Shevuot 28
אֲפִילּוּ כָּל שֶׁהוּא נָמֵי!
Even if he had left any amount it would also be possible for him to dissolve the oath, as he had not yet broken his oath.
אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ – מִיגּוֹ דְּמַהְנְיָא לֵיהּ שְׁאֵלָה אַכְּזַיִת בָּתְרָא, מַהְנְיָא לֵיהּ שְׁאֵלָה נָמֵי אַכְּזַיִת קַמָּא.
Rav Ashi answers: If you wish, say that the halakha stated by Rava is referring to a case where he took an oath, saying: I will not eat this loaf, and if you wish, say that it is referring to a case where he took an oath, saying: I will not eat it. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the halakha stated by Rava is referring to a case where he took an oath, saying: I will not eat this loaf. Since a request for dissolution is still effective even for the last olive-bulk of the loaf, it is effective also for the first olive-bulk.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״ – אִי שַׁיַּיר כְּזַיִת, חֲשִׁיב לְאִיתְּשׁוֹלֵי עֲלֵיהּ; וְאִי לָא, לָא חֲשִׁיב לְאִיתְּשׁוֹלֵי עֲלֵיהּ.
And if you wish, say that the halakha stated by Rava is referring to a case where he took an oath, saying: I will not eat it. If he left an olive-bulk, that is a sufficiently significant quantity for which to request dissolution of the oath. But if he did not leave that much, it is not a sufficiently significant quantity for which to request dissolution of the oath.
מֵיתִיבִי: מִי שֶׁנָּדַר שְׁתֵּי נְזִירוֹת, וּמָנָה רִאשׁוֹנָה וְהִפְרִישׁ עָלֶיהָ קׇרְבָּן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשְׁאַל עַל הָרִאשׁוֹנָה – עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה!
Rava assumes that once one has eaten the entire loaf, it is no longer possible to dissolve the oath. The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: With regard to one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term and separated an offering for it, and afterward requested and received dissolution of the first vow from a halakhic authority, the second term was counted for him in the observance of the first term and he is not required to be a nazirite further. Although the first term of naziriteship was entirely finished, a halakhic authority could still dissolve the vow.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּשֶׁלֹּא כִּיפֵּר.
The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he has not yet atoned, i.e., he has not yet brought the offerings that one brings at the conclusion of naziriteship.
וְהָתַנְיָא: כִּיפֵּר! בְּשֶׁלֹּא גִּלַּח – וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דְּאָמַר תִּגְלַחַת מְעַכְּבָא.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that one can still dissolve his vow of naziriteship after he has atoned? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he has brought the offerings but has not yet shaved his hair, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shaving is indispensable to the completion of naziriteship.
וְהָתַנְיָא: גִּלַּח! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נְזִירוֹת קָא רָמֵית? מִי גָּרַם לַשְּׁנִיָּה שֶׁלֹּא תָּחוּל – רִאשׁוֹנָה; וְאֵינָהּ.
The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that one can still dissolve his vow of naziriteship after he has shaved? Rav Ashi said: Are you comparing naziriteship to oaths? What caused the second naziriteship to not take effect until now? It was the first naziriteship, and once it has been dissolved, it is no longer a factor. Since the observance of the naziriteship term is the same whether it is counted for the second or the first, the first term of naziriteship can be regarded as not yet having started and that is why it can be dissolved. By contrast, in the case of the oath, once he ate the loaf, his oath is no longer extant at all.
אַמֵּימָר אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ אֲכָלָהּ כּוּלָּהּ, נִשְׁאָל עָלֶיהָ; אִי בְּשׁוֹגֵג – מְחוּסָּר קׇרְבָּן, אִי בְּמֵזִיד – מְחוּסָּר מַלְקוֹת. אֲבָל כְּפָתוּהוּ עַל הָעַמּוּד – לָא; כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כְּפָתוּהוּ עַל הָעַמּוּד וְרָץ מִבֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר.
Ameimar said, in contrast to the opinion of Rava: Even if he ate the entire loaf he may still request dissolution of the oath. If he ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the oath, it is a situation where he has not yet brought the offering he is liable to bring. If he ate it intentionally, it is a situation where he has not yet received lashes. But if he was already tied to the stake in order to receive lashes, he can no longer request that his oath be dissolved, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: If one had already been tied to the stake in order to receive lashes, and he ran away from the court and escaped, he is exempt from receiving lashes, as being tied to the stake is regarded as the beginning of receiving the lashes; once he has escaped, he is treated as though he were already flogged.
וְלָא הִיא; הָתָם רָץ, הָכָא לָא רָץ.
The Gemara rejects this: And that is not so. Even if he was tied to the stake he can still have his oath dissolved. There, with regard to his exemption from receiving lashes after he ran away, the original flogging is over and there is no need to initiate a new one. Here, with regard to dissolving the oath, he did not run, and since he is still subject to lashes, he can still have his oath dissolved.
אָמַר רָבָא: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ אִם אוֹכַל זוֹ״, וְאָכַל אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה בְּשׁוֹגֵג וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה בְּמֵזִיד – פָּטוּר. רִאשׁוֹנָה בְּמֵזִיד וּשְׁנִיָּה בְּשׁוֹגֵג – חַיָּיב. שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר.
§ Rava says: If one says: On my oath I will not eat that loaf if I eat this one, and then he ate the first one, i.e., the loaf whose consumption was the condition for the oath taking effect, unwittingly, and ate the second intentionally, he is exempt. Since he fulfilled the condition unintentionally, the oath does not take effect, as it was without full intent. But if he ate the first intentionally, knowing that if he eats it it will be prohibited for him to eat the other loaf, and he then ate the second unwittingly, he is liable to bring an offering for breaking his oath unwittingly. If he ate them both unwittingly he is exempt, as the oath does not take effect when he fulfills the condition unwittingly.
שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּמֵזִיד – אַכְלֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ וַהֲדַר אַכְלֵיהּ לְאִיסּוּרֵיהּ, מִיחַיַּיב; אַכְלֵיהּ לְאִיסּוּרֵיהּ וַהֲדַר אַכְלֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ, פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה, חַיָּיב; לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לָאו שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה, פָּטוּר.
In a case where he ate both of them intentionally, if he ate the loaf whose consumption was his condition and then ate the forbidden loaf, he is liable to receive lashes. If he ate the forbidden loaf and then ate the loaf whose consumption was his condition, his liability is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. According to the one who says that an uncertain forewarning is deemed a valid forewarning, he is liable to receive lashes. According to the one who says that an uncertain forewarning is not deemed a valid forewarning, he is exempt. Since when he was forewarned for eating the forbidden loaf it was uncertain whether it would actually become forbidden, that forewarning is not sufficient for him to be liable to receive lashes.
תְּלָאָן זוֹ בָּזוֹ – ״לֹא אוֹכַל זוֹ אִם אוֹכַל זוֹ״, ״לֹא אוֹכַל זוֹ אִם אוֹכַל זוֹ״; וְאָכַל זוֹ בִּזְדוֹן עַצְמָהּ וּבְשִׁגְגַת חֲבֶירְתָּהּ, וְזוֹ בִּזְדוֹן עַצְמָהּ וּבְשִׁגְגַת חֲבֶירְתָּהּ – פָּטוּר.
If one took an oath with regard to two loaves such that he rendered them interdependent, this one on that one, saying: I will not eat that if I eat this, and: I will not eat this if I eat that, and he ate this one intentionally with regard to itself, i.e., at the time he ate it he was aware that he had taken an oath that would render it forbidden if he ate the other, but unwittingly with regard to the other, i.e., he did not remember that in eating it he rendered the second one forbidden, and then he ate that one intentionally with regard to itself but unwittingly with regard to the other, he is exempt, as both conditions were fulfilled only unintentionally.
זוֹ בְּשִׁגְגַת עַצְמָהּ וּבְזָדוֹן חֲבֶירְתָּהּ, וְזוֹ בְּשִׁגְגַת עַצְמָהּ וּבִזְדוֹן חֲבֶירְתָּהּ – חַיָּיב.
If he ate this one unwittingly with regard to itself, having forgotten that it would be forbidden if he ate the other, but intentionally with regard to the other, understanding that with his action he rendered the other forbidden, and that one unwittingly with regard to itself but intentionally with regard to the other, he is liable to bring offerings for unwittingly breaking his oaths, as the conditions were fulfilled intentionally and the oaths took effect.
שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּשׁוֹגֵג – פָּטוּר.
If he ate both of them unwittingly he is exempt, as both conditions were fulfilled only unintentionally.
שְׁתֵּיהֶן בְּמֵזִיד – אַשְּׁנִיָּה מִיחַיַּיב, אַרִאשׁוֹנָה פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ.
If he ate both of them intentionally, he is liable to receive lashes for eating the second loaf, while for the first loaf his status depends on the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to an uncertain forewarning.
אָמַר רַב מָרִי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: אַרְבָּעָה נְדָרִים הִתִּירוּ חֲכָמִים – נִדְרֵי זֵרוּזִין, נִדְרֵי הֲבַאי, נִדְרֵי שְׁגָגוֹת, נִדְרֵי אֳונָסִין.
Rav Mari said: We learn in the mishna (Nedarim 20b) as well that if one takes an oath with a condition but then fulfills the condition only unwittingly, he is exempt: The Sages dissolved four types of vows without the requirement of a request to a halakhic authority: Vows of exhortation, vows of exaggeration, unwitting vows, and vows whose fulfillment is impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control.
נִדְרֵי שְׁגָגוֹת כֵּיצַד? ״קוּנָּם אִם אָכַלְתִּי וְאִם שָׁתִיתִי״, וְנִזְכַּר שֶׁאָכַל וְשָׁתָה; ״שֶׁאֵינִי אוֹכֵל שֶׁאֵינִי שׁוֹתֶה״, שָׁכַח וְאָכַל וְשָׁתָה – מוּתָּר. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁנִּדְרֵי שְׁגָגוֹת מוּתָּרִין, כָּךְ שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁגָגוֹת מוּתָּרוֹת.
The mishna elaborates (see Nedarim 25b): Unwitting vows, how so? If one says: A certain item is forbidden to me like an offering [konam] if I ate or if I drank, and he then remembers that he ate or drank, or if one says: This loaf is konam for me if I will eat or if I will drink, and he then forgets and eats or drinks, the item is permitted. And it is taught in a baraita with regard to that mishna: Just as unwitting vows are dissolved, so are unwitting oaths dissolved, since he fulfilled the condition while lacking awareness that he was doing so.
שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁגָגוֹת הֵיכִי דָּמֵי – לָאו כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of unwitting oaths? Is it not a case like this, where he takes an oath with a condition and then fulfills the condition of the oath unwittingly? Conclude from that mishna that there is support for Rava’s opinion.
עֵיפָא תָּנֵי שְׁבוּעוֹת בֵּי רַבָּה. פְּגַע בֵּיהּ אֲבִימִי אֲחוּהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי״ ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי״, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִישְׁתַּבַּשְׁתְּ, הֲרֵי יָצְאָה שְׁבוּעָה לַשֶּׁקֶר!
§ It is related that the Sage Eifa learned tractate Shevuot in the academy of Rabba. His brother Avimi met him and tested him concerning the halakhot of oaths. Avimi said to him: If one says: On my oath I did not eat, and then again: On my oath I did not eat, what is the halakha? Eifa said to him: He is liable only once if he ate. Avimi said to him: You have confused the issue. Since the oaths are about the past, it is not a question of whether the second oath takes effect. Each time, a false oath was issued, and each was a separate transgression.
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תֵּשַׁע וְעֶשֶׂר״, מַהוּ? חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִישְׁתַּבַּשְׁתְּ, אִי תֵּשַׁע לָא אָכֵיל, עֶשֶׂר לָא אָכֵיל!
Avimi asked him further: If one said: On my oath I will not eat nine pieces and on my oath I will not eat ten, what is the halakha? Eifa replied: He is liable for each and every one of the oaths, as the scope of the second oath is broader than that of the first. Avimi said to him: You have confused the issue: If he may not eat nine, he may not eat ten. The oath not to eat ten cannot take effect, since it is an action already prohibited by the oath not to eat nine.
״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל עֶשֶׂר וָתֵשַׁע״, מַהוּ? אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִישְׁתַּבַּשְׁתְּ, עֶשֶׂר הוּא דְּלָא אָכֵיל, הָא תֵּשַׁע מִיהָא אָכֵיל!
Avimi asked him further: If one said: On my oath I will not eat ten and on my oath I will not eat nine, what is the halakha? Eifa replied: He is liable for only one oath. Avimi said to him: You have confused the issue. According to the first oath, it is ten that he may not eat, but he may still eat nine, so the second oath takes effect, in that it prohibits him from eating nine.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: זִימְנִין דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ לְהָא דְּעֵיפָא, כִּדְמָר. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים״, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל תְּאֵנִים״;
Abaye said: There are times when you find that the ruling of Eifa with regard to an oath not to eat ten followed by an oath not to eat nine applies, as in the case mentioned by the Master. As Rabba says: In the case of one who says: On my oath I will not eat figs and grapes together, and then says: On my oath I will not eat figs,
