Sanhedrin 60
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Sanhedrin
Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father and greatest chevruta, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v’Chana, on his first yahrzeit.
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Sanhedrin
Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father and greatest chevruta, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v’Chana, on his first yahrzeit.
Sanhedrin 60
״מְכַשֵּׁפָה לֹא תְחַיֶּה״, וּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל שֹׁכֵב עִם בְּהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָת״. כֹּל שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בִּכְלַל ״כׇּל שֹׁכֵב עִם בְּהֵמָה״ – יֶשְׁנוֹ בִּכְלַל ״מְכַשֵּׁפָה לֹא תְחַיֶּה״.
“You shall not allow a witch to live” (Exodus 22:17), and it is written in the following verse: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). It is derived from here that anyone who is included in the prohibition of: “Whoever lies with an animal,” including gentiles, is included in the command: “You shall not allow a witch to live.”
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף עַל הַכִּלְאַיִם. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אֵת חֻקֹּתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״ – חוּקִּים שֶׁחָקַקְתִּי לְךָ כְּבָר: ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם״.
The baraita teaches that Rabbi Elazar says that descendants of Noah were also commanded about the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: They are derived from that which the verse states: “My statutes you shall keep. You shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). God is saying: Keep the statutes that I have already instituted for you, i.e., mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, namely, “you shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed.”
מָה בְּהֶמְתְּךָ בְּהַרְבָּעָה, אַף שָׂדְךָ בְּהַרְכָּבָה. מָה בְּהֶמְתְּךָ בֵּין בָּאָרֶץ בֵּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, אַף שָׂדְךָ בֵּין בָּאָרֶץ בֵּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ.
The Gemara derives the details of this prohibition from the verse: Just as the Noahide prohibition concerning your animal applies with regard to breeding animals of different species, and not with regard to plowing with animals of two different species working together, which is prohibited only for Jews, so too, the Noahide prohibition in your field applies with regard to grafting one species onto another, which is equivalent to breeding, but it is not prohibited for gentiles to sow different seeds together. Furthermore, just as the Noahide prohibition against breeding your animal applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael, so too, the Noahide prohibition against grafting diverse kinds in your field applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה: ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי וְאֶת מִשְׁפָּטַי״ – חֻקִּים שֶׁחָקַקְתִּי לְךָ כְּבָר?
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the term “My statutes” is understood as referring to mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, then the verse: “You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances” (Leviticus 18:5), referring to the entire Torah, should also obligate the descendants of Noah, as it would be referring to: Statutes that I have already instituted for you.
הָתָם – ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי״ דְּהַשְׁתָּא. הָכָא – ״אֶת חֻקֹּתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״, חֻקִּים דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא תִּשְׁמֹרוּ.
The Gemara answers: There the verse states: “You shall therefore keep My statutes,” indicating only those statutes that I am giving you now, whereas here, in the verse concerning diverse kinds, the wording is “My statutes you shall keep,” meaning statutes that obligate you from the outset you shall keep in the future.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה כּוּ׳.
§ After clarifying the halakhot of the descendants of Noah, the Gemara returns to the halakhot stated in the mishna with regard to one who blasphemes. It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said that during a blasphemer’s trial, the judges ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, they would use the sentence: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, like the Tetragrammaton.
אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּבָרֵךְ שֵׁם בֶּן אַרְבַּע אוֹתִיּוֹת, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בֶּן שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת דְּלָא.
Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: The blasphemer is not liable unless he blesses, i.e., curses, the Tetragrammaton, the four-letter name of God, which is to the exclusion of one who curses the two-letter name of God, spelled yod heh, who is not liable.
פְּשִׁיטָא! ״יַכֶּה יוֹסִי אֶת יוֹסִי״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִילְּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּנָקֵט, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei, which indicates a four-letter name. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example but does not intend that the witnesses use the four-letter name in particular, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable only for cursing the Tetragrammaton.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שֵׁם בֶּן אַרְבַּע אוֹתִיּוֹת נָמֵי שֵׁם הוּא.
There are those who say that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says as follows: Conclude from the mishna that the Tetragrammaton is also a name for which one is liable, and he is liable not only for cursing the forty-two-letter name of God.
פְּשִׁיטָא! ״יַכֶּה יוֹסִי אֶת יוֹסִי״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: עַד דְּאִיכָּא שֵׁם רַבָּה, וּמִילְּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּנָקֵט – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that one is not liable unless there is a grand name that he curses, i.e., the forty-two-letter name, and the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable even for cursing the Tetragrammaton, and the name Yosei is mentioned specifically.
נִגְמַר הַדִּין כּוּ׳.
§ The mishna teaches: When the judgment is over, and judges need to hear the exact wording of the curse so they can sentence the defendant, the eldest of the witnesses repeats the curse, and the judges rise and make a tear in their clothing.
עוֹמְדִין – מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַמֵּי: דְּאָמַר קְרָא, ״וְאֵהוּד בָּא אֵלָיו וְהוּא יֹשֵׁב בַּעֲלִיַּת הַמְּקֵרָה אֲשֶׁר לוֹ לְבַדּוֹ וַיֹּאמֶר אֵהוּד דְּבַר אֱלֹהִים לִי אֵלֶיךָ וַיָּקׇם מֵעַל הַכִּסֵּא״. וַהֲלֹא דְּבָרִים קַל וָחוֹמֶר? וּמָה עֶגְלוֹן מֶלֶךְ מוֹאָב שֶׁהוּא גּוֹי וְלֹא יָדַע אֶלָּא בְּכִינּוּי – עָמַד, יִשְׂרָאֵל וְשֵׁם הַמְפוֹרָשׁ – עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה!
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the judges must stand? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ami says: It is derived from that which the verse states about Eglon: “And Ehud came to him, and he was sitting by himself alone in his cool upper chamber. And Ehud said: I have a message from God [Elohim] to you. And he arose out of his seat” (Judges 3:20). And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? And if Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew the name of God only by an appellation, stood in honor, all the more so must a Jew stand if he hears the ineffable name.
קוֹרְעִין – מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיָּבֹא אֶלְיָקִים בֶּן חִלְקִיָּהוּ [וְגוֹ׳] וְשֶׁבְנָא הַסֹּפֵר וְיוֹאָח בֶּן אָסָף הַמַּזְכִּיר אֶל חִזְקִיָּהוּ קְרוּעֵי בְגָדִים וַיַּגִּידוּ לוֹ אֵת דִּבְרֵי רַבְשָׁקֵה״.
The mishna teaches that upon hearing the curse the judges each make a tear in their garments. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that it is derived from that which is written: “Then came Eliakim, son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, and Shebna the scribe, and Joah, son of Asaph, the recorder, to Hezekiah with torn garments, and they told him Rabshakeh’s statement” (II Kings 18:37). Apparently, since they heard the blasphemous statement of Rabshakeh they were obligated to make a tear in their garments.
וְלֹא מְאַחִין – מְנָלַן?
It is furthermore stated that the judges do not ever fully stitch the tear together again. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this?
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: אָתְיָא קְרִיעָה קְרִיעָה, כְּתִיב הָכָא ״קְרוּעֵי בְגָדִים״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם ״וֶאֱלִישָׁע רֹאֶה וְהוּא מְצַעֵק אָבִי אָבִי רֶכֶב יִשְׂרָאֵל וּפָרָשָׁיו וְלֹא רָאָהוּ עוֹד וַיַּחֲזֵק בִּבְגָדָיו וַיִּקְרָעֵם לִשְׁנַיִם קְרָעִים״. מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וַיִּקְרָעֵם לִשְׁנַיִם״, אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהֵן קְרָעִים? וּמָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״קְרָעִים״? מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהֵן קְרוּעִים לְעוֹלָם.
Rabbi Abbahu says: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the tearing stated in this regard and the tearing stated with regard to Elijah’s ascendance to heaven. It is written here, with regard to those who heard Rabshakeh’s blasphemy: “With torn garments,” and it is written there: “And Elisha saw it, and he cried: My father, my father, the chariots of Israel and its horsemen. And he saw him no more, and he grabbed hold of his clothes and tore them into two pieces” (II Kings 2:12). From the meaning of that which is stated: “And tore them into two,” do I not know that they are pieces? And why must the verse state: “Pieces”? This teaches that they remain torn forever; they may never be fully stitched back together, but only partially sewn.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ, וְאֶחָד שׁוֹמֵעַ מִפִּי שׁוֹמֵעַ – חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ. וְהָעֵדִים אֵין חַיָּיבִין לִקְרוֹעַ, שֶׁכְּבָר קָרְעוּ בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁשָּׁמְעוּ.
The Sages taught: Both one who hears the curse himself and one who hears it from the one who heard it are obligated to make a tear in their garments. But the witnesses are not obligated to make a tear when they testify, as they already made a tear when they heard it from the blasphemer himself.
וְכִי קָרְעוּ בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁשָּׁמְעוּ, מַאי הָוֵי? הָא קָא שָׁמְעִי הַשְׁתָּא! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיְהִי כִּשְׁמֹעַ הַמֶּלֶךְ חִזְקִיָּהוּ אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבְשָׁקֵה וַיִּקְרַע אֶת בְּגָדָיו״. הַמֶּלֶךְ חִזְקִיָּהוּ קָרַע, וְהֵם לֹא קָרְעוּ.
The Gemara asks: And if they made a tear when they heard the curse, what of it? Aren’t they also hearing the curse now? The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that they are obligated to make a tear a second time, as it is written: “And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard the statement of Rabshakeh, that he tore his clothes” (II Kings 19:1). It can be inferred that King Hezekiah tore his clothes, but those who reported the blasphemy did not tear their clothes a second time.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אַזְכָּרָה מִפִּי הַגּוֹי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ. וְאִם תֹּאמַר: רַבְשָׁקֵה – יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר הָיָה.
§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous manner from a gentile is not obligated to make a tear in his garments. And if you object and say that those who heard the blasphemy of Rabshakeh made a tear even though he was a gentile, that is not correct, as Rabshakeh was an apostate Jew.
וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין קוֹרְעִין אֶלָּא עַל שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד בִּלְבַד, לְאַפּוֹקֵי כִּינּוּי דְּלָא.
And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One makes a tear only for hearing a curse of the ineffable name of God, to the exclusion of hearing a curse of an appellation for the name of God, for which one does not make a tear.
וּפְלִיגִי דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אַזְכָּרָה בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ, שֶׁאִם אִי אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן – נִתְמַלֵּא כׇּל הַבֶּגֶד קְרָעִים.
The Gemara notes: And Shmuel disagrees with Rav Ḥiyya with regard to two matters. As Rabbi Ḥiyya says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous context nowadays is not obligated to make a tear, as if you do not say so, the entire garment will be full of tears.
מִמַּאן? אִילֵימָא מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, מִי פְּקִירִי כּוּלֵּי הַאי? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, מִגּוֹי. וְאִי שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד, מִי גְּמִירִי? אֶלָּא לָאו, בְּכִינּוּי.
The Gemara clarifies: From whom does one hear these mentions of God’s name about which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that one’s entire garment would be full of tears? If we say that he hears from it a Jew, are Jews irreverent to such an extent that they demean the name of God? Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Ḥiyya is referring to hearing it from a gentile. And if you say that the reference is to cursing the ineffable name, have the gentiles learned it? They have no knowledge of his name. Rather, is it not referring to cursing by an appellation of God’s name?
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה הוּא דְּלָא, הָא מֵעִיקָּרָא – חַיָּיב. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
And conclude from it that it is specifically nowadays that, according to Rav Ḥiyya, one is not obligated to make a tear in his garment when hearing the curse of a gentile and when hearing a curse of God that referred to God with an appellation, but initially, when the fundamental halakha was practiced, one was obligated to make a tear in these cases, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
הַשֵּׁנִי אוֹמֵר: ״אַף אֲנִי כָּמוֹהוּ״. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, ״אַף אֲנִי כָּמוֹהוּ״ כָּשֵׁר בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וּבְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, וּמַעֲלָה הוּא דַּעֲבוּד רַבָּנַן. וְהָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, אוֹקְמוּהָ רַבָּנַן אַדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
§ The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse.
דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ פָּסוּל, הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, קָטְלִינַן לְגַבְרָא?
As if it enters your mind that saying: I too heard as he did, is not valid testimony by Torah law, here, in the case of blasphemy, would we execute the man without full testimony because it is not possible to allow the repetition of blasphemy? Clearly, such testimony is valid by Torah law.
וְהַשְּׁלִישִׁי אוֹמֵר: ״אַף אֲנִי כָּמוֹהוּ״. סְתָמָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּמַקֵּישׁ שְׁלֹשָׁה לִשְׁנַיִם.
The mishna teaches: And the third witness says: I too heard as he did. The Gemara comments: The unattributed tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares three witnesses to two. Rabbi Akiva maintains that just as in a case where there are two witnesses, the disqualification of one disqualifies all of the testimony, so too, even if there are three witnesses, and one of the three is disqualified, all of the testimony is disqualified. Similarly, here too he holds that if there are three witnesses, each of them must testify concerning the curse.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה: אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד, וְאֶחָד הַמְזַבֵּחַ, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַטֵּר, וְאֶחָד הַמְנַסֵּךְ, וְאֶחָד הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַבְּלוֹ עָלָיו לֶאֱלוֹהַּ, וְהָאוֹמֵר לוֹ ״אֵלִי אַתָּה״.
MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god.
אֲבָל הַמְגַפֵּף, וְהַמְנַשֵּׁק, וְהַמְכַבֵּד, וְהַמְרַבֵּץ, וְהַמְרַחֵץ, וְהַסָּךְ, וְהַמַּלְבִּישׁ, וְהַמַּנְעִיל – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. הַנּוֹדֵר בִּשְׁמוֹ, וְהַמְקַיֵּים בִּשְׁמוֹ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition.
הַפּוֹעֵר עַצְמוֹ לְבַעַל פְּעוֹר – זוֹ הִיא עֲבוֹדָתָהּ. הַזּוֹרֵק אֶבֶן לְמַרְקוּלִיס – זוֹ הִיא עֲבוֹדָתָהּ.
One who defecates before the idol known as Ba’al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד״?
GEMARA: What is added in the mishna by stating the phrase: One who worships? Since worship is the general description of all the actions detailed in the mishna, why is this phrase necessary?
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הָכִי קָאָמַר, אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְאֶחָד הַמְזַבֵּחַ, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַטֵּר, וְאֶחָד הַמְנַסֵּךְ, וְאֶחָד הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, וַאֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya says that this is what the mishna is saying: One who worships an idol in its typical manner of worship is liable to be executed; and furthermore, one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense, and one who pours a libation, and the one who bows to an idol are all liable to be executed, and this applies even if this manner of worship is not the idol’s typical manner of worship. Even if the idol in question is not typically worshipped in these ways, these specific acts are still considered idol worship because these are the ways in which God is worshipped in the Temple.
וְלִיחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי זוֹרֵק? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: זוֹרֵק הַיְינוּ מְנַסֵּךְ, דִּכְתִיב ״בַּל אַסִּיךְ נִסְכֵּיהֶם מִדָּם״.
The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also count sprinkling the blood of an offering, which is also one of the sacrificial rites in the Temple. Abaye says: Sprinkling the blood of an offering is the same as pouring a libation, since they are essentially one sacrificial rite, as it is written: “I will not pour their libations of blood” (Psalms 16:4), indicating that sprinkling the blood of an offering is also referred to as offering a libation.
מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי?
§ The Gemara asks with regard to the halakha that one is liable for worshipping an idol in these manners even if they are not the way the idol is typically worshipped: From where are these matters derived?
דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״זֹבֵחַ יׇחֳרָם״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר בְּזוֹבֵחַ קֳדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לָאֱלֹהִים״ – בְּזוֹבֵחַ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be utterly destroyed, except to the Lord alone” (Exodus 22:19): If it were stated: One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed, I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard, referring to a severe transgression that is stated elsewhere in the Torah. Therefore, the verse states: “To the gods,” indicating that the verse speaks of one who slaughters an offering to an idol.
אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּזוֹבֵחַ, מְקַטֵּר וּמְנַסֵּךְ מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בִּלְתִּי לַה׳ לְבַדּוֹ״. רִיקֵּן הָעֲבוֹדוֹת כּוּלָּן לַשֵּׁם הַמְיוּחָד.
The baraita asks: From here I know only the halakha of one who slaughters an offering to an idol. From where is it derived that one who burns incense or pours a libation is also liable to receive the death penalty? The baraita answers that the verse states: “Except to the Lord alone”; the verse emptied out, i.e., designated, all the sacrificial rites to the ineffable name of God, indicating that one who performs any of these rites in idol worship is liable.
לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה זְבִיחָה לִידּוֹן בַּעֲבוֹדוֹת פְּנִים, מִנַּיִין לְרַבּוֹת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה?
The baraita asks: Since slaughter is singled out from all of the forms of worship to be mentioned in this verse in order to derive from it that with regard to all the sacrificial rites performed inside the Temple, one who performs them in idol worship is liable to receive capital punishment, from where is it derived that this halakha includes bowing down to an idol, which is not a sacrificial rite?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וַיֵּלֶךְ וַיַּעֲבֹד אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ לָהֶם״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״וְהוֹצֵאתָ אֶת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא וְגוֹ׳״.
The baraita answers that the verse states: “And has gone and served other gods and bowed to them” (Deuteronomy 17:3), and a verse near it states: “Then you shall bring forth that man or that woman who has done this evil thing to your gates, the man or the woman, and you shall stone them with stones and they shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:5). It is derived from the juxtaposition of these two verses that one who bows down to an idol is liable to be executed.
עוֹנֶשׁ שָׁמַעְנוּ, אַזְהָרָה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי לֹא תִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְאֵל אַחֵר״.
The baraita asks: We have heard the punishment for bowing down to an idol, but from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The baraita answers that the verse states: “For you shall bow to no other god” (Exodus 34:14).
יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה הַמְגַפֵּף וְהַמְנַשֵּׁק וְהַמַּנְעִיל? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֹבֵחַ״.
One might have thought that I should include among those liable to receive capital punishment one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who puts its shoes on it as well. Therefore, the verse states: “One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed,” referring to the act of slaughtering an offering in idol worship.
זְבִיחָה בַּכְּלָל הָיְתָה, וְלָמָּה יָצְאָה? לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ וְלוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה זְבִיחָה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא עֲבוֹדַת פְּנִים וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה, אַף כֹּל שֶׁהִיא עֲבוֹדַת פְּנִים וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה.
The baraita explains: The slaughter of an offering was included in the general category of the prohibited forms of idol worship, and why was it singled out to be mentioned in this verse? It was singled out to compare a matter to it and say to you: Just as slaughter is notable in that it is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple, and those who perform this rite for the purpose of idol worship are liable to receive the death penalty for it, so too, any form of worship that is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple is prohibited when performed for idol worship, and transgressors are liable to receive the death penalty for it.
יָצְאָה הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לִידּוֹן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָצְאָה זְבִיחָה לִידּוֹן עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ.
Therefore, the act of bowing to an idol is singled out to be mentioned in a separate verse to derive the death penalty for that action itself, despite the fact that it is not a sacrificial rite performed in the Temple, whereas the slaughter of an offering is singled out to be mentioned in order to derive from it the principle with regard to the entire category, namely, that generally one is not liable to receive capital punishment for a form of worship that is not performed in the Temple.
אָמַר מָר: הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר בְּזוֹבֵחַ קֳדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. זוֹבֵחַ קֳדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ כָּרֵת הוּא!
The Gemara proceeds to clarify the baraita. The Master said in the baraita: I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: The punishment for one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard is karet, not capital punishment, as it is stated: “Each and every man…who offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice it to the Lord, even that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). Therefore, how can the baraita suggest that a verse that mentions capital punishment could be referring to this transgression?
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כִּי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – קְטָלָא, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – כָּרֵת. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that in a case when the witnesses warned the transgressor not to slaughter the offering outside the Temple he is liable to receive the death penalty, but in a case when they did not warn him he is liable to receive karet. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple is not liable to receive the death penalty even if he was warned.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר רַב חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: אֵימָא, יָצְאָה הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לְלַמֵּד עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ.
The baraita states that the principle concerning the forms of idol worship that are punishable by execution is derived from the verse that mentions slaughtering an animal as an idolatrous offering, whereas bowing to an idol is mentioned in the verse as an exception. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Say that bowing is singled out to be mentioned to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship, when performed for the sake of idol worship, carries the death penalty, not only sacrificial rites performed in the Temple.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: זוֹבֵחַ לְמָה לִי? לְגוּפֵיהּ, דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה.
And if you would say that if so, why do I need slaughter to be mentioned in the verse specifically, one can say that mentioning slaughter is necessary for the matter of slaughter itself, i.e., to teach that one can have intention from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. In other words, slaughtering an animal with idolatrous intent is punishable by death even if the intention of the transgressor pertains not to the slaughter itself but to another part of the sacrificial process.
דְּאִיתְּמַר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר:
As it was stated that with regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood in idol worship or to burn its fat in idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:
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Sanhedrin 60
״מְכַשֵּׁפָה לֹא תְחַיֶּה״, וּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל שֹׁכֵב עִם בְּהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָת״. כֹּל שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בִּכְלַל ״כׇּל שֹׁכֵב עִם בְּהֵמָה״ – יֶשְׁנוֹ בִּכְלַל ״מְכַשֵּׁפָה לֹא תְחַיֶּה״.
“You shall not allow a witch to live” (Exodus 22:17), and it is written in the following verse: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). It is derived from here that anyone who is included in the prohibition of: “Whoever lies with an animal,” including gentiles, is included in the command: “You shall not allow a witch to live.”
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף עַל הַכִּלְאַיִם. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אֵת חֻקֹּתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״ – חוּקִּים שֶׁחָקַקְתִּי לְךָ כְּבָר: ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם״.
The baraita teaches that Rabbi Elazar says that descendants of Noah were also commanded about the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: They are derived from that which the verse states: “My statutes you shall keep. You shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). God is saying: Keep the statutes that I have already instituted for you, i.e., mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, namely, “you shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed.”
מָה בְּהֶמְתְּךָ בְּהַרְבָּעָה, אַף שָׂדְךָ בְּהַרְכָּבָה. מָה בְּהֶמְתְּךָ בֵּין בָּאָרֶץ בֵּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, אַף שָׂדְךָ בֵּין בָּאָרֶץ בֵּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ.
The Gemara derives the details of this prohibition from the verse: Just as the Noahide prohibition concerning your animal applies with regard to breeding animals of different species, and not with regard to plowing with animals of two different species working together, which is prohibited only for Jews, so too, the Noahide prohibition in your field applies with regard to grafting one species onto another, which is equivalent to breeding, but it is not prohibited for gentiles to sow different seeds together. Furthermore, just as the Noahide prohibition against breeding your animal applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael, so too, the Noahide prohibition against grafting diverse kinds in your field applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה: ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי וְאֶת מִשְׁפָּטַי״ – חֻקִּים שֶׁחָקַקְתִּי לְךָ כְּבָר?
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the term “My statutes” is understood as referring to mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, then the verse: “You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances” (Leviticus 18:5), referring to the entire Torah, should also obligate the descendants of Noah, as it would be referring to: Statutes that I have already instituted for you.
הָתָם – ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי״ דְּהַשְׁתָּא. הָכָא – ״אֶת חֻקֹּתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״, חֻקִּים דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא תִּשְׁמֹרוּ.
The Gemara answers: There the verse states: “You shall therefore keep My statutes,” indicating only those statutes that I am giving you now, whereas here, in the verse concerning diverse kinds, the wording is “My statutes you shall keep,” meaning statutes that obligate you from the outset you shall keep in the future.
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה כּוּ׳.
§ After clarifying the halakhot of the descendants of Noah, the Gemara returns to the halakhot stated in the mishna with regard to one who blasphemes. It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said that during a blasphemer’s trial, the judges ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, they would use the sentence: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, like the Tetragrammaton.
אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּבָרֵךְ שֵׁם בֶּן אַרְבַּע אוֹתִיּוֹת, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בֶּן שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת דְּלָא.
Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: The blasphemer is not liable unless he blesses, i.e., curses, the Tetragrammaton, the four-letter name of God, which is to the exclusion of one who curses the two-letter name of God, spelled yod heh, who is not liable.
פְּשִׁיטָא! ״יַכֶּה יוֹסִי אֶת יוֹסִי״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִילְּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּנָקֵט, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei, which indicates a four-letter name. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example but does not intend that the witnesses use the four-letter name in particular, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable only for cursing the Tetragrammaton.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שֵׁם בֶּן אַרְבַּע אוֹתִיּוֹת נָמֵי שֵׁם הוּא.
There are those who say that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says as follows: Conclude from the mishna that the Tetragrammaton is also a name for which one is liable, and he is liable not only for cursing the forty-two-letter name of God.
פְּשִׁיטָא! ״יַכֶּה יוֹסִי אֶת יוֹסִי״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: עַד דְּאִיכָּא שֵׁם רַבָּה, וּמִילְּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּנָקֵט – קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that one is not liable unless there is a grand name that he curses, i.e., the forty-two-letter name, and the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable even for cursing the Tetragrammaton, and the name Yosei is mentioned specifically.
נִגְמַר הַדִּין כּוּ׳.
§ The mishna teaches: When the judgment is over, and judges need to hear the exact wording of the curse so they can sentence the defendant, the eldest of the witnesses repeats the curse, and the judges rise and make a tear in their clothing.
עוֹמְדִין – מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַמֵּי: דְּאָמַר קְרָא, ״וְאֵהוּד בָּא אֵלָיו וְהוּא יֹשֵׁב בַּעֲלִיַּת הַמְּקֵרָה אֲשֶׁר לוֹ לְבַדּוֹ וַיֹּאמֶר אֵהוּד דְּבַר אֱלֹהִים לִי אֵלֶיךָ וַיָּקׇם מֵעַל הַכִּסֵּא״. וַהֲלֹא דְּבָרִים קַל וָחוֹמֶר? וּמָה עֶגְלוֹן מֶלֶךְ מוֹאָב שֶׁהוּא גּוֹי וְלֹא יָדַע אֶלָּא בְּכִינּוּי – עָמַד, יִשְׂרָאֵל וְשֵׁם הַמְפוֹרָשׁ – עַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה!
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the judges must stand? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ami says: It is derived from that which the verse states about Eglon: “And Ehud came to him, and he was sitting by himself alone in his cool upper chamber. And Ehud said: I have a message from God [Elohim] to you. And he arose out of his seat” (Judges 3:20). And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? And if Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew the name of God only by an appellation, stood in honor, all the more so must a Jew stand if he hears the ineffable name.
קוֹרְעִין – מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיָּבֹא אֶלְיָקִים בֶּן חִלְקִיָּהוּ [וְגוֹ׳] וְשֶׁבְנָא הַסֹּפֵר וְיוֹאָח בֶּן אָסָף הַמַּזְכִּיר אֶל חִזְקִיָּהוּ קְרוּעֵי בְגָדִים וַיַּגִּידוּ לוֹ אֵת דִּבְרֵי רַבְשָׁקֵה״.
The mishna teaches that upon hearing the curse the judges each make a tear in their garments. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that it is derived from that which is written: “Then came Eliakim, son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, and Shebna the scribe, and Joah, son of Asaph, the recorder, to Hezekiah with torn garments, and they told him Rabshakeh’s statement” (II Kings 18:37). Apparently, since they heard the blasphemous statement of Rabshakeh they were obligated to make a tear in their garments.
וְלֹא מְאַחִין – מְנָלַן?
It is furthermore stated that the judges do not ever fully stitch the tear together again. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this?
אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: אָתְיָא קְרִיעָה קְרִיעָה, כְּתִיב הָכָא ״קְרוּעֵי בְגָדִים״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם ״וֶאֱלִישָׁע רֹאֶה וְהוּא מְצַעֵק אָבִי אָבִי רֶכֶב יִשְׂרָאֵל וּפָרָשָׁיו וְלֹא רָאָהוּ עוֹד וַיַּחֲזֵק בִּבְגָדָיו וַיִּקְרָעֵם לִשְׁנַיִם קְרָעִים״. מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וַיִּקְרָעֵם לִשְׁנַיִם״, אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהֵן קְרָעִים? וּמָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״קְרָעִים״? מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהֵן קְרוּעִים לְעוֹלָם.
Rabbi Abbahu says: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the tearing stated in this regard and the tearing stated with regard to Elijah’s ascendance to heaven. It is written here, with regard to those who heard Rabshakeh’s blasphemy: “With torn garments,” and it is written there: “And Elisha saw it, and he cried: My father, my father, the chariots of Israel and its horsemen. And he saw him no more, and he grabbed hold of his clothes and tore them into two pieces” (II Kings 2:12). From the meaning of that which is stated: “And tore them into two,” do I not know that they are pieces? And why must the verse state: “Pieces”? This teaches that they remain torn forever; they may never be fully stitched back together, but only partially sewn.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ, וְאֶחָד שׁוֹמֵעַ מִפִּי שׁוֹמֵעַ – חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ. וְהָעֵדִים אֵין חַיָּיבִין לִקְרוֹעַ, שֶׁכְּבָר קָרְעוּ בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁשָּׁמְעוּ.
The Sages taught: Both one who hears the curse himself and one who hears it from the one who heard it are obligated to make a tear in their garments. But the witnesses are not obligated to make a tear when they testify, as they already made a tear when they heard it from the blasphemer himself.
וְכִי קָרְעוּ בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁשָּׁמְעוּ, מַאי הָוֵי? הָא קָא שָׁמְעִי הַשְׁתָּא! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיְהִי כִּשְׁמֹעַ הַמֶּלֶךְ חִזְקִיָּהוּ אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבְשָׁקֵה וַיִּקְרַע אֶת בְּגָדָיו״. הַמֶּלֶךְ חִזְקִיָּהוּ קָרַע, וְהֵם לֹא קָרְעוּ.
The Gemara asks: And if they made a tear when they heard the curse, what of it? Aren’t they also hearing the curse now? The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that they are obligated to make a tear a second time, as it is written: “And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard the statement of Rabshakeh, that he tore his clothes” (II Kings 19:1). It can be inferred that King Hezekiah tore his clothes, but those who reported the blasphemy did not tear their clothes a second time.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אַזְכָּרָה מִפִּי הַגּוֹי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ. וְאִם תֹּאמַר: רַבְשָׁקֵה – יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּמָר הָיָה.
§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous manner from a gentile is not obligated to make a tear in his garments. And if you object and say that those who heard the blasphemy of Rabshakeh made a tear even though he was a gentile, that is not correct, as Rabshakeh was an apostate Jew.
וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין קוֹרְעִין אֶלָּא עַל שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד בִּלְבַד, לְאַפּוֹקֵי כִּינּוּי דְּלָא.
And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One makes a tear only for hearing a curse of the ineffable name of God, to the exclusion of hearing a curse of an appellation for the name of God, for which one does not make a tear.
וּפְלִיגִי דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אַזְכָּרָה בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ, שֶׁאִם אִי אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן – נִתְמַלֵּא כׇּל הַבֶּגֶד קְרָעִים.
The Gemara notes: And Shmuel disagrees with Rav Ḥiyya with regard to two matters. As Rabbi Ḥiyya says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous context nowadays is not obligated to make a tear, as if you do not say so, the entire garment will be full of tears.
מִמַּאן? אִילֵימָא מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, מִי פְּקִירִי כּוּלֵּי הַאי? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, מִגּוֹי. וְאִי שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד, מִי גְּמִירִי? אֶלָּא לָאו, בְּכִינּוּי.
The Gemara clarifies: From whom does one hear these mentions of God’s name about which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that one’s entire garment would be full of tears? If we say that he hears from it a Jew, are Jews irreverent to such an extent that they demean the name of God? Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Ḥiyya is referring to hearing it from a gentile. And if you say that the reference is to cursing the ineffable name, have the gentiles learned it? They have no knowledge of his name. Rather, is it not referring to cursing by an appellation of God’s name?
וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה הוּא דְּלָא, הָא מֵעִיקָּרָא – חַיָּיב. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
And conclude from it that it is specifically nowadays that, according to Rav Ḥiyya, one is not obligated to make a tear in his garment when hearing the curse of a gentile and when hearing a curse of God that referred to God with an appellation, but initially, when the fundamental halakha was practiced, one was obligated to make a tear in these cases, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
הַשֵּׁנִי אוֹמֵר: ״אַף אֲנִי כָּמוֹהוּ״. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, ״אַף אֲנִי כָּמוֹהוּ״ כָּשֵׁר בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וּבְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, וּמַעֲלָה הוּא דַּעֲבוּד רַבָּנַן. וְהָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, אוֹקְמוּהָ רַבָּנַן אַדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
§ The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse.
דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ פָּסוּל, הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, קָטְלִינַן לְגַבְרָא?
As if it enters your mind that saying: I too heard as he did, is not valid testimony by Torah law, here, in the case of blasphemy, would we execute the man without full testimony because it is not possible to allow the repetition of blasphemy? Clearly, such testimony is valid by Torah law.
וְהַשְּׁלִישִׁי אוֹמֵר: ״אַף אֲנִי כָּמוֹהוּ״. סְתָמָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּמַקֵּישׁ שְׁלֹשָׁה לִשְׁנַיִם.
The mishna teaches: And the third witness says: I too heard as he did. The Gemara comments: The unattributed tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares three witnesses to two. Rabbi Akiva maintains that just as in a case where there are two witnesses, the disqualification of one disqualifies all of the testimony, so too, even if there are three witnesses, and one of the three is disqualified, all of the testimony is disqualified. Similarly, here too he holds that if there are three witnesses, each of them must testify concerning the curse.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה: אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד, וְאֶחָד הַמְזַבֵּחַ, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַטֵּר, וְאֶחָד הַמְנַסֵּךְ, וְאֶחָד הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַבְּלוֹ עָלָיו לֶאֱלוֹהַּ, וְהָאוֹמֵר לוֹ ״אֵלִי אַתָּה״.
MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god.
אֲבָל הַמְגַפֵּף, וְהַמְנַשֵּׁק, וְהַמְכַבֵּד, וְהַמְרַבֵּץ, וְהַמְרַחֵץ, וְהַסָּךְ, וְהַמַּלְבִּישׁ, וְהַמַּנְעִיל – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. הַנּוֹדֵר בִּשְׁמוֹ, וְהַמְקַיֵּים בִּשְׁמוֹ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition.
הַפּוֹעֵר עַצְמוֹ לְבַעַל פְּעוֹר – זוֹ הִיא עֲבוֹדָתָהּ. הַזּוֹרֵק אֶבֶן לְמַרְקוּלִיס – זוֹ הִיא עֲבוֹדָתָהּ.
One who defecates before the idol known as Ba’al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד״?
GEMARA: What is added in the mishna by stating the phrase: One who worships? Since worship is the general description of all the actions detailed in the mishna, why is this phrase necessary?
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הָכִי קָאָמַר, אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְאֶחָד הַמְזַבֵּחַ, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַטֵּר, וְאֶחָד הַמְנַסֵּךְ, וְאֶחָד הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, וַאֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya says that this is what the mishna is saying: One who worships an idol in its typical manner of worship is liable to be executed; and furthermore, one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense, and one who pours a libation, and the one who bows to an idol are all liable to be executed, and this applies even if this manner of worship is not the idol’s typical manner of worship. Even if the idol in question is not typically worshipped in these ways, these specific acts are still considered idol worship because these are the ways in which God is worshipped in the Temple.
וְלִיחְשׁוֹב נָמֵי זוֹרֵק? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: זוֹרֵק הַיְינוּ מְנַסֵּךְ, דִּכְתִיב ״בַּל אַסִּיךְ נִסְכֵּיהֶם מִדָּם״.
The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also count sprinkling the blood of an offering, which is also one of the sacrificial rites in the Temple. Abaye says: Sprinkling the blood of an offering is the same as pouring a libation, since they are essentially one sacrificial rite, as it is written: “I will not pour their libations of blood” (Psalms 16:4), indicating that sprinkling the blood of an offering is also referred to as offering a libation.
מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי?
§ The Gemara asks with regard to the halakha that one is liable for worshipping an idol in these manners even if they are not the way the idol is typically worshipped: From where are these matters derived?
דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״זֹבֵחַ יׇחֳרָם״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר בְּזוֹבֵחַ קֳדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לָאֱלֹהִים״ – בְּזוֹבֵחַ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be utterly destroyed, except to the Lord alone” (Exodus 22:19): If it were stated: One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed, I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard, referring to a severe transgression that is stated elsewhere in the Torah. Therefore, the verse states: “To the gods,” indicating that the verse speaks of one who slaughters an offering to an idol.
אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּזוֹבֵחַ, מְקַטֵּר וּמְנַסֵּךְ מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בִּלְתִּי לַה׳ לְבַדּוֹ״. רִיקֵּן הָעֲבוֹדוֹת כּוּלָּן לַשֵּׁם הַמְיוּחָד.
The baraita asks: From here I know only the halakha of one who slaughters an offering to an idol. From where is it derived that one who burns incense or pours a libation is also liable to receive the death penalty? The baraita answers that the verse states: “Except to the Lord alone”; the verse emptied out, i.e., designated, all the sacrificial rites to the ineffable name of God, indicating that one who performs any of these rites in idol worship is liable.
לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה זְבִיחָה לִידּוֹן בַּעֲבוֹדוֹת פְּנִים, מִנַּיִין לְרַבּוֹת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה?
The baraita asks: Since slaughter is singled out from all of the forms of worship to be mentioned in this verse in order to derive from it that with regard to all the sacrificial rites performed inside the Temple, one who performs them in idol worship is liable to receive capital punishment, from where is it derived that this halakha includes bowing down to an idol, which is not a sacrificial rite?
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וַיֵּלֶךְ וַיַּעֲבֹד אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ לָהֶם״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״וְהוֹצֵאתָ אֶת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא וְגוֹ׳״.
The baraita answers that the verse states: “And has gone and served other gods and bowed to them” (Deuteronomy 17:3), and a verse near it states: “Then you shall bring forth that man or that woman who has done this evil thing to your gates, the man or the woman, and you shall stone them with stones and they shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:5). It is derived from the juxtaposition of these two verses that one who bows down to an idol is liable to be executed.
עוֹנֶשׁ שָׁמַעְנוּ, אַזְהָרָה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי לֹא תִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְאֵל אַחֵר״.
The baraita asks: We have heard the punishment for bowing down to an idol, but from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The baraita answers that the verse states: “For you shall bow to no other god” (Exodus 34:14).
יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה הַמְגַפֵּף וְהַמְנַשֵּׁק וְהַמַּנְעִיל? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֹבֵחַ״.
One might have thought that I should include among those liable to receive capital punishment one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who puts its shoes on it as well. Therefore, the verse states: “One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed,” referring to the act of slaughtering an offering in idol worship.
זְבִיחָה בַּכְּלָל הָיְתָה, וְלָמָּה יָצְאָה? לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ וְלוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה זְבִיחָה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא עֲבוֹדַת פְּנִים וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה, אַף כֹּל שֶׁהִיא עֲבוֹדַת פְּנִים וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה.
The baraita explains: The slaughter of an offering was included in the general category of the prohibited forms of idol worship, and why was it singled out to be mentioned in this verse? It was singled out to compare a matter to it and say to you: Just as slaughter is notable in that it is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple, and those who perform this rite for the purpose of idol worship are liable to receive the death penalty for it, so too, any form of worship that is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple is prohibited when performed for idol worship, and transgressors are liable to receive the death penalty for it.
יָצְאָה הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לִידּוֹן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָצְאָה זְבִיחָה לִידּוֹן עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ.
Therefore, the act of bowing to an idol is singled out to be mentioned in a separate verse to derive the death penalty for that action itself, despite the fact that it is not a sacrificial rite performed in the Temple, whereas the slaughter of an offering is singled out to be mentioned in order to derive from it the principle with regard to the entire category, namely, that generally one is not liable to receive capital punishment for a form of worship that is not performed in the Temple.
אָמַר מָר: הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר בְּזוֹבֵחַ קֳדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. זוֹבֵחַ קֳדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ כָּרֵת הוּא!
The Gemara proceeds to clarify the baraita. The Master said in the baraita: I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: The punishment for one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard is karet, not capital punishment, as it is stated: “Each and every man…who offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice it to the Lord, even that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). Therefore, how can the baraita suggest that a verse that mentions capital punishment could be referring to this transgression?
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כִּי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – קְטָלָא, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – כָּרֵת. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that in a case when the witnesses warned the transgressor not to slaughter the offering outside the Temple he is liable to receive the death penalty, but in a case when they did not warn him he is liable to receive karet. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple is not liable to receive the death penalty even if he was warned.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר רַב חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: אֵימָא, יָצְאָה הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לְלַמֵּד עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ.
The baraita states that the principle concerning the forms of idol worship that are punishable by execution is derived from the verse that mentions slaughtering an animal as an idolatrous offering, whereas bowing to an idol is mentioned in the verse as an exception. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Say that bowing is singled out to be mentioned to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship, when performed for the sake of idol worship, carries the death penalty, not only sacrificial rites performed in the Temple.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: זוֹבֵחַ לְמָה לִי? לְגוּפֵיהּ, דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה.
And if you would say that if so, why do I need slaughter to be mentioned in the verse specifically, one can say that mentioning slaughter is necessary for the matter of slaughter itself, i.e., to teach that one can have intention from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. In other words, slaughtering an animal with idolatrous intent is punishable by death even if the intention of the transgressor pertains not to the slaughter itself but to another part of the sacrificial process.
דְּאִיתְּמַר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר:
As it was stated that with regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood in idol worship or to burn its fat in idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:
