Niddah 46

Niddah 46

וְטַעְמָא דִּלְאַחַר זְמַן הוּא דְּגָמְרָה לַהּ לְמִילְּתֵיהּ? הָא תּוֹךְ זְמַן — כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן.

and the reason that the development of two hairs renders him an adult is that the onset of his matter, i.e., his reaching puberty, was completed for him after the time? Rav Hamnuna infers from here that if the child developed two hairs during the time, it is considered as before the time, and he or she is not classified as an adult.

וְעוֹד מֵתִיב רַבִּי זֵירָא: ״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא לִנְדּוֹר נֶדֶר״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ״? לְרַבּוֹת בֶּן שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לְהַפְלִיא — נְדָרָיו קַיָּימִין.

And furthermore, Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to the opinion that the development of signs indicating puberty during the time is equivalent to their development after the time. It is taught in a baraita which deals with the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When either man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2). What is the meaning when the verse states “man,” after it has already stated “the children of Israel”? This serves to include anyone who is thirteen years and one day old, that even if he does not know how to utter clearly and articulate the meaning of his statements, his vows are in effect.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא אַיְיתִי שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת — קָטָן הוּא! אֶלָּא לָאו דְּאַיְיתִי שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, וְטַעְמָא דְּבֶן שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה וְיוֹם אֶחָד הוּא דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ ״אִישׁ״, הָא תּוֹךְ זְמַן כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

Rabbi Zeira analyzes this baraita. What are the circumstances? If it is referring to a case where the boy has not yet developed two pubic hairs, then he is a minor, and the halakha with regard to him cannot be derived from the word “man.” Rather, is it not referring to a case where the boy has developed two pubic hairs? And by inference, the reason that he is considered a man due to his development of pubic hairs is that he is thirteen years and one day old, but if the boy developed two hairs during the time, it is considered as before the time. The Gemara concludes: This is indeed a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that developing pubic hairs during the time is equivalent to developing hairs after the time.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּתַנָּאֵי, בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים שֶׁהֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת — שׁוּמָא, מִבֶּן תֵּשַׁע וְעַד שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד — שׁוּמָא. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: סִימָן. בֶּן שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל סִימָן.

Rav Naḥman said that the baraita is not a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as this matter is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, since there is another baraita which teaches the following: Everyone agrees with regard to a nine-year-old boy who developed two hairs that this is not considered a sign of puberty, as they are treated as hairs that grow on a mole. From nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day, even if the hairs have not fallen out, this is still considered a mole. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: At this stage it is a sign indicating puberty. If he is thirteen years and one day old and has grown two hairs, all agree that it is a sign indicating puberty.

הָא גּוּפַאּ קַשְׁיָא, אָמְרַתְּ: ״מִבֶּן תֵּשַׁע וְעַד שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד״ — שׁוּמָא, הָא שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה גּוּפָא — סִימָן, וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: ״בֶּן שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד״ — סִימָן, הָא שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה גּוּפָא — שׁוּמָא!

Rav Naḥman analyzes the baraita. This baraita itself is difficult, as you initially said that from nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day it is a mole, from which it can be inferred that if he developed two pubic hairs in the thirteenth year itself, it is a sign indicating puberty. And then the baraita teaches that if he is thirteen years and one day old and has grown two hairs, this is a sign indicating puberty, which indicates that if he developed the hairs in the thirteenth year itself, it is a mole.

מַאי לַָאו תַּנָּאֵי הִיא: דְּמָר סָבַר תּוֹךְ זְמַן כִּלְאַחַר זְמַן, וּמָר סָבַר תּוֹךְ זְמַן כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן?

Rav Naḥman concludes: What, is it not correct to say that there is a dispute between tanna’im, as one Sage, the tanna who states the first line of the baraita, holds that during that time is considered as after the time, and one Sage, the tanna of the last line of the baraita, holds that during that time is considered as before the time? If so, the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is one side of a dispute between tanna’im.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא תּוֹךְ זְמַן כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן, וְאִידִי וְאִידִי בְּתִינוֹקֶת, וְרֵישָׁא רַבִּי וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone, i.e., the tanna’im of both clauses of the baraita, agrees that during that time is considered as before the time, and this clause and that clause of the baraita are both referring to a young girl. And the difference between them is that the first clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that the thirteenth year for a female is considered after the time, and therefore the development of two pubic hairs at this stage is a sign of maturation; and the last clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that the thirteenth year for a female is considered before the time.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא וְהָא בְּתִינוֹק, וְרֵישָׁא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי.

And if you wish, say that this clause and that clause are both dealing with a young boy, and the first clause is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the last clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that the thirteenth year for a boy is considered before the time.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי, הָא — בְּתִינוֹק, הָא — בְּתִינוֹקֶת. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, הָא — בְּתִינוֹק, הָא — בְּתִינוֹקֶת.

And if you wish, say that both this clause and that clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the difference between them is that this last clause of the baraita is referring to a young boy, whereas that first clause is referring to a young girl. And if you wish, say that both this clause and that clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and that first clause of the baraita is referring to a young boy, whereas this last clause is referring to a young girl.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: סִימָן. אָמַר רַבִּי כְּרוּסְפָּדַאי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שַׁבְּתַאי: וְהוּא שֶׁעוֹדָן בּוֹ.

The baraita further teaches that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says with regard to hairs from nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day, that it is a sign indicating puberty. In explanation of this opinion, Rabbi Keruspedai, son of Rabbi Shabbtai, says: And this is the halakha only when the hairs are still upon him, i.e., they had not fallen out when he reached the age of puberty, as otherwise they are considered a mole.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁהֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת — שׁוּמָא, מִבֶּן תֵּשַׁע וְעַד שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד, וְעוֹדָן בּוֹ — שׁוּמָא. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: סִימָן.

The Gemara notes that this opinion is also taught in a baraita: With regard to a boy nine years and one day old who developed two hairs, this is considered a mole. If the boy is from nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day, and the hairs are still upon him, it is still considered a mole. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is a sign indicating puberty.

אָמַר רָבָא, הִילְכְתָא: תּוֹךְ זְמַן — כְּלִפְנֵי זְמַן. רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר זוּטְרָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא דְּרָבָא בְּהַאי לִישָּׁנָא, אָמַר רָבָא: קְטַנָּה כׇּל שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה מְמָאֶנֶת וְהוֹלֶכֶת, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ אֵינָהּ מְמָאֶנֶת וְאֵינָהּ חוֹלֶצֶת.

§ In summary of the rulings cited above, Rava said: The halakha is that the development of two hairs during the time is considered as before the time, and it does not render one an adult. Rav Shmuel bar Zutra teaches this halakha of Rava in this formulation: Rava says: With regard to a minor girl whose father has passed away and whose mother or brothers accepted betrothal on her behalf, a form of betrothal instituted by the Sages, throughout her entire twelfth year she has the continuous right to perform refusal with regard to this marriage and thereby annul it. From that point forward, when she is already an adult, she may no longer perform refusal, and she may not perform ḥalitza with the brother of her husband, if he died without children.

הָא גוּפַאּ קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ ״אֵינָהּ מְמָאֶנֶת״, אַלְמָא גְּדוֹלָה הִיא, אִי גְּדוֹלָה הִיא — תַּחְלוֹץ!

The Gemara asks: This statement of Rava itself is difficult: You first said that once she is twelve she may not perform refusal. Evidently, she is an adult woman. But if she is an adult woman, let her perform ḥalitza, like any other adult woman.

וְכִי תֵּימָא מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ, וּמִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: קְטַנָּה שֶׁהִגִּיעָה לִכְלַל שְׁנוֹתֶיהָ אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה בְּדִיקָה, חֲזָקָה הֵבִיאָה סִימָנִין!

And if you would say that Rava is uncertain whether a twelve-year-old girl is presumed to have developed two hairs and is therefore an adult, or whether it is presumed that she has not yet grown two hairs and remains a minor, and consequently he is stringent on both counts, that she may not perform refusal, like an adult, but she may also not perform ḥalitza, like a minor, this suggestion is problematic, as is Rava actually uncertain in this regard? But doesn’t Rava say: A minor girl who reached her full age of maturity, i.e., twelve years and one day, does not require examination to determine whether she has grown two hairs, as there is a presumption that she has developed signs indicating puberty.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי בִּסְתָמָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּבְדַקוּ וְלָא אַשְׁכַּחוּ — לָא.

The Gemara answers that this statement, that it is presumed that a twelve-year-old girl has developed two hairs, applies only in an ordinary situation. But here Rava is referring to a case where they examined her and did not find hairs. In such an instance, Rava did not say that the presumption is in effect.

אִי הָכִי, תְּמָאֵן! חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא נָשְׁרוּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, that she was actually examined, she should be considered a minor in all regards and she should be able to perform refusal. The Gemara answers: We are concerned that perhaps the girl had already developed pubic hairs but they fell out. Consequently, although the girl is not treated with the presumption that she is an adult, she does not have the certain status of a minor either, and cannot perform refusal.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חוֹשְׁשִׁין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? דְּאִיתְּמַר: רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא נָשְׁרוּ, רַב פַּפֵּי אָמַר: חוֹשְׁשִׁין. הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְעִנְיַן חֲלִיצָה, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן מֵיאוּן — חוֹשְׁשִׁין.

The Gemara objects: This works out well according to the one who says that we are concerned that the pubic hairs fell out. But according to the one who says that we are not concerned that they have fallen out, what is there to say? As it was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to this matter. Rav Pappa says: We are not concerned that perhaps the pubic hairs fell out; Rav Pappi says: We are concerned that they might have fallen out. The Gemara answers that this statement of Rav Pappa, that there is no concern that perhaps the pubic hairs fell out, applies only with regard to ḥalitza, but with regard to refusal everyone agrees that we are concerned that they might have fallen out.

מִכְּלָל דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר ״חוֹשְׁשִׁין״ — חוֹלֶצֶת? וְהָא ״חוֹשְׁשִׁין״ בְּעָלְמָא קָאָמַר!

The Gemara asks: By inference, does the one who says that we are concerned that perhaps the hairs fell out maintain that this twelve-year-old performs ḥalitza? But this cannot be correct, as he says that we are merely concerned that the hairs might have fallen out, not that this is certainly the case. How, then, can she perform ḥalitza like an adult?

אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם דְּלָא (בַּדְקֻהָ) [בַּדְקַן], וּלְעִנְיַן חֲלִיצָה חָיְישִׁינַן, וְכִי קָאָמַר רָבָא חֲזָקָה לְמֵיאוּן, אֲבָל לַחֲלִיצָה בָּעֲיָא בְּדִיקָה.

Rather, Rava is actually referring to a case where one did not examine the girl, and with regard to ḥalitza we are concerned that she might not have developed hairs and is still a minor. And when Rava said that there is a presumption that a twelve-year-old has developed signs indicating puberty, he was referring to refusal, but with regard to ḥalitza she requires examination.

אָמַר רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא: הִלְכְתָא, חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא נָשְׁרוּ.

With regard to the issue of whether there is concern that hairs might have fallen out, Rav Dimi of Neharde’a said: The halakha is that if a girl reached the age of twelve and she was examined and the signs of puberty were not found, we are concerned that perhaps the pubic hairs fell out. Consequently, if her mother or brothers had accepted betrothal for her when she was a minor, she cannot perform refusal at that stage.

וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקִדְּשָׁהּ בְּתוֹךְ זְמַן, וּבָעַל לְאַחַר זְמַן, דְּאִיכָּא סְפֵיקָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֲבָל מֵעִיקָּרָא — לָא.

The Gemara adds: And this statement applies only in a case where her husband betrothed her during the time, before she reached the age of twelve years and one day, and engaged in intercourse with her after the time, when she was already twelve years and one day old. This is a situation where there is an uncertainty with regard to Torah law, since if she had developed two hairs and is an adult, the marriage applies by Torah law, due to the intercourse. But if he engaged in intercourse with her only at the outset, before she turned twelve, there is no concern that perhaps she developed pubic hairs and they fell out, as this marriage applies by rabbinic law.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הִקְדִּישׁ וְאָכַל — לוֹקֶה.

§ With regard to a minor who vowed, Rav Huna says: If the minor is aware of the meaning of his vow and in Whose name he or she vowed, and the minor’s age is during the time, i.e., the twelfth year for a girl or the thirteenth year for a boy, and he consecrated an item of food and subsequently ate it, he is flogged, which is the punishment for one who eats consecrated food.

שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא לִנְדּוֹר״, וְ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״ — כֹּל שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בְּהַפְלָאָה יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּבַל יַחֵל, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּהַפְלָאָה אֵינוֹ בְּבַל יַחֵל.

Rav Huna explains: As it is stated: “When either a man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), from which it is derived that if one on the brink of adulthood is able to articulate that his vow is in the name of God, his vows are valid. And another verse states: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). This indicates that any person who is included in explicitness of intent is also included in the prohibition: “He shall not profane his word,” and anyone who is not included in explicitness of intent is not included in the prohibition: “He shall not profane his word.”

מֵתִיב רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה (לְרָבָא) לְסַיּוֹעֵי לְרַב הוּנָא:

Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection to Rava, in support of the opinion of Rav Huna:

לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ שֶׁהִשְׁוָה הַכָּתוּב הַקָּטָן כַּגָּדוֹל לִזְדוֹן שְׁבוּעָה וּלְאִיסָּר וּלְבַל יַחֵל, יָכוֹל יְהֵא חַיָּיב עַל הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹ קׇרְבָּן?

Since we find that the verse equates a minor, i.e., one on the brink of adulthood, to an adult with regard to an intentional violation of an oath and with regard to a vow of prohibition, where one renders an item prohibited to himself through a vow, and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, one might have thought that this minor, like an adult, should also be liable to bring an offering for misuse of his consecrated property, e.g., if he ate an item that he consecrated.

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״זֶה הַדָּבָר״.

Therefore, the verse states with regard to vows: “This is the matter which the Lord has commanded. When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath” (Numbers 30:2–3). The emphasis of “this” indicates that it is only with regard to this matter, i.e., prohibitions resulting from vows, that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult, but he is not rendered liable to bring an offering for his misuse.

קָתָנֵי מִיהַת לְאִיסָּר וּלְ״בַל יַחֵל״ חַיָּיב. אֵימָא: לְאִיסּוּר ״בַּל יַחֵל״.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. In any event, the baraita teaches that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult with regard to a vow of prohibition and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, which indicates that he is liable for violating this prohibition. This supports the opinion of Rav Huna that a minor is flogged for eating food he consecrated. The Gemara refutes this proof: There is room to say that the word: And, in the phrase: With regard to a vow of prohibition and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, should be omitted, and the baraita is comparing a minor to an adult with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, but it does not indicate that he is liable to receive lashes for violating this prohibition.

אִיסּוּר ״בַּל יַחֵל״ — מָה נַפְשָׁךְ: אִי מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — מִילְקָא נָמֵי לִילְקֵי, וְאִי מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — אִיסּוּר נָמֵי לֵיכָּא, לְאוֹתָן הַמּוּזְהָרִים עָלָיו.

The Gemara asks: Can the baraita actually mean that a minor is compared to an adult with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, but he is not flogged? Whichever way you look at it, this is problematic: If a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, he should be flogged too, for his violation. And if a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is not considered an adult by Torah law, there is no prohibition violated here either. The Gemara answers that according to the baraita the prohibition does not apply to the minor himself, but to those who are warned to keep him away from the prohibited item.

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: קָטָן אוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת — בֵּית דִּין מְצוִּּוין עָלָיו לְהַפְרִישׁוֹ. הָכָא בְמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִקְדִּישׁ הוּא, וְאָכְלוּ אֲחֵרִים.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can conclude from the baraita that if a minor eats meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses or violates other prohibitions, the court is commanded to prevent him from doing so. This is problematic, as elsewhere it is stated that this matter is subject to dispute (see Yevamot 114a). The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a case where the minor consecrated the food item and others ate it. They are liable to receive lashes for their consumption, but if he ate it he is not liable.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: ״הִקְדִּישׁ הוּא וְאָכְלוּ אֲחֵרִים — לוֹקִין״, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: ״אֵין לוֹקִין״ — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? דְּאִיתְּמַר: הִקְדִּישׁ הוּא וְאָכְלוּ אֲחֵרִים, רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: אֵין לוֹקִין, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַויְהוּ: לוֹקִין!

