Shevuot 38
אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rather, no inference is to be learned from the mishna.
שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן כֵּיצַד? ״תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״ כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּלָל – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. פְּרָט – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁבוּעָה לֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לָךְ״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
§ The mishna teaches: What is the case of an oath on a deposit? It is where the claimant said to the defendant: Give me my deposit, which is in your possession, and the defendant replied: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, or the defendant said to him: Nothing of yours is in my possession; the claimant responded: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen. In either case this defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if he lied. The mishna then discusses a case where five people sued him and he took an oath denying all of their claims. With regard to this case, the Sages taught in a baraita: If he included all the denials in one oath, he is liable for only one false oath; if he specified them, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that if he said: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ, שְׁבוּעָה״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר שְׁבוּעָה לְכׇל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says that only if he said: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, on my oath, i.e., he said the word oath at the end, is he liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each individual claim unless he says: On my oath, to each and every claimant.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר – פְּרָטוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה; כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – פְּרָטוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The phrasing where one uses the conjunction: And, between denials is considered by Rabbi Meir to be a general denial and is considered by Rabbi Yehuda to be a specific denial; and the phrasing where one refrains from using the conjunction: And, is considered by Rabbi Yehuda to be a general denial and is considered by Rabbi Meir to be a specific denial.
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּ״וְלֹא לָךְ״ – שֶׁהוּא פְּרָט; לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּ״לֹא לָךְ״ – שֶׁרַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר פְּרָט, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר כְּלָל. וְאֵיזֶהוּ כְּלָלוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר? ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי״.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All concede in a case where the defendant says: And nothing of yours, that it is considered specific and that he is liable for his oath concerning each claim, even Rabbi Meir. They disagree only with regard to a case where the defendant said: Nothing of yours, without the conjunctive: And. As Rabbi Meir says: It is considered specific, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is considered general. And what is the case of a general denial according to Rabbi Meir, where one is liable for only one oath? It is the case where the defendant says, in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? שְׁמוּאֵל דָּיֵיק מִבָּרַיְיתָא, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דָּיֵיק מִמַּתְנִיתִין. שְׁמוּאֵל דָּיֵיק מִבָּרַיְיתָא: מִדְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״וְלֹא לָךְ״ פְּרָטָא הָוֵי – מִכְּלָל דְּשַׁמְעֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר כְּלָלָא הָוֵי, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: פְּרָטָא הָוֵי.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree that they explain the opinion of Rabbi Meir differently? The Gemara responds: Shmuel inferred his explanation from the baraita, and Rabbi Yoḥanan inferred his explanation from the mishna. The Gemara explains: Shmuel inferred his explanation from the baraita as follows: From the fact that Rabbi Yehuda says that the phrase: And nothing of yours, is considered a specific denial, for which one is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim, one may conclude by inference that Rabbi Yehuda understood that Rabbi Meir said that it is considered a general denial, and therefore, Rabbi Yehuda disagreed and said to him: No, it is considered a specific denial.
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: תַּרְוַיְיהוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר פְּרָטָא הָוֵי; וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: בִּ״וְלֹא לָךְ״ מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ, בְּ״לֹא לָךְ״ פְּלִיגְנָא עֲלָךְ. וּשְׁמוּאֵל – עַד דְּאוֹדִי לֵיהּ אוֹדוֹיֵי, לִפְלוֹג עֲלֵיהּ אִיפְּלוֹגֵי!
And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in response to this inference that the baraita can be explained differently: Both phrases: Nothing of yours, and: And nothing of yours, are deemed specific denials by Rabbi Meir; and Rabbi Yehuda said to him: With regard to: And nothing of yours, I concede to you that it is considered specific. But with regard to: Nothing of yours, I disagree with you and consider it a general denial. And Shmuel would respond: If that is so, then why does Rabbi Yehuda state in the baraita the instance in which he concedes to Rabbi Meir? Instead of conceding, let him disagree and state the instance in which they differ.
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דָּיֵיק מִמַּתְנִיתִין – מִדְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי״ – כְּלָלָא הָוֵי, מִכְּלָל דִּ״וְלֹא לָךְ״ – פְּרָטָא הָוֵי; דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ ״וְלֹא לָךְ״ כְּלָלָא הָוֵי – אַדְּמַשְׁמַע לַן ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי״, נַשְׁמְעִינַן ״שְׁבוּעָה לֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ״, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי״!
The Gemara proceeds to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: And Rabbi Yoḥanan inferred his explanation from the mishna as follows: From the fact that Rabbi Meir, who is the tanna associated with unattributed statements in the Mishna, says: If he addressed all of the claimants and said: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, it is deemed a general denial, one may conclude by inference that a denial phrased: And nothing of yours, is deemed specific. As if it would enter your mind that Rabbi Meir also deems: And nothing of yours, to be a general denial, then instead of teaching us that when one states in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, it is deemed general, let him teach us that when one states: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, it is general, and all the more so it would be clear that when one states in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, it is considered general.
וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״וְלֹא לָךְ״, כְּאוֹמֵר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי״ דָּמֵי.
And Shmuel says that one may interpret the statement of Rabbi Meir as follows: Anyone who says: And nothing of yours, is considered as though he says in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession.
תְּנַן: ״לֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ״! תְּנִי: ״לֹא לָךְ״.
The Gemara attempts to bring a proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: We learned in the mishna that if the defendant said: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim that he falsely denied. Evidently, Rabbi Meir deems: And nothing of yours, to be specific. The Gemara rejects the proof: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: Nothing of yours, nothing of yours, nothing of yours.
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד וְגָזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה״! תְּנִי: ״תְּשׂוּמֶת יָד גָּזֵל אֲבֵידָה״.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an additional proof from that which is taught in the mishna: In a case where the claimant says: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, and stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your deposit, or pledge, or stolen item, or lost item, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Evidently, by using the conjunction: Or, Rabbi Meir deems the denials specific, counter to the explanation of Shmuel. The Gemara rejects the proof: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: On my oath you do not have a deposit, a pledge, a stolen item, a lost item, in my possession.
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין״! תְּנִי: ״שְׂעוֹרִין כּוּסְּמִין״.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my wheat, and barley, and spelt that are in your possession, if the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, or barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. The mishna is therefore counter to the explanation of Shmuel. The Gemara rejects the proof: Again, emend the language of the mishna and teach: Wheat, barley, spelt, without the conjunction: Or.
וְהַאי תַּנָּא כֹּל הָכִי שָׁבֵישׁ תָּנֵי וְאָזֵיל?! אֶלָּא הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לָא שְׁנָא ״כְּזַיִת, כְּזַיִת״, וְלָא שְׁנָא ״כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת״ – פְּרָטָא הָוֵי.
The Gemara asks: But could it be that this tanna errs so much as he teaches the mishna? The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: According to Shmuel, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: There is no difference if one says: An olive-bulk an olive-bulk, and there is no difference if one says: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk; both are considered specific formulations.
תָּא שְׁמַע מִדִּידֵיהּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, אֲפִילּוּ ״חִטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְכוּסֶּמֶת״ – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. תְּנִי: ״חִטָּה שְׂעוֹרָה כּוּסֶּמֶת״.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from Rabbi Meir’s own statement in the mishna: Rabbi Meir says: Even if the defendant says: On my oath I do not have in my possession your grain of wheat, or grain of barley, or grain of spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Clearly, the conjunction: Or, renders the denial specific according to Rabbi Meir, counter to the explanation of Shmuel. The Gemara rejects the proof: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: On my oath I do not have in my possession a grain of wheat, a grain of barley, a grain of spelt of yours.
מַאי ״אֲפִילּוּ״? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: אֲפִילּוּ חִטָּה בִּכְלַל חִטִּין, וּשְׂעוֹרָה בִּכְלַל שְׂעוֹרִין, וְכוּסֶּמֶת בִּכְלַל כּוּסְּמִין.
The Gemara explains: What novelty is there in a case where one takes an oath in this manner, that Rabbi Meir says: Even? Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Even the singular form for wheat includes much wheat, and the singular form for barley includes much barley, and the singular form for spelt includes much spelt, i.e., although the defendant refers to the grains in the singular, his denial is referring to all wheat, all barley, and all spelt.
״תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד גָּזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״ כּוּ׳. ״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין״ – אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: פְּרוּטָה מִכּוּלָּם מִצְטָרֶפֶת.
§ The mishna teaches: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, etc. If the claimant said: Give me back my wheat and barley, and spelt, and the defendant responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, or barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If all of the wheat, barley, and spelt were collectively worth at least one peruta, then even if each type of grain was worth less than one peruta, their total value combines to render him liable.
פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא – חַד אָמַר: אַפְּרָטֵי מִיחַיַּיב, אַכְּלָלֵי לָא מִיחַיַּיב; וְחַד אָמַר: אַכְּלָלֵי נָמֵי מִיחַיַּיב.
Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to the ruling of the mishna. One says that when the mishna teaches that one is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim, it means that he is liable for the three specific denials of wheat, barley, and spelt, and he must bring three separate offerings; but he is not liable for the general oath taken at the beginning of his denial, i.e., when he said: On my oath I do not have in my possession. Accordingly, the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan was said with regard to the previous case in the mishna, where the defendant said: On my oath I do not have in my possession. And one says that he is liable also for the general oath taken at the beginning of his denial, so that the defendant is liable to bring a total of four offerings. Accordingly, even if the grains were worth only one peruta collectively and the defendant is not liable for any of the specific oaths, the defendant remains liable to bring an offering for the general oath according to Rabbi Yoḥanan.
וְהָתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הֲרֵי כָּאן חֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה חַטָּאוֹת; וְאִם אִיתָא – עֶשְׂרִים הָוְיָין! הַאי תַּנָּא – דִּפְרָטֵי קָא חָשֵׁיב, דִּכְלָלֵי לָא קָא חָשֵׁיב.
The Gemara questions the second opinion: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach in a baraita: If five people claimed from one defendant wheat, barley, and spelt, and the defendant took an oath denying each claim of each claimant, there are then fifteen sin-offerings here that the defendant is liable to bring? And if it is so that the defendant is liable for the general oath as well, there would be a total of twenty sin-offerings that he is liable to bring. The Gemara responds: That tanna calculated the defendant’s liability for the specific oaths; he did not calculate the defendant’s liability for the general oaths.
וְהָא תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: ״הֲרֵי כָּאן עֶשְׂרִים חַטָּאוֹת״! הָהִיא אַפִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד וְגָזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה.
The Gemara now questions the first opinion: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach in a different baraita: There are twenty sin-offerings here? Evidently, Rabbi Ḥiyya does calculate the general oaths. The Gemara responds: That baraita does not count the general oaths either; rather, it is referring to a different case entirely, where each of the five claimants claimed from the defendant a deposit and a pledge and a stolen item and a lost item.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הָיוּ חֲמִשָּׁה תּוֹבְעִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״תֵּן לָנוּ פִּקָּדוֹן תְּשׂוּמֶת יָד וְגָזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָנוּ בְּיָדְךָ״; אָמַר לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי פִּקָּדוֹן תְּשׂוּמֶת יָד גָּזֵל וַאֲבֵידָה, וְלֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ וְלֹא לָךְ״ – מַהוּ? אַחֲדָא מִיחַיַּיב,
Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In a case where five people were suing another and they said to him: Give us back our deposit, pledge, and stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant said to one of them: On my oath your deposit, pledge, stolen item, and lost item are not in my possession, and neither are yours, and neither are yours, and neither are yours, and neither are yours, what is the halakha? Is he liable for only one oath for each of the four claimants to whom he said: And neither are yours, since these are considered general oaths?
אוֹ דִלְמָא אַכׇּל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא מִיחַיַּיב?
Or perhaps he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim made by each claimant.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הֲרֵי כָּאן עֶשְׂרִים חַטָּאוֹת. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּפָרֵישׁ – רַבִּי חִיָּיא מִנְיָנָא אֲתָא לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ – וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ פְּרָטָא הָוֵי?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita: There are twenty sin-offerings here that the defendant must bring. The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If the defendant specified each claim of each of the claimants in his oath, does Rabbi Ḥiyya come to teach us a number? Obviously, the defendant is liable to bring twenty offerings. Rather, is it not that the baraita is referring to a case where he did not specify an oath to each claimant, but he specified it to the first claimant and said: And neither are yours, to each of the remaining claimants? And therefore, conclude from the baraita that such a denial is considered specific.
אָנַסְתָּ וּפִתִּיתָ אֶת בִּתִּי כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? הוֹאִיל וְעִיקַּר קְנָס הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ.
§ The mishna teaches that if one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is a false oath, and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from liability for a false oath on a deposit. The reason is that the payment for rape or seduction is a fine, and one does not pay a fine based on his own admission; therefore, he is also exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for having taken a false oath. The Rabbis hold that he is liable since he would have been liable to pay compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon holds that since the father is primarily claiming the fine and his claim to the other payments is secondary, the defendant is exempt from liability.
אָמַר רָבָא: מָשָׁל דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְאָדָם שֶׁאָמַר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי חִטִּין״; וְאִשְׁתְּכַח דְּחִטִּין הוּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ, הָא שְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין אִית לֵיהּ – דְּפָטוּר; דְּכִי אִשְׁתְּבַע אַחִטִּין – אַקּוּשְׁטָא מִשְׁתְּבַע.
Rava says: To what case is this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon compared? It is compared to a case where a person said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the other said to him: On my oath your wheat is not in my possession; and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is exempt from liability for an oath on a deposit, as when he took an oath with regard to the wheat, he took a truthful oath.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי?! הָתָם – בְּחִטִּין קָא כָפַר לֵיהּ, בִּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין לָא קָא כָפַר לֵיהּ. הָכָא – בְּכוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא הוּא דְּקָא כָפַר לֵיהּ! הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי כְּלָל״; וְאִשְׁתְּכַח חִטִּין הוּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ, הָא שְׂעוֹרִין וְכוּסְּמִין אִית לֵיהּ – דְּמִיחַיַּיב!
Abaye said to Rava: Are the two cases comparable? There, in the case of the grain, the defendant denies only the other’s claim of wheat, but he does not deny his claim of barley and spelt. Here, the defendant denies the entire matter, as he claims that he never raped or seduced the man’s daughter. Rather, this explanation is comparable only to a case where one said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the defendant said to him: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession at all, and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable for an oath on a deposit. This, then, cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, as he exempts the defendant from liability.
אֶלָּא כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְדִבְרֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן – קְנָס הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ, וְלֹא בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם; לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים – אַף בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ. בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ מִידֵּי דְּקִיץ, וְתָבַע מִידֵּי דְּלָא קִיץ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא שָׁבֵיק מִידֵּי דְּכִי מוֹדֵה בֵּיהּ לָא מִיפְּטַר, וְתָבַע מִידֵּי דְּכִי מוֹדֵה בֵּיהּ מִיפְּטַר.
Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: According to the statement of Rabban Shimon, the father is claiming only the fine and not the compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from his daughter’s having been raped or seduced. According to the statement of the Rabbis, he is also claiming payment for humiliation and degradation resulting from her having been raped or seduced. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds: A person does not forgo a claim to something with a fixed value, such as a fine, and claim something whose value is not fixed and requires an appraisal, such as humiliation and degradation resulting from being raped or seduced. And the Rabbis hold that one does not forgo a claim to something that the defendant is not exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, and claim something that the defendant is exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, such as a fine.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין – הַטַּעֲנָה שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף, וְהַהוֹדָאָה בְּשָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה. וְאִם אֵין הַהוֹדָאָה מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה – פָּטוּר.
MISHNA: By Torah law, the oath imposed by the judges upon one who admits to part of a claim is administered only when the claim is for the value of at least two silver ma’a, and the defendant’s admission is for the value of at least one peruta. And furthermore, if the admission is not of the same type as the claim, i.e., the defendant admitted to a debt that the claimant did not claim, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath.
כֵּיצַד? ״שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא פְּרוּטָה״ – פָּטוּר. ״שְׁתֵּי כֶּסֶף וּפְרוּטָה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא פְּרוּטָה״ – חַיָּיב.
How so? If the claimant said to the defendant: I have two silver ma’a in your possession, and the latter responded: You have only one peruta, a coin made from copper, in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath (see 39b). But if the claimant said: I have two silver ma’a and one peruta in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only one peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath.
״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – פָּטוּר. ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא חֲמִשִּׁים דִּינָר״ – חַיָּיב.
If the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt, as he denies the entire claim. But if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim.
״מָנָה לְאַבָּא בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא חֲמִישִּׁים דִּינָר״ – פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה.
If the claimant said: My late father had one hundred dinars in your possession, and I am now claiming them, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he is like one returning a lost item, since he could have easily denied the entire claim.
״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ ״הֵן״; לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ: ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, ״נְתַתִּיו לָךְ״ – פָּטוּר. ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״ – חַיָּיב.
§ The mishna discusses other cases where the defendant denies an entire claim. In a case where one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, I acknowledge that claim; and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. But if he responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, i.e., he denies that a debt ever existed, he is liable to pay, as he already admitted that he owed him the amount.
״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, אָמַר לוֹ ״הֵן״; ״אַל תִּתְּנֵהוּ לִי אֶלָּא בְּעֵדִים״, לְמָחָר אָמַר לוֹ ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, ״נְתַתִּיו לָךְ״ – חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לִיתְּנוֹ בְּעֵדִים.
In a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant said to him: Yes, to which the claimant responded: Give the money to me only in the presence of witnesses, then if the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is liable to pay, as he is required to give it to him in the presence of witnesses, and he cannot prove that he did so.
״לִיטְרָא זָהָב יֵשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא לִיטְרָא כֶּסֶף״ – פָּטוּר. ״דִּינַר זָהָב יֵשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא דִּינָר כֶּסֶף וּטְרֵיסִית וּפוּנְדָּיוֹת וּפְרוּטָה״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַכֹּל מִין מַטְבֵּעַ אַחַת.
§ The mishna resumes discussion of the oath imposed by the court in a case where the defendant admits to a part of a claim. If the claimant said: I have a litra, i.e., a specific weight, of gold in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a litra of silver in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as his admission relates to a different item than that which the claim relates to. But if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Since the claim concerns money, the difference between the different types of coins is disregarded, as the claim is essentially referring to the monetary value, not to a specific type of coin.
״כּוֹר תְּבוּאָה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא לֶתֶךְ קִטְנִית״ – פָּטוּר. ״כּוֹר פֵּירוֹת לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא לֶתֶךְ קִטְנִית״ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַקִּטְנִית בִּכְלַל פֵּירוֹת.
If the claimant said: I have a kor of grain in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half-kor of legumes in my possession, he is exempt. But if the claimant said: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half-kor of legumes in my possession, he is liable, as legumes are included in produce.
טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין, וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בִּשְׂעוֹרִין – פָּטוּר. וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מְחַיֵּיב.
If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. According to Rabban Gamliel, one who admits to a part of the claim is liable to take an oath even if the admission is not of the same type as the claim.
הַטּוֹעֵן לַחֲבֵירוֹ בְּכַדֵּי שֶׁמֶן, וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּקַנְקַנִּים – אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְהוֹדָה לוֹ מִקְצָת מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה, יִשָּׁבַע. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין הַהוֹדָאָה מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.
With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter then admitted that he owes him pitchers, i.e., the jugs themselves, but not the oil, Admon says: Since he admitted to him with regard to a part of the claim, and his admission was of the same type as the claim, i.e., the claim included both containers and oil and he admitted to owing him containers, he must take an oath. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as he completely denied owing him oil. Rabban Gamliel said: I see the statement of Admon as correct.
טְעָנוֹ כֵּלִים וְקַרְקָעוֹת; וְהוֹדָה בַּכֵּלִים וְכָפַר בַּקַּרְקָעוֹת, בַּקַּרְקָעוֹת וְכָפַר בַּכֵּלִים – פָּטוּר. הוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת הַקַּרְקָעוֹת – פָּטוּר. בְּמִקְצָת הַכֵּלִים – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהַנְּכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת זוֹקְקִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחְרָיוּת לִישָּׁבַע עֲלֵיהֶן.
If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath, as oaths are not taken concerning claims involving land. If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the entire claim, as property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that the oath about the movable property can be extended to require him to take an oath concerning the land as well.
אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, וְאֵין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אֶת הַקָּטָן; אֲבָל נִשְׁבָּעִין לַקָּטָן וְלַהֶקְדֵּשׁ.
One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. And the court does not administer an oath to a minor. But one does take an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury with regard to consecrated property.
גְּמָ׳ הֵיכִי מַשְׁבְּעִינַן לֵיהּ? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ בִּשְׁבוּעָה הָאֲמוּרָה בְּתוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ בַּה׳ אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם״.
GEMARA: How does the court administer an oath to someone who is liable to take an oath? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The court administers to him the oath stated in the Torah, as it is written in Abraham’s instruction to his servant: “And I will make you swear by the Lord, the God of heaven” (Genesis 24:3).
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: כְּמַאן – כְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר אִידִי, דְּאָמַר: בָּעֵינַן שֵׁם הַמְיוּחָד?
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In accordance with whose opinion is Rav’s statement? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Idi, who says that when one is liable to take an oath, we require him to take it using the ineffable name of God?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי בְּכִינּוּי; וְנָפְקָא מִינַּהּ צְרִיךְ לְאַתְפּוֹשֵׂי חֶפְצָא בִּידֵיהּ.
Rav Ashi said to him: You may even say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one is merely required to take an oath using an appellation of God. And the practical ramification of Rav’s statement is that just as in the aforementioned verse, Abraham said: “Please put your hand under my thigh, and I will make you swear” (Genesis 24:2–3), instructing his servant to grasp his circumcised penis, which is considered sacred to some degree, so too, in oaths administered by the court, one must grasp a sacred item in his hand while taking the oath.
וְכִדְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הַאי דַּיָּינָא דְּאַשְׁבַּע ״בַּה׳ אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם״ – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁטָּעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה, וְחוֹזֵר. וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַאי דַּיָּינָא דְּאַשְׁבַּע בִּתְפִלִּין – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁטָּעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה, וְחוֹזֵר.
And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava; as Rava said: This judge who administers an oath “by the Lord, the God of heaven,” without instructing the litigant to grasp a sacred item, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath. And Rav Pappa said: This judge who administers an oath in which the litigant grasps phylacteries, not a Torah scroll, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא. הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא – דְּהָא לָא נָקֵיט חֶפְצָא בִּידֵיהּ; וְלֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא – דְּהָא נָקֵיט חֶפְצָא בִּידֵיהּ.
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that if the litigant merely took an oath using the ineffable name of God, he is required to take another oath, as he was not grasping any sacred item in his hand; but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, that if the litigant was grasping phylacteries he is required to take another oath, as he was grasping a sacred item in his hand, even though it was not a Torah scroll.
שְׁבוּעָה מְעוּמָּד; תַּלְמִיד חָכָם – מְיוּשָּׁב. שְׁבוּעָה בְּסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה; תַּלְמִיד חָכָם – לְכַתְּחִלָּה בִּתְפִלִּין.
One takes an oath while standing, but a Torah scholar takes an oath while sitting. One takes an oath grasping a Torah scroll ab initio, but a Torah scholar may take an oath grasping phylacteries ab initio.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁבוּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין, אַף הִיא בִּלְשׁוֹנָהּ נֶאֶמְרָה.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: An oath imposed by the judges may also be recited in its language, i.e., in any language spoken by the one taking the oath. It is not required that the oath be in Hebrew.
אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: הֱוֵי יוֹדֵעַ,
Before he takes the oath, the judges say to him: Be aware
