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Yevamot 112

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Today’s daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm in honor of the “Tzevet Yevamot.” “Their brilliant graphics, along with Rabbanit Michelle’s teaching, literally saved me as we learned this difficult, but rewarding, masechet. Someone ought to design for them a graphic with a superhero cape!” 

If the yabam and yevama have moved in together with the purposes of performing the mitzvah of yibum, but she then claims that he did not have relations with her, and he claims he did, who is believed? According to the Mishna it depends if it was within thirty days or beyond as there is an assumption (chazaka) that if they were together for 30 days, one can assume they had intercourse. If we believe her, then we insist that the man do chalitza to enable her to remarry. Rav explains that the case being discussed is one in which he already gave her a get and that is why we insist he perform chalitza and not insist that he do yibum with her. A braita is quoted to raise a difficulty against Rav’s explanation, however, two answers are brought. Women were once believed if they made a claim why they couldn’t stay married – for example, my husband is incapable of having intercourse with me” and her husband would have to divorce her and give her the ketuba money, but once they say that women had set their eyes on another man and would make claims like this to get out of the marriage while receiving their ketuba money, they changed the law and either required proof when possible or requested from the husband to divorce her, but did not force him to. What is done if she makes a vow not to have intercourse with any Jewish man? Would this vow include the yabam as well, as during her marriage he was forbidden to her anyway (as her husband’s brother)? Can we find an answer to this question from our Mishna? The Mishnayot of the fourteenth chapter describes various different situations regarding a deaf-mute, minor, etc. as it relates to marriage, divorce and yibum.  What if someone was competent when they got married and then became a deaf-mute or lost his/her mental capacity? What happens to the marriage – can they get divorced?

 

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Yevamot 112

מִיבְזָז בְּזִיז מִינַּהּ.

he is embarrassed with her. Therefore, it is possible that more time passed before he engaged in intercourse with her.

עַד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לַחְלוֹץ — נִיכְפֶּנּוּ לְיַיבֵּם! אָמַר רַב: בְּשֶׁגִּיטָּהּ יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יָדָהּ.

§ The Gemara asks about the halakha that if he has not consummated the marriage, he is forced to perform ḥalitza: Before he is forced to perform ḥalitza, let us force him to consummate the levirate marriage. Rav said: The mishna is referring to a case where her bill of divorce is already to be found in her hand. The yavam has already given her a bill of divorce, but she claims that he never consummated the levirate marriage, and that therefore she is not released by the bill of divorce and still requires ḥalitza.

מֵיתִיבִי: יְבָמָה שֶׁאָמְרָה בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם ״לֹא נִבְעַלְתִּי״ — בֵּין שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״בָּעַלְתִּי״, בֵּין שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי״, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָהּ. לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — מְבַקְּשִׁין הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָהּ.

The Gemara raises an objection: If, within thirty days, a yevama said: I have not engaged in sexual intercourse with him, then whether he says: I did engage in intercourse, or whether he says: I did not engage in intercourse, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza. If she made this claim after thirty days have passed, the court asks him to perform ḥalitza.

הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״נִבְעַלְתִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי״ — הֲרֵי זֶה יוֹצִיא בְּגֵט. הוּא אוֹמֵר ״בָּעַלְתִּי״, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״לֹא נִבְעַלְתִּי״ — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָזַר וְאָמַר ״לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי״, צָרִיךְ גֵּט וַחֲלִיצָה.

If she says after thirty days: I engaged in sexual intercourse with him, and he says: I did not engage in sexual intercourse with her, then he releases her with a bill of divorce, because the legal presumption is that he did have sexual relations with her. If he says: I engaged in sexual intercourse with her, and she says: I did not engage in sexual intercourse with him, even if he retracted his statement and said: I did not engage in sexual intercourse with her, this situation requires both a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. The fact that the baraita requires a bill of divorce indicates that the entire passage is referring to a case when she did not yet have a bill of divorce.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: צְרִיכָה חֲלִיצָה עִם גִּיטָּהּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָתָם — גֵּט לְזִיקָּתוֹ, הָכָא — גֵּט לְבִיאָתוֹ.

Rabbi Ami says: When the baraita says that she requires a bill of divorce, it means that she requires ḥalitza with her bill of divorce that she already received. Rav Ashi says: There, where Rav explained the mishna as referring to a case where she has already received a divorce, it is referring to a bill of divorce that he gave her for his levirate bond, before he consummated the levirate marriage. Upon its reception, it is prohibited to consummate the levirate marriage, but she still requires ḥalitza. Here, in the baraita, it is referring to a bill of divorce that he gave for his consummation of the levirate marriage. After he engaged in sexual relations with her she becomes his wife and requires a regular divorce in order to remarry.

הָנְהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים דַּאֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: חֲלוּצוּ לַהּ, וּשְׁרוֹ לַהּ תִּיגְרָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא לְרָבָא: וְהָתַנְיָא צְרִיכָה גֵּט וַחֲלִיצָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי תַּנְיָא — תַּנְיָא.

It was told: A certain couple, a yavam and yevama, who both admitted that they had not consummated the levirate marriage, came before Rava. Rava said to the Sages who sat before him: Arrange ḥalitza for her, and resolve her case. Rav Sherevya said to Rava: But it is taught in a baraita that she requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. He said to him: If this baraita is taught, it is taught, and I retract my ruling on account of it.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ הוּן בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן: צָרָתָהּ מַהוּ?

Hon, son of Rav Naḥman, asked Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha with regard to her rival wife? If the yavam consummated the levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, the rival wife is exempted. In the event that the yevama who entered levirate marriage says that her yavam did not consummate the levirate marriage, is there a need for a procedure to exempt the rival wife from the levirate bond?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְכִי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָנוּ כּוֹפִין וּמְבַקְּשִׁין, תֵּיאָסֵר צָרָה?

He said to him: Just because we force or sometimes ask the husband to perform ḥalitza in order to remove any uncertainty and release the wife, should the rival wife be forbidden to remarry? The presumption is that the yavam did consummate the levirate marriage but since she denies it, she causes herself to be forbidden to marry others without ḥalitza. However, her statement is not relied upon to the extent that her rival wife would be forbidden.

הַנּוֹדֶרֶת הֲנָאָה וְכוּ׳. תְּנַן הָתָם, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְנוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָּה.

§ It is taught in the mishna: If a woman vows during her husband’s lifetime to derive no benefit from her yavam, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Nedarim 90b): At first they said: Three categories of women are divorced from their husbands against their will, and even so they receive payment of their marriage contract.

הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לְךָ״, ״הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״, ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״.

They are: A woman who says: I am defiled to you. When a priest’s wife tells her husband that she was raped, he is obligated to divorce her as she is forbidden to him. Since she became forbidden due to circumstances beyond her control, she is entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. Likewise, a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, that is: There are no witnesses to the matter, but Heaven will testify that you are incapable of having normal sexual relations with me. Since this is not her fault, she receives the settlement in her marriage contract. The same halakha applies if a woman vows: I am withdrawn from the Jews, meaning, she vows not to engage in sexual relations with any Jew, because conjugal relations are difficult for her.

חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר, שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא אִשָּׁה נוֹתֶנֶת עֵינֶיהָ בְּאַחֵר וּמְקַלְקֶלֶת עַל בַּעְלָהּ. אֶלָּא: ״הָאוֹמֶרֶת טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לְךָ״ — תָּבִיא רְאָיָה לִדְבָרֶיהָ. ״הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״ — יַעֲשׂוּ דֶּרֶךְ בַּקָּשָׁה.

The Sages subsequently retracted and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and, in order to be with him, ruin her relationship with her husband and leave with payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified. Rather, a priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring evidence for her statement that she was raped. A woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court deals with the matter by way of a request, and the husband is not forced to divorce his wife.

״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״ — יָפֵר חֶלְקוֹ, וּמְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְהֵא נְטוּלָה מִן הַיְּהוּדִים.

As for a woman who says: I am withdrawn from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part in the vow, that is, the part of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may have relations with him. But she is withdrawn from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her, she is forbidden to all.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״ לַיָּבָם מַהוּ? מִי מַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ דְּמָיֵית בַּעֲלָהּ וְנָפְלָה קַמֵּי יָבָם, אוֹ לָא.

A dilemma was raised before the scholars: If the wife said: I am withdrawn from the Jews and the husband nullifies his part in the vow, what is the halakha with regard to the yavam once the husband has died? Does this vow apply to him? When she takes the vow, does it enter her mind that her husband will die and she will happen before a yavam, or not? If she did entertain the thought, then the vow applies to the yavam, as the husband’s nullification only affects himself, and she must perform ḥalitza. If she did not consider the possibility of becoming a yevama, then the vow does not apply to the yavam and she can enter into levirate marriage. Her vow was directed only against any potential suitors she might have if her husband divorced her.

רַב אָמַר: יָבָם אֵינוֹ כְּבַעַל, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: יָבָם הֲרֵי הוּא כְּבַעַל. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּתְנַן: הַנּוֹדֶרֶת הֲנָאָה מִיְּבָמָהּ בְּחַיֵּי בַעְלָהּ, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ. וְאִם אִיתָא דְּמַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ —

Rav says: A yavam is not like a husband. She did not intend that her vow be directed against him at all, and he may enter into levirate marriage with her. And Shmuel says: A yavam is like a husband in this respect and the vow applies to him as well, so he must perform ḥalitza. Abaye said: Ruling according to Rav’s opinion stands to reason, as we learned in the mishna: If a woman vows during her husband’s lifetime to derive no benefit from her yavam, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza. And if it is the case that it enters her mind that the husband will die and she will become a candidate for levirate marriage with the yavam,

״מְבַקְּשִׁין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים, דְּכוּלֵּי הַאי לָא מַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ.

the mishna should have said that the court asks the yavam to perform ḥalitza rather than forces him. The court would not force him to perform ḥalitza in a case where she deliberately attempted to avoid fulfilling the mitzva of levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a woman who has children with her husband when she vows, so that it did not enter her mind to the extent that her children would die, and later her husband would also die, and she would happen before his brother for levirate marriage.

אֲבָל אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים, מַאי — מְבַקְּשִׁין? אַדְּתָנֵי ״אִם נִתְכַּוְּונָה לְכָךְ, אֲפִילּוּ בְּחַיֵּי בַעְלָהּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָהּ״, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים, אֲבָל אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים — מְבַקְּשִׁין!

The Gemara asks: But if she has no children, what is the halakha? Is it that we ask him to perform ḥalitza, but do not force him? If so, then instead of teaching the more remote case that if she intended to do so, to avoid levirate marriage in the event of her husband’s death, even if she vowed during her husband’s lifetime, the court merely asks him to perform ḥalitza with her, let the mishna distinguish and teach the distinction within this halakha itself, as follows: In what case is this statement said? When she has children, but if she does not have children, the court merely asks him.

אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לָא שְׁנָא יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים, וְלָא שְׁנָא אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים — כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ כְּרַב, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, learn from it that there is no difference between when she has children and when she does not have children. Either way the court forces him to perform ḥalitza, in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as there is no assumption that the woman planned to avoid levirate marriage unless she says so explicitly. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that the halakha follows Rav’s opinion.



הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי

חֵרֵשׁ שֶׁנָּשָׂא פִּקַּחַת וּפִקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא חֵרֶשֶׁת, אִם רָצָה לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיא, וְאִם רָצָה לְקַיֵּים — יְקַיֵּים. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוּא כּוֹנֵס בִּרְמִיזָה — כָּךְ הוּא מוֹצִיא בִּרְמִיזָה.

MISHNA: With regard to a deaf-mute who married a halakhically competent woman, and a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute: If either man wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. The reason why a deaf-mute man can divorce his wife is that just as he marries her by intimation, i.e., his marriage is not performed by explicit speech, as deaf-mutes rely on gestures, so too, he divorces her by intimation.

פִּקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא פִּקַּחַת וְנִתְחָרְשָׁה, אִם רָצָה — יוֹצִיא, וְאִם רָצָה — יְקַיֵּים. נִשְׁתַּטֵּית — לֹא יוֹצִיא. נִתְחָרֵשׁ הוּא אוֹ נִשְׁתַּטָּה — אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיאָהּ עוֹלָמִית.

Likewise, in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a halakhically competent woman, and she later became a deaf-mute: If he wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, as a wife does not have to have intellectual capacity to receive a bill of divorce, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. If she became an imbecile, he may not divorce her, i.e., a bill of divorce is ineffective in this case. If he became a deaf-mute or an imbecile after they were married, he may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal competence to give a bill of divorce.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי: מִפְּנֵי מָה הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּתְחָרְשָׁה יוֹצְאָה, וְהָאִישׁ שֶׁנִּתְחָרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה יוֹצְאָה לִרְצוֹנָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִרְצוֹנָהּ, וְהָאִישׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶלָּא לִרְצוֹנוֹ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what reason is the halakha that in the case of the woman who becomes a deaf-mute, her husband may divorce her, but in the case of the man who becomes a deaf-mute, he may not divorce his wife? If the bill of divorce written by someone who formerly possessed all his senses and later became a deaf-mute is invalid, it stands to reason that it should not be valid when she becomes a deaf-mute either. They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling. Since the woman’s consent is not required, she may be divorced even if she is a deaf-mute. And, conversely, the man divorces his wife only willingly, and therefore the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, is ineffective.

הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ שֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף זוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off when she was a minor, which means her marriage was valid by Torah law, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce even when she matures and is no longer under her father’s authority, despite the fact that she is not legally competent. They said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status. In other words, a woman who possessed all her faculties and later became a deaf-mute is comparable to a minor whose marriage was valid by Torah law and later, when she matured and was no longer under the authority of her father, received a bill of divorce. Both of these women can receive a bill of divorce, in accordance with the principle stated in the previous paragraph.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין חֵרְשִׁין נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת חֵרְשׁוֹת, אוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת, אוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. אוֹ שְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת חֵרְשׁוֹת (נְשׂוּאִין) [נְשׂוּאוֹת] לִשְׁנֵי אַחִין פִּקְחִין, אוֹ לִשְׁנֵי אַחִין חֵרְשִׁין, אוֹ לִשְׁנֵי אַחִין אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם. וְאִם הָיוּ נׇכְרִיּוֹת — יִכְנוֹסוּ, וְאִם רָצוּ לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיאוּ.

The mishna continues: In a case where there were two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters or to two halakhically competent sisters, or to two sisters, one of whom was a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent; or in a case where there were two deaf-mute sisters married to two halakhically competent brothers or to two deaf-mute brothers or to two brothers, one of whom was a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, all these women are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage. Each of them is forbidden to her yavam because he is married to her sister. And if they were unrelated women, i.e., the women are not sisters, the men may marry them in levirate marriage, and if they want to divorce them later, they may divorce them.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל הַפִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל הַפִּקַּחַת — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה.

However, if two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and other one halakhically competent, were married to two halakhically competent sisters, and the deaf-mute married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? His brother’s wife is released without levirate marriage or ḥalitza, due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister.

מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל הַפִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — מוֹצִיא אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט, וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו אֲסוּרָה לְעוֹלָם.

If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, as his wife’s sister came before him for levirate marriage by Torah law, and the legal status of her marriage and her levirate marriage is higher than his own marriage, which applies only by rabbinic law. And his brother’s wife is forbidden to him forever, and there is no remedy for her. He cannot marry her, as by rabbinic law she is the sister of his ex-wife, nor can he exempt her by means of ḥalitza, as he is a deaf-mute.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין פִּקְחִין נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת — מוֹצִיא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט, וְאֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו בַּחֲלִיצָה.

If two halakhically competent brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? The deaf-mute sister is released due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, as the halakhically competent sister came before him for levirate marriage, and the status of her levirate bond is higher than the status of his marriage to his wife, a deaf-mute. And he releases his brother’s wife, who is not a deaf-mute, by means of ḥalitza, as they are both legally competent and can therefore perform ḥalitza.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two sisters, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? The deaf-mute woman is released due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister.

מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת — מוֹצִיא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט, וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו אֲסוּרָה לְעוֹלָם.

If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, which is as valid as their original marriage. And his brother’s wife is forbidden to him forever. There is no remedy for her, as he may not consummate levirate marriage with her because she is the sister of his ex-wife by rabbinic law, and he cannot perform ḥalitza with her either, as he is a deaf-mute.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי נׇכְרִיּוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — אוֹ חוֹלֵץ אוֹ מְיַיבֵּם. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — כּוֹנֵס וְאֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא לְעוֹלָם.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two unrelated, halakhically competent women, and the deaf-mute married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? He either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the other halakhically competent woman do? He cannot perform ḥalitza with her, as he is a deaf-mute. Rather, he marries her, and he may never divorce her, as sexual intercourse between a yavam and his yevama creates a valid marriage that cannot be broken by the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין פִּקְחִין נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי נׇכְרִיּוֹת, אַחַת פִּקַּחַת וְאַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — כּוֹנֵס, וְאִם רָצָה לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיא. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת — אוֹ חוֹלֵץ אוֹ מְיַיבֵּם.

If two halakhically competent brothers were married to two unrelated women, one of whom is halakhically competent and the other one a deaf-mute, and the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? The brother cannot perform ḥalitza with her, as she is a deaf-mute. Rather, he marries the deaf-mute, and if he wishes to divorce her, he may subsequently divorce her with a bill of divorce. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute do? Either he performs ḥalitza or he enters into levirate marriage.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִים לִשְׁתֵּי נׇכְרִיּוֹת, אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — כּוֹנֵס, וְאִם רָצָה לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיא. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת — כּוֹנֵס וְאֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא לְעוֹלָם.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two unrelated women, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the deaf-mute brother who was married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? He may marry her if he desires the deaf-mute woman, and if he wishes afterward to divorce her, he may divorce her. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute woman do? He marries his yevama and may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal capacity to end a valid marriage.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: מַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֵשׁ וְחֵרֶשֶׁת דְּתַקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין, וּמַאי שְׁנָא דְּשׁוֹטֶה וְשׁוֹטָה דְּלָא תַּקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין? דְּתַנְיָא: שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן שֶׁנָּשְׂאוּ נָשִׁים וּמֵתוּ — נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן פְּטוּרוֹת מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּבּוּם!

GEMARA: Rami bar Ḥama said: What is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, that the Sages enacted rabbinic marriage for them despite their condition, and the case of an imbecilic man and an imbecilic woman, that the Sages did not enact marriage for them? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an imbecilic man and a minor who married women and died, their wives are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage. This indicates that the marriages of an imbecile and a minor are of no significance.

חֵרֵשׁ וְחֵרֶשֶׁת, דְּקָיְימָא תַּקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן — תַּקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין. שׁוֹטֶה וְשׁוֹטָה, דְּלָא קָיְימָא תַּקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן, דְּאֵין אָדָם דָּר עִם נָחָשׁ בִּכְפִיפָה אַחַת — לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין.

The Gemara explains: In the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, where the ordinance of the Sages can be fulfilled, i.e., these marriages can be maintained, the Sages enacted marriage for them. By contrast, with regard to an imbecilic man and an imbecilic woman, where the ordinance of the Sages cannot be fulfilled, as one cannot live with an imbecilic partner, in accordance with the well-known saying: A person cannot reside in a basket, i.e., in close quarters, with a snake, the Sages did not enact marriage for them.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא קָטָן דְּלָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין, וְחֵרֵשׁ תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין? חֵרֵשׁ, דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל נִשּׂוּאִין — תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין, קָטָן, דְּאָתֵי לִכְלַל נִשּׂוּאִין — לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין.

The Gemara asks: And what is the difference between a minor, that the Sages did not enact marriage for him, and a deaf-mute, that the Sages did enact marriage for him? The Gemara explains: In the case of a deaf-mute, as he will not reach the stage of eligibility for marriage by Torah law, the Sages enacted marriage for him. Conversely, with regard to a minor, as he will eventually reach the stage of eligibility for marriage by Torah law when he matures, the Sages did not enact marriage for him.

וַהֲרֵי קְטַנָּה, דְּאָתְיָא לִכְלַל נִשּׂוּאִין, וְתַקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין! הָתָם — שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ [בָּהּ] מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of a minor girl, who will reach the stage of eligibility for marriage by Torah law someday, and yet the Sages enacted marriage for her, as her mother and brothers may marry her off by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: There the Sages issued their decree for a different reason, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. If she marries, her husband will watch over her; if not, she might be treated disrespectfully.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא קְטַנָּה דִּמְמָאֲנָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֶשֶׁת דְּלָא מְמָאֲנָה? דְּאִם כֵּן,

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may perform refusal, i.e., she can retroactively nullify her marriage by means of a declaration of refusal of her husband, and a female deaf-mute, that she cannot perform refusal, as the Sages did not establish the option of refusal in her case? Since the marriage of a deaf-mute woman also applies by rabbinic law, why didn’t the Sages establish refusal in her case as well? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, i.e., had the Sages enacted refusal for a female deaf-mute,

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Catriella Freedman

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

While vacationing in San Diego, Rabbi Leah Herz asked if I’d be interested in being in hevruta with her to learn Daf Yomi through Hadran. Why not? I had loved learning Gemara in college in 1971 but hadn’t returned. With the onset of covid, Daf Yomi and Rabbanit Michelle centered me each day. Thank-you for helping me grow and enter this amazing world of learning.
Meryll Page
Meryll Page

Minneapolis, MN, United States

It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.

Joanna Rom
Joanna Rom

Northwest Washington, United States

I learned Talmud as a student in Yeshivat Ramaz and felt at the time that Talmud wasn’t for me. After reading Ilana Kurshan’s book I was intrigued and after watching the great siyum in Yerushalayim it ignited the spark to begin this journey. It has been a transformative life experience for me as a wife, mother, Savta and member of Klal Yisrael.
Elana Storch
Elana Storch

Phoenix, Arizona, United States

I decided to learn one masechet, Brachot, but quickly fell in love and never stopped! It has been great, everyone is always asking how it’s going and chering me on, and my students are always making sure I did the day’s daf.

Yafit Fishbach
Yafit Fishbach

Memphis, Tennessee, United States

I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.

Anne Rubin
Anne Rubin

Elkins Park, United States

It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.