The Gemara raises another difficulty: This works out well according to the one who said that if a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, they are flogged. But according to the one who said that in such a case they are not flogged, what can be said? As it was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue: If a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, Rav Kahana says that they are not flogged; Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that they are flogged.

מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וּקְרָא אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא.

The Gemara therefore reverts to the interpretation that the baraita is referring to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, not the punishment for violation of the vow. And the reason lashes are not administered is that the prohibition is by rabbinic law. And as for the verse mentioned in the baraita, when it states that the verse equates a minor to an adult, which indicates that it is dealing with Torah law, this verse is a mere support for a rabbinic law.

גּוּפָא: הִקְדִּישׁ וְאָכְלוּ אֲחֵרִים — רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: אֵין לוֹקִין, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לוֹקִין. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר: מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וּמָר סָבַר: מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ מִדְּרַבָּנַן.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself, i.e., the dispute cited above. If a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, Rav Kahana says that they are not flogged; Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that they are flogged. With regard to what principle do these Sages disagree? One Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, holds that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, which is why others are liable for eating an item he consecrated; and one Sage, Rav Kahana, holds that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by rabbinic law.

מֵתִיב רַב יִרְמְיָה: יְתוֹמָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה — בַּעְלָהּ מֵפֵר לָהּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּרַבָּנַן, אָתוּ נִשּׂוּאִין דְּרַבָּנַן וּמְבַטְּלִי נִדְרָא דְּרַבָּנַן; אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אָתוּ נִשּׂוּאִין דְּרַבָּנַן וּמְבַטְּלִי נִדְרָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא?

Rav Yirmeya raises an objection from a baraita: In the case of a minor girl who is an orphan from her father and her mother or brothers accepted betrothal on her behalf, who vowed, her husband may nullify her vow, like any other husband, despite the fact that this marriage is valid merely by rabbinic law. Rav Yirmeya analyzes this baraita: Granted, if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by rabbinic law, one can explain that a husband whose marriage is by rabbinic law comes and negates a vow that also applies by rabbinic law. But if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, can a husband whose marriage is by rabbinic law come and negate a vow that applies by Torah law?

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בַּעְלָהּ מֵפֵר לָהּ מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ, אִי דְּרַבָּנַן — דְּרַבָּנַן הוּא, אִי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — קָטָן אוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת הוּא, וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְצוִּּוין עָלָיו לְהַפְרִישׁוֹ.

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Her husband may nullify her vows, whichever way you look at it: If the validity of the vows of such a minor applies by rabbinic law, the husband may nullify her vows, as the validity of their marriage is likewise by rabbinic law. And if the validity of a vow by a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is by Torah law, which means she would be violating a Torah prohibition, this is the same as the case of a minor who may eat meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses or violate other prohibitions, and the court or any other adult, including her husband in this case, is not commanded to prevent him from doing so,and it does not matter if his nullification was not effective.

וְהָא כִּי גָדְלָה אָכְלָה בַּהֲפָרָה קַמַּיְיתָא!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is still concern for a violation, as when she grows and becomes an adult she will eat the food that she rendered forbidden to herself, relying on the initial nullification of her vow by her husband, which was not valid. At that stage she is an adult, whom the court is certainly commanded to prevent from violating prohibitions.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר לֵיוַאי: בַּעְלָהּ מֵפֵר לָהּ כׇּל שָׁעָה וְשָׁעָה, וְהוּא שֶׁבָּעַל.

Rabba bar Livai said that this is not a concern, as her husband nullifies her vows each and every moment, and therefore when she reaches majority he will nullify her vow in a manner that is valid by Torah law. And this is the halakha, that the nullification takes effect by Torah law, only in a case where her husband engaged in intercourse with her after she became an adult, thereby rendering their marriage valid by Torah law.

וְהָא אֵין בַּעַל מֵפֵר בְּקוֹדְמִין, כִּדְרַב פִּינְחָס מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: כׇּל הַנּוֹדֶרֶת — עַל דַּעַת בַּעְלָהּ הִיא נוֹדֶרֶת.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But there is a principle that a husband cannot nullify vows of his wife that preceded their marriage; and as she is considered his wife by Torah law only when she becomes an adult, her vow when she was a minor preceded their marriage. The Gemara answers that he can still nullify her vow, in accordance with the statement of Rav Pineḥas in the name of Rava, as Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava: Any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Since the minor was married by rabbinic law, she vowed on the condition that her husband should agree to her vow, and therefore the nullification is valid by Torah law.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: תָּא שְׁמַע, קָטָן שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים — אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, מִשֶּׁבָּא לְעוֹנַת נְדָרִים — תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the validity of the vows of a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood. Abaye said: Come and hear a mishna (Terumot 1:3): With regard to a minor who has not grown two hairs, Rabbi Yehuda says: His teruma is not valid teruma. Rabbi Yosei says: Until he has reached the age of vows, i.e., when he does not yet have the status of a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood, his teruma is not valid teruma, but once he has reached the age of vows, his teruma is teruma.

סַבְרוּהָ, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: תְּרוּמָה בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לָאִישׁ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — אָתֵי גַּבְרָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא וּמְתַקֵּן טִבְלָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּרַבָּנַן — אָתֵי גַּבְרָא דְּרַבָּנַן וּמְתַקֵּן טִבְלָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא? לָא, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: תְּרוּמָה בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה דְּרַבָּנַן.

The Sages assumed that Rabbi Yosei holds that teruma in the present applies by Torah law. They therefore objected: Granted, if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is an adult by Torah law, one can understand that one who is a man by Torah law with regard to vows can come and prepare untithed produce [tivla] for consumption by tithing it, which also applies by Torah law. But if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is an adult by rabbinic law, can one who is a man by rabbinic law come and prepare untithed produce, which is prohibited by Torah law? The Gemara refutes this proof: No, perhaps Rabbi Yosei holds that teruma in the present applies by rabbinic law, and this is why he rules that a minor on the brink of adulthood can set aside teruma.

וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי תְּרוּמָה בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה דְּרַבָּנַן? וְהָתַנְיָא בְּסֵדֶר עוֹלָם: ״אֲשֶׁר יָרְשׁוּ אֲבוֹתֶיךָ וִירִשְׁתָּהּ״,

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that teruma in the present applies by rabbinic law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the anthology called Seder Olam: The verse that states with regard to the Jewish people’s return to Eretz Yisrael following their exile: “And the Lord your God will bring you into the land that your fathers possessed, and you shall possess it” (Deuteronomy 30:5).

יְרוּשָּׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה וּשְׁנִיָּה — יֵשׁ לָהֶן, שְׁלִישִׁית — אֵין לָהֶן.

These two expressions of possession indicate that the Jewish people had a first possession of Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua, when Eretz Yisrael was first sanctified with regard to the obligation of its mitzvot, and they had a second possession at the time of Ezra and the return of the Babylonian exile. In other words, the sanctity of the land lapsed when the First Temple was destroyed and the Jews were exiled to Babylonia, and therefore a second sanctification was necessary when they returned to their land. But they will not have a third possession. That is, it will never be necessary to sanctify the land a third time, as the second sanctification was permanent.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאן תְּנָא סֵדֶר עוֹלָם? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is the tanna that taught Seder Olam? Rabbi Yosei. Since Rabbi Yosei maintains that the second sanctification of Eretz Yisrael did not lapse even after the destruction of the Second Temple, he must also maintain that teruma in the present applies by Torah law.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי תָּנֵי לַהּ, וְלָא סָבַר לַהּ. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּתַנְיָא: עִיסָּה שֶׁנִּדְמְעָה, אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְחַמְּצָה בִּשְׂאוֹר שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה —

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei taught Seder Olam but he does not maintain in accordance with its ruling here. The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable that this is so, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to non-sacred dough that became mixed with teruma dough, or which was leavened with leaven of teruma,