Sanhedrin 24
בְּעֵדִים פְּסוּלִין וְדַיָּינִין כְּשֵׁרִין, מִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי עֵידֵי – פָּסְלִי נָמֵי דַּיָּינֵי. סֵיפָא: בְּדַיָּינִין פְּסוּלִין וְעֵדִים כְּשֵׁרִין, דְּמִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי דַּיָּינֵי – פָּסְלִי נָמֵי עֵידֵי.
is stated with regard to a case of disqualified witnesses and fit judges, i.e., the litigant claims that both the witnesses and the judges are disqualified and proves his claim only with regard to the witnesses. Rabbi Meir holds that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as the litigant’s entire claim is deemed credible. The latter clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify witnesses, is stated with regard to a case of disqualified judges and fit witnesses, i.e., the litigant proves his claim only with regard to the judges. Since the judges are disqualified the witnesses were also disqualified.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: בִּשְׁלָמָא, מִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי עֵדֵי פָּסְלִי נָמֵי דַּיָּינֵי, אִיכָּא בֵּי דִינָא אַחֲרִינָא. אֶלָּא מִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי דַּיָּינֵי פָּסְלִי נָמֵי עֵדֵי? וְהָא עֵדִים תּוּ לֵיכָּא!
Rava objects to this interpretation: Granted, in the former clause, it is reasonable that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as, since there is the option of going to another court, disqualifying these specific judges has no irreversible effect on the outcome of the case. But in the latter case, how can Rabbi Meir hold that since the judges are disqualified, the witnesses are also disqualified without proof? This disqualification nullifies the entire case, as there are no more witnesses.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא כַּת אַחֶרֶת.
The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is not referring to a case where there are no other witnesses. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is necessary only in a case where there is another set of witnesses, which the litigant did not disqualify. Since disqualifying this set will not predetermine the outcome, the litigant’s claim that these witnesses are disqualified is accepted.
הָא לֵיכָּא כַּת אַחֶרֶת, מַאי? הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מָצֵי פָּסְלִי? הַיְינוּ דְּרַב דִּימִי!
The Gemara asks: But if there is no other set of witnesses, what is the halakha? Is it indeed true that the litigant cannot disqualify them? If so, this is identical to Rav Dimi’s interpretation that the mishna is referring to a case where there are two sets of witnesses.
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מִיגּוֹ, דְּמָר סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ.
The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the principle that since [miggo] one of the litigant’s claims is found to be correct, it can be assumed that other claims of his are correct as well. As one Sage, Ravin, holds that according to Rabbi Meir, we say miggo, i.e., this principle should be followed, and one Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that we do not say miggo, but rather the litigant is required to prove every claim he makes.
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: פֶּה קָדוֹשׁ יֹאמַר דָּבָר זֶה? תְּנִי: ״עֵדוֹ״.
§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.
אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: הָרוֹאֶה אֶת רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, כְּאִילּוּ עוֹקֵר הָרִים וְטוֹחֲנָן זֶה בָּזֶה.
The Gemara asks: Is that so? Was it in character for Reish Lakish to speak of Rabbi Meir with such reverence when disagreeing with his ruling? But doesn’t Ulla say: When one sees Reish Lakish studying Torah in the study hall it is as though he is uprooting mountains and grinding them into each other? Reish Lakish was evidently very sharp in his analyses.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: וַהֲלֹא כׇּל הָרוֹאֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, כְּאִילּוּ עוֹקֵר הָרֵי הָרִים וְטוֹחֲנָן זֶה בָּזֶה!
Ravina said in response: What is the difficulty? But is it not so that when anyone sees Rabbi Meir studying Torah in the study hall, it is as though he is uprooting the highest of mountains and grinding them into each other? Rabbi Meir was a greater scholar than Reish Lakish, so it was fitting for Reish Lakish to speak of him with reverence.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: בָּא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה מְחַבְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה.
The Gemara answers: The question: Is that so, was not stated to raise a difficulty; rather, this is what he is saying, i.e., this is what the Gemara was noting: Come and see how much the Sages love each other. Although Reish Lakish was himself very sharp and a great Torah scholar, he spoke of Rabbi Meir with reverence.
כִּי הָא דְּיָתֵיב רַבִּי וְקָאָמַר: אָסוּר לְהַטְמִין אֶת הַצּוֹנֵן. אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַבָּא הִתִּיר לְהַטְמִין אֶת הַצּוֹנֵן. אָמַר לָהֶם: כְּבָר הוֹרָה זָקֵן.
The Gemara cites another example of Torah scholars who spoke of each other with reverence. It is like that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, as this may lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: My father ruled that it is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat. There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi subsequently said to those who asked him about this issue: I retract my previous statement; the elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בֹּא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה מְחַבְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה, דְּאִילּוּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי קַיָּים הָיָה, כָּפוּף וְיוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבִּי. דְּהָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מְמַלֵּא מְקוֹם אֲבוֹתָיו הֲוָה, וְהָיָה כָּפוּף וְיוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבִּי, וְקָא אָמַר: כְּבָר הוֹרָה זָקֵן.
Rav Pappa says: Come and see how much they loved each other. As, had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was his fathers’ replacement, i.e., he was as great a Torah scholar as his forebears, and he was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling.
אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מַאי דִּכְתִיב ״וָאֶקַּח לִי אֶת שְׁנֵי מַקְלוֹת לְאַחַד קָרָאתִי נוֹעַם וּלְאַחַד קָרָאתִי חוֹבְלִים״? ״נוֹעַם״ – אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁמַּנְעִימִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה. ״חוֹבְלִים״ – אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּבָבֶל, שֶׁמְּחַבְּלִים זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה.
This demonstrates what Rabbi Oshaya says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And I took for myself two staves; the one I called Graciousness, and the other I called Binders” (Zechariah 11:7)? “Graciousness”; these are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are gracious to one another in discussions of halakha. They treat each other with honor and love, as demonstrated in the statements of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. “Binders [ḥovelim]”; these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who injure [shemeḥabbelim] each other in discussions of halakha, i.e., they speak harshly to each other when they disagree.
״וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי אֵלֶּה [שְׁנֵי] בְנֵי הַיִּצְהָר הָעֹמְדִים וְגוֹ׳ וּשְׁנַיִם זֵיתִים עָלֶיהָ״. ״יִצְהָר״ – אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנּוֹחִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה כְּשֶׁמֶן זַיִת. ״וּשְׁנַיִם זֵיתִים עָלֶיהָ״ – אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּבָבֶל, שֶׁמְּרוֹרִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה כְּזַיִת.
Similarly, it is stated: “Then he said to me: These are the two anointed ones, that stand by the Lord of the whole earth” (Zechariah 4:14), and it is stated: “And two olive trees by it, one upon the right side of the bowl, and the other upon its left side” (Zechariah 4:3). With regard to the expression “anointed ones,” Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are pleasant to each other in discussions of halakha like olive oil, which is not bitter. The verse “and two olive trees by it” should be interpreted as follows: These are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to each other in discussions of halakha like an olive.
״וָאֶשָּׂא עֵינַי וָאֵרֶא וְהִנֵּה שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְרוּחַ בְּכַנְפֵיהֶם וְלָהֵנָּה כְנָפַיִם כְּכַנְפֵי הַחֲסִידָה וַתִּשֶּׂאנָה הָאֵיפָה בֵּין הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבֵין הָאָרֶץ. וָאֹמַר אֶל הַמַּלְאָךְ הַדֹּבֵר בִּי אָנָה הֵמָּה מוֹלִכוֹת אֶת הָאֵיפָה. וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי לִבְנוֹת לָה בַיִת בְּאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר״. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי: זוֹ חֲנוּפָּה וְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ שֶׁיָּרְדוּ לְבָבֶל.
The Gemara interprets another verse in Zechariah: “Then I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: To where do they take the measure? And he said to me: To build her a house in the land of Shinar” (Zechariah 5:9–11). Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: This measure refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar.
וְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ לְבָבֶל נְחִית? וְהָאָמַר מָר: עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּין גַּסּוּת יָרְדוּ לְעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה עֵילָם וְאַחַת כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ!
The Gemara asks: And did arrogance descend to Babylonia? But doesn’t the Master say: Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one?
אִין, לְבָבֶל נְחִית, וְאִישְׁתַּרְבּוֹבֵי [הוּא] דְּאִישְׁתַּרְבַּב לְעֵילָם. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״לִבְנוֹת לָה בַיִת בְּאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to Babylonia, and it made its way to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it is written: “To build her a house in the land of Shinar,” which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia.
וְהָאָמַר מָר: סִימָן לְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ – עֲנִיּוּת, וַעֲנִיּוּת לְבָבֶל נְחִית! מַאי עֲנִיּוּת? עֲנִיּוּת תּוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״אָחוֹת לָנוּ קְטַנָּה וְשָׁדַיִם אֵין לָהּ״. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ עֵילָם, שֶׁזָּכְתָה לִלְמוֹד וְלֹא זָכְתָה לְלַמֵּד.
The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty? And poverty descended to Babylonia, not to Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: “We have a little sister, and she has no breasts” (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn Torah but did not merit to teach it. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others.
מַאי בָּבֶל? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּלוּלָה בַּמִּקְרָא, בְּלוּלָה בַּמִּשְׁנָה, בְּלוּלָה בַּתַּלְמוּד. ״בְּמַחֲשַׁכִּים הוֹשִׁיבַנִי כְּמֵתֵי עוֹלָם״ – אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: זֶה תַּלְמוּדָהּ שֶׁל בָּבֶל.
The Gemara asks: What is the homiletic interpretation of the word Babylonia? Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as a tribute to the Jewish community of Babylonia and its Torah scholars: It means mixed with Bible, mixed with Mishna, and mixed with Talmud. Other Sages had a different opinion of the Torah in Babylonia: With regard to the verse: “He has made me dwell in dark places, as those that have been long dead” (Lamentations 3:6), Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is the Talmud of Babylonia, which is not as clear as the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael.
מַתְנִי׳ אָמַר לוֹ: ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אַבָּא״, ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אָבִיךָ״, ״נֶאֱמָנִים עָלַי שְׁלֹשָׁה רוֹעֵי בָּקָר״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.
MISHNA: If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict.
הָיָה חַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״דּוֹר לִי בְּחַיֵּי רֹאשֶׁךָ״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.
Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב דִּימִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כְּגוֹן דְּקַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּחַד.
GEMARA: Rav Dimi, son of Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Yosef, says: The case of a litigant who accepts his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge is referring to where the litigant accepted this relative upon himself as one of the judges in a court of three, where the other two judges are fit. It is not referring to where he accepted him as the sole judge.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״, אֲבָל בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת.
Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the claimant had said to the defendant: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you if my father or your father rules as judge to that effect, and the claimant subsequently wishes to retract his offer. But in a case where it is the defendant who said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge, everyone agrees that he can retract his offer. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ? אוֹ דִילְמָא: בֵּין בָּזוֹ וּבֵין בָּזוֹ מַחְלוֹקֶת?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is the dispute only with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer? Or perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case?
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״, אֲבָל בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, רָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בֵּין בָּזוֹ וּבֵין בָּזוֹ מַחְלוֹקֶת, רָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּמַאן?
Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan too, the dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer; this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with neither Shmuel’s opinion nor Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.
רָבָא טַעְמָא דְנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָאָמַר.
The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava is stating his own explanation of the dispute.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא לְרָבָא: הָיָה חַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״דּוֹר לִי בְּחַיֵּי רֹאשֶׁךָ״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.
Rav Aḥa bar Taḥlifa raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the latter clause in the mishna: With regard to one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, and the latter said to him: Vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer.
מַאי לָאו בְּאוֹתָן הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין וְלֹא מְשַׁלְּמִין, דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ כְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״?
What, is it not referring to those who take an oath and do not pay, i.e., cases where the defendant is obligated to take an oath that the claim against him is false, and he is thereby exempt from paying? Accordingly, it is the claimant who suggests that the defendant take a vow instead, which is the same as saying: If you take a vow, the money I claim you owe is forgiven you.
לָא, בְּאוֹתָן הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין וְנוֹטְלִין, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״.
The Gemara rejects this objection: No, it is referring to those who take an oath and collect a debt. There are cases where it is the claimant who is obligated to take an oath, and he then collects the money that he claims. In a case where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow instead, it is the same as saying: If you take a vow I will give you what you claim.
וְהָא תְּנָא לֵיהּ רֵישָׁא!
The Gemara challenges: But according to Rava’s interpretation, the mishna already taught the halakha in a case where the defendant says: I will give you, in the first clause, where the defendant accepts unfit judges.
תְּנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים, וּתְנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: The mishna taught in the former clause a case where the defendant makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, namely, his father or the father of the claimant; and the mishna taught in the latter clause a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant’s own decision.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תְּנָא תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת אֲחֵרִים – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּמָצֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא גָּמַר וּמַקְנֵי, דְּאָמַר: ״מִי יֵימַר דִּמְזַכֵּי לֵיהּ?״ אֲבָל תּוֹלֶה בְּדַעַת עַצְמוֹ, אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן.
And it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases, since if the mishna taught only the case where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, one might reason that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. This is because he presumably did not resolve to transfer the money if these judges deem him liable, as he must have said to himself: Who will say that the judges will rule in favor of the claimant? But in a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant’s own decision by suggesting that he take a vow, say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that the defendant cannot retract his commitment to pay.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן, אֲבָל בְּהַהִיא אֵימָא מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר. צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if the mishna would teach us only this latter case, where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow, one might reason that specifically in this case the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his offer; but in that former case, where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מַחְלוֹקֶת לִפְנֵי גְּמַר דִּין, אֲבָל לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת.
§ Reish Lakish says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance of unfit judges before the verdict is issued. But after the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that one cannot retract his acceptance, as he has already been deemed liable. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל לִפְנֵי גְּמַר דִּין דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ? אוֹ דִילְמָא: בֵּין בָּזוֹ וּבֵין בָּזוֹ מַחְלוֹקֶת?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is the dispute over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that he can retract his acceptance? Or perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: קִיבֵּל עָלָיו קָרוֹב אוֹ פָּסוּל – לִפְנֵי גְּמַר דִּין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as Rava says: If one accepted a relative upon himself as a judge or witness, or if he accepted one who is disqualified for another reason from serving as a judge or a witness, he can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued. He cannot retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא: לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל לִפְנֵי גְּמַר דִּין דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ – רָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: בֵּין בָּזוֹ בֵּין בָּזוֹ מַחְלוֹקֶת – רָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּמַאן?
Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan too, the dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued everyone agrees that one can retract his acceptance; then this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and according to the opinion of the Rabbis. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with the opinion of neither Reish Lakish nor Rabbi Yoḥanan.
אֶלָּא, לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rather, must we not conclude from Rava’s statement that the dispute is over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from Rava’s statement that this is so.
שְׁלַח לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יַעֲקֹב: יְלַמְּדֵנוּ רַבֵּינוּ, לִפְנֵי גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת אוֹ לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת? וַהֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי מִי? שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: לְאַחַר גְּמַר דִּין מַחְלוֹקֶת, וַהֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.
Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Ḥisda, sent the following question to Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov: Our teacher, instruct us: Does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued, or does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov sent to him in response: The dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָכִי שְׁלַח לֵיהּ, בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ מַחְלוֹקֶת, אוֹ בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ מַחְלוֹקֶת? וַהֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי מִי? שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ מַחְלוֹקֶת, וַהֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.
Rav Ashi says a different version of the question and answer: This is the question that Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Ḥisda, sent to Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov: Is the dispute with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, or is the dispute with regard to a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov sent this response to him: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.
בְּסוּרָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי. בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי, אָמַר רַב חֲנִינָא בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָה: שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ מִבֵּי רַב לִשְׁמוּאֵל, יְלַמְּדֵנוּ רַבֵּינוּ: לִפְנֵי גְּמַר דִּין וְקָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, מַאי? שְׁלַח לְהוּ: אֵין לְאַחַר קִנְיָין כְּלוּם.
In Sura they teach that previous version of the question and the answer. In Pumbedita they teach this following version: Rav Ḥanina bar Shelemya says that they sent the following question from Rav’s study hall to Shmuel: Our teacher, instruct us: In a case where one litigant wishes to retract his acceptance of the judges before the verdict is issued, and the other litigant had performed a formal act of acquisition with him giving legal power to the acceptance, what is the halakha? Shmuel sent them in response: Nothing can be retracted after an act of acquisition was performed.
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַפְּסוּלִין: הַמְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא, וְהַמַּלְוֶה בְּרִיבִּית, וּמַפְרִיחֵי יוֹנִים, וְסוֹחֲרֵי שְׁבִיעִית.
MISHNA: And these on the following list are the ones who are disqualified by the Sages from bearing witness due to their unseemly behavior, as they are considered wicked individuals guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice [bekubbiyya] for money, and one who lends money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: בַּתְּחִילָּה הָיוּ קוֹרִין אוֹתָן אוֹסְפֵי שְׁבִיעִית. מִשֶּׁרַבּוּ הָאַנָּסִין, חָזְרוּ לִקְרוֹתָן סוֹחֲרֵי שְׁבִיעִית.
Rabbi Shimon said: Initially, people would call them: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year. Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, as the Gemara will explain.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אוּמָּנוּת אֶלָּא הוּא, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לָהֶן אוּמָּנוּת שֶׁלֹּא הוּא – כְּשֵׁרִין.
Rabbi Yehuda said: When are the people listed above disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one, although they also make money by these inappropriate means, they are fit to bear witness.
גְּמָ׳ מְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא, מַאי קָא עָבֵיד? אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה אַסְמַכְתָּא, וְאַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא.
GEMARA: With regard to one who plays with dice for money, what is he doing that disqualifies him from bearing witness? Rami bar Ḥama says: He is disqualified because gambling is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], as one who gambles does not have conclusive consent to pay when he loses since he plays under the assumption that he will win. And as an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, the one who wins takes money that is not legally his, and is considered a robber.
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: כֹּל כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא לָאו אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא, אֶלָּא לְפִי שֶׁאֵין עֲסוּקִין בְּיִישּׁוּבוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם.
Rav Sheshet says: Any case like this is not an asmakhta. In a game of dice both sides realize that they might lose, and consent at the outset to pay if that happens. Rather, those who play dice are disqualified because they are not involved in settling the world, i.e., in productive occupations that demand hard work. Since they do not realize the effort required of most people to earn a living they might not be scrupulous about other people’s money, and their testimony cannot be relied upon.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דִּגְמַר אוּמָּנוּתָא אַחֲרִיתִי.
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the explanations of Rami bar Ḥama and Rav Sheshet? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where the dice player learns another occupation, and is involved in that occupation as well. According to Rav Sheshet, since he has a productive occupation he is fit to bear witness. According to Rami bar Ḥama, since he is considered a robber, as the money he gains from gambling is not legally his, he is disqualified.
וּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אוּמָּנוּת אֶלָּא הוּא; אֲבָל יֵשׁ לָהֶן אוּמָּנוּת שֶׁלֹּא הוּא – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּשֵׁרִים. אַלְמָא, טַעְמָא דְמַתְנִיתִין מִשּׁוּם יִישּׁוּבוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם הוּא. קַשְׁיָא לְרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא!
The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama: But we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: When are they disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one they are fit to bear witness. Apparently, the reason that the mishna disqualifies these individuals from bearing witness is that they are not involved in settling the world, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה
And if you would say this is not difficult, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, this would be a problem as well. But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: Any place where Rabbi Yehuda says in the corpus of the Mishna:
