Shevuot 22
תִּיפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ וְאָכַל עָפָר, בְּכַמָּה? תִּפְשׁוֹט עַד דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת! כִּי קָאָמְרִינַן – בְּמִידֵּי דְּבַר אֲכִילָה קָאָמְרִינַן.
answer that which Rava asks with regard to one who says: On my oath I will not eat, and who then ate dirt. Rava’s question is: How much must he eat in order to be liable? Based on the Rabbis’ statement, you could answer that he is not liable unless there is an olive-bulk that he has eaten. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: When we say in the mishna that there are no cases where a person who eats less than a full measure is liable, we say it with regard to items that are edible.
וַהֲרֵי קוּנָּמוֹת! קוּנָּמוֹת נָמֵי כִּמְפָרֵשׁ דָּמֵי.
The Gemara asks: But aren’t konamot an example of a case where one is liable for eating even less than an olive-bulk? The Gemara answers: Konamot are also like a case where he specifies that any amount is forbidden for consumption.
אָמַר לָהֶן: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בִּמְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן, שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן. וְלָא?! וַהֲרֵי מְגַדֵּף! מְדַבֵּר וְאוֹסֵר קָאָמְרִינַן, וְהַאי מְדַבֵּר וְחוֹטֵא הוּא.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva said to the Rabbis: Where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it? The Gemara asks: And do we not? But isn’t a blasphemer liable to bring an offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva (see Karetot 7a)? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who speaks and in doing so generates a prohibition. And this one, the blasphemer, is merely one who speaks and sins but does not bring an offering.
וַהֲרֵי נָזִיר! מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּנוֹ עַל דִּבּוּרוֹ קָאָמְרִינַן, וְהַאי מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן – לְאִשְׁתְּרוֹיֵי לֵיהּ חַמְרָא הוּא דְּקָא מַיְיתֵי.
The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t a nazirite render wine forbidden to himself through speech, by making a vow? And he does bring an offering. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who brings an offering specifically for his speaking, and this one, the nazirite, brings an offering at the end of his naziriteship in order to permit wine to himself.
וַהֲרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ! אוֹסֵר לְעַצְמוֹ קָאָמְרִינַן, וְהַאי אוֹסֵר עַל כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ הוּא.
The Gemara challenges: But isn’t consecrated property a case where one renders an item forbidden via speech alone and brings an offering for its misuse? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who, by speaking, generates a prohibition for himself, and nevertheless brings an offering. And this one, who consecrates an item, generates a prohibition for the whole world.
הֲרֵי קוּנָּמוֹת! קָסָבַר אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת.
The Gemara challenges: Aren’t konamot an example of a case where one renders an item forbidden to himself by speech alone and brings an offering for using it? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בִּסְתָם, אֲבָל בִּמְפָרֵשׁ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא. מַאי טַעְמָא? מְפָרֵשׁ נָמֵי כִּבְרִיָּה דָּמֵי.
§ Rava says: The dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is with regard to where one took the oath without specifying that he is liable for eating any amount. But in a case where he specifies that his oath applies to any amount, everyone agrees that he is liable for eating any amount. What is the reason for this? One who specifies this renders any amount significant like a whole entity.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, אֲבָל בְּ״שֶׁלֹּא אֶטְעוֹם״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִיטְעוֹם נָמֵי – כִּדְאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
And Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where one takes an oath saying: On my oath I will not eat, but in a case where one says: On my oath I will not taste, all agree that he is liable for tasting any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he is liable in that case? Tasting has no defined measure. The Gemara answers: Rava nevertheless taught it, lest you say that even if one takes an oath saying: I will not taste, he is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk, as people say: To taste, as a way of saying: To eat. Therefore, Rava teaches us that this is not the case.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת, אֲבָל בְּקוּנָּמוֹת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא. מַאי טַעְמָא? קוּנָּמוֹת נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא קָא מַדְכַּר שְׁמָא דַּאֲכִילָה, כְּדִמְפָרֵשׁ דָּמֵי.
§ Rav Pappa says: The dispute in the mishna is with regard to oaths, but with regard to konamot, all agree that one is liable for eating any amount. What is the reason for this? Indeed, with regard to konamot, since in the vow he did not explicitly mention eating, which has a defined measure, but only that the item is forbidden to him like an offering, it is as if he specified that he is liable for eating any amount.
מֵיתִיבִי: שְׁנֵי קוּנָּמוֹת מִצְטָרְפִין, שְׁתֵּי שְׁבוּעוֹת אֵין מִצְטָרְפוֹת. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: קוּנָּמוֹת כִּשְׁבוּעוֹת. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חַיָּיב בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא, לְמָה לִי לְצָרֵף?
The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in a baraita: Items that are forbidden by two konamot combine to produce a full measure for which one is liable; items forbidden by two oaths do not so combine. Rabbi Meir says: Items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths. The Gemara explains the objection: And if it enters your mind that with regard to items forbidden by konamot, one is liable for eating any amount, why do I need them to combine?
דְּאָמַר: ״אֲכִילָה מִזּוֹ עָלַי קוּנָּם״, ״אֲכִילָה מִזּוֹ עָלַי קוּנָּם״. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי מִצְטָרְפוֹת? סוֹף סוֹף – זִיל לְהָכָא לֵיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא, וְזִיל לְהָכָא לֵיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא! דְּאָמַר: ״אֲכִילָה מִשְּׁתֵּיהֶן עָלַי קוּנָּם״.
The Gemara answers: They combine in a case where he said: Eating from this one is konam for me; eating from that one is konam for me. Since he explicitly mentions eating, he is not liable unless he eats an olive-bulk. The Gemara asks: If so, why do they combine to produce a full measure? Ultimately, since he took two separate vows, go to this item and there is not a full measure, and go to that item and there is not a full measure. The Gemara answers: They combined to produce one full measure when he said: Eating from both of them is konam for me.
דִּכְוָותַהּ גַּבֵּי שְׁבוּעוֹת – דְּאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל מִשְּׁתֵּיהֶן״, אַמַּאי אֵין מִצְטָרְפִין? אָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס: שָׁאנֵי שְׁבוּעוֹת, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁחֲלוּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, אֵין מִצְטָרְפוֹת.
The Gemara asks: In the corresponding situation with regard to oaths, where he said: On my oath I will not eat from both of them, why do they not combine? Rav Pineḥas said: Oaths are different. Since two items that are forbidden by a single oath are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, in that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for eating each one, so too eating a small amount from each does not combine in order to produce a full measure.
אִי הָכִי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: קוּנָּמוֹת כִּשְׁבוּעוֹת – בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁבוּעוֹת, הוֹאִיל וַחֲלוּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת; אֶלָּא קוּנָּמוֹת, אַמַּאי לָא? אֵיפוֹךְ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: שְׁבוּעוֹת כְּקוּנָּמוֹת. וְלֵית לֵיהּ לִדְרַב פִּנְחָס.
The Gemara asks: If so, how did Rabbi Meir say that items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths and do not combine to produce a full measure? Granted that items forbidden by oaths do not combine, since they are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, but why do items forbidden by konamot not combine? The Gemara answers: Reverse the language so that the baraita has Rabbi Meir say: Items forbidden by oaths are like items forbidden by konamot. Neither combines to produce a full measure, and Rabbi Meir does not accept the statement of Rav Pineḥas that items forbidden by oaths are different.
רָבִינָא אָמַר: כִּי קָאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא – לְעִנְיַן מַלְקוֹת; כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא – לְעִנְיַן קׇרְבָּן, דְּבָעֵינַן שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
Ravina said: When Rav Pappa says that one is liable for eating any amount of an item forbidden by konamot, that is with regard to the matter of lashes. When it is taught in the baraita that items forbidden by konamot combine to produce a full measure, that is with regard to the matter of an offering for misuse of consecrated property, where we require that one derive benefit equal to the value of one peruta from the forbidden item.
לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבְרִי רַבָּנַן יֵשׁ מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת?! וְהָתַנְיָא: ״כִּכָּר זוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ״, וַאֲכָלָהּ – בֵּין הוּא בֵּין חֲבֵירוֹ מָעַל; לְפִיכָךְ יֵשׁ לָהּ פִּדְיוֹן. ״כִּכָּר זוֹ עָלַי הֶקְדֵּשׁ״ – הֲרֵי הוּא מָעַל, חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא מָעַל; לְפִיכָךְ אֵין לָהּ פִּדְיוֹן. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the Sages hold that the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property extend to items forbidden by konamot? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one said: This loaf is consecrated, and subsequently ate it, then either he or another who ate it is liable for misusing consecrated property; consequently, since the loaf is consecrated, it is subject to redemption. If one said: This loaf is forbidden to me as if it were consecrated, i.e., it is konam for me, and then he ate it, he is liable for misusing consecrated property, but another is not liable for misusing consecrated property; consequently, since the loaf is not fully consecrated, it is not subject to redemption. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין הוּא וּבֵין חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא מָעַל, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת.
And the Rabbis say: Both he and the other are not liable for misusing consecrated property, because there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.
אֵיפוֹךְ: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה לֹא מָעַל, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הוּא מָעַל, וַחֲבֵירוֹ לֹא מָעַל.
The Gemara responds: Reverse the opinions and say as follows: Both this one and that one are not liable for misusing consecrated property, because there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He is liable for misuse of consecrated property and the other is not liable for misuse of consecrated property.
אִי הָכִי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר קוּנָּמוֹת כִּשְׁבוּעוֹת – אֶלָּא קוּנָּמוֹת אִצְטְרוֹפֵי הוּא דְּלָא מִצְטָרְפִי, הָא מְעִילָה אִית בְּהוּ?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת כְּלָל!
The Gemara asks: If so, how is it that Rabbi Meir says in the previous baraita: Items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths? Items forbidden by konamot do not combine to produce a full measure that renders one liable for misuse of consecrated property, but this indicates that misuse of consecrated property nevertheless applies to them. But doesn’t Rabbi Meir say, according to the reversal of the opinions, that with regard to konamot, there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property at all?
לְדִבְרֵיהֶן דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי – אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקוּנָּמוֹת כְּלָל; לְדִידְכוּ – אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהַת דְּקוּנָּמוֹת כִּשְׁבוּעוֹת!
The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Meir says that items forbidden by konamot do not combine to produce a full measure, he is saying this to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, as follows: According to my opinion with regard to konamot, there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property at all. According to your opinion, at least admit to me that items forbidden by konamot are like items forbidden by oaths and do not combine to produce a full measure.
וְרַבָּנַן – שְׁבוּעוֹת אִיכָּא דְּרַב פִּנְחָס, קוּנָּמוֹת לֵיכָּא דְּרַב פִּנְחָס.
And the Rabbis? They explain that with regard to items forbidden by oaths one should apply the reasoning of Rav Pineḥas that since two items that are forbidden by a single oath are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, they do not combine in order to produce a full measure. With regard to konamot the reasoning of Rav Pineḥas does not apply.
אָמַר רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל עָפָר – פָּטוּר. בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל עָפָר״, בְּכַמָּה? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכְּזַיִת; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו מִידֵּי דְּאָכְלִי אִינָשֵׁי הוּא, בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא? תֵּיקוּ.
§ Rava says that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate dirt, he is exempt, because eating dirt is not considered to be eating. Rava raises a dilemma: If one says: On my oath I will not eat dirt, how much dirt must he eat in order to be liable? Is the halakha that since he said: I will not eat dirt, his intention is that the prohibition applies to an olive-bulk? That is the standard measure for prohibitions with regard to eating. Or perhaps, since dirt is not something that people eat, he is liable for eating any amount. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל חַרְצָן״, בְּכַמָּה? כֵּיוָן דְּמִתְאֲכִיל עַל יְדֵי תַּעֲרוֹבֶת – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכְּזַיִת; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא בְּעֵינֵיהּ אָכְלִי לֵיהּ אִינָשֵׁי – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַמַּשֶּׁהוּ? תֵּיקוּ.
Rava raises a dilemma: If one says: On my oath I will not eat a grape seed, how much must he eat in order to be liable? Is the halakha that since it is ordinarily eaten in a mixture, i.e., as part of a grape, his intention is that the prohibition applies to a complete olive-bulk measure of grape seeds? Or perhaps, since people do not eat it by itself but always in a mixture, his intention is to be liable for eating any amount. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: נָזִיר שֶׁאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל חַרְצָן״, בְּכַמָּה? דְּכֵיוָן דִּכְזַיִת אִיסּוּרָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא, כִּי קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע – אַהֶתֵּירָא קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע, וְדַעְתֵּיהּ אַמַּשֶּׁהוּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכְּזַיִת?
§ Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: In the case of a nazirite who says: On my oath I will not eat a grape seed, how much must he eat in order to be liable? A nazirite is prohibited from eating grape seeds (see Numbers 6:4). Is the halakha that since eating an olive-bulk is a prohibition by Torah law, when he takes an oath of this sort, he is taking the oath to prohibit that which is permitted to him and his intention in taking the oath is to prohibit eating any amount? Or perhaps, since he said: I will not eat a grape seed, his intention is that the prohibition applies to an olive-bulk, which is the standard measure for what is considered eating.
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – חַיָּיב. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? מוּשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא! רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמְרִי: בְּכוֹלֵל דְּבָרִים הַמּוּתָּרִין עִם דְּבָרִים הָאֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (22b): With regard to one who said: On my oath I will not eat, and then ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. And we discussed it: Why is he liable for violating his oath when he eats non-kosher food? He is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden food, and an oath cannot take effect to prohibit that which is already forbidden. Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan all say that this is a case where he incorporates into the oath that he will not eat some permitted items, along with the statement concerning the forbidden items. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it extends also to the forbidden ones.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אִי אַתָּה מוֹצֵא אֶלָּא אִי בִּמְפָרֵשׁ חֲצִי שִׁיעוּר, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן; אִי בִּסְתָם, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר: אָדָם אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא.
And Reish Lakish says: You find that one is liable for eating non-kosher food after taking an oath not to eat only if it is both a case where he specifies in the oath that his oath includes a half-measure and in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is not liable for eating a half-measure unless it is specified in the oath. Since eating a half-measure is not prohibited by the Torah, the oath takes effect. Alternatively, you find that one is liable if he took the oath without specifying that the oath prohibits less than the usual measure and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that a person renders himself prohibited from eating any amount by taking an oath not to eat.
וְהָא נְבֵילָה – דְּמוּשְׁבָּע וְעוֹמֵד מֵהַר סִינַי הוּא, דְּכִי חַרְצָן לְגַבֵּי נָזִיר דָּמְיָא; וְטַעְמָא דְּפָרֵישׁ, הָא לָא פָּרֵישׁ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכְּזַיִת! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara comments: But isn’t a carcass an item for which one is already under oath from Mount Sinai? In that respect it resembles a grape seed for a nazirite, and yet the reason that Reish Lakish says he is liable according to the Rabbis is that he specified that the oath prohibits him from eating even a half-measure, indicating that if he did not specify, his intention is that the oath refer to an olive-bulk. Conclude from it that a nazirite who takes an oath not to eat a grape seed is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk.
אֶלָּא תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל עָפָר״, בְּכַמָּה? תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּעַד דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת – דְּהָא נְבֵילָה כְּעָפָר דָּמְיָא; וְטַעְמָא דְּפָרֵישׁ, הָא לֹא פָּרִישׁ – דַּעְתֵּיהּ אַכְּזַיִת!
The Gemara asks: But according to this, resolve the dilemma that Rava raises with regard to one who says: On my oath I will not eat dirt, asking how much he must eat in order to be liable? Resolve the dilemma by saying that he is not liable unless he eats an olive-bulk, since a carcass resembles dirt, and the reason he is liable is that he specified that the oath prohibits him from eating even a half-measure, indicating that if he did not specify, his intention is that the oath refers to an olive-bulk.
לֹא; עָפָר – לָאו בַּר אֲכִילָה הוּא כְּלָל; נְבֵילָה – בַּת אֲכִילָה, וְאַרְיָא הוּא דִּרְבִיעַ עִילָּוַוהּ.
The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this comparison. Dirt is entirely inedible. A carcass, by contrast, is edible, but a lion crouches on it, i.e., eating it is prohibited by the Torah. Therefore, one cannot derive the halakha concerning dirt from the halakha concerning a carcass.
מַתְנִי׳ ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה״, וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה – חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעוֹרִין וּפַת כּוּסְּמִין – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין וּפַת שְׂעוֹרִין וּפַת כּוּסְּמִין״, וְאָכַל – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה״, וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין הַרְבֵּה – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶשְׁתֶּה יַיִן וְשֶׁמֶן וּדְבַשׁ״, וְשָׁתָה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
MISHNA: If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering, because an oath to refrain from eating includes refraining from drinking. If he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring two offerings. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate wheat bread and barley bread and spelt bread, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread or barley bread or spelt bread, and then he ate all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. If he said: On my oath I will not drink, and then he drank several kinds of liquids, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not drink wine or oil or honey, and then he drank all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל אֳוכָלִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִן לַאֲכִילָה, וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִן לִשְׁתִיָּה – פָּטוּר. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – חַיָּיב. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. אָמַר: ״קוּנָּם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם״, וְהוּא אָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – הֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה.
If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְשָׁתָה – חַיָּיב. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא.
GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Shmuel says: If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he drank, he is liable. If you wish, you may propose a logical argument for this ruling, and if you wish, you may cite a verse to explain it.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא – דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ אִינָשׁ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: ״נִטְעוֹם מִידֵּי״, וְעָיְילִי וְאָכְלִי וְשָׁתוּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא – שְׁתִיָּה בִּכְלַל אֲכִילָה; דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִנַּיִן לִשְׁתִיָּה שֶׁהִיא בִּכְלַל אֲכִילָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאָכַלְתָּ לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר לְשַׁכֵּן שְׁמוֹ שָׁם מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְתִירֹשְׁךָ״;
The Gemara explains: If you wish, you may propose a logical argument for this ruling: It is clear that drinking is included in eating from the fact that a person will say to another: Let’s have a taste of something, and they go in and eat and drink. And if you wish, cite a verse as the source for this ruling, as Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that drinking is included in eating? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, the tithe of your grain, of your tirosh, and of your oil” (Deuteronomy 14:23).
