya’akov bar Idi said in the name of Abaye: We learn in the mishna as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other lamb is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that since the first lamb is not a permitting factor of the second lamb, it cannot render the second lamb piggul? The same reasoning should apply to the case of the handful and frankincense.
לָא, הָתָם הוּא דְּלָא אִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּאִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא – כִּי חַד דָּמוּ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; there is a difference between these cases. It is only there, in the mishna, that one lamb cannot render the other piggul, as it was not fixed in one vessel with the other lamb, and therefore each animal stands independent of the other. But here, as the handful and frankincense were fixed in one vessel for the purpose of offering them, they are considered like one item and one of them therefore renders the other piggul.
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: הָא מִילְּתָא אַבְלַע לִי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וּתְקִילָא לִי כְּכוּלֵּיהּ תַּלְמוּדַאי – הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה, וּלְבוֹנָה לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר – פִּגּוּל.
§ Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Ḥanina helped me internalize this following matter, and to me it is equivalent to all the rest of my learning, as it contains a significant novelty: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, and burned the frankincense with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the meal offering is piggul.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? אִי הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה״! אִי מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״! אִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֲתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה וְלֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״!
The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? If he is teaching us that burning renders burning piggul, then let him simply say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense, the offering is piggul. If he is teaching us that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, then let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul. If he is coming to teach us both of these halakhot, let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense or to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul.
אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וְאֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּפָשְׁטָא לַיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה בְּכוּלַּהּ מִנְחָה.
Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, Rabbi Ḥanina holds that burning does not render burning piggul, and therefore if one burned only the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is not piggul. And he also holds that one does not render an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, and consequently if one burned only the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is not piggul either. But it is different here, as intent of piggul has extended over the entire meal offering, as he had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful with regard to the frankincense and during the burning of the frankincense with regard to the remainder.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא: הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פִּגּוּל. וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל.
The Gemara relates that a tanna taught a baraita before Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is piggul. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to this very case? Rather, say that the baraita states: Everyone agrees that the offering is disqualified, as although the Rabbis hold that such intent does not render an offering piggul, they concede that it disqualifies the offering.
וְלֵימָא: הֲרֵי זֶה פִּגּוּל, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא! תַּנָּא ״דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ אַתְנְיוּהּ, ״פִּיגּוּל״ בְּ״פָסוּל״ מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ, ״הֲרֵי זֶה״ בְּ״דִבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ לָא מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ.
The Gemara challenges: But if one must emend the baraita, let him say that the baraita states: It is piggul, and that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara responds: It is reasonable that the tanna taught that everyone agrees, and that he accidentally exchanged the word piggul for disqualified. But he would not confuse the phrase: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, with the phrase: Everyone agrees.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה.
מַתְנִי׳ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.
MISHNA: In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not piggul, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet].
לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר פָּחוֹת מִכְּזַיִת – כָּשֵׁר. לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.
In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אָמַר קְרָא ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, לוֹמַר לָךְ: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת אָדָם, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer that the intention to consume, beyond its designated time, an item that is not usually consumed renders the meal offering unfit? The verse states with regard to consuming an offering after its designated time: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all consumed [he’akhol ye’akhel]” (Leviticus 7:18), repeating for emphasis the term for consumption. He derives from the repeated term that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is the consumption of the offering by a person, e.g., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is the consumption of the sacrificial portions by their being burned on the altar. This serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of a person renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of the altar renders the offering unfit.
וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לָאָדָם.
And furthermore, this serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by the altar renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the altar renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? מִדְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא לְהַקְטָרָה בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה.
What is the reason for this derivation? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי דְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה,
And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, maintain the following: This fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption
דְּלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה לְמִזְבֵּחַ, וְלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן הַקְטָרָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ.
demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is piggul.
אִי נָמֵי, מָה אֲכִילָה בִּכְזַיִת – אַף הַקְטָרָה בִּכְזַיִת, וּלְעוֹלָם אֲכִילָה דְּאוֹרְחָא מַשְׁמַע.
Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״אִם הֵאָכֹל הֵאָכֹל״, אִי נָמֵי ״אִם יֵאָכֵל יֵאָכֵל״, מַאי ״הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that halakha, let the Merciful One write either: If he’akhol he’akhol, or: If ye’akhel ye’akhel, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “he’akhol ye’akhel,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two halakhot. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַב אַסִּי: וְאִי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִשּׁוּם הָכִי הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָא אַתְּ הוּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת!
Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive karet for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive karet, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by karet?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תַּנָּאֵי הִיא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּרַבָּנַן.
Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between tanna’im as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive karet. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of karet for this transgression.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לִשְׁתּוֹת מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר, לְהַקְטִיר מִבְּשָׂרוֹ לְמָחָר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵאֵימוּרָיו לְמָחָר – כָּשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. לְהַנִּיחַ מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בָּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין.
As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה מַכְשְׁרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be piggul, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?
אֶלָּא, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בְּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.
אֶלָּא לָאו כָּרֵת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה (דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא) סָבַר: לְהַנִּיחַ – פְּסוּלָא בְּעָלְמָא, בְּהָנָךְ כָּרֵת נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְמֵימַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת!
Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for karet? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive karet as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive karet for it.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כָּרֵת לֵיכָּא, וְהָכָא שָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּדָבָר: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר בְּהָנָךְ פְּלִיגִי, לְהַנִּיחַ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל כָּשֵׁר,
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive karet. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first tanna holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.
Follow 
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
While vacationing in San Diego, Rabbi Leah Herz asked if I’d be interested in being in hevruta with her to learn Daf Yomi through Hadran. Why not? I had loved learning Gemara in college in 1971 but hadn’t returned. With the onset of covid, Daf Yomi and Rabbanit Michelle centered me each day. Thank-you for helping me grow and enter this amazing world of learning.
Meryll Page
Minneapolis, MN, United States
After being so inspired by the siyum shas two years ago, I began tentatively learning daf yomi, like Rabbanut Michelle kept saying – taking one daf at a time. I’m still taking it one daf at a time, one masechet at a time, but I’m loving it and am still so inspired by Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran community, and yes – I am proud to be finishing Seder Mo’ed.
Caroline Graham-Ofstein
Bet Shemesh, Israel
It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.
Joanna Rom
Northwest Washington, United States
When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.
Shira Krebs
Minnesota, United States
After enthusing to my friend Ruth Kahan about how much I had enjoyed remote Jewish learning during the earlier part of the pandemic, she challenged me to join her in learning the daf yomi cycle. I had always wanted to do daf yomi but now had no excuse. The beginning was particularly hard as I had never studied Talmud but has become easier, as I have gained some familiarity with it.
Susan Vishner
Brookline, United States
When I began learning Daf Yomi at the beginning of the current cycle, I was preparing for an upcoming surgery and thought that learning the Daf would be something positive I could do each day during my recovery, even if I accomplished nothing else. I had no idea what a lifeline learning the Daf would turn out to be in so many ways.
Laura Shechter
Lexington, MA, United States
When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.
Hannah Lee
Pennsylvania, United States
I’ve been learning since January 2020, and in June I started drawing a phrase from each daf. Sometimes it’s easy (e.g. plants), sometimes it’s very hard (e.g. korbanot), and sometimes it’s loads of fun (e.g. bird racing) to find something to draw. I upload my pictures from each masechet to #DafYomiArt. I am enjoying every step of the journey.
Gila Loike
Ashdod, Israel
Shortly after the death of my father, David Malik z”l, I made the commitment to Daf Yomi. While riding to Ben Gurion airport in January, Siyum HaShas was playing on the radio; that was the nudge I needed to get started. The “everyday-ness” of the Daf has been a meaningful spiritual practice, especial after COVID began & I was temporarily unable to say Kaddish at daily in-person minyanim.
Lisa S. Malik
Wynnewood, United States
I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!
Shira Jacobowitz
Jerusalem, Israel
I started learning on January 5, 2020. When I complete the 7+ year cycle I will be 70 years old. I had been intimidated by those who said that I needed to study Talmud in a traditional way with a chevruta, but I decided the learning was more important to me than the method. Thankful for Daf Yomi for Women helping me catch up when I fall behind, and also being able to celebrate with each Siyum!
Pamela Elisheva
Bakersfield, United States
I started learning at the beginning of this cycle more than 2 years ago, and I have not missed a day or a daf. It’s been challenging and enlightening and even mind-numbing at times, but the learning and the shared experience have all been worth it. If you are open to it, there’s no telling what might come into your life.
Patti Evans
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!
Judith Weil
Raanana, Israel
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Sharon Mink
Haifa, Israel
I had tried to start after being inspired by the hadran siyum, but did not manage to stick to it. However, just before masechet taanit, our rav wrote a message to the shul WhatsApp encouraging people to start with masechet taanit, so I did! And this time, I’m hooked! I listen to the shiur every day , and am also trying to improve my skills.
Laura Major
Yad Binyamin, Israel
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Sara Averick
Jerusalem, Israel
When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!
Wendy Dickstein
Jerusalem, Israel
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Caroline Ben-Ari
Karmiel, Israel
I started learning at the start of this cycle, and quickly fell in love. It has become such an important part of my day, enriching every part of my life.
Naomi Niederhoffer
Toronto, Canada
I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.
Rachel Rotenberg
Tekoa, Israel
Menachot 17
חֲרִיפֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא: הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי אֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּשִׁירַיִם וּלְבוֹנָה בְּמִילְּתָא קָיְימָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב לַהּ בִּלְבוֹנָה – כְּמָה דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ מַתִּיר דָּמֵי.
the sharp people in the city of Pumbedita: Burning renders burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day renders the meal offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render an offering piggul with intent occurring during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful alone with intent of piggul. The reason is that this statement applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, and the frankincense stands intact, i.e., he had no intent with regard to it. But here, when he had intent with regard to the frankincense while burning the handful, it is considered as though he had intent with regard to the entire permitting factor.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַקּוֹמֵץ וְנוֹתֵן בִּכְלִי, וְהַמּוֹלִיךְ וְהַמַּקְטִיר, לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.
Rava said: We learn this halakha in a mishna, as well (12a): This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it.
מַאי לָאו הַקְטָרָה דּוּמְיָא דְּהָנָךְ, מָה הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר, אַף הַקְטָרָה – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר?
Rava explains: What, is it not correct to say that the halakha with regard to burning is similar to these, i.e., the removal of the handful, its placement in a vessel, and the conveying? Accordingly, just as with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day or to burn the frankincense the next day, the halakha is that the offering is piggul, so too with regard to burning, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is piggul.
לָא, הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר; הַקְטָרָה – לֶאֱכוֹל אִין, לְהַקְטִיר לָא.
The Gemara rejects this comparison: No, with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is in fact piggul. But with regard to burning, if one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day, yes, it is piggul, but if one’s intent was to burn the frankincense the next day, it is not piggul.
יָתֵיב רַב מְנַשְּׁיָא בַּר גַּדָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָא אָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: ״מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר״ –
The Gemara relates that Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and while he was sitting he said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Burning does not render burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day does not render the offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful but not the frankincense with intent of piggul.
הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בְּהוּ בְּשִׁירַיִם, דְּקוֹמֶץ מַתִּיר דִּידְהוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּקוֹמֶץ לָאו מַתִּיר דִּלְבוֹנָה הוּא – לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Menashya bar Gadda explains that the reason is that this statement of Rabbi Meir applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, as the handful is their permitting factor. But here, as the handful is not a permitting factor of the frankincense, the offering cannot be rendered piggul through it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: עֲנִי מָרִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַב: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה.
Abaye said to Rav Menashya: Answer me, my Master, did Rav Ḥisda state this halakha in the name of Rav? Rav Menashya said to Abaye: Yes. The Gemara notes that it was also stated explicitly that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: Burning does not render burning piggul.
אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, שָׁחַט אֶחָד מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים לֶאֱכוֹל מִמֶּנּוּ לְמָחָר – הוּא פִּיגּוּל וַחֲבֵירוֹ כָּשֵׁר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵחֲבֵירוֹ לְמָחָר – שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָאו מַתִּיר דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Ya’akov bar Idi said in the name of Abaye: We learn in the mishna as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other lamb is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that since the first lamb is not a permitting factor of the second lamb, it cannot render the second lamb piggul? The same reasoning should apply to the case of the handful and frankincense.
לָא, הָתָם הוּא דְּלָא אִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּאִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא – כִּי חַד דָּמוּ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; there is a difference between these cases. It is only there, in the mishna, that one lamb cannot render the other piggul, as it was not fixed in one vessel with the other lamb, and therefore each animal stands independent of the other. But here, as the handful and frankincense were fixed in one vessel for the purpose of offering them, they are considered like one item and one of them therefore renders the other piggul.
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: הָא מִילְּתָא אַבְלַע לִי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וּתְקִילָא לִי כְּכוּלֵּיהּ תַּלְמוּדַאי – הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה, וּלְבוֹנָה לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר – פִּגּוּל.
§ Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Ḥanina helped me internalize this following matter, and to me it is equivalent to all the rest of my learning, as it contains a significant novelty: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, and burned the frankincense with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the meal offering is piggul.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? אִי הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה״! אִי מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״! אִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֲתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה וְלֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״!
The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? If he is teaching us that burning renders burning piggul, then let him simply say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense, the offering is piggul. If he is teaching us that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, then let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul. If he is coming to teach us both of these halakhot, let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense or to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul.
אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וְאֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּפָשְׁטָא לַיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה בְּכוּלַּהּ מִנְחָה.
Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, Rabbi Ḥanina holds that burning does not render burning piggul, and therefore if one burned only the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is not piggul. And he also holds that one does not render an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, and consequently if one burned only the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is not piggul either. But it is different here, as intent of piggul has extended over the entire meal offering, as he had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful with regard to the frankincense and during the burning of the frankincense with regard to the remainder.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא: הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פִּגּוּל. וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל.
The Gemara relates that a tanna taught a baraita before Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is piggul. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to this very case? Rather, say that the baraita states: Everyone agrees that the offering is disqualified, as although the Rabbis hold that such intent does not render an offering piggul, they concede that it disqualifies the offering.
וְלֵימָא: הֲרֵי זֶה פִּגּוּל, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא! תַּנָּא ״דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ אַתְנְיוּהּ, ״פִּיגּוּל״ בְּ״פָסוּל״ מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ, ״הֲרֵי זֶה״ בְּ״דִבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ לָא מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ.
The Gemara challenges: But if one must emend the baraita, let him say that the baraita states: It is piggul, and that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara responds: It is reasonable that the tanna taught that everyone agrees, and that he accidentally exchanged the word piggul for disqualified. But he would not confuse the phrase: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, with the phrase: Everyone agrees.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה.
מַתְנִי׳ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.
MISHNA: In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not piggul, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet].
לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר פָּחוֹת מִכְּזַיִת – כָּשֵׁר. לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.
In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אָמַר קְרָא ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, לוֹמַר לָךְ: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת אָדָם, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer that the intention to consume, beyond its designated time, an item that is not usually consumed renders the meal offering unfit? The verse states with regard to consuming an offering after its designated time: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all consumed [he’akhol ye’akhel]” (Leviticus 7:18), repeating for emphasis the term for consumption. He derives from the repeated term that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is the consumption of the offering by a person, e.g., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is the consumption of the sacrificial portions by their being burned on the altar. This serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of a person renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of the altar renders the offering unfit.
וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לָאָדָם.
And furthermore, this serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by the altar renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the altar renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? מִדְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא לְהַקְטָרָה בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה.
What is the reason for this derivation? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי דְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה,
And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, maintain the following: This fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption
דְּלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה לְמִזְבֵּחַ, וְלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן הַקְטָרָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ.
demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is piggul.
אִי נָמֵי, מָה אֲכִילָה בִּכְזַיִת – אַף הַקְטָרָה בִּכְזַיִת, וּלְעוֹלָם אֲכִילָה דְּאוֹרְחָא מַשְׁמַע.
Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״אִם הֵאָכֹל הֵאָכֹל״, אִי נָמֵי ״אִם יֵאָכֵל יֵאָכֵל״, מַאי ״הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that halakha, let the Merciful One write either: If he’akhol he’akhol, or: If ye’akhel ye’akhel, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “he’akhol ye’akhel,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two halakhot. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַב אַסִּי: וְאִי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִשּׁוּם הָכִי הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָא אַתְּ הוּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת!
Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive karet for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive karet, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by karet?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תַּנָּאֵי הִיא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּרַבָּנַן.
Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between tanna’im as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive karet. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of karet for this transgression.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לִשְׁתּוֹת מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר, לְהַקְטִיר מִבְּשָׂרוֹ לְמָחָר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵאֵימוּרָיו לְמָחָר – כָּשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. לְהַנִּיחַ מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בָּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין.
As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה מַכְשְׁרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be piggul, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?
אֶלָּא, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בְּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.
אֶלָּא לָאו כָּרֵת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה (דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא) סָבַר: לְהַנִּיחַ – פְּסוּלָא בְּעָלְמָא, בְּהָנָךְ כָּרֵת נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְמֵימַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת!
Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for karet? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive karet as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive karet for it.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כָּרֵת לֵיכָּא, וְהָכָא שָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּדָבָר: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר בְּהָנָךְ פְּלִיגִי, לְהַנִּיחַ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל כָּשֵׁר,
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive karet. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first tanna holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.
Follow
