Yevamot 19

Yevamot 19

מִבַּיִת אֶחָד. יַבּוֹמֵי חֲדָא וְאִיפְּטוֹרֵ[י] אִידַּךְ — לָא, דְּדִלְמָא אֵין זִיקָה כִּכְנוּסָה, וְהָווּ לְהוּ שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת הַבָּאוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי בָתִּים. אַלְמָא מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ!

from a single household, i.e., husband, and everyone agrees that only one wife from each household may be taken in levirate marriage, as the verse states: “To build his brother’s house,” which is interpreted to mean that the remaining brother may perform levirate marriage with only one wife of his late brother and not with two. To take one in levirate marriage and exempt the other without any procedure, he may not do, as perhaps the levirate bond is not substantial enough to make the first brother’s widow like a married woman to the second brother. In that case this woman whose husband died first remains the wife of the first brother, and the second woman is the wife of the second brother. Then there would be two separate levirate obligations, and one could not exempt the other; they would be two yevamot who come from two households. Therefore, apparently even when levirate betrothal was performed Rabbi Shimon is uncertain whether or not the levirate bond is substantial.

וְכִי תֵּימָא: מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמִיַּיבְּמָא חֲדָא וּמִפַּטְרָא חֲדָא, וּמִדְּרַבָּנַן הוּא דְּאָסוּר, גְּזֵירָה מִשּׁוּם שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ שְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת הַבָּאוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי בָתִּים — חֲדָא מִיַּיבְּמָא, וְאִידַּךְ מִיפַּטְרָא בִּוְּלֹא כְּלוּם,

And if you would say that by Torah law, indeed, one of them may be taken in levirate marriage and thereby exempt the other, and this was prohibited only by rabbinic law, this would be a rabbinic decree due to the concern lest those who were not aware of the details mistakenly say that in general if two yevamot come from two households then one is taken in levirate marriage and the other is exempt without anything. One might have thought that the reason Rabbi Shimon required the other woman to perform ḥalitza is to avoid the possibility of such a mistake.

וְהָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מִשּׁוּם מַאֲמָר וְלָאו מַאֲמָר הוּא. דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לַחֲכָמִים: אִם מַאֲמָרוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי מַאֲמָר — אֵשֶׁת שֵׁנִי הוּא בּוֹעֵל.

But this cannot be, as Rabbi Shimon’s reason is mentioned explicitly in the baraita, and there he does not state that this is a decree of the Sages. Rather, his reason is due to the question with regard to the strength of levirate betrothal, specifically whether the status of marriage is achieved by levirate betrothal or not achieved by levirate betrothal. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis in explanation of his opinion that one of the women could enter into levirate marriage: If the levirate betrothal of the second brother is indeed levirate betrothal and is considered as a fully valid marriage, then the third brother is engaging in relations with the wife of the second brother when he takes her in levirate marriage. That is, if the levirate betrothal by the second brother has the same status as full marriage, then she becomes the wife of this second brother, and all previous connections are no longer relevant.

וְאִם מַאֲמָרוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי אֵינוֹ מַאֲמָר — אֵשֶׁת רִאשׁוֹן הוּא בּוֹעֵל.

But if the levirate betrothal of the second brother is not levirate betrothal, i.e., it does not have the full status of marriage, then there was never in fact any connection between the two. If she is then taken by the third brother in levirate marriage, he would be engaging in relations with the wife of the first brother. From here one can conclude that the basis for Rabbi Shimon’s uncertainty is related to the questions concerning the strength of the levirate betrothal.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין זִיקַת יָבָם אֶחָד לְזִיקַת שְׁנֵי יְבָמִים? דִּלְמָא כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן זִיקָה כִּכְנוּסָה דָּמְיָא — בְּיָבָם אֶחָד, אֲבָל בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִין — לָא.

Abaye said to him: From here you cannot prove what Rabbi Shimon’s opinion was. Is there no difference to you between a levirate bond to a single yavam and a bond to two yevamim? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon said that a levirate bond is substantial enough to render her like a married woman, this applies only when there is a single yavam. If these were the circumstances of the case discussed, that when one brother died there remained only one yavam, then because the obligation of levirate marriage would apply only to him, she would be considered his wife. But perhaps he held that if there were two yevamin, then no, she would not be considered a married woman, as here the bond would apply to both at once. Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon’s uncertainty is with regard to the case of a levirate bond with two yevamin.

וּמִי שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? וְהָתַנְיָא, כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: כׇּל שֶׁהַלֵּידָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַנִּשּׂוּאִין — לֹא חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת, נִשּׂוּאִין (קודם) [קוֹדְמִין] לַלֵּידָה — אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

The Gemara challenges: Does Rabbi Shimon differentiate between the case of one yavam and the case of two yevamin in the matter of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist? But it is taught in a baraita with regard to the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist: Rabbi Shimon stated a principle: Whenever the birth of the third brother precedes the levirate marriage of the second brother, if this second brother dies and the yevama falls before the third brother, she does not perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. In such circumstances she is the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. But if the levirate marriage preceded his birth, she either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage.

מַאי לָאו בְּיָבָם אֶחָד, וְקָתָנֵי: לֹא חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. לָא, בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִים.

What, is it not referring to the case of a single yavam, and it is taught in a baraita: She does not perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. Even if there is only a single yavam this is not considered full marriage, and she remains forbidden as the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. Consequently, she who is subject to a levirate bond is not like a married woman. The Gemara answers: No. it refers to a case of two yevamin.

אֲבָל בְּיָבָם אֶחָד מַאי — הָכִי נָמֵי אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת? אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי: נִשּׂוּאִין קוֹדְמִין לַלֵּידָה — אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִים, אֲבָל בְּיָבָם אֶחָד — אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

The Gemara asks: But what, then, is the ruling for a single yavam? So too, one should say she either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage, as the woman who requires levirate marriage is like the wife of the second brother for all purposes. If so, rather than teaching the case when the marriage of the second brother precedes the birth of the third brother, that if this second brother dies and she falls before the third brother, she either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage, let Rabbi Shimon distinguish and teach the distinction within the situation itself and say: In what case is this statement said? When there are two yevamin. But if there is one yavam, she either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage.

כּוּלָּהּ בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִין קָמַיְירֵי. וְאֶלָּא מַאי כְּלָלָא?!

The Gemara rejects this: No, the entire baraita is in reference to two yevamin and differentiates between various cases involving two yevamin, namely, the case where the birth of the third brother preceded the marriage of the second brother and the case where the marriage of the second brother preceded the birth of the third brother. The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the principle in this matter? If Rabbi Shimon is speaking of two yevamin and not a single yavam, then it makes no sense to speak of a principle, as the halakha is different in the case of a single yavam.

וְעוֹד, מֵתִיב רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: שְׁלֹשָׁה אַחִין, שְׁנַיִם מֵהֶן נְשׂוּאִין שְׁתֵּי אֲחָיוֹת, אוֹ אִשָּׁה וּבִתָּהּ, אוֹ אִשָּׁה וּבַת בִּתָּהּ, אוֹ אִשָּׁה וּבַת בְּנָהּ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חוֹלְצוֹת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבְּמוֹת. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר.

Moreover, Rav Oshaya raised an objection from that which was taught in a mishna (28b): If there were three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her daughter’s daughter, or a woman and her son’s daughter, who are, in each case, two women who may not be married to the same person simultaneously, and subsequently these brothers who were married to relatives died, then those two women must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. Since they both have a levirate bond to the third brother at the same time and he is prohibited from marrying both, they cause one another to be unable to perform levirate marriage. And Rabbi Shimon exempts them even from ḥalitza.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ קָסָבַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן זִיקָה כִּכְנוּסָה דָּמְיָא — לְיַיבֵּם לְקַמַּיְיתָא, וְתִיפְּטַר אִידַּךְ!

And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Shimon held that a levirate bond is substantial enough to make her like a married woman, then let the third brother consummate the levirate marriage to the widow of the first husband to die, since as soon as her husband dies she has a levirate bond with the other brothers and should be considered to be like his wife, and let the other be exempt as a result, as her levirate bond began only with the death of the second husband.

אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: מַאי פּוֹטֵר, נָמֵי פּוֹטֵר בַּשְּׁנִיָּה. וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן!

Rav Amram said: What is really the meaning of the word exempt used by Rabbi Shimon? Only the second is exempt. The Gemara objects: But it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon exempts both. From here it is clear that in his opinion a woman subject to a levirate bond does not have the same status as a married woman.

אָמַר רָבָא: שְׁנִיָּה שֶׁבְּזוּג זֶה, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּה שֶׁבְּזוּג זֶה.

Rava said: In the case mentioned in that baraita, there were three brothers, two of whom died. Each of the deceased brothers had four wives who were related to the wives of the other brother as described in the mishna. One wife of the first brother was the sister of a wife of the second brother. Another wife was the mother of a wife of the second brother. Another was the daughter of the daughter of a wife of the second brother. And another was the daughter of the son of a wife of the second brother. When these brothers died, all eight women happened before the remaining brother for levirate marriage. When Rabbi Shimon deemed both of them exempt, he was referring to the second from this pair and the second from that pair. That is, since one of them was bound to the third brother her relative became exempt as a forbidden relative, and the other of the pair was her rival wife in each of the cases.

קָא טָעֵי רָבָא בְּאַרְבְּעָה זוּגֵי: חֲדָא, דְּ״אוֹ״ ״אוֹ״ קָתָנֵי. וְעוֹד, ״רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר בְּאַרְבַּעְתָּן״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ.

The Gemara comments: Rava was mistaken about there being four pairs. He mistakenly understood that the mishna spoke of two brothers who married four pairs of relatives. Why does the Gemara assume that he was mistaken? One piece of evidence is that the mishna teaches the case using the expression: Or, or. The mishna teaches: Or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter’s daughter, or a woman and her son’s daughter, meaning that not all of the pairs happened before a single yavam for levirate marriage. And further, the baraita should have said: Rabbi Shimon exempts all four of them, i.e., the four women married to the second brother.

וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאִשָּׁה אֶל אֲחוֹתָהּ לֹא תִקָּח לִצְרוֹר״, בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ צָרוֹת זוֹ לָזוֹ — לֹא יְהֵא לְךָ לִיקּוּחִין אֲפִילּוּ בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן!

And further, it is taught explicitly in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon exempts both of them from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage, as it is stated: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her” (Leviticus 18:18). From here it is derived that when two sisters are about to become rival wives one to the other, that is, at the moment they fall before one brother for levirate marriage, you do not have the option of taking even one of them. In other words, levirate marriage to either of them is not permitted, and therefore both are exempt and not only the second. Thus Rava’s explanation is rejected.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִי דִּנְפוּל בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — הָכִי נָמֵי, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דִּנְפוּל בְּבַת אַחַת, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּאָמַר: אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם.

Rather, Rav Ashi said an alternative answer to the Gemara’s challenge: If these yevamot happened before him for levirate marriage one after the other, indeed it is so that the first woman bound is like a married woman, and she exempts the second, who is her close relative. However, here we are dealing with a case when both brothers died at once and so both women happened before him at once. And Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said: It is possible to be precise. He held, contrary to the opinion of the Rabbis, that it was possible to be exact about measurements of time. Therefore, it is possible for two things to truly occur at once, and it is possible that both brothers died simultaneously.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּיִיבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד — פְּלִיג רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, בְּנוֹלַד וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִיבֵּם — לָא פְּלִיג.

Until this point the Gemara dealt with Rav Oshaya’s opinion stating that according to Rabbi Shimon’s statement, even in the case of one who was born before his brother’s levirate marriage the ruling of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist would not apply. However, Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon disagreed in the case where the second brother performed levirate marriage and after that the third brother was born; however, where the third brother was born after the death of the first brother and after that the second brother performed levirate marriage Rabbi Shimon did not disagree. He agreed that in this case she would be forbidden to the newly born brother as the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist.

וְתַרְוַויְיהוּ לְרַבָּנַן אִיצְטְרִיךְ, וְלֹא זוֹ אַף זוֹ קָתָנֵי.

As for the question that Rav Oshaya raised with regard to the apparent redundancy of the similar rulings in both the first mishna of the chapter and the mishna on 18b, it can be explained that both were necessary for the opinion of the Rabbis who prohibited marriage to the wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist in every case. The difficulty raised concerning the apparent redundancy of the first mishna, given the greater scope of the opinion revealed in the second mishna, can be explained by saying that the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that. That is, the mishna follows the stylistic principle of first teaching the obvious case and continues by saying that this principle applies not only in the obvious case but even in the less obvious case. If so, there is no need to assume that there is an additional dispute with Rabbi Shimon.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא, וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא. שְׁנֵי אַחִים בְּעוֹלָם אֶחָד, וּמֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶם בְּלֹא וָלָד, וְעָמַד הַשֵּׁנִי הַזֶּה לַעֲשׂוֹת מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לַעֲשׂוֹת בָּהּ מַאֲמָר עַד שֶׁנּוֹלַד לוֹ אָח, וּמֵת — הָרִאשׁוֹנָה יוֹצְאָה מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּעוֹלָמוֹ, וּשְׁנִיָּה — אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

The Gemara continues: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya: If there were two coexisting brothers, and one died childless, and the second was about to perform levirate betrothal with his yevama but did not manage to perform levirate betrothal before his brother was born, and then the second brother died, then the first woman goes out and is free to remarry without ḥalitza or levirate marriage due to the fact that she was the wife of a brother with whom the third brother did not coexist, and the second either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. She was never the rival wife of the widow of the first brother.

עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַאֲמָר, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד אָח, אוֹ שֶׁנּוֹלַד לוֹ אָח וְאַחַר כָּךְ עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַאֲמָר, וּמֵת — הָרִאשׁוֹנָה יוֹצְאָה מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּעוֹלָמוֹ, וּשְׁנִיָּה — חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

If the second brother performed levirate betrothal with her and afterward his brother was born, or if his brother was born and then he performed the levirate betrothal, and then he died, the first goes out and is free to remarry as the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, and the second, the wife of the second brother, must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. This is because, due to the levirate betrothal, she is considered by the Rabbis to be the rival wife of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: בִּיאָתָהּ אוֹ חֲלִיצָתָהּ שֶׁל אַחַת מֵהֶם פּוֹטֶרֶת צָרָתָהּ, חָלַץ לְבַעֲלַת מַאֲמָר — לֹא נִפְטְרָה צָרָה. כְּנָסָהּ וָמֵת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד לוֹ אָח, אוֹ שֶׁנּוֹלַד לוֹ אָח וְאַחַר כָּךְ כְּנָסָהּ, וָמֵת — שְׁתֵּיהֶן פְּטוּרוֹת מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם.

Rabbi Shimon says: Intercourse or ḥalitza with one of them, i.e., the wife of the second brother, exempts her rival wife, but if he performed ḥalitza with the one who received the levirate betrothal, then her rival wife, i.e., the wife of the second brother, is not thereby exempt, since possibly levirate betrothal does not have the same strength as marriage. If the second brother married his deceased brother’s wife and then died himself, and afterward a brother was born, or if a brother was born and then he married her and died, the two wives are both exempt from ḥalitza and levirate marriage. In this case, one was the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist and the other her rival wife.

כְּנָסָהּ וְנוֹלַד לוֹ אָח, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת — שְׁתֵּיהֶן פְּטוּרוֹת מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וּבָא וּמְצָאָהּ בְּהֶיתֵּר, וְלֹא עָמְדָה עָלָיו שָׁעָה אַחַת בְּאִיסּוּר — מְיַיבֵּם לְאֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה, אוֹ חוֹלֵץ לְאֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה.

The baraita continues: If he married his yevama and then a brother was born, and then he died, both the wife of the first deceased brother and the original wife of the yavam are exempt from ḥalitza and levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon says: Since the third brother came and found her in a permitted state, and she was never for a moment prohibited to him, as when he was born she was already the wife of the second brother, who was still alive, he therefore takes whichever he wishes in levirate marriage, or performs ḥalitza with whichever he wishes.

הָא בָּבָא דְסֵיפָא לְמַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ? אִילֵּימָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר קָתָנֵי לַהּ — מִכְּדִי לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין יִיבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד בֵּין נוֹלַד וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִיבֵּם?! לְעָרְבִינְהוּ וְלִתְנִינְהוּ!

The Gemara clarifies: The section of the latter clause of the baraita, which refers to the case of a brother born after the levirate marriage, according to whom is it taught? If we say it is taught for the purpose of clarifying the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it does not make sense, since it makes no difference to Rabbi Meir whether the levirate marriage preceded the birth or the birth preceded the levirate marriage. In his opinion under both circumstances she is the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. And if this were in fact taught for the purpose of clarifying his opinion it should have combined the cases and taught them together.

אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וּבְיִיבֵּם וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד — פְּלִיג, בְּנוֹלַד וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִיבֵּם — לָא פְּלִיג. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, is it not that the latter segment was meant to clarify the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since the different parts of the baraita enumerate different possibilities? And Rabbi Shimon disagrees in the case when the brother first performed levirate marriage and afterward his brother was born, but he does not disagree in the case where the younger brother was born and afterward the second brother performed levirate marriage. The Gemara summarizes: Conclude from this that Rabbi Shimon disagrees only here, as Rav Pappa explained.

אָמַר מָר: עָמַד הַשֵּׁנִי לַעֲשׂוֹת מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ, וְלֹא הִסְפִּיק לַעֲשׂוֹת מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ עַד שֶׁנּוֹלַד לוֹ אָח, וָמֵת — רִאשׁוֹנָה יוֹצְאָה מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּעוֹלָמוֹ, וּשְׁנִיָּה — אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. מַאי ״עָמַד״, וּמַאי ״לֹא הִסְפִּיק״? אִי עֲבַד — עֲבַד, וְאִי לָא עֲבַד — לָא עֲבַד!

§ The Gemara proceeds to discuss the baraita itself. The Master said: The second was about to perform levirate betrothal with his yevama, but did not manage to perform levirate betrothal with his yevama before his brother was born, and then the second brother died. The first woman goes out and is free to remarry without ḥalitza or levirate marriage due to the fact that she was the wife of a brother with whom the third brother did not coexist, and the second woman performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: Was about to, and what is the meaning of: Did not manage to perform levirate betrothal? The important issue is not his intention but his actions. If he did it, he did it; and if he did not do it, he did not do it.

אֶלָּא: ״עָמַד״ — מִדַּעְתָּהּ, וְ״לֹא הִסְפִּיק״ — מִדַּעְתָּהּ, אֶלָּא בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ, וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי. דְּתַנְיָא: הָעוֹשֶׂה מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: קָנָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: לֹא קָנָה.

Rather, the correct interpretation is: Was about to means that he was about to perform levirate betrothal with her consent. Did not manage means that he did not manage to perform it with her consent, but instead did it against her will. Consequently, it is understood that this baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who performs levirate betrothal with his yevama without her consent, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He acquired her and the betrothal is fully valid, like a consensual levirate betrothal with his yevama; and the Rabbis say: He did not acquire her.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי — גָּמַר מִבִּיאָה דִיבָמָה: מָה בִּיאָה דִיבָמָה — בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ, אַף קִדּוּשִׁין דִּיבָמָה — בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ. וְרַבָּנַן גָּמְרִי מִקִּדