If the burning is done in very small quantities and the thought the kohen has each time he burns a little bit is about eating a very small part of the remainder, is that pigul? A debate is brought regarding the case where one burns the kmitza and thinks about burning the frankincense at the wrong time, is that pigul or not? The third perek starts with an explanation of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis regarding a pigul thought about burning something that is meant to be eaten and eating something that is meant to be burned.
Menachot 17
08.27.2018 | ט״ז באלול תשע״ח
Share this shiur:
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Menachot 17
חֲרִיפֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא: הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי אֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּשִׁירַיִם וּלְבוֹנָה בְּמִילְּתָא קָיְימָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב לַהּ בִּלְבוֹנָה – כְּמָה דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ מַתִּיר דָּמֵי.
the sharp people in the city of Pumbedita: Burning renders burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day renders the meal offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render an offering piggul with intent occurring during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful alone with intent of piggul. The reason is that this statement applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, and the frankincense stands intact, i.e., he had no intent with regard to it. But here, when he had intent with regard to the frankincense while burning the handful, it is considered as though he had intent with regard to the entire permitting factor.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַקּוֹמֵץ וְנוֹתֵן בִּכְלִי, וְהַמּוֹלִיךְ וְהַמַּקְטִיר, לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.
Rava said: We learn this halakha in a mishna, as well (12a): This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it.
מַאי לָאו הַקְטָרָה דּוּמְיָא דְּהָנָךְ, מָה הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר, אַף הַקְטָרָה – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר?
Rava explains: What, is it not correct to say that the halakha with regard to burning is similar to these, i.e., the removal of the handful, its placement in a vessel, and the conveying? Accordingly, just as with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day or to burn the frankincense the next day, the halakha is that the offering is piggul, so too with regard to burning, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is piggul.
לָא, הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר; הַקְטָרָה – לֶאֱכוֹל אִין, לְהַקְטִיר לָא.
The Gemara rejects this comparison: No, with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is in fact piggul. But with regard to burning, if one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day, yes, it is piggul, but if one’s intent was to burn the frankincense the next day, it is not piggul.
יָתֵיב רַב מְנַשְּׁיָא בַּר גַּדָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָא אָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: ״מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר״ –
The Gemara relates that Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and while he was sitting he said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Burning does not render burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day does not render the offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful but not the frankincense with intent of piggul.
הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בְּהוּ בְּשִׁירַיִם, דְּקוֹמֶץ מַתִּיר דִּידְהוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּקוֹמֶץ לָאו מַתִּיר דִּלְבוֹנָה הוּא – לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Menashya bar Gadda explains that the reason is that this statement of Rabbi Meir applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, as the handful is their permitting factor. But here, as the handful is not a permitting factor of the frankincense, the offering cannot be rendered piggul through it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: עֲנִי מָרִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַב: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה.
Abaye said to Rav Menashya: Answer me, my Master, did Rav Ḥisda state this halakha in the name of Rav? Rav Menashya said to Abaye: Yes. The Gemara notes that it was also stated explicitly that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: Burning does not render burning piggul.
אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, שָׁחַט אֶחָד מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים לֶאֱכוֹל מִמֶּנּוּ לְמָחָר – הוּא פִּיגּוּל וַחֲבֵירוֹ כָּשֵׁר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵחֲבֵירוֹ לְמָחָר – שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָאו מַתִּיר דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Ya’akov bar Idi said in the name of Abaye: We learn in the mishna as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other lamb is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that since the first lamb is not a permitting factor of the second lamb, it cannot render the second lamb piggul? The same reasoning should apply to the case of the handful and frankincense.
לָא, הָתָם הוּא דְּלָא אִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּאִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא – כִּי חַד דָּמוּ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; there is a difference between these cases. It is only there, in the mishna, that one lamb cannot render the other piggul, as it was not fixed in one vessel with the other lamb, and therefore each animal stands independent of the other. But here, as the handful and frankincense were fixed in one vessel for the purpose of offering them, they are considered like one item and one of them therefore renders the other piggul.
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: הָא מִילְּתָא אַבְלַע לִי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וּתְקִילָא לִי כְּכוּלֵּיהּ תַּלְמוּדַאי – הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה, וּלְבוֹנָה לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר – פִּגּוּל.
§ Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Ḥanina helped me internalize this following matter, and to me it is equivalent to all the rest of my learning, as it contains a significant novelty: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, and burned the frankincense with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the meal offering is piggul.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? אִי הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה״! אִי מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״! אִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֲתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה וְלֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״!
The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? If he is teaching us that burning renders burning piggul, then let him simply say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense, the offering is piggul. If he is teaching us that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, then let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul. If he is coming to teach us both of these halakhot, let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense or to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul.
אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וְאֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּפָשְׁטָא לַיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה בְּכוּלַּהּ מִנְחָה.
Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, Rabbi Ḥanina holds that burning does not render burning piggul, and therefore if one burned only the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is not piggul. And he also holds that one does not render an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, and consequently if one burned only the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is not piggul either. But it is different here, as intent of piggul has extended over the entire meal offering, as he had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful with regard to the frankincense and during the burning of the frankincense with regard to the remainder.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא: הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פִּגּוּל. וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל.
The Gemara relates that a tanna taught a baraita before Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is piggul. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to this very case? Rather, say that the baraita states: Everyone agrees that the offering is disqualified, as although the Rabbis hold that such intent does not render an offering piggul, they concede that it disqualifies the offering.
וְלֵימָא: הֲרֵי זֶה פִּגּוּל, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא! תַּנָּא ״דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ אַתְנְיוּהּ, ״פִּיגּוּל״ בְּ״פָסוּל״ מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ, ״הֲרֵי זֶה״ בְּ״דִבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ לָא מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ.
The Gemara challenges: But if one must emend the baraita, let him say that the baraita states: It is piggul, and that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara responds: It is reasonable that the tanna taught that everyone agrees, and that he accidentally exchanged the word piggul for disqualified. But he would not confuse the phrase: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, with the phrase: Everyone agrees.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה.
מַתְנִי׳ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.
MISHNA: In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not piggul, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet].
לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר פָּחוֹת מִכְּזַיִת – כָּשֵׁר. לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.
In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אָמַר קְרָא ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, לוֹמַר לָךְ: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת אָדָם, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer that the intention to consume, beyond its designated time, an item that is not usually consumed renders the meal offering unfit? The verse states with regard to consuming an offering after its designated time: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all consumed [he’akhol ye’akhel]” (Leviticus 7:18), repeating for emphasis the term for consumption. He derives from the repeated term that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is the consumption of the offering by a person, e.g., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is the consumption of the sacrificial portions by their being burned on the altar. This serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of a person renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of the altar renders the offering unfit.
וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לָאָדָם.
And furthermore, this serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by the altar renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the altar renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? מִדְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא לְהַקְטָרָה בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה.
What is the reason for this derivation? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי דְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה,
And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, maintain the following: This fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption
דְּלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה לְמִזְבֵּחַ, וְלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן הַקְטָרָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ.
demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is piggul.
אִי נָמֵי, מָה אֲכִילָה בִּכְזַיִת – אַף הַקְטָרָה בִּכְזַיִת, וּלְעוֹלָם אֲכִילָה דְּאוֹרְחָא מַשְׁמַע.
Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״אִם הֵאָכֹל הֵאָכֹל״, אִי נָמֵי ״אִם יֵאָכֵל יֵאָכֵל״, מַאי ״הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that halakha, let the Merciful One write either: If he’akhol he’akhol, or: If ye’akhel ye’akhel, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “he’akhol ye’akhel,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two halakhot. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַב אַסִּי: וְאִי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִשּׁוּם הָכִי הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָא אַתְּ הוּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת!
Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive karet for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive karet, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by karet?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תַּנָּאֵי הִיא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּרַבָּנַן.
Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between tanna’im as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive karet. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of karet for this transgression.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לִשְׁתּוֹת מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר, לְהַקְטִיר מִבְּשָׂרוֹ לְמָחָר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵאֵימוּרָיו לְמָחָר – כָּשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. לְהַנִּיחַ מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בָּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין.
As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה מַכְשְׁרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be piggul, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?
אֶלָּא, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בְּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.
אֶלָּא לָאו כָּרֵת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה (דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא) סָבַר: לְהַנִּיחַ – פְּסוּלָא בְּעָלְמָא, בְּהָנָךְ כָּרֵת נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְמֵימַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת!
Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for karet? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive karet as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive karet for it.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כָּרֵת לֵיכָּא, וְהָכָא שָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּדָבָר: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר בְּהָנָךְ פְּלִיגִי, לְהַנִּיחַ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל כָּשֵׁר,
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive karet. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first tanna holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.
Follow 
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
When we heard that R. Michelle was starting daf yomi, my 11-year-old suggested that I go. Little did she know that she would lose me every morning from then on. I remember standing at the Farbers’ door, almost too shy to enter. After that first class, I said that I would come the next day but couldn’t commit to more. A decade later, I still look forward to learning from R. Michelle every morning.
Ruth Leah Kahan
Ra’anana, Israel
A Gemara shiur previous to the Hadran Siyum, was the impetus to attend it.It was highly inspirational and I was smitten. The message for me was התלמוד בידינו. I had decided along with my Chahsmonaim group to to do the daf and take it one daf at time- without any expectations at all. There has been a wealth of information, insights and halachik ideas. It is truly exercise of the mind, heart & Soul
Phyllis Hecht
Hashmonaim, Israel
I started learning Daf Yomi inspired by תָּפַסְתָּ מְרוּבֶּה לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ, תָּפַסְתָּ מוּעָט תָּפַסְתָּ. I thought I’d start the first page, and then see. I was swept up into the enthusiasm of the Hadran Siyum, and from there the momentum kept building. Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur gives me an anchor, a connection to an incredible virtual community, and an energy to face whatever the day brings.
Medinah Korn
בית שמש, Israel
I started my Daf Yomi journey at the beginning of the COVID19 pandemic.
Karena Perry
Los Angeles, United States
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Michelle Lewis
Beit Shemesh, Israel
It has been a pleasure keeping pace with this wonderful and scholarly group of women.
Janice Block
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I attended the Siyum so that I could tell my granddaughter that I had been there. Then I decided to listen on Spotify and after the siyum of Brachot, Covid and zoom began. It gave structure to my day. I learn with people from all over the world who are now my friends – yet most of us have never met. I can’t imagine life without it. Thank you Rabbanit Michelle.
Emma Rinberg
Raanana, Israel
I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
Sarene Shanus
Mamaroneck, NY, United States
I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.
Rachel Rotenberg
Tekoa, Israel
My family recently made Aliyah, because we believe the next chapter in the story of the Jewish people is being written here, and we want to be a part of it. Daf Yomi, on the other hand, connects me BACK, to those who wrote earlier chapters thousands of years ago. So, I feel like I’m living in the middle of this epic story. I’m learning how it all began, and looking ahead to see where it goes!
Tina Lamm
Jerusalem, Israel
At almost 70 I am just beginning my journey with Talmud and Hadran. I began not late, but right when I was called to learn. It is never too late to begin! The understanding patience of staff and participants with more experience and knowledge has been fabulous. The joy of learning never stops and for me. It is a new life, a new light, a new depth of love of The Holy One, Blessed be He.
Deborah Hoffman-Wade
Richmond, CA, United States
I started Daf during the pandemic. I listened to a number of podcasts by various Rebbeim until one day, I discovered Rabbanit Farbers podcast. Subsequently I joined the Hadran family in Eruvin. Not the easiest place to begin, Rabbanit Farber made it all understandable and fun. The online live group has bonded together and have really become a supportive, encouraging family.
Leah Goldford
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Jill Shames
Jerusalem, Israel
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Michelle Lewis
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I learned Mishnayot more than twenty years ago and started with Gemara much later in life. Although I never managed to learn Daf Yomi consistently, I am learning since some years Gemara in depth and with much joy. Since last year I am studying at the International Halakha Scholars Program at the WIHL. I often listen to Rabbanit Farbers Gemara shiurim to understand better a specific sugyiah. I am grateful for the help and inspiration!
Shoshana Ruerup
Berlin, Germany
תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
Vitti Kones
מיתר, ישראל
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Sharon Mink
Haifa, Israel
I learned daf more off than on 40 years ago. At the beginning of the current cycle, I decided to commit to learning daf regularly. Having Rabanit Michelle available as a learning partner has been amazing. Sometimes I learn with Hadran, sometimes with my husband, and sometimes on my own. It’s been fun to be part of an extended learning community.
Miriam Pollack
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Sara Averick
Jerusalem, Israel
It has been a pleasure keeping pace with this wonderful and scholarly group of women.
Janice Block
Beit Shemesh, Israel
Menachot 17
חֲרִיפֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא: הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי אֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּשִׁירַיִם וּלְבוֹנָה בְּמִילְּתָא קָיְימָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב לַהּ בִּלְבוֹנָה – כְּמָה דְּחַשֵּׁב בֵּיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ מַתִּיר דָּמֵי.
the sharp people in the city of Pumbedita: Burning renders burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day renders the meal offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render an offering piggul with intent occurring during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful alone with intent of piggul. The reason is that this statement applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, and the frankincense stands intact, i.e., he had no intent with regard to it. But here, when he had intent with regard to the frankincense while burning the handful, it is considered as though he had intent with regard to the entire permitting factor.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַקּוֹמֵץ וְנוֹתֵן בִּכְלִי, וְהַמּוֹלִיךְ וְהַמַּקְטִיר, לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת.
Rava said: We learn this halakha in a mishna, as well (12a): This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it.
מַאי לָאו הַקְטָרָה דּוּמְיָא דְּהָנָךְ, מָה הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר, אַף הַקְטָרָה – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר?
Rava explains: What, is it not correct to say that the halakha with regard to burning is similar to these, i.e., the removal of the handful, its placement in a vessel, and the conveying? Accordingly, just as with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day or to burn the frankincense the next day, the halakha is that the offering is piggul, so too with regard to burning, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is piggul.
לָא, הָנָךְ – בֵּין לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין לְהַקְטִיר; הַקְטָרָה – לֶאֱכוֹל אִין, לְהַקְטִיר לָא.
The Gemara rejects this comparison: No, with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is in fact piggul. But with regard to burning, if one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day, yes, it is piggul, but if one’s intent was to burn the frankincense the next day, it is not piggul.
יָתֵיב רַב מְנַשְּׁיָא בַּר גַּדָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָא אָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: ״מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר״ –
The Gemara relates that Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and while he was sitting he said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Burning does not render burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day does not render the offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful but not the frankincense with intent of piggul.
הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּחַשֵּׁב בְּהוּ בְּשִׁירַיִם, דְּקוֹמֶץ מַתִּיר דִּידְהוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּקוֹמֶץ לָאו מַתִּיר דִּלְבוֹנָה הוּא – לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Menashya bar Gadda explains that the reason is that this statement of Rabbi Meir applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, as the handful is their permitting factor. But here, as the handful is not a permitting factor of the frankincense, the offering cannot be rendered piggul through it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: עֲנִי מָרִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַב: אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה.
Abaye said to Rav Menashya: Answer me, my Master, did Rav Ḥisda state this halakha in the name of Rav? Rav Menashya said to Abaye: Yes. The Gemara notes that it was also stated explicitly that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: Burning does not render burning piggul.
אָמַר רַב יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, שָׁחַט אֶחָד מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים לֶאֱכוֹל מִמֶּנּוּ לְמָחָר – הוּא פִּיגּוּל וַחֲבֵירוֹ כָּשֵׁר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵחֲבֵירוֹ לְמָחָר – שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָאו מַתִּיר דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, לָא מָצֵי מְפַגֵּל בֵּיהּ.
Rav Ya’akov bar Idi said in the name of Abaye: We learn in the mishna as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other lamb is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that since the first lamb is not a permitting factor of the second lamb, it cannot render the second lamb piggul? The same reasoning should apply to the case of the handful and frankincense.
לָא, הָתָם הוּא דְּלָא אִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּאִיקְּבַע בְּחַד מָנָא – כִּי חַד דָּמוּ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; there is a difference between these cases. It is only there, in the mishna, that one lamb cannot render the other piggul, as it was not fixed in one vessel with the other lamb, and therefore each animal stands independent of the other. But here, as the handful and frankincense were fixed in one vessel for the purpose of offering them, they are considered like one item and one of them therefore renders the other piggul.
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: הָא מִילְּתָא אַבְלַע לִי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וּתְקִילָא לִי כְּכוּלֵּיהּ תַּלְמוּדַאי – הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה, וּלְבוֹנָה לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר – פִּגּוּל.
§ Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Ḥanina helped me internalize this following matter, and to me it is equivalent to all the rest of my learning, as it contains a significant novelty: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, and burned the frankincense with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the meal offering is piggul.
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? אִי הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה״! אִי מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״! אִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֲתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – לֵימָא: ״הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לְהַקְטִיר לְבוֹנָה וְלֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם לְמָחָר״!
The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? If he is teaching us that burning renders burning piggul, then let him simply say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense, the offering is piggul. If he is teaching us that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, then let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul. If he is coming to teach us both of these halakhot, let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense or to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul.
אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר אֵין הַקְטָרָה מְפַגֶּלֶת הַקְטָרָה, וְאֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּפָשְׁטָא לַיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה בְּכוּלַּהּ מִנְחָה.
Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, Rabbi Ḥanina holds that burning does not render burning piggul, and therefore if one burned only the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is not piggul. And he also holds that one does not render an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, and consequently if one burned only the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is not piggul either. But it is different here, as intent of piggul has extended over the entire meal offering, as he had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful with regard to the frankincense and during the burning of the frankincense with regard to the remainder.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא: הִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ לֶאֱכוֹל שִׁירַיִם – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פִּגּוּל. וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי? אֶלָּא אֵימָא: לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל.
The Gemara relates that a tanna taught a baraita before Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is piggul. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to this very case? Rather, say that the baraita states: Everyone agrees that the offering is disqualified, as although the Rabbis hold that such intent does not render an offering piggul, they concede that it disqualifies the offering.
וְלֵימָא: הֲרֵי זֶה פִּגּוּל, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא! תַּנָּא ״דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ אַתְנְיוּהּ, ״פִּיגּוּל״ בְּ״פָסוּל״ מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ, ״הֲרֵי זֶה״ בְּ״דִבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ לָא מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ.
The Gemara challenges: But if one must emend the baraita, let him say that the baraita states: It is piggul, and that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara responds: It is reasonable that the tanna taught that everyone agrees, and that he accidentally exchanged the word piggul for disqualified. But he would not confuse the phrase: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, with the phrase: Everyone agrees.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה.
מַתְנִי׳ הַקּוֹמֵץ אֶת הַמִּנְחָה לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.
MISHNA: In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not piggul, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet].
לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר פָּחוֹת מִכְּזַיִת – כָּשֵׁר. לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.
In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אָמַר קְרָא ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״ – בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, לוֹמַר לָךְ: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת אָדָם, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין בַּאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
GEMARA: Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer that the intention to consume, beyond its designated time, an item that is not usually consumed renders the meal offering unfit? The verse states with regard to consuming an offering after its designated time: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all consumed [he’akhol ye’akhel]” (Leviticus 7:18), repeating for emphasis the term for consumption. He derives from the repeated term that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is the consumption of the offering by a person, e.g., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is the consumption of the sacrificial portions by their being burned on the altar. This serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of a person renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of the altar renders the offering unfit.
וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁמְּחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, כָּךְ מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לָאָדָם.
And furthermore, this serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by the altar renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the altar renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? מִדְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא לְהַקְטָרָה בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה.
What is the reason for this derivation? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי דְּאַפְּקִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה,
And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, maintain the following: This fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption
דְּלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה לְמִזְבֵּחַ, וְלָא שְׁנָא כִּי מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן הַקְטָרָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ.
demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is piggul.
אִי נָמֵי, מָה אֲכִילָה בִּכְזַיִת – אַף הַקְטָרָה בִּכְזַיִת, וּלְעוֹלָם אֲכִילָה דְּאוֹרְחָא מַשְׁמַע.
Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״אִם הֵאָכֹל הֵאָכֹל״, אִי נָמֵי ״אִם יֵאָכֵל יֵאָכֵל״, מַאי ״הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that halakha, let the Merciful One write either: If he’akhol he’akhol, or: If ye’akhel ye’akhel, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “he’akhol ye’akhel,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two halakhot. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַב אַסִּי: וְאִי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מִשּׁוּם הָכִי הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָא אַתְּ הוּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת!
Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive karet for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive karet, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by karet?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תַּנָּאֵי הִיא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: פְּסוּלָה דְּרַבָּנַן.
Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between tanna’im as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive karet. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of karet for this transgression.
דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לִשְׁתּוֹת מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר, לְהַקְטִיר מִבְּשָׂרוֹ לְמָחָר, לֶאֱכוֹל מֵאֵימוּרָיו לְמָחָר – כָּשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. לְהַנִּיחַ מִדָּמוֹ לְמָחָר – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בָּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין.
As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה מַכְשְׁרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be piggul, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?
אֶלָּא, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אַף בְּזוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.
אֶלָּא לָאו כָּרֵת אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה (דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא) סָבַר: לְהַנִּיחַ – פְּסוּלָא בְּעָלְמָא, בְּהָנָךְ כָּרֵת נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְמֵימַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת!
Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for karet? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive karet as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive karet for it.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כָּרֵת לֵיכָּא, וְהָכָא שָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּדָבָר: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר בְּהָנָךְ פְּלִיגִי, לְהַנִּיחַ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל כָּשֵׁר,
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive karet. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first tanna holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.
Follow
