Sanhedrin 48
מְשַׁמְּשִׁין מִמְּשַׁמְּשִׁין גָּמְרִינַן, לְאַפּוֹקֵי עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה דְּהִיא גּוּפַהּ קְדוֹשָׁה.
We derive the halakha governing the accessories relating to a dead person, e.g., a shroud, from the halakha governing the accessories used in idol worship, e.g., the animal sacrificed to the idol. This is to the exclusion of a heifer whose neck is broken, which is itself consecrated for the ceremony taking place in the valley and is not an accessory used in that ceremony.
וְאַבָּיֵי, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא גָּמַר מֵעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה? אָמַר לָךְ: מִידֵּי דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ מִמִּידֵּי דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ גָּמְרִינַן, לְאַפּוֹקֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּלָאו אוֹרְחָא.
The Gemara asks: And Abaye, what is the reason that he did not derive the halakha by way of a verbal analogy from the halakha governing accessories used in idol worship? The Gemara answers: Abaye could have said to you that we learn the halakha governing something that involves a proper way of conduct, i.e., burying the dead, from the halakha governing something that involves a proper way of conduct, i.e., the rite relating to the heifer whose neck is broken, as these are both mitzvot by Torah law. This is to the exclusion of objects of idol worship, which do not involve a proper way of conduct.
סִימָן: כִּפָּה, נַפְשֵׁיהּ, דַּחֲצִיבָא, בְּקִבְרֵיהּ דְּיַתִּיר מֵאֲבֻהּ, בְּכִיסָא דְּאוּמָּנָא.
§ The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the forthcoming series of attempted proofs concerning the dispute between Rava and Abaye: Scarf; monument; that was hewed; pouch; craftsman.
מֵיתִיבִי: כִּפָּה שֶׁהוּא טָמֵא מִדְרָס וּנְתָנַתּוּ לְסֵפֶר – טָהוֹר מִן הַמִּדְרָס, אֲבָל טָמֵא מַגַּע מִדְרָס. אֵימָא: נְתָנַתּוּ וּכְרָכַתּוּ.
The Gemara raises an objection against Rava from a baraita discussing ritual impurity that is contracted by treading: If a scarf is ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, e.g., after a zav sat or lay down upon it, and its owner then designated it as a cover for a Torah scroll, it is pure of the more severe level of ritual impurity, that which is imparted by treading, even without immersion, because it is no longer an object intended to be lied on or sat upon. But it is still impure with the less severe ritual impurity, that which is contracted by touching that which is treaded upon. This indicates that mere designation has halakhic significance and validity. The Gemara rejects this argument: Say that the baraita should read as follows: The owner of the scarf designated it as a cover for a Torah scroll and wrapped it around the scroll, so that there was not only designation, but an action as well.
לְמָה לִי נְתָנַתּוּ וּכְרָכַתּוּ? כִּדְרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַאי סוּדָרָא דְּאַזְמְנֵיהּ לְמֵיצַר בֵּיהּ תְּפִילִּין, וְצַר בֵּיהּ תְּפִילִּין – אָסוּר לְמֵיצַר בֵּיהּ פְּשִׁיטֵי. אַזְמְנֵיהּ וְלָא צַר בֵּיהּ, צַר בֵּיהּ וְלָא אַזְמְנֵיהּ – שְׁרֵי לְמֵיצַר בֵּיהּ פְּשִׁיטֵי.
The Gemara asks: If there was an action, why do I need for the baraita to say that the owner designated it and wrapped it? Wouldn’t wrapping alone have sufficed? The Gemara answers: The baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to this cloth that one designated for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it, if he already bundled phylacteries in it, then it is forbidden to bundle coins in it, as it was designated and used as an accessory of a sacred object. But if he merely designated it for that purpose but did not yet bundle phylacteries in it, or if he bundled phylacteries in it but did not previously designate it for bundling phylacteries, then it is permitted to bundle coins in it. Consequently, in the case of the scarf, it was necessary both to designate it as a cover for the Torah scroll and to actually wrap it around the scroll.
ולְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר: הַזְמָנָה מִילְּתָא הִיא, אַזְמְנֵיהּ – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא צַר בֵּיהּ. צַר בֵּיהּ: אִי אַזְמְנֵיהּ – אִין, אִי לָא אַזְמְנֵיהּ – לָא.
And according to Abaye, who said that designation is a significant matter, the halakha is as follows: If he designated the cloth for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it, even if he did not bundle phylacteries in it, it is prohibited to bundle money in it. In a case where he already bundled phylacteries in it, if he designated the cloth for bundling phylacteries, yes, it is prohibited to bundle money in it; but if he did not designate it for bundling phylacteries, bundling money in the cloth is not prohibited.
תָּא שְׁמַע: נֶפֶשׁ שֶׁבְּנָאוֹ לְשֵׁם חַי – מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה. הוֹסִיף בּוֹ דִּימוֹס אֶחָד לְשֵׁם מֵת – אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? דִּרְמָא בֵּיהּ מֵת.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof against Rava: With regard to a monument that was built as a memorial for the sake of an individual while he was still alive, one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as it is like any other construction; but if even a single row of stones was added to it for the sake of a corpse, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it, apparently even before the deceased is buried there. This seems to indicate that mere designation is a significant matter. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the corpse was placed under the monument, so that it became forbidden not through mere designation, but by way of an action.
אִי הָכִי, מַאי אִירְיָא הוֹסִיף? כִּי לֹא הוֹסִיף נָמֵי! לָא צְרִיכָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּפַנְּיֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: If so, why does the baraita specifically mention that a row of stones was added? If the deceased was buried under the monument, one should be prohibited from deriving benefit from it even when a row of stones was not added, as the entire monument has been used for the dead. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary for the baraita to state that a row of stones was added in order to teach us that even if the corpse was later removed from the grave, the monument remains forbidden since it had been designated for a corpse.
אָמַר רַפְרָם בַּר פָּפָּא אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אִם הָיָה מַכִּירוֹ, חוֹלְצוֹ וּמוּתָּר.
Rafram bar Pappa says that Rav Ḥisda says: If the corpse was later removed from the grave and one recognizes the row of stones that had been added to the monument in the dead man’s honor, he may remove that row of stones, and it is permitted to derive benefit from the rest of the construction.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַחוֹצֵב קֶבֶר לְאָבִיו, וְהָלַךְ וּקְבָרוֹ בְּקֶבֶר אַחֵר – הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִקָּבֵר בּוֹ עוֹלָמִית. הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹד אָבִיו.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear yet another proof against Rava from a baraita: If one hewed a grave for his deceased father in one place, and then went and buried him in a different place, the son may never be buried in the grave that he had dug. This indicates that mere designation is a significant matter. The Gemara answers: There, the son may not be buried in the grave that he had dug because that would detract from the honor that he must show his father, not because the designation is significant with regard to the status of a grave in general.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, אַף הַחוֹצֵב אֲבָנִים לְאָבִיו וְהָלַךְ וּקְבָרוֹ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר – הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִקָּבֵר בָּהֶן עוֹלָמִית.
The Gemara comments: So, too, it is reasonable that the son may not be buried in the grave that he had dug only because of the honor due to his father, as the latter clause of the same baraita teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if one hewed stones for his father’s grave and then went and buried him in a different place, the son himself may never be buried in a tomb constructed from those stones.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹד אָבִיו – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשּׁוּם הַזְמָנָה: טְוִוי לַאֲרִיגָה מִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר?
The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the son may not be buried in the grave that he dug for his father because of the honor that must be shown his father, it is well understood why he can also not be buried in tomb constructed from stones that he hewed for his father’s grave. But if you say that it is because of designation, the son should be permitted to be buried in such a tomb, as is there anyone who says that spinning yarn in order to weave it into cloth for shrouds is regarded as designating an item for a dead person, resulting in a prohibition against deriving benefit from the yarn? In such a case there is certainly no prohibition, and the case of hewing stones for a tomb is analogous to a case of spinning yarn in order to weave it into cloth.
תָּא שְׁמַע: קֶבֶר חָדָשׁ מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה. הֵטִיל בּוֹ נֵפֶל – אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. הֵטִיל – אִין, לֹא הֵטִיל – לָא.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof in support of Rava from a baraita: With regard to a fresh grave that was not designated for a particular individual, one is permitted to derive benefit from it. But if even a non-viable newborn that died was cast into it, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave. It may be inferred from here that if a non-viable newborn was cast into the grave, yes, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, but if it was not cast into the grave, one is not prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, indicating that mere designation is insignificant.
הוּא הַדִּין דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא הֵטִיל, וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּאָמַר: אֵין לִנְפָלִים תְּפִיסַת הַקֶּבֶר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara rejects this inference: The same is true even if a non-viable newborn was not cast into the grave; one is still prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, merely by virtue of the designation. Why, then, does the baraita say that a non-viable newborn was cast into the grave? This serves to exclude the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says: A non-viable newborn does not take possession of its grave to render it forbidden even once it is buried there. To counter this opinion, the baraita teaches us that this opinion is not accepted, and a non-viable newborn is treated like any other corpse.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מוֹתַר הַמֵּתִים – לְמֵתִים, מוֹתַר הַמֵּת – לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? שֶׁגָּבוּ מֵחַיִּים.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof in support of Rava’s opinion from a mishna (Shekalim 2:5): The money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. The money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. Evidently, money that had been designated for the sake of a dead person but was not actually used for burying him does not become forbidden, and his heirs may use it. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with money that had been collected for the deceased during his lifetime. It was thought that a certain individual was soon to die, and money was collected to cover the costs of his burial. Since at the time the money was collected the person was alive, the money had not been designated for the sake of a dead person. Therefore, one is permitted to derive benefit from it, and it is given to the heirs of the deceased.
הָא לָא תָּנֵי הָכִי, דִּתְנַן: מוֹתַר הַמֵּתִים – לְמֵתִים, מוֹתַר הַמֵּת – לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: כֵּיצַד? גָּבוּ לְמֵתִים סְתָם – זֶהוּ מוֹתַר הַמֵּתִים לְמֵתִים, גָּבוּ לְמֵת זֶה – זֶהוּ מוֹתַר הַמֵּת לְיוֹרְשָׁיו.
The Gemara raises an objection: But we were not taught this, as we learned in the mishna: The money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. The money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. And it is taught with regard to this mishna in a baraita: How so? If they collected money for the purpose of burying the dead without specification, this is the case about which they said that the money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. But if they collected money for the sake of this particular dead person, this is the case about which they said that the money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. This indicates that the mishna is discussing a case where the money was designated for one who had already died.
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, לֹא יִגַּע בָּהֶן עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: יַעֲשֶׂנּוּ דִּימוֹס עַל קִבְרוֹ אוֹ זִילּוּף לִפְנֵי מִטָּתוֹ.
The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna, which appears to support the opinion of Abaye: Rabbi Meir says: If money was left over from the sum collected for the burial of a particular dead person, the money may not be touched until Elijah comes and resolves the uncertainty as to whether or not the money is forbidden. Rabbi Natan says: The leftover money shall be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier as he is brought for burial. This indicates that there are certain tanna’im who maintain that mere designation is in fact significant.
אֶלָּא, אַבָּיֵי מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ וְרָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הַזְמָנָה מִילְּתָא הִיא. תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: דַּחֲזֵי לֵיהּ – תָּפֵיס, דְּלָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ – לָא תָּפֵיס.
Rather, Abaye can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning, and Rava, too, can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning. The Gemara explains: Abaye can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning, as follows: According to everyone, i.e., the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan, mere designation is a significant matter. The first tanna holds that the sum that it is fitting to spend for the burial of the particular dead person is encompassed by the prohibition, and the sum that it is not fitting to spend is not encompassed by the prohibition. Therefore, whatever money is not required for his burial is given to his heirs, as it was never included in the prohibition.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ, אִי תָּפֵיס אִי לָא תָּפֵיס. הִלְכָּךְ, לֹא יִגַּע בָּהֶן עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ. וְרַבִּי נָתָן פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּוַדַּאי תָּפֵיס, הִלְכָּךְ יֵעָשֶׂה דִּימוֹס עַל קִבְרוֹ.
And Rabbi Meir is uncertain as to whether the sum that it is not fitting to spend for his burial is encompassed by the prohibition or is not encompassed by the prohibition. Therefore, the leftover money may not be touched until Elijah comes and clarifies the matter. And it is obvious to Rabbi Natan that all of the money collected is certainly encompassed by the prohibition, including the money that it is not fitting to spend for the deceased’s burial. Therefore, whatever money is left over should be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier.
וְרָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ: לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הַזְמָנָה לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא. תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כִּי בָּזוּ לֵיהּ, אַחוֹלֵי מַחֵיל זִילוּתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי יוֹרְשִׁין.
And Rava, too, can explain the mishna according to his line of reasoning, as follows: According to everyone, i.e., the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan, mere designation is nothing, and so the money collected for the burial of a particular dead person does not become forbidden. And the disagreement is about an entirely different manner. The first tanna holds that even though the heirs of the deceased disgraced him by collecting money for his burial, the deceased still forgoes his disgrace for the benefit of his heirs, and therefore the leftover money is given to them.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי מַחֵיל אִי לָא מַחֵיל, הִלְכָּךְ לֹא יִגַּע בָּהֶן כּוּ׳. וְרַבִּי נָתָן פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ דְּלָא מַחֵיל, הִלְכָּךְ יֵעָשֶׂה דִּימוֹס עַל קִבְרוֹ אוֹ זִילּוּף לִפְנֵי מִטָּתוֹ.
And Rabbi Meir is uncertain as to whether the deceased forgoes his disgrace or does not forgo it. Therefore, the leftover money may not be touched until Elijah comes and clarifies the issue. And it is obvious to Rabbi Natan that the deceased does not forgo his disgrace. Therefore, whatever money is left over should be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased, or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיוּ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מְזָרְקִין בּוֹ כֵּלִים, מִצְוָה עַל הָאֲחֵרִים לְהַצִּילָן.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof in support of Rava’s opinion from a baraita: If the father and the mother of the deceased were throwing garments onto their late son’s bier so that they would be buried along with him, it is a mitzva for the others present to save those garments from being lost. This indicates that mere designation is insignificant, as were it significant, one would be prohibited to derive benefit from the garments as soon as the parents cast them onto the bier.
הָתָם מִשּׁוּם מְרָרַיְיהוּ. אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁלֹּא נָגְעוּ בַּמִּטָּה, אֲבָל נָגְעוּ בַּמִּטָּה – אֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara rejects this proof: There, the parents threw the garments onto their son’s bier because of their bitterness over his death, but they did not really mean to designate the garments to be buried with him. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, how can one understand that which is taught with regard to this baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? It is stated with regard to a case where the garments did not yet touch the bier before they were saved. But if they already touched the bier, they are forbidden. If no importance is ascribed to what is done out of bitterness, why should the garments that touched the bier be forbidden?
תַּרְגְּמַהּ עוּלָּא: בְּמִטָּה הַנִּקְבֶּרֶת עִמּוֹ, דְּמִחַלְּפִי בְּתַכְרִיכִי הַמֵּת.
Ulla interpreted the baraita as referring to a case where the garments were thrown onto a bier that was to be buried together with the son, and it is possible that those garments might be mistaken for shrouds of the deceased. The Sages decreed that it is prohibited to derive benefit from such garments, lest people mistakenly think that just as they are permitted, so too, actual shrouds are permitted. There is no proof from here that mere designation is significant and that articles designated for the dead are permanently forbidden.
תָּא שְׁמַע: כִּיס שֶׁעֲשָׂאוֹ לְהַנִּיחַ בּוֹ תְּפִילִּין – אָסוּר לְהַנִּיחַ בּוֹ מָעוֹת. הִנִּיחַ בּוֹ תְּפִילִּין – יַנִּיחַ בּוֹ מָעוֹת. אֵימָא: עֲשָׂאוֹ וְהִנִּיחַ בּוֹ תְּפִילִּין – אָסוּר לְהַנִּיחַ בּוֹ מָעוֹת, כִּדְרַב חִסְדָּא.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof in support of Abaye’s opinion from a baraita: If one fashioned a pouch in which to put phylacteries, it is prohibited to put money in it. If he put phylacteries in it, but he did not designate it beforehand for that purpose, he may still put money in it. The ruling of the first clause indicates that designation is significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that the baraita should be understood as follows: If one fashioned a pouch for phylacteries and then put the phylacteries in it, it is prohibited to put money in it. This is in accordance with the ruling of Rav Ḥisda, that if one designated a cloth for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it and then he wrapped the phylacteries in it, he may no longer use the cloth to hold money.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אָמַר לְאוּמָּן ״עֲשֵׂה לִי תִּיק שֶׁל סֵפֶר״ אוֹ ״נַרְתִּיק שֶׁל תְּפִילִּין״ – עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן קוֹדֶשׁ, מוּתָּר לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן חוֹל. נִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן קוֹדֶשׁ – אָסוּר לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן חוֹל.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another baraita that supports the opinion of Rava: If one said to a craftsman: Fashion me a case [tik] for a Torah scroll, or: Fashion for me a bag [nartik] for phylacteries, as long as he has not yet used them for a sacred purpose, it is permitted for him to use them for a mundane purpose. But if he already used them for a sacred purpose, it is prohibited for him to use them for a mundane purpose. This indicates that mere designation is nothing until the item is actually used for the purpose for which it had been designated.
תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: צִיפָּן זָהָב אוֹ שֶׁטָּלָה עֲלֵיהֶן עוֹר שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה – פְּסוּלוֹת. עוֹר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – כְּשֵׁירוֹת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא עִיבְּדָן לִשְׁמָן. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף עוֹר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה פְּסוּלוֹת, עַד שֶׁיְּעַבְּדוֹ לִשְׁמָן.
The Gemara explains: The matter of whether or not mere designation is significant is a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If one took phylacteries and coated them with gold or patched them with the hide of a non-kosher animal, they are unfit. But if one patched them with the hide of a kosher animal then they are fit, and this is so even though he did not prepare them, i.e., the hides, for their sake, i.e., for the sake of their use in a mitzva. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he patched them with the hide of a kosher animal they are unfit, and they remain unfit until he prepares them for their sake. Preparing the hide for the sake of the mitzva is analogous to designating it for that purpose. The first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who disagree as to whether the hide must be prepared for the sake of the mitzva, differ as to whether designation is significant.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: מִי אִיכָּא דּוּכְתָּא דְּרָמוּ בֵּיהּ מֵת, וְאָרְגִי בֶּגֶד לַמֵּת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, כְּגוֹן שָׁכְבֵי דְּהַרְפַּנְיָא.
In connection with what was stated previously, that the amora’im disagree whether one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a garment woven for the sake of a dead person, Ravina said to Rava: Is there really such a place where the deceased is first placed on a bier and only afterward do they begin to weave a garment for the deceased? Rava said to Ravina: Yes, this is practiced on behalf of, for example, the dead of Harpanya, where the people are so poor that they cannot prepare shrouds for themselves during their lifetimes.
דְּרַשׁ מָרִימָר: הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, וְרַבָּנַן אָמְרִי: הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא.
Mareimar taught that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye that mere designation is significant. And the Rabbis say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that mere designation is nothing. The Gemara concludes that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that mere designation is nothing.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הֲרוּגֵי מַלְכוּת – נִכְסֵיהֶן לַמֶּלֶךְ, הֲרוּגֵי בֵּית דִּין – נִכְסֵיהֶן לַיּוֹרְשִׁין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף הֲרוּגֵי מַלְכוּת נִכְסֵיהֶן לַיּוֹרְשִׁין. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״הִנֵּה בְּכֶרֶם נָבוֹת אֲשֶׁר יָרַד שָׁם לְרִשְׁתּוֹ״?
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to those executed by a Jewish king for crimes that they committed against him, their property belongs to the king. As for those executed by the court for a capital transgression, their property belongs to their heirs. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even with regard to those executed by a Jewish king, their property belongs to their heirs. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But isn’t it already stated: “Arise, go down to meet Ahab, king of Israel, who is in Samaria; behold he is in the vineyard of Naboth, where he is gone down there to inherit it” (I Kings 21:18)? The wording of the verse indicates that Ahab went down there by right, proving that the property of those executed by the king legally belongs to the king.
אָמַר לָהֶן: בֶּן אֲחִי אָבִיו הָיָה, וְרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ הָיָה. וַהֲלֹא הַרְבֵּה בָּנִים הָיוּ לוֹ? אָמַר לָהֶן: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בָּנָיו הָרַג, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם לֹא אֶת דְּמֵי נָבוֹת וְאֶת דְּמֵי בָנָיו רָאִיתִי״. וְרַבָּנַן? הַהוּא בָּנִים הָרְאוּיִין לָצֵאת מִמֶּנּוּ.
Rabbi Yehuda said to them: Ahab was Naboth’s cousin, the son of his paternal uncle, and therefore he was fit to inherit from him. Accordingly, he took possession of the property in his capacity as an heir, and not as the king. They said to him: But Naboth had many sons. Why, then, did they not inherit from him? Rabbi Yehuda said to them: Ahab executed Naboth and also his sons, as it is stated: “I have seen yesterday the blood of Naboth and the blood of his sons” (II Kings 9:26). The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis counter this claim? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that verse is referring to the sons who would have issued from him had Naboth not been executed. Ahab was held accountable for the blood of Naboth and for the blood of his unborn children.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נִכְסֵיהֶן לַמֶּלֶךְ, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב ״בֵּרַךְ נָבוֹת אֱלֹהִים וָמֶלֶךְ״. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נִכְסֵיהֶן לַיּוֹרְשִׁין, לְמָה לִי ״וָמֶלֶךְ״?
The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to the king, that is the reason that it is written that Jezebel arranged for witnesses to falsely testify that “Naboth cursed God and the king” (I Kings 21:13). Since Naboth cursed the king, Ahab could execute him and seize his property. But according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to their heirs, why do I need the testimony that Naboth cursed the king? It would have sufficed for the witnesses to testify that he cursed God, in which case he would have been executed by the court, and Ahab would have taken possession of the vineyard as his heir.
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, אֱלֹהִים לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא לְאַפּוֹשֵׁי רִיתְחָא. הָכִי נָמֵי, לְאַפּוֹשֵׁי רִיתְחָא.
The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, that the witnesses testified that Naboth cursed the king so that Ahab could execute him and seize his property, why do I need the additional testimony that Naboth cursed God? Rather, you must say that the witnesses were instructed to testify that Naboth cursed both God and the king in order to increase the anger of the judges by accusing him of a second offense. So too, it can be argued that according to Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning, the witnesses testified that Naboth also cursed the king in order to increase the anger of the judges. No proof can be brought from here that the property of those executed by the king belongs to the king.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: ״נִכְסֵיהֶן לַמֶּלֶךְ״, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיָּנׇס יוֹאָב אֶל אֹהֶל ה׳ וַיַּחֲזֵק בְּקַרְנוֹת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ״, וּכְתִיב: ״וַיֹּאמֶר לֹא אֵצֵא כִּי פֹּה אָמוּת״. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: ״נִכְסֵיהֶן לַיּוֹרְשִׁין״, מַאי נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִינַּהּ? לְחַיֵּי שָׁעָה.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: Granted, according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to the king, that is the reason that it is written: “And Joab fled to the tent of the Lord and caught hold of the horns of the altar” (I Kings 2:28), describing Joab’s actions after it became known that he supported Adonijah, and furthermore it is written: “And he said, I will not leave, for here I will die” (I Kings 2:30). Joab did not want to be put to death by the king because he did not want his property to pass into the king’s possession. But according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to their heirs, what difference did taking refuge in the Sanctuary make to him? The Gemara answers: Joab fled to the sanctuary in order to live a short while longer. Consequently, there is no proof from here to either side of the dispute.
״וַיָּשֶׁב בְּנָיָהוּ אֶת הַמֶּלֶךְ דָּבָר לֵאמֹר כֹּה דִבֶּר יוֹאָב וְכֹה עָנָנִי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל אֵימָא לֵיהּ: תַּרְתֵּי לָא תַּעֲבֵיד בְּהַאי גַּבְרָא. אִי קָטְלַתְּ לֵיהּ, קַבֵּול לָטוּתֵיהּ דְּלַטְיֵיהּ אֲבוּךְ. וְאִי לָא, שִׁבְקֵיהּ דְּלֵיקוּ בְּלָטוּתֵיהּ דְּלַטְיֵיהּ אֲבוּךְ. ״וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ הַמֶּלֶךְ עֲשֵׂה כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר וּפְגַע בּוֹ וּקְבַרְתּוֹ״.
§ The Gemara continues to discuss the incident involving Joab. After Joab took refuge in the Sanctuary and King Solomon sent Benaiah, son of Jehoiada, to fall upon him, Benaiah ordered Joab to leave the sanctuary, whereupon Joab refused. The verse then states: “And Benaiah brought the king word back, saying: So said Joab, and so he answered me” (I Kings 2:30). The Gemara explains: Joab said to him: Go and say to Solomon: You cannot perform two actions to this man, i.e., to me, Joab. If you kill him, i.e., me, you and your descendants will receive the curses with which your father cursed me. And if you do not wish to receive those curses, let him go so that he may receive the curses with which your father cursed him. And the next verse states: “And the king said to him: Do as he has said, and fall upon him, and bury him.” Solomon thereby accepted his father’s curses upon himself and his descendants.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: כׇּל קְלָלוֹת שֶׁקִּילֵּל דָּוִד אֶת יוֹאָב נִתְקַיְּימוּ בְּזַרְעוֹ שֶׁל דָּוִד. ״אַל יִכָּרֵת מִבֵּית יוֹאָב זָב וּמְצֹרָע וּמַחֲזִיק בַּפֶּלֶךְ וְנֹפֵל בַּחֶרֶב וַחֲסַר לָחֶם״.
Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: All the curses with which David cursed Joab were ultimately fulfilled in David’s descendants, due to the curse that Solomon accepted upon himself. David cursed Joab: “Let the house of Joab never lack such as are afflicted with a discharge, or a leper, or that hold onto a staff, or fall by the sword, or lack bread” (II Samuel 3:29).
״זָב״ – מֵרְחַבְעָם, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהַמֶּלֶךְ רְחַבְעָם הִתְאַמֵּץ לַעֲלוֹת בַּמֶּרְכָּבָה לָנוּס יְרוּשָׁלִָים״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְכׇל הַמֶּרְכָּב אֲשֶׁר יִרְכַּב עָלָיו הַזָּב יִטְמָא״.
The Gemara clarifies: The curse of being afflicted “with a discharge,” i.e., a zav, was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Rehoboam, as it is written: “And King Rehoboam made speed to get him up to his chariot [bamerkava] to flee to Jerusalem” (I Kings 12:18), and it is written: “And whatever saddle [hamerkav] he that has a discharge rides upon shall be unclean” (Leviticus 15:9). The similarity between the words merkava and merkav indicates that Rehoboam was a zav.
״מְצוֹרָע״ – מֵעוּזִּיָּהוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וּבְחֶזְקָתוֹ גָּבַהּ לִבּוֹ עַד לְהַשְׁחִית וַיִּמְעַל בַּה׳ אֱלֹהָיו וַיָּבֹא אֶל הֵיכַל ה׳ לְהַקְטִיר עַל מִזְבַּח הַקְּטֹרֶת״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְהַצָּרַעַת זָרְחָה בְמִצְחוֹ״.
The curse of “a leper” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Uzziah, as it is written: “But when he was strong, his heart was lifted up to his destruction; for he transgressed against the Lord his God, and went into the Temple of the Lord to burn incense upon the altar of incense” (II Chronicles 26:16). And it is also written: “And leprosy broke out on his forehead” (II Chronicles 26:19).
״מַחֲזִיק בְּפֶלֶךְ״ – מֵאָסָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״רַק לְעֵת זִקְנָתוֹ חָלָה אֶת רַגְלָיו.״ וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ פּוֹדַגְרָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן לְרַב נַחְמָן: הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּמַחַט בִּבְשַׂר הַחַי. מְנָא יָדַע? אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: מֵיחַשׁ הֲוָה חָיֵישׁ בֵּיהּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מֵרַבֵּיהּ הֲוָה גְּמִיר לַהּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: ״סוֹד ה׳ לִירֵאָיו וּבְרִיתוֹ לְהוֹדִיעָם״.
The curse of those who “hold onto a staff” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Asa, as it is written concerning him: “But in the time of his old age, he was diseased in his feet” (I Kings 15:23). And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This means that he was seized with gout [podagra]. Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said to Rav Naḥman: What are the circumstances and symptoms of this disease? Rav Naḥman said to him: The pain is similar to the pain of a needle piercing live flesh. The Gemara asks: How did Rav Naḥman know what gout is like? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that he himself suffered from the disease. And if you wish, say that he learned it as a tradition from his teacher. And if you wish, say that he knew this through divine inspiration, as the verse states: “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him; and He will show to them His covenant” (Psalms 25:14).
״נוֹפֵל בַּחֶרֶב״ – מִיֹּאשִׁיָּהוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיֹּרוּ הַמּוֹרִים לַמֶּלֶךְ יֹאשִׁיָּהוּ״. וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: שֶׁעָשׂוּ כׇּל גּוּפוֹ כִּכְבָרָה.
The curse of those who “fall by the sword” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Josiah, as it is written: “And the archers shot at King Josiah” (II Chronicles 35:23), and Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They shot him with so many arrows that they turned his whole body into a sieve.
״וַחֲסַר לֶחֶם״ – מִיכׇנְיָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַאֲרֻחָתוֹ אֲרֻחַת תָּמִיד נִתְּנָה לוֹ״. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הַיְינוּ דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי:
The curse of those who “lack bread” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Jeconiah, as it is written concerning him: “And as for his food allowance, there was a continual food allowance given him by the king, a daily portion for every day, all the days of his life” (II Kings 25:30). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This explains the adage that people say:
