Shevuot 24
בְּאִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו; בְּאִיסּוּר הַבָּא עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
it is with regard to a prohibition that occurs on its own, like the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur, which is more inclusive than the prohibition against eating non-kosher food and therefore takes effect. But with regard to a prohibition that occurs by the act of a person himself, i.e., an oath or a vow, we do not say that because it is more inclusive it can take effect also with regard to items that are already forbidden by Torah law.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי קָא פָטַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל שֶׁהוּא לְמַכּוֹת, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ כְּזַיִת אֶלָּא לְקׇרְבָּן. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּפָטַר?
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Reish Lakish, who understands the mishna to be dealing with the case of one who took an oath about less than a full measure, it is due to this reason that Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who takes an oath prohibiting himself from eating non-kosher food, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: Any amount is sufficient to render one liable to receive lashes, and the Sages stated the measure of an olive-bulk to determine only liability to bring an offering. According to Reish Lakish, Rabbi Shimon holds that one is already under oath from Mount Sinai even with regard to less than a full measure, and for that reason the oath does not take effect. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who understands the mishna to be referring to an oath that includes erstwhile permitted items, what is the reason that Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt from bringing an offering for breaking his oath not to eat non-kosher food?
מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא – אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל; רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּלֵית לֵיהּ אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹכֵל נְבֵילָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – פָּטוּר.
The Gemara answers: Isn’t the reason that the first tanna holds that the individual is liable for violating his oath only due to the fact that the oath generates a more inclusive prohibition? In this matter Rabbi Shimon conforms to his standard line of reasoning in that he does not hold that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where a preexisting prohibition is in place. This is in accordance with that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats non-kosher meat on Yom Kippur is exempt from bringing an offering for eating on Yom Kippur, despite the fact that the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur is a more inclusive prohibition than that of eating non-kosher meat, as on that day one may not eat anything.
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּלָאו וָהֵן; אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, בִּשְׁלָמָא לָאו – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, אֶלָּא הֵן – הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
From the verse: “Or if any one take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), the Sages derived that one is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance only when the oath is such that it could be inverted from the positive to the negative or vice versa. For example, one is liable for violating an oath to eat because one can also take an oath not to eat. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, you find a case where the oath can be negative or positive. Therefore, one is liable according to the Rabbis when he takes an oath that he will eat any amount, since he could also take an oath that he will not eat any amount. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, granted, that you can find a case of a negative oath, as the oath not to eat non-kosher animals takes effect when it includes other erstwhile permitted items. But how can you find a positive version of this oath? An oath to eat non-kosher animals cannot take effect, as eating non-kosher animals is prohibited by Torah law.
אֶלָּא כִּדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל עָפָר – פָּטוּר.
Rather, do not distinguish between the former and the latter clauses of the mishna based on whether he specifies what he is eating. In both cases he takes an oath not to eat, without specifying. In the case where he eats something inedible, he is exempt, in accordance with that which Rava says, as Rava says that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate dirt, he is exempt, since eating an inedible substance is not considered to be eating. Eating non-kosher meat is considered to be eating; for that reason, the latter clause of the mishna states that one is liable for doing so if he took an oath not to eat. The oath takes effect with regard to the non-kosher items because, as Rabbi Yoḥanan noted, it includes items that would otherwise be permitted.
אָמַר רַב מָרִי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״קוּנָּם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי אִם אָכַלְתִּי הַיּוֹם״, וְאָכַל נְבֵילוֹת וּטְרֵיפוֹת, שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים – הֲרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה לוֹ.
Rav Mari said: We learn in the mishna (22b) as well that eating non-kosher food is considered eating, as if one said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, כֵּיוָן דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא (אכל) [אַכְלֵיהּ] וַהֲדַר אִשְׁתְּבַע (ליה) [עֲלֵיהּ],
The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, since he initially ate the forbidden item and only then took an oath saying that he did not eat,
(חשובי) [אַחְשׁוֹבֵי]; אֶלָּא הָכָא מִי אַחְשְׁבֵיהּ?!
in taking the oath, he granted significance to the non-kosher food, and that is why his eating forbidden items is considered to be eating. But here, where he took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher food, did he thereby give significance to it? For this reason, no conclusive proof can be cited from the last case in the mishna.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל?
Rabbi Yoḥanan understands the mishna as referring to a case in which the oath takes effect because it is a more inclusive prohibition than the prohibition against eating non-kosher food, in that it adds additional prohibitions for the same individual. In this context, Rava says: What is the reasoning of the one who holds that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where there already is a prohibition in place?
מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַאִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף.
Rava answers his own question: It is just as it is in the case of an expanded prohibition, which incorporates additional people into the list of those for whom the original item is forbidden. An expanded prohibition also takes effect despite the fact that there is already a prohibition in place.
וּמַאן דְּפָטַר, דְּלֵית לֵיהּ? כִּי אָמַר אִיסּוּר מוֹסִיף – בַּחֲדָא חֲתִיכָה, בִּשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת לָא אָמְרִינַן.
And with regard to the one who exempts another from liability in the case of a more inclusive prohibition, as he does not hold that it takes effect, why does he hold that an expanded prohibition does take effect? When he says that an expanded prohibition takes effect, that is with regard to a single piece, i.e., that the number of people who are prohibited from eating the same piece of meat is expanded. With regard to two distinct pieces, i.e., a case where the new prohibition expands the scope of prohibited items, as in an inclusive prohibition, we do not say that it takes effect.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל, אָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תְּאֵנִים״, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים״ – מִיגּוֹ דְּחָיְילָא שְׁבוּעָה אַעֲנָבִים, חָיְילָא נָמֵי אַתְּאֵנִים.
§ And Rava says: According to the one who holds that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where another prohibition is already in place, the halakha should be as follows: When a person says: On my oath I will not eat figs, and then says: On my oath I will not eat figs and grapes, since the last oath takes effect with regard to the grapes, it also takes effect with regard to the figs, even though they were already forbidden by his previous oath.
פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו אָמְרִינַן, אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵעַצְמוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: Lest you say that we say that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect only with regard to a prohibition that occurs on its own, like the prohibition against eating non-kosher food, but with regard to a prohibition that occurs by the act of a person himself we do not say that the more inclusive prohibition takes effect, Rava teaches us that there is no difference.
מֵתִיב רָבָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה: יֵשׁ אוֹכֵל אֲכִילָה אַחַת, וְחַיָּיב עָלֶיהָ אַרְבַּע חַטָּאוֹת וְאָשָׁם אֶחָד; וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל חֵלֶב, וְהוּא נוֹתָר, מִן הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים.
Rava, son of Rabba, raises an objection from a mishna (Karetot 13b): It is possible for a person to perform one act of eating for which he is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. And these are the prohibitions one can violate in this manner: A ritually impure person who ate forbidden fat that is the leftover from one of the sacrificial animals on Yom Kippur. If he did this and was unaware of the relevant prohibitions he is liable to bring four sin-offerings, as well as a guilt-offering for deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property.
רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אַף אִם הָיְתָה שַׁבָּת וְהוֹצִיאוֹ – חַיָּיב. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵינוֹ מִן הַשֵּׁם.
Rabbi Meir says: Also, if it was Shabbat and he transferred the item from one domain to another in his mouth, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing labor on Shabbat as well. The Rabbis said to him: This is not a prohibition of the same type, since in the case of Rabbi Meir’s additional prohibition he does not violate it by eating.
וְאִם אִיתָא, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ חָמֵשׁ – כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תְּמָרִים וְחֵלֶב״, מִיגּוֹ דְּחָיְילָא שְׁבוּעָה אַתְּמָרִים, חָיְילָא נָמֵי אַחֵלֶב!
Rava, son of Rabba, explains the objection that arises from the mishna: And if it is so that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect, then you find a case where one is liable for the violation of five prohibitions in one act of eating, such as where one says in the aforementioned situation: On my oath I will not eat dates and forbidden fat. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the dates, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden fat. The fact that the mishna fails to mention such an oath indicates that a more inclusive prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition is already in place.
כִּי קָתָנֵי, אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו; אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵעַצְמוֹ לָא קָתָנֵי.
The Gemara answers: The absence of an oath with a more inclusive prohibition in the mishna does not indicate anything. When the tanna teaches the scenario above, he lists only the potential prohibitions that occur on their own in one act of eating, but he does not teach prohibitions that occur by the act of the person himself.
וַהֲרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ!
The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from consecrated property, which does not occur on its own but only when an item is consecrated?
בִּבְכוֹר, דִּקְדוּשָּׁתוֹ מֵרֶחֶם.
The Gemara answers: The case in the mishna is that of a first-born animal, whose sanctity is from the womb, i.e., begins automatically at birth.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי קָתָנֵי, מִידֵּי דְּלֵית לֵיהּ שְׁאֵלָה; שְׁבוּעָה דְּאִית לֵיהּ שְׁאֵלָה לָא קָתָנֵי.
If you wish, say instead, in response to the question, that when the tanna of the mishna teaches it, he includes only matters to which presenting a request for dissolution do not apply. An oath, to which a request for dissolution applies, is not taught.
הֲרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ!
The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from consecrated property? Consecration can be dissolved by a Sage.
הָא אוֹקְמִינַן בִּבְכוֹר.
The Gemara answers: Didn’t we already establish that the case in the mishna is that of a firstborn animal, whose sanctity cannot be dissolved?
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי קָתָנֵי, קׇרְבָּן קָבוּעַ; קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד לָא קָתָנֵי.
If you wish, say instead that when he teaches that case, he lists only those prohibitions for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. If one breaks his oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, and the tanna of the mishna does not teach about the liability to bring other offerings.
הֲרֵי טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל אֶת הַקֹּדֶשׁ – דְּקׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד הוּא!
The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna list the transgression of an impure person who ate consecrated items, i.e., the sacrificial animals mentioned in the mishna, which is a prohibition for which one brings a sliding-scale offering?
בְּנָשִׂיא, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא דְּאָמַר: נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא שָׂעִיר.
The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a king who eats the leftover of a sacrificial animal while impure, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: A ritually impure king who ate consecrated items brings a male goat as a sin-offering, rather than the sliding-scale offering brought by a commoner.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כִּי קָתָנֵי, מִידֵּי דְּבָעֵי שִׁיעוּר; שְׁבוּעָה דְּחָיְילָא אַפָּחוֹת מִכְּשִׁיעוּר, לָא קָתָנֵי.
Rav Ashi said there is a different answer: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only matters that apply when one eats the measure of an olive-bulk, whereas the case of an oath, which applies to eating even less than the standard measure, is not taught in the mishna.
הֲרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ!
The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property, which applies to eating even less than an olive-bulk?
הָא בָּעֵינַן שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה.
The Gemara answers: We require that one derive the value of one peruta of benefit in order to be liable, so that is also a prohibition to which standard measures apply.
וְרַב אָשֵׁי מֵאַוֵּירְיָא אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כִּי קָתָנֵי, זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת; זְדוֹנוֹ לָאו, לָא קָתָנֵי.
And Rav Ashi of Avireya said that Rabbi Zeira said: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only prohibitions for which intentional violation of them renders one liable to receive karet, and he does not teach prohibitions for which intentional violation of them renders one liable to receive lashes.
וַהֲרֵי אָשָׁם, דִּזְדוֹנוֹ לָאו, וְקָתָנֵי!
The Gemara asks: But isn’t the guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property, which is listed in the mishna, a prohibition for which intentional violation of it renders one liable to receive only lashes, not karet? And nevertheless the tanna of the mishna teaches it.
