In what categories do the laws of substitution not apply? Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis learn these out from different places. Rabbi Shimon adds an additional category and Rava tries to understand what exactly he was referring to. Why are the laws of substitution repeated in the laws on animal tithes?
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Temurah 13
שָׁלֹשׁ שָׂדוֹת וּשְׁתֵּי מַעֲנוֹת. וְכַמָּה מְלֹא מַעֲנֶה? מֵאָה אַמָּה, כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַחוֹרֵשׁ אֶת הַקֶּבֶר — עוֹשֶׂה בֵּית הַפְּרָס מְלֹא מַעֲנֶה מֵאָה אַמָּה.
A beit haperas extends over three fields, the field that was plowed and the two adjacent fields in the direction it was plowed. For example, if one plowed the field from north to south, each of the fields adjacent to it on the north and south is also considered a beit haperas. But whereas the plowed field is a beit haperas in its entirety, the two adjacent fields are a beit haperas only to the extent of two furrows, one furrow on each side. And how much is the full length of a furrow [ma’ana]? It is one hundred cubits, as it is taught in a mishna (Oholot 17:1): One who plows a field containing a grave, and who may have strewn the bones throughout the field, renders the field a beit haperas up to the full length of a furrow, which is one hundred cubits.
וְאֵין תְּרוּמָה אַחַר תְּרוּמָה כּוּ׳. מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁתָּרְמוּ זֶה אַחַר זֶה, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: תְּרוּמַת שְׁנֵיהֶם תְּרוּמָה.
§ The mishna teaches: And there is no teruma after teruma. Once one designates produce from his crop as teruma, if he then designates additional produce from that crop as teruma, it is not teruma. The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:3): In the case of joint owners of produce who separated teruma one after the other, Rabbi Eliezer says: The teruma of both of them is teruma, as each is considered to have separated from his share of the produce.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין תְּרוּמַת שְׁנֵיהֶם תְּרוּמָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם תָּרַם הָרִאשׁוֹן כַּשִּׁיעוּר — אֵין תְּרוּמַת הַשֵּׁנִי תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לֹא תָּרַם כַּשִּׁיעוּר — תְּרוּמַת הַשֵּׁנִי תְּרוּמָה.
Rabbi Akiva says: The teruma of neither of them is teruma. Since each separated teruma independently, it is clear that neither accepts the separation of the other, and therefore neither is valid. And the Rabbis say: If the first one separated teruma of the correct measure, i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce, the produce is thereby tithed, and therefore the teruma of the second is not teruma; but if the first did not separate teruma of the correct measure, and he separated too little, the teruma of the second is teruma.
וְאֵין תְּמוּרָה עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה כּוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּתְמוּרָתוֹ״, וְלֹא תְּמוּרַת תְּמוּרָתוֹ.
§ The mishna teaches: And a substitute animal that was consecrated when it was substituted for a consecrated animal does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute; rather, it remains non-sacred. The Gemara explains: What is the reason, i.e., the source for this halakha in the Torah? The verse states: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10). The verse teaches that the halakha of substitution applies only to a consecrated animal and its substitute, but not the substitute of its substitute.
וְאֵין הַוָּלָד עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה. דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״ — הוּא וְלֹא וָלָד.
§ The mishna teaches: And the offspring born of a consecrated animal that was not consecrated itself does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara explains: The reason for this is that the verse states: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10), which teaches that only it, a consecrated animal, but not its offspring, renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הַוָּלָד עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה. דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״יִהְיֶה״ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַוָּלָד. וְרַבָּנַן: לְרַבּוֹת שׁוֹגֵג כְּמֵזִיד.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: The offspring renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda reasons that when the verse states: “Shall be sacred,” this serves to include the offspring. The Gemara adds: And as for the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot substitute for the offspring of a consecrated animal, they maintain that this phrase serves to include one who substitutes unwittingly, so that the substitution is valid as if he had done so intentionally.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹפוֹת וְהַמְּנָחוֹת אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא בְּהֵמָה. הַצִּיבּוּר וְהַשּׁוּתָּפִין אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר״. יָחִיד עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה, וְאֵין הַצִּבּוּר וְהַשּׁוּתָּפִין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה. קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה.
MISHNA: The birds sacrificed as offerings, i.e., doves and pigeons, and the meal offerings do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes, as only the term “an animal” is stated with regard to substitution, in the verse: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal” (Leviticus 27:10). A consecrated animal belonging to the community or to partners does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is stated in the same verse: “He shall neither exchange it nor substitute it.” One derives from the singular pronoun in the verse that an individual renders a non-sacred animal a substitute, but the community and partners do not render a non-sacred animal a substitute. Items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וַהֲרֵי מַעֲשֵׂר בַּכְּלָל הָיָה, וְלָמָּה יָצָא?
Rabbi Shimon said: The fact that animals belonging to the community or partners do not render animals exchanged for them substitutes is derived as follows: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out in the verse: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord. He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute for it; and if he substitutes it, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32–33)?
לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה מַעֲשֵׂר — קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, יָצְאוּ קׇרְבְּנוֹת צִבּוּר; וּמָה מַעֲשֵׂר — קׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ, יָצְאוּ קׇרְבָּנוֹת בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת.
Rabbi Shimon explains: It was singled out to juxtapose substitution to the animal tithe, to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is brought exclusively as an individual offering, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are individual offerings, excluding communal offerings and the offerings of partners from the halakha of substitution. And just as the animal tithe is an offering sacrificed on the altar, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are offerings sacrificed on the altar, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance from the halakha of substitution.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יָכוֹל יְהוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״קׇרְבָּן״ — מִי שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״, יָצְאוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת שֶׁלֹּא נִקְרְאוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״.
GEMARA: According to the mishna, items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. The Sages taught in a baraita: One might have thought that items consecrated for Temple maintenance render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of which men bring an offering to the Lord…he shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad” (Leviticus 27:9–10). This teaches that the halakha of substitution applies to that which is called an offering, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not called an offering.
וְלָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: אִי ״קׇרְבָּן״ — שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי אֲפִילּוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת, שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״, כָּעִנְיָן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַנַּקְרֵב אֶת קׇרְבַּן ה׳ וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara asks: And are items consecrated for Temple maintenance not called offerings? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or who slaughters it outside the camp, and has not brought it to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). If the verse had mentioned just the word “offering,” I would derive that the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple applies even to items consecrated for Temple maintenance, as they too are called offerings, as is stated in the matter of the spoils of the war against Midian: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). These were certainly not items consecrated for the altar.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״ — כׇּל הַבָּא אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּא לְפֶתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ. אַלְמָא אִיקְּרוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״.
The baraita continues: Therefore the verse states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:4), to teach that for any item that is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, i.e., that is fit to be sacrificed, one is liable for it due to the prohibition against slaughtering offerings outside of the Temple courtyard. And by contrast, for any animal that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for it due to the prohibition against slaughtering offerings outside of the Temple courtyard. Evidently, as a verse is necessary to exclude items consecrated for Temple maintenance, such items are generally called an offering, contrary to the first baraita cited.
אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָא רַבָּנַן. לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אִיקְּרִי ״קׇרְבָּן״, לְרַבָּנַן לָא אִיקְּרִי ״קׇרְבָּן״.
Rabbi Ḥanina said: This is not difficult. This second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, whereas that first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, items consecrated for Temple maintenance are in fact called an offering, and therefore in the mishna he derives that items consecrated for Temple maintenance are excluded from the halakhot of substitution from the juxtaposition with the animal tithe, not from word “offering.” According to the opinion of the Rabbis, items consecrated for Temple maintenance are not called an offering, and they therefore derive the halakha from the word “offering.”
וְלָא? וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַנַּקְרֵב אֶת קׇרְבַּן ה׳״! ״קׇרְבַּן ה׳״ אִיקְּרִי, ״קׇרְבָּן לַה׳״ לָא אִיקְּרִי.
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, are items consecrated for Temple maintenance not called an offering? But isn’t it written: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering” (Numbers 31:50)? The Gemara answers: These items are called: “The Lord’s offering,” but they are not called: “An offering to the Lord,” which is used only with regard to offerings sacrificed upon the altar.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״לֹא יְבַקֵּר בֵּין טוֹב לָרַע וְלֹא יְמִירֶנּוּ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אוֹתוֹ טוֹב בְּרָעוְגוֹ׳״.
§ The mishna teaches that consecrated animals belonging to the community or to partners are not included in the halakha of substitution. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute it; and if he substitute it at all, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33). Why is the issue of substitution stated here in connection to the animal tithe? Isn’t it already stated earlier: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good, and if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10)?
לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אוֹתוֹ״, מַשְׁמַע קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, קׇרְבַּן צִבּוּר, וְקׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ וְקׇרְבַּן בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לֹא יְבַקֵּר״.
Since it is stated: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it,” the verse apparently indicates that all types of offering are included, whether an individual offering or a communal offering, and whether it is an offering sacrificed on the altar or an offering consecrated for Temple maintenance. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “He shall not inquire.”
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וַהֲרֵי מַעֲשֵׂר בַּכְּלָל הָיָה, וְלָמָּה יָצָא? לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה מַעֲשֵׂר קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, וְקׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ, וְדָבָר שֶׁבָּא בְּחוֹבָה, וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת — אַף כֹּל קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, וְקׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ, וְדָבָר שֶׁבָּא בְּחוֹבָה,
Rabbi Shimon said in explanation: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out? It is to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is an individual offering, and an offering sacrificed on the altar, and it is an item that comes only as an obligation, not as a gift offering, and it is an item that is not brought in partnership, but only by an individual, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred must be an individual offering, and an offering sacrificed on the altar, and it must be an item that comes only as an obligation,
וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּא בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת.
and it must be an item that is not brought in partnership.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: לָמָּה יָצָא מַעֲשֵׂר מֵעַתָּה? לִידּוֹן בִּ״תְמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ״ וּבִ״תְמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ״.
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Why was the animal tithe singled out of all offerings as subject to substitution now, after the halakha of substitution was stated in general? It serves to discuss a special halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that of substitution of its name. If, when the animals emerge from the pen to be tithed, the one counting them errs and calls the tenth animal the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, they are both sanctified. The animal that actually emerges tenth is the animal tithe, while the eleventh animal is consecrated as a peace offering. And since this halakha of a substitution of its name applies only to the animal tithe, it is necessary to teach that the general halakha of the substitution of its body, i.e., regular substitution, applies to it as well.
לוֹמַר לָךְ: תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ — קְרֵיבָה, תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ — אֵינָהּ קְרֵיבָה; תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ — נִגְאֶלֶת, תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ — אֵינָהּ נִגְאֶלֶת.
Furthermore, the verse tells you other halakhot unique to the animal tithe: An animal that is the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is sacrificed upon the altar as a peace offering, whereas the substitute of its body is not sacrificed at all. But for all other offerings, substitutes hold the same status as the animal for which they were substituted. Another difference is that the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is redeemed when it develops a blemish, like a peace offering, and the proceeds of the sale belong to the Temple treasury, whereas the substitute of its body is not redeemed, as it is stated with regard to the animal tithe: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33).
תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ — חָלָה עַל דָּבָר הָרָאוּי וְעַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי, וּתְמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ — אֵינָהּ חָלָה אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר הָרָאוּי בִּלְבַד.
Finally, the sanctity of the substitution of the body of an animal tithe takes effect upon both an item that is fit for sacrifice upon the altar and upon an item that is unfit for sacrifice, e.g., a blemished animal, as the sanctity of the animal tithe can apply even to a blemished animal, but the substitution of its name takes effect only upon an item that is fit for sacrifice. If the animal that was mistakenly called the tenth is blemished, it is not consecrated.
אָמְרִי: מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ, אִיגְּרוֹעֵי אִיגְּרַע? אִין, דְּאָמְרִינַן: מַאי דְּרַבִּי — רַבִּי, וּמַאי דְּלָא רַבִּי — לָא רַבִּי.
The Sages say in response to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Simply because the Merciful One includes a unique halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that it has the substitution of its name, would one assume that it is diminished, and the halakha of regular substitution does not apply to it? The Gemara answers: Yes, one can make such a claim, as we say: That which the verse included with regard to a particular halakha, it included, and that which it did not include, it did not include. Since the passage initially addresses substitution of name solely with regard to the animal tithe, one could assume that this is the only substitution that applies to it.
וְהָא מֵהֵיכָא תֵּיתֵי? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה דָּבָר הַבָּא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ, וְאֵין בּוֹ אֶלָּא חִידּוּשׁוֹ בִּלְבָד.
The Gemara asks: And from where would this be derived, that in this case we should assume only that which is specifically mentioned? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is derived since this is a case of a matter, i.e., the animal tithe, where the Torah comes to discuss a novel matter, i.e., substitution of name, and as a rule, in such cases the object of discussion has only its novelty, and one cannot infer the applicability of additional principles. It was therefore necessary for a verse to teach that substitution of body, which applies to all other offerings, applies to the animal tithe as well.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא: לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר דָּבָר הַבָּא בְּחוֹבָה — עוֹלַת חוֹבָה הִיא דְּעָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, הָא עוֹלַת נְדָבָה — לָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עוֹלַת נְדָבָה נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקַבְּלַהּ עֲלֵיהּ — עַבְדַּהּ תְּמוּרָה.
§ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said earlier that the halakha of substitution applies only to offerings that come as an obligation, should one conclude that it is only an obligatory burnt offering that renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute, but a voluntary burnt offering does not? Rava said to him: A voluntary burnt offering also falls under the category of obligatory offerings. Since he accepted upon himself to bring a voluntary burnt offering, it is considered an obligation for him, and therefore it renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute.
וְלֹא נִצְרְכָה, אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת.
Rava adds: And this qualification mentioned by Rabbi Shimon is necessary only to exclude a burnt offering that came from surplus funds. For example, if one set aside a certain sum of money for a sin offering or a guilt offering, and after purchasing his animal some of the money remained, he must purchase a burnt offering with that money. The halakha of substitution does not apply to such an animal.
מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר לַהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת צִבּוּר אָזְלִי — פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלָא עָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, הָא אֵין תְּמוּרָה בְּצִבּוּר!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: The Sages disputed the use of surplus money. Some say that it must go toward the purchase of communal burnt offerings, whereas Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the owner himself must purchase a voluntary burnt offering. What does Rabbi Shimon hold in this regard? If he holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward communal gift offerings, then it is obvious that this offering does not render a substitute, as it is explicitly taught that there is no substitution with regard to a communal offering. Rabbi Shimon’s statement would then be redundant.
אֶלָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת יָחִיד אָזְלִי. מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר! הָא שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ בְּהֶדְיָא דְּעָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה״, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!
Rather, say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward the voluntary burnt offering of an individual. But this too is problematic, as whom did you hear who holds this reasoning? It is Rabbi Eliezer, but we heard that Rabbi Eliezer explicitly stated that such an animal renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute. As it is taught in a baraita: A burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it consecrated as a substitute. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, וְאִיהוּ סָבַר: אֵין עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one matter, that surplus funds go toward an individual voluntary burnt offering, and disagrees with him with regard to another matter, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and he, Rabbi Shimon, maintains that it does not render it a substitute.
אִי הָכִי, דְּבָעֵי רַבִּי אָבִין: הִפְרִישׁ אָשָׁם לְהִתְכַּפֵּר בּוֹ, וְהֵמִיר בּוֹ, וְנִתְכַּפֵּר בְּאָשָׁם אַחֵר, וְנִיתַּק זֶה לְעוֹלָה — מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחְזוֹר וְיָמִיר בּוֹ?
The Gemara objects: If so, consider that dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin: If one separated an animal as a guilt offering by which to achieve atonement, and he effected substitution for it, and then that original guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which he subsequently lost, and the owner achieved atonement by bringing yet another animal as a guilt offering; and then this lost animal was found and consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, what is the halakha as to whether he can again effect substitution for it? In this case, the animal in question is a burnt offering that came from surplus funds.
אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הָא אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת אֵין עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה!
In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you said that Rabbi Shimon maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. There would therefore be no dilemma at all. This is problematic, because the dilemma assumes that one cannot effect substitution twice for the same animal, which is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
רַבִּי אָבִין הָכִי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: אִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ תַּנָּא דְּקָאֵי כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר אֵין מְמִירִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְמִירִין, וּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחְזוֹר וְיָמִיר בּוֹ?
The Gemara explains that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Avin was raising: If a tanna is found who holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one cannot effect substitution once and again effect substitution for the same consecrated animal, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, what is his opinion as to whether one can again effect substitution with the animal in question?
בִּשְׁנֵי גוּפִין וּקְדוּשָּׁה אַחַת, מַאי?
As explained earlier (9b), Rabbi Avin’s dilemma was first posed with regard to two bodies, i.e., two different animals, and one type of sanctity, e.g., in a case where one separated an animal as a guilt offering, and he effected substitution for it, and the animal he separated as a guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which assumed the same status of a guilt offering. What is the halakha as to whether one can substitute for this replacement? Do we say that since it is a different animal from the one for which he initially effected substitution, the second substitution is effective? Or perhaps, since it possesses the same sanctity as the original animal, one cannot effect substitution for it.
וְאִם תִּימְצָא לוֹמַר: קְדוּשָּׁה אַחַת (אוֹ לָא), אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי קְדוּשּׁוֹת וְגוּף אֶחָד, מַאי? תִּיבְּעֵי.
And then Rabbi Avin further asked: If you say that in the above case one cannot effect substitution for the animal, perhaps this is only because the two animals possess one sanctity. But in a case of two sanctities and one body, what is the halakha? For example, if one consecrated a guilt offering and effected substitution for it, and he subsequently lost it and atoned using another animal, and he then found it again, such that the original animal must now be consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, does one say that since the animal now possesses a different sanctity he can effect further substitution for it? The Gemara concludes: According to that tanna, the dilemma remains unresolved [tiba’ei].
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַכֹּל מְמִירִין.
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Temurah 13
שָׁלֹשׁ שָׂדוֹת וּשְׁתֵּי מַעֲנוֹת. וְכַמָּה מְלֹא מַעֲנֶה? מֵאָה אַמָּה, כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַחוֹרֵשׁ אֶת הַקֶּבֶר — עוֹשֶׂה בֵּית הַפְּרָס מְלֹא מַעֲנֶה מֵאָה אַמָּה.
A beit haperas extends over three fields, the field that was plowed and the two adjacent fields in the direction it was plowed. For example, if one plowed the field from north to south, each of the fields adjacent to it on the north and south is also considered a beit haperas. But whereas the plowed field is a beit haperas in its entirety, the two adjacent fields are a beit haperas only to the extent of two furrows, one furrow on each side. And how much is the full length of a furrow [ma’ana]? It is one hundred cubits, as it is taught in a mishna (Oholot 17:1): One who plows a field containing a grave, and who may have strewn the bones throughout the field, renders the field a beit haperas up to the full length of a furrow, which is one hundred cubits.
וְאֵין תְּרוּמָה אַחַר תְּרוּמָה כּוּ׳. מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁתָּרְמוּ זֶה אַחַר זֶה, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: תְּרוּמַת שְׁנֵיהֶם תְּרוּמָה.
§ The mishna teaches: And there is no teruma after teruma. Once one designates produce from his crop as teruma, if he then designates additional produce from that crop as teruma, it is not teruma. The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:3): In the case of joint owners of produce who separated teruma one after the other, Rabbi Eliezer says: The teruma of both of them is teruma, as each is considered to have separated from his share of the produce.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין תְּרוּמַת שְׁנֵיהֶם תְּרוּמָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם תָּרַם הָרִאשׁוֹן כַּשִּׁיעוּר — אֵין תְּרוּמַת הַשֵּׁנִי תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לֹא תָּרַם כַּשִּׁיעוּר — תְּרוּמַת הַשֵּׁנִי תְּרוּמָה.
Rabbi Akiva says: The teruma of neither of them is teruma. Since each separated teruma independently, it is clear that neither accepts the separation of the other, and therefore neither is valid. And the Rabbis say: If the first one separated teruma of the correct measure, i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce, the produce is thereby tithed, and therefore the teruma of the second is not teruma; but if the first did not separate teruma of the correct measure, and he separated too little, the teruma of the second is teruma.
וְאֵין תְּמוּרָה עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה כּוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּתְמוּרָתוֹ״, וְלֹא תְּמוּרַת תְּמוּרָתוֹ.
§ The mishna teaches: And a substitute animal that was consecrated when it was substituted for a consecrated animal does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute; rather, it remains non-sacred. The Gemara explains: What is the reason, i.e., the source for this halakha in the Torah? The verse states: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10). The verse teaches that the halakha of substitution applies only to a consecrated animal and its substitute, but not the substitute of its substitute.
וְאֵין הַוָּלָד עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה. דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״ — הוּא וְלֹא וָלָד.
§ The mishna teaches: And the offspring born of a consecrated animal that was not consecrated itself does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara explains: The reason for this is that the verse states: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10), which teaches that only it, a consecrated animal, but not its offspring, renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הַוָּלָד עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה. דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״יִהְיֶה״ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַוָּלָד. וְרַבָּנַן: לְרַבּוֹת שׁוֹגֵג כְּמֵזִיד.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: The offspring renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda reasons that when the verse states: “Shall be sacred,” this serves to include the offspring. The Gemara adds: And as for the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot substitute for the offspring of a consecrated animal, they maintain that this phrase serves to include one who substitutes unwittingly, so that the substitution is valid as if he had done so intentionally.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹפוֹת וְהַמְּנָחוֹת אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא בְּהֵמָה. הַצִּיבּוּר וְהַשּׁוּתָּפִין אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר״. יָחִיד עוֹשֶׂה תְּמוּרָה, וְאֵין הַצִּבּוּר וְהַשּׁוּתָּפִין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה. קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת אֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה.
MISHNA: The birds sacrificed as offerings, i.e., doves and pigeons, and the meal offerings do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes, as only the term “an animal” is stated with regard to substitution, in the verse: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal” (Leviticus 27:10). A consecrated animal belonging to the community or to partners does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is stated in the same verse: “He shall neither exchange it nor substitute it.” One derives from the singular pronoun in the verse that an individual renders a non-sacred animal a substitute, but the community and partners do not render a non-sacred animal a substitute. Items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וַהֲרֵי מַעֲשֵׂר בַּכְּלָל הָיָה, וְלָמָּה יָצָא?
Rabbi Shimon said: The fact that animals belonging to the community or partners do not render animals exchanged for them substitutes is derived as follows: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out in the verse: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord. He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute for it; and if he substitutes it, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32–33)?
לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה מַעֲשֵׂר — קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, יָצְאוּ קׇרְבְּנוֹת צִבּוּר; וּמָה מַעֲשֵׂר — קׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ, יָצְאוּ קׇרְבָּנוֹת בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת.
Rabbi Shimon explains: It was singled out to juxtapose substitution to the animal tithe, to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is brought exclusively as an individual offering, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are individual offerings, excluding communal offerings and the offerings of partners from the halakha of substitution. And just as the animal tithe is an offering sacrificed on the altar, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are offerings sacrificed on the altar, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance from the halakha of substitution.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יָכוֹל יְהוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״קׇרְבָּן״ — מִי שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״, יָצְאוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת שֶׁלֹּא נִקְרְאוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״.
GEMARA: According to the mishna, items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. The Sages taught in a baraita: One might have thought that items consecrated for Temple maintenance render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of which men bring an offering to the Lord…he shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad” (Leviticus 27:9–10). This teaches that the halakha of substitution applies to that which is called an offering, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not called an offering.
וְלָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: אִי ״קׇרְבָּן״ — שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי אֲפִילּוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת, שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״, כָּעִנְיָן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַנַּקְרֵב אֶת קׇרְבַּן ה׳ וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara asks: And are items consecrated for Temple maintenance not called offerings? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or who slaughters it outside the camp, and has not brought it to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). If the verse had mentioned just the word “offering,” I would derive that the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple applies even to items consecrated for Temple maintenance, as they too are called offerings, as is stated in the matter of the spoils of the war against Midian: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). These were certainly not items consecrated for the altar.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״ — כׇּל הַבָּא אֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּא לְפֶתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ. אַלְמָא אִיקְּרוּ ״קׇרְבָּן״.
The baraita continues: Therefore the verse states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:4), to teach that for any item that is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, i.e., that is fit to be sacrificed, one is liable for it due to the prohibition against slaughtering offerings outside of the Temple courtyard. And by contrast, for any animal that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for it due to the prohibition against slaughtering offerings outside of the Temple courtyard. Evidently, as a verse is necessary to exclude items consecrated for Temple maintenance, such items are generally called an offering, contrary to the first baraita cited.
אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָא רַבָּנַן. לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אִיקְּרִי ״קׇרְבָּן״, לְרַבָּנַן לָא אִיקְּרִי ״קׇרְבָּן״.
Rabbi Ḥanina said: This is not difficult. This second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, whereas that first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, items consecrated for Temple maintenance are in fact called an offering, and therefore in the mishna he derives that items consecrated for Temple maintenance are excluded from the halakhot of substitution from the juxtaposition with the animal tithe, not from word “offering.” According to the opinion of the Rabbis, items consecrated for Temple maintenance are not called an offering, and they therefore derive the halakha from the word “offering.”
וְלָא? וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַנַּקְרֵב אֶת קׇרְבַּן ה׳״! ״קׇרְבַּן ה׳״ אִיקְּרִי, ״קׇרְבָּן לַה׳״ לָא אִיקְּרִי.
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, are items consecrated for Temple maintenance not called an offering? But isn’t it written: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering” (Numbers 31:50)? The Gemara answers: These items are called: “The Lord’s offering,” but they are not called: “An offering to the Lord,” which is used only with regard to offerings sacrificed upon the altar.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״לֹא יְבַקֵּר בֵּין טוֹב לָרַע וְלֹא יְמִירֶנּוּ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אוֹתוֹ טוֹב בְּרָעוְגוֹ׳״.
§ The mishna teaches that consecrated animals belonging to the community or to partners are not included in the halakha of substitution. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute it; and if he substitute it at all, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33). Why is the issue of substitution stated here in connection to the animal tithe? Isn’t it already stated earlier: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good, and if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10)?
לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אוֹתוֹ״, מַשְׁמַע קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, קׇרְבַּן צִבּוּר, וְקׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ וְקׇרְבַּן בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לֹא יְבַקֵּר״.
Since it is stated: “He shall not alter it, nor substitute it,” the verse apparently indicates that all types of offering are included, whether an individual offering or a communal offering, and whether it is an offering sacrificed on the altar or an offering consecrated for Temple maintenance. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “He shall not inquire.”
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וַהֲרֵי מַעֲשֵׂר בַּכְּלָל הָיָה, וְלָמָּה יָצָא? לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה מַעֲשֵׂר קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, וְקׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ, וְדָבָר שֶׁבָּא בְּחוֹבָה, וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת — אַף כֹּל קׇרְבַּן יָחִיד, וְקׇרְבַּן מִזְבֵּחַ, וְדָבָר שֶׁבָּא בְּחוֹבָה,
Rabbi Shimon said in explanation: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out? It is to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is an individual offering, and an offering sacrificed on the altar, and it is an item that comes only as an obligation, not as a gift offering, and it is an item that is not brought in partnership, but only by an individual, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred must be an individual offering, and an offering sacrificed on the altar, and it must be an item that comes only as an obligation,
וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּא בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת.
and it must be an item that is not brought in partnership.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: לָמָּה יָצָא מַעֲשֵׂר מֵעַתָּה? לִידּוֹן בִּ״תְמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ״ וּבִ״תְמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ״.
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Why was the animal tithe singled out of all offerings as subject to substitution now, after the halakha of substitution was stated in general? It serves to discuss a special halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that of substitution of its name. If, when the animals emerge from the pen to be tithed, the one counting them errs and calls the tenth animal the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, they are both sanctified. The animal that actually emerges tenth is the animal tithe, while the eleventh animal is consecrated as a peace offering. And since this halakha of a substitution of its name applies only to the animal tithe, it is necessary to teach that the general halakha of the substitution of its body, i.e., regular substitution, applies to it as well.
לוֹמַר לָךְ: תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ — קְרֵיבָה, תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ — אֵינָהּ קְרֵיבָה; תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ — נִגְאֶלֶת, תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ — אֵינָהּ נִגְאֶלֶת.
Furthermore, the verse tells you other halakhot unique to the animal tithe: An animal that is the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is sacrificed upon the altar as a peace offering, whereas the substitute of its body is not sacrificed at all. But for all other offerings, substitutes hold the same status as the animal for which they were substituted. Another difference is that the substitute of the name of an animal tithe is redeemed when it develops a blemish, like a peace offering, and the proceeds of the sale belong to the Temple treasury, whereas the substitute of its body is not redeemed, as it is stated with regard to the animal tithe: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33).
תְּמוּרַת גּוּפוֹ — חָלָה עַל דָּבָר הָרָאוּי וְעַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי, וּתְמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ — אֵינָהּ חָלָה אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר הָרָאוּי בִּלְבַד.
Finally, the sanctity of the substitution of the body of an animal tithe takes effect upon both an item that is fit for sacrifice upon the altar and upon an item that is unfit for sacrifice, e.g., a blemished animal, as the sanctity of the animal tithe can apply even to a blemished animal, but the substitution of its name takes effect only upon an item that is fit for sacrifice. If the animal that was mistakenly called the tenth is blemished, it is not consecrated.
אָמְרִי: מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ תְּמוּרַת שְׁמוֹ, אִיגְּרוֹעֵי אִיגְּרַע? אִין, דְּאָמְרִינַן: מַאי דְּרַבִּי — רַבִּי, וּמַאי דְּלָא רַבִּי — לָא רַבִּי.
The Sages say in response to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Simply because the Merciful One includes a unique halakha with regard to the animal tithe, that it has the substitution of its name, would one assume that it is diminished, and the halakha of regular substitution does not apply to it? The Gemara answers: Yes, one can make such a claim, as we say: That which the verse included with regard to a particular halakha, it included, and that which it did not include, it did not include. Since the passage initially addresses substitution of name solely with regard to the animal tithe, one could assume that this is the only substitution that applies to it.
וְהָא מֵהֵיכָא תֵּיתֵי? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה דָּבָר הַבָּא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ, וְאֵין בּוֹ אֶלָּא חִידּוּשׁוֹ בִּלְבָד.
The Gemara asks: And from where would this be derived, that in this case we should assume only that which is specifically mentioned? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is derived since this is a case of a matter, i.e., the animal tithe, where the Torah comes to discuss a novel matter, i.e., substitution of name, and as a rule, in such cases the object of discussion has only its novelty, and one cannot infer the applicability of additional principles. It was therefore necessary for a verse to teach that substitution of body, which applies to all other offerings, applies to the animal tithe as well.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא: לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר דָּבָר הַבָּא בְּחוֹבָה — עוֹלַת חוֹבָה הִיא דְּעָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, הָא עוֹלַת נְדָבָה — לָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עוֹלַת נְדָבָה נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקַבְּלַהּ עֲלֵיהּ — עַבְדַּהּ תְּמוּרָה.
§ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said earlier that the halakha of substitution applies only to offerings that come as an obligation, should one conclude that it is only an obligatory burnt offering that renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute, but a voluntary burnt offering does not? Rava said to him: A voluntary burnt offering also falls under the category of obligatory offerings. Since he accepted upon himself to bring a voluntary burnt offering, it is considered an obligation for him, and therefore it renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute.
וְלֹא נִצְרְכָה, אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת.
Rava adds: And this qualification mentioned by Rabbi Shimon is necessary only to exclude a burnt offering that came from surplus funds. For example, if one set aside a certain sum of money for a sin offering or a guilt offering, and after purchasing his animal some of the money remained, he must purchase a burnt offering with that money. The halakha of substitution does not apply to such an animal.
מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר לַהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת צִבּוּר אָזְלִי — פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלָא עָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, הָא אֵין תְּמוּרָה בְּצִבּוּר!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: The Sages disputed the use of surplus money. Some say that it must go toward the purchase of communal burnt offerings, whereas Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the owner himself must purchase a voluntary burnt offering. What does Rabbi Shimon hold in this regard? If he holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward communal gift offerings, then it is obvious that this offering does not render a substitute, as it is explicitly taught that there is no substitution with regard to a communal offering. Rabbi Shimon’s statement would then be redundant.
אֶלָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת יָחִיד אָזְלִי. מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר! הָא שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ בְּהֶדְיָא דְּעָבְדָה תְּמוּרָה, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה״, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!
Rather, say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the one who said that these surplus funds go toward the voluntary burnt offering of an individual. But this too is problematic, as whom did you hear who holds this reasoning? It is Rabbi Eliezer, but we heard that Rabbi Eliezer explicitly stated that such an animal renders an animal exchanged for it a substitute. As it is taught in a baraita: A burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it consecrated as a substitute. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, וְאִיהוּ סָבַר: אֵין עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one matter, that surplus funds go toward an individual voluntary burnt offering, and disagrees with him with regard to another matter, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and he, Rabbi Shimon, maintains that it does not render it a substitute.
אִי הָכִי, דְּבָעֵי רַבִּי אָבִין: הִפְרִישׁ אָשָׁם לְהִתְכַּפֵּר בּוֹ, וְהֵמִיר בּוֹ, וְנִתְכַּפֵּר בְּאָשָׁם אַחֵר, וְנִיתַּק זֶה לְעוֹלָה — מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחְזוֹר וְיָמִיר בּוֹ?
The Gemara objects: If so, consider that dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin: If one separated an animal as a guilt offering by which to achieve atonement, and he effected substitution for it, and then that original guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which he subsequently lost, and the owner achieved atonement by bringing yet another animal as a guilt offering; and then this lost animal was found and consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, what is the halakha as to whether he can again effect substitution for it? In this case, the animal in question is a burnt offering that came from surplus funds.
אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִילֵימָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הָא אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת אֵין עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה!
In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you said that Rabbi Shimon maintains that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. There would therefore be no dilemma at all. This is problematic, because the dilemma assumes that one cannot effect substitution twice for the same animal, which is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
רַבִּי אָבִין הָכִי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: אִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ תַּנָּא דְּקָאֵי כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר אֵין מְמִירִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְמִירִין, וּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת עוֹשָׂה תְּמוּרָה, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחְזוֹר וְיָמִיר בּוֹ?
The Gemara explains that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Avin was raising: If a tanna is found who holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one cannot effect substitution once and again effect substitution for the same consecrated animal, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that a burnt offering that came from surplus funds renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, what is his opinion as to whether one can again effect substitution with the animal in question?
בִּשְׁנֵי גוּפִין וּקְדוּשָּׁה אַחַת, מַאי?
As explained earlier (9b), Rabbi Avin’s dilemma was first posed with regard to two bodies, i.e., two different animals, and one type of sanctity, e.g., in a case where one separated an animal as a guilt offering, and he effected substitution for it, and the animal he separated as a guilt offering developed a blemish and he redeemed it with another animal, which assumed the same status of a guilt offering. What is the halakha as to whether one can substitute for this replacement? Do we say that since it is a different animal from the one for which he initially effected substitution, the second substitution is effective? Or perhaps, since it possesses the same sanctity as the original animal, one cannot effect substitution for it.
וְאִם תִּימְצָא לוֹמַר: קְדוּשָּׁה אַחַת (אוֹ לָא), אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי קְדוּשּׁוֹת וְגוּף אֶחָד, מַאי? תִּיבְּעֵי.
And then Rabbi Avin further asked: If you say that in the above case one cannot effect substitution for the animal, perhaps this is only because the two animals possess one sanctity. But in a case of two sanctities and one body, what is the halakha? For example, if one consecrated a guilt offering and effected substitution for it, and he subsequently lost it and atoned using another animal, and he then found it again, such that the original animal must now be consigned to be sacrificed as a burnt offering, does one say that since the animal now possesses a different sanctity he can effect further substitution for it? The Gemara concludes: According to that tanna, the dilemma remains unresolved [tiba’ei].
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַכֹּל מְמִירִין.
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