Joanna Rom
Joanna Rom

Northwest Washington, United States

I saw an elderly man at the shul kiddush in early March 2020, celebrating the siyyum of masechet brachot which he had been learning with a young yeshiva student. I thought, if he can do it, I can do it! I began to learn masechet Shabbat the next day, Making up masechet brachot myself, which I had missed. I haven’t missed a day since, thanks to the ease of listening to Hadran’s podcast!
Judith Shapiro
Judith Shapiro

Minnesota, United States

I had no formal learning in Talmud until I began my studies in the Joint Program where in 1976 I was one of the few, if not the only, woman talmud major. It was superior training for law school and enabled me to approach my legal studies with a foundation . In 2018, I began daf yomi listening to Rabbanit MIchelle’s pod cast and my daily talmud studies are one of the highlights of my life.

Krivosha_Terri_Bio
Terri Krivosha

Minneapolis, United States

I started my Daf Yomi journey at the beginning of the COVID19 pandemic.

Karena Perry
Karena Perry

Los Angeles, United States

Hadran entered my life after the last Siyum Hashaas, January 2020. I was inspired and challenged simultaneously, having never thought of learning Gemara. With my family’s encouragement, I googled “daf yomi for women”. A perfecr fit!
I especially enjoy when Rabbanit Michelle connects the daf to contemporary issues to share at the shabbat table e.g: looking at the Kohen during duchaning. Toda rabba

Marsha Wasserman
Marsha Wasserman

Jerusalem, Israel

I started learning on January 5, 2020. When I complete the 7+ year cycle I will be 70 years old. I had been intimidated by those who said that I needed to study Talmud in a traditional way with a chevruta, but I decided the learning was more important to me than the method. Thankful for Daf Yomi for Women helping me catch up when I fall behind, and also being able to celebrate with each Siyum!

Pamela Elisheva
Pamela Elisheva

Bakersfield, United States

A beautiful world of Talmudic sages now fill my daily life with discussion and debate.
bringing alive our traditions and texts that has brought new meaning to my life.
I am a מגילת אסתר reader for women . the words in the Mishna of מסכת megillah 17a
הקורא את המגילה למפרע לא יצא were powerful to me.
I hope to have the zchut to complete the cycle for my 70th birthday.

Sheila Hauser
Sheila Hauser

Jerusalem, Israel

I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.

Linda Brownstein
Linda Brownstein

Mitspe, Israel

Yevamot 112

מִיבְזָז בְּזִיז מִינַּהּ.

he is embarrassed with her. Therefore, it is possible that more time passed before he engaged in intercourse with her.

עַד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לַחְלוֹץ — נִיכְפֶּנּוּ לְיַיבֵּם! אָמַר רַב: בְּשֶׁגִּיטָּהּ יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יָדָהּ.

§ The Gemara asks about the halakha that if he has not consummated the marriage, he is forced to perform ḥalitza: Before he is forced to perform ḥalitza, let us force him to consummate the levirate marriage. Rav said: The mishna is referring to a case where her bill of divorce is already to be found in her hand. The yavam has already given her a bill of divorce, but she claims that he never consummated the levirate marriage, and that therefore she is not released by the bill of divorce and still requires ḥalitza.

מֵיתִיבִי: יְבָמָה שֶׁאָמְרָה בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם ״לֹא נִבְעַלְתִּי״ — בֵּין שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״בָּעַלְתִּי״, בֵּין שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי״, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָהּ. לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — מְבַקְּשִׁין הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָהּ.

The Gemara raises an objection: If, within thirty days, a yevama said: I have not engaged in sexual intercourse with him, then whether he says: I did engage in intercourse, or whether he says: I did not engage in intercourse, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza. If she made this claim after thirty days have passed, the court asks him to perform ḥalitza.

הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״נִבְעַלְתִּי״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי״ — הֲרֵי זֶה יוֹצִיא בְּגֵט. הוּא אוֹמֵר ״בָּעַלְתִּי״, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת ״לֹא נִבְעַלְתִּי״ — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָזַר וְאָמַר ״לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי״, צָרִיךְ גֵּט וַחֲלִיצָה.

If she says after thirty days: I engaged in sexual intercourse with him, and he says: I did not engage in sexual intercourse with her, then he releases her with a bill of divorce, because the legal presumption is that he did have sexual relations with her. If he says: I engaged in sexual intercourse with her, and she says: I did not engage in sexual intercourse with him, even if he retracted his statement and said: I did not engage in sexual intercourse with her, this situation requires both a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. The fact that the baraita requires a bill of divorce indicates that the entire passage is referring to a case when she did not yet have a bill of divorce.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: צְרִיכָה חֲלִיצָה עִם גִּיטָּהּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָתָם — גֵּט לְזִיקָּתוֹ, הָכָא — גֵּט לְבִיאָתוֹ.

Rabbi Ami says: When the baraita says that she requires a bill of divorce, it means that she requires ḥalitza with her bill of divorce that she already received. Rav Ashi says: There, where Rav explained the mishna as referring to a case where she has already received a divorce, it is referring to a bill of divorce that he gave her for his levirate bond, before he consummated the levirate marriage. Upon its reception, it is prohibited to consummate the levirate marriage, but she still requires ḥalitza. Here, in the baraita, it is referring to a bill of divorce that he gave for his consummation of the levirate marriage. After he engaged in sexual relations with her she becomes his wife and requires a regular divorce in order to remarry.

הָנְהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים דַּאֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: חֲלוּצוּ לַהּ, וּשְׁרוֹ לַהּ תִּיגְרָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא לְרָבָא: וְהָתַנְיָא צְרִיכָה גֵּט וַחֲלִיצָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי תַּנְיָא — תַּנְיָא.

It was told: A certain couple, a yavam and yevama, who both admitted that they had not consummated the levirate marriage, came before Rava. Rava said to the Sages who sat before him: Arrange ḥalitza for her, and resolve her case. Rav Sherevya said to Rava: But it is taught in a baraita that she requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. He said to him: If this baraita is taught, it is taught, and I retract my ruling on account of it.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ הוּן בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן: צָרָתָהּ מַהוּ?

Hon, son of Rav Naḥman, asked Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha with regard to her rival wife? If the yavam consummated the levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, the rival wife is exempted. In the event that the yevama who entered levirate marriage says that her yavam did not consummate the levirate marriage, is there a need for a procedure to exempt the rival wife from the levirate bond?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְכִי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָנוּ כּוֹפִין וּמְבַקְּשִׁין, תֵּיאָסֵר צָרָה?

He said to him: Just because we force or sometimes ask the husband to perform ḥalitza in order to remove any uncertainty and release the wife, should the rival wife be forbidden to remarry? The presumption is that the yavam did consummate the levirate marriage but since she denies it, she causes herself to be forbidden to marry others without ḥalitza. However, her statement is not relied upon to the extent that her rival wife would be forbidden.

הַנּוֹדֶרֶת הֲנָאָה וְכוּ׳. תְּנַן הָתָם, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְנוֹטְלוֹת כְּתוּבָּה.

§ It is taught in the mishna: If a woman vows during her husband’s lifetime to derive no benefit from her yavam, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza. We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Nedarim 90b): At first they said: Three categories of women are divorced from their husbands against their will, and even so they receive payment of their marriage contract.

הָאוֹמֶרֶת ״טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לְךָ״, ״הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״, ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״.

They are: A woman who says: I am defiled to you. When a priest’s wife tells her husband that she was raped, he is obligated to divorce her as she is forbidden to him. Since she became forbidden due to circumstances beyond her control, she is entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. Likewise, a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, that is: There are no witnesses to the matter, but Heaven will testify that you are incapable of having normal sexual relations with me. Since this is not her fault, she receives the settlement in her marriage contract. The same halakha applies if a woman vows: I am withdrawn from the Jews, meaning, she vows not to engage in sexual relations with any Jew, because conjugal relations are difficult for her.

חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר, שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא אִשָּׁה נוֹתֶנֶת עֵינֶיהָ בְּאַחֵר וּמְקַלְקֶלֶת עַל בַּעְלָהּ. אֶלָּא: ״הָאוֹמֶרֶת טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לְךָ״ — תָּבִיא רְאָיָה לִדְבָרֶיהָ. ״הַשָּׁמַיִם בֵּינִי לְבֵינָךְ״ — יַעֲשׂוּ דֶּרֶךְ בַּקָּשָׁה.

The Sages subsequently retracted and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and, in order to be with him, ruin her relationship with her husband and leave with payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified. Rather, a priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring evidence for her statement that she was raped. A woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court deals with the matter by way of a request, and the husband is not forced to divorce his wife.

״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״ — יָפֵר חֶלְקוֹ, וּמְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְהֵא נְטוּלָה מִן הַיְּהוּדִים.

As for a woman who says: I am withdrawn from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part in the vow, that is, the part of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may have relations with him. But she is withdrawn from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her, she is forbidden to all.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״נְטוּלָה אֲנִי מִן הַיְּהוּדִים״ לַיָּבָם מַהוּ? מִי מַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ דְּמָיֵית בַּעֲלָהּ וְנָפְלָה קַמֵּי יָבָם, אוֹ לָא.

A dilemma was raised before the scholars: If the wife said: I am withdrawn from the Jews and the husband nullifies his part in the vow, what is the halakha with regard to the yavam once the husband has died? Does this vow apply to him? When she takes the vow, does it enter her mind that her husband will die and she will happen before a yavam, or not? If she did entertain the thought, then the vow applies to the yavam, as the husband’s nullification only affects himself, and she must perform ḥalitza. If she did not consider the possibility of becoming a yevama, then the vow does not apply to the yavam and she can enter into levirate marriage. Her vow was directed only against any potential suitors she might have if her husband divorced her.

רַב אָמַר: יָבָם אֵינוֹ כְּבַעַל, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: יָבָם הֲרֵי הוּא כְּבַעַל. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּתְנַן: הַנּוֹדֶרֶת הֲנָאָה מִיְּבָמָהּ בְּחַיֵּי בַעְלָהּ, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ. וְאִם אִיתָא דְּמַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ —

Rav says: A yavam is not like a husband. She did not intend that her vow be directed against him at all, and he may enter into levirate marriage with her. And Shmuel says: A yavam is like a husband in this respect and the vow applies to him as well, so he must perform ḥalitza. Abaye said: Ruling according to Rav’s opinion stands to reason, as we learned in the mishna: If a woman vows during her husband’s lifetime to derive no benefit from her yavam, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza. And if it is the case that it enters her mind that the husband will die and she will become a candidate for levirate marriage with the yavam,

״מְבַקְּשִׁין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים, דְּכוּלֵּי הַאי לָא מַסְּקָה אַדַּעְתַּהּ.

the mishna should have said that the court asks the yavam to perform ḥalitza rather than forces him. The court would not force him to perform ḥalitza in a case where she deliberately attempted to avoid fulfilling the mitzva of levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a woman who has children with her husband when she vows, so that it did not enter her mind to the extent that her children would die, and later her husband would also die, and she would happen before his brother for levirate marriage.

אֲבָל אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים, מַאי — מְבַקְּשִׁין? אַדְּתָנֵי ״אִם נִתְכַּוְּונָה לְכָךְ, אֲפִילּוּ בְּחַיֵּי בַעְלָהּ מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיַּחְלוֹץ לָהּ״, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים, אֲבָל אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים — מְבַקְּשִׁין!

The Gemara asks: But if she has no children, what is the halakha? Is it that we ask him to perform ḥalitza, but do not force him? If so, then instead of teaching the more remote case that if she intended to do so, to avoid levirate marriage in the event of her husband’s death, even if she vowed during her husband’s lifetime, the court merely asks him to perform ḥalitza with her, let the mishna distinguish and teach the distinction within this halakha itself, as follows: In what case is this statement said? When she has children, but if she does not have children, the court merely asks him.

אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לָא שְׁנָא יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים, וְלָא שְׁנָא אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים — כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ כְּרַב, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, learn from it that there is no difference between when she has children and when she does not have children. Either way the court forces him to perform ḥalitza, in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as there is no assumption that the woman planned to avoid levirate marriage unless she says so explicitly. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that the halakha follows Rav’s opinion.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי

חֵרֵשׁ שֶׁנָּשָׂא פִּקַּחַת וּפִקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא חֵרֶשֶׁת, אִם רָצָה לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיא, וְאִם רָצָה לְקַיֵּים — יְקַיֵּים. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוּא כּוֹנֵס בִּרְמִיזָה — כָּךְ הוּא מוֹצִיא בִּרְמִיזָה.

MISHNA: With regard to a deaf-mute who married a halakhically competent woman, and a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute: If either man wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. The reason why a deaf-mute man can divorce his wife is that just as he marries her by intimation, i.e., his marriage is not performed by explicit speech, as deaf-mutes rely on gestures, so too, he divorces her by intimation.

פִּקֵּחַ שֶׁנָּשָׂא פִּקַּחַת וְנִתְחָרְשָׁה, אִם רָצָה — יוֹצִיא, וְאִם רָצָה — יְקַיֵּים. נִשְׁתַּטֵּית — לֹא יוֹצִיא. נִתְחָרֵשׁ הוּא אוֹ נִשְׁתַּטָּה — אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיאָהּ עוֹלָמִית.

Likewise, in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a halakhically competent woman, and she later became a deaf-mute: If he wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, as a wife does not have to have intellectual capacity to receive a bill of divorce, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. If she became an imbecile, he may not divorce her, i.e., a bill of divorce is ineffective in this case. If he became a deaf-mute or an imbecile after they were married, he may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal competence to give a bill of divorce.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי: מִפְּנֵי מָה הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנִּתְחָרְשָׁה יוֹצְאָה, וְהָאִישׁ שֶׁנִּתְחָרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵינוֹ דּוֹמֶה הָאִישׁ הַמְגָרֵשׁ לָאִשָּׁה הַמִּתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה יוֹצְאָה לִרְצוֹנָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִרְצוֹנָהּ, וְהָאִישׁ אֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא אֶלָּא לִרְצוֹנוֹ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what reason is the halakha that in the case of the woman who becomes a deaf-mute, her husband may divorce her, but in the case of the man who becomes a deaf-mute, he may not divorce his wife? If the bill of divorce written by someone who formerly possessed all his senses and later became a deaf-mute is invalid, it stands to reason that it should not be valid when she becomes a deaf-mute either. They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling. Since the woman’s consent is not required, she may be divorced even if she is a deaf-mute. And, conversely, the man divorces his wife only willingly, and therefore the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, is ineffective.

הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן גּוּדְגְּדָא עַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ שֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף זוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off when she was a minor, which means her marriage was valid by Torah law, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce even when she matures and is no longer under her father’s authority, despite the fact that she is not legally competent. They said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status. In other words, a woman who possessed all her faculties and later became a deaf-mute is comparable to a minor whose marriage was valid by Torah law and later, when she matured and was no longer under the authority of her father, received a bill of divorce. Both of these women can receive a bill of divorce, in accordance with the principle stated in the previous paragraph.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין חֵרְשִׁין נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת חֵרְשׁוֹת, אוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת, אוֹ לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. אוֹ שְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת חֵרְשׁוֹת (נְשׂוּאִין) [נְשׂוּאוֹת] לִשְׁנֵי אַחִין פִּקְחִין, אוֹ לִשְׁנֵי אַחִין חֵרְשִׁין, אוֹ לִשְׁנֵי אַחִין אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם. וְאִם הָיוּ נׇכְרִיּוֹת — יִכְנוֹסוּ, וְאִם רָצוּ לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיאוּ.

The mishna continues: In a case where there were two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters or to two halakhically competent sisters, or to two sisters, one of whom was a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent; or in a case where there were two deaf-mute sisters married to two halakhically competent brothers or to two deaf-mute brothers or to two brothers, one of whom was a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, all these women are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage. Each of them is forbidden to her yavam because he is married to her sister. And if they were unrelated women, i.e., the women are not sisters, the men may marry them in levirate marriage, and if they want to divorce them later, they may divorce them.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל הַפִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל הַפִּקַּחַת — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה.

However, if two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and other one halakhically competent, were married to two halakhically competent sisters, and the deaf-mute married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? His brother’s wife is released without levirate marriage or ḥalitza, due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister.

מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל הַפִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — מוֹצִיא אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט, וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו אֲסוּרָה לְעוֹלָם.

If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, as his wife’s sister came before him for levirate marriage by Torah law, and the legal status of her marriage and her levirate marriage is higher than his own marriage, which applies only by rabbinic law. And his brother’s wife is forbidden to him forever, and there is no remedy for her. He cannot marry her, as by rabbinic law she is the sister of his ex-wife, nor can he exempt her by means of ḥalitza, as he is a deaf-mute.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין פִּקְחִין נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל הַחֵרֶשֶׁת — מוֹצִיא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט, וְאֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו בַּחֲלִיצָה.

If two halakhically competent brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? The deaf-mute sister is released due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, as the halakhically competent sister came before him for levirate marriage, and the status of her levirate bond is higher than the status of his marriage to his wife, a deaf-mute. And he releases his brother’s wife, who is not a deaf-mute, by means of ḥalitza, as they are both legally competent and can therefore perform ḥalitza.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — תֵּצֵא מִשּׁוּם אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two sisters, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? The deaf-mute woman is released due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister.

מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת — מוֹצִיא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּגֵט, וְאֵשֶׁת אָחִיו אֲסוּרָה לְעוֹלָם.

If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, which is as valid as their original marriage. And his brother’s wife is forbidden to him forever. There is no remedy for her, as he may not consummate levirate marriage with her because she is the sister of his ex-wife by rabbinic law, and he cannot perform ḥalitza with her either, as he is a deaf-mute.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי נׇכְרִיּוֹת פִּקְּחוֹת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — אוֹ חוֹלֵץ אוֹ מְיַיבֵּם. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — כּוֹנֵס וְאֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא לְעוֹלָם.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two unrelated, halakhically competent women, and the deaf-mute married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? He either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the other halakhically competent woman do? He cannot perform ḥalitza with her, as he is a deaf-mute. Rather, he marries her, and he may never divorce her, as sexual intercourse between a yavam and his yevama creates a valid marriage that cannot be broken by the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין פִּקְחִין נְשׂוּאִין לִשְׁתֵּי נׇכְרִיּוֹת, אַחַת פִּקַּחַת וְאַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — כּוֹנֵס, וְאִם רָצָה לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיא. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת — אוֹ חוֹלֵץ אוֹ מְיַיבֵּם.

If two halakhically competent brothers were married to two unrelated women, one of whom is halakhically competent and the other one a deaf-mute, and the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? The brother cannot perform ḥalitza with her, as she is a deaf-mute. Rather, he marries the deaf-mute, and if he wishes to divorce her, he may subsequently divorce her with a bill of divorce. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute do? Either he performs ḥalitza or he enters into levirate marriage.

שְׁנֵי אַחִין, אֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ וְאֶחָד פִּקֵּחַ, נְשׂוּאִים לִשְׁתֵּי נׇכְרִיּוֹת, אַחַת חֵרֶשֶׁת וְאַחַת פִּקַּחַת. מֵת חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת — כּוֹנֵס, וְאִם רָצָה לְהוֹצִיא — יוֹצִיא. מֵת פִּקֵּחַ בַּעַל פִּקַּחַת, מָה יַעֲשֶׂה חֵרֵשׁ בַּעַל חֵרֶשֶׁת — כּוֹנֵס וְאֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא לְעוֹלָם.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two unrelated women, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the deaf-mute brother who was married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? He may marry her if he desires the deaf-mute woman, and if he wishes afterward to divorce her, he may divorce her. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute woman do? He marries his yevama and may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal capacity to end a valid marriage.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: מַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֵשׁ וְחֵרֶשֶׁת דְּתַקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין, וּמַאי שְׁנָא דְּשׁוֹטֶה וְשׁוֹטָה דְּלָא תַּקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין? דְּתַנְיָא: שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן שֶׁנָּשְׂאוּ נָשִׁים וּמֵתוּ — נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן פְּטוּרוֹת מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּבּוּם!

GEMARA: Rami bar Ḥama said: What is the difference between the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, that the Sages enacted rabbinic marriage for them despite their condition, and the case of an imbecilic man and an imbecilic woman, that the Sages did not enact marriage for them? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an imbecilic man and a minor who married women and died, their wives are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage. This indicates that the marriages of an imbecile and a minor are of no significance.

חֵרֵשׁ וְחֵרֶשֶׁת, דְּקָיְימָא תַּקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן — תַּקִּינוּ לְהוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין. שׁוֹטֶה וְשׁוֹטָה, דְּלָא קָיְימָא תַּקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן, דְּאֵין אָדָם דָּר עִם נָחָשׁ בִּכְפִיפָה אַחַת — לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין.

The Gemara explains: In the case of a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, where the ordinance of the Sages can be fulfilled, i.e., these marriages can be maintained, the Sages enacted marriage for them. By contrast, with regard to an imbecilic man and an imbecilic woman, where the ordinance of the Sages cannot be fulfilled, as one cannot live with an imbecilic partner, in accordance with the well-known saying: A person cannot reside in a basket, i.e., in close quarters, with a snake, the Sages did not enact marriage for them.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא קָטָן דְּלָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין, וְחֵרֵשׁ תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין? חֵרֵשׁ, דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל נִשּׂוּאִין — תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין, קָטָן, דְּאָתֵי לִכְלַל נִשּׂוּאִין — לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין.

The Gemara asks: And what is the difference between a minor, that the Sages did not enact marriage for him, and a deaf-mute, that the Sages did enact marriage for him? The Gemara explains: In the case of a deaf-mute, as he will not reach the stage of eligibility for marriage by Torah law, the Sages enacted marriage for him. Conversely, with regard to a minor, as he will eventually reach the stage of eligibility for marriage by Torah law when he matures, the Sages did not enact marriage for him.

וַהֲרֵי קְטַנָּה, דְּאָתְיָא לִכְלַל נִשּׂוּאִין, וְתַקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן נִשּׂוּאִין! הָתָם — שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ [בָּהּ] מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of a minor girl, who will reach the stage of eligibility for marriage by Torah law someday, and yet the Sages enacted marriage for her, as her mother and brothers may marry her off by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: There the Sages issued their decree for a different reason, so that people should not treat her in the manner of ownerless property. If she marries, her husband will watch over her; if not, she might be treated disrespectfully.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא קְטַנָּה דִּמְמָאֲנָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא חֵרֶשֶׁת דְּלָא מְמָאֲנָה? דְּאִם כֵּן,

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between a minor girl, that she may perform refusal, i.e., she can retroactively nullify her marriage by means of a declaration of refusal of her husband, and a female deaf-mute, that she cannot perform refusal, as the Sages did not establish the option of refusal in her case? Since the marriage of a deaf-mute woman also applies by rabbinic law, why didn’t the Sages establish refusal in her case as well? The Gemara answers: The reason is that if so, i.e., had the Sages enacted refusal for a female deaf-mute,

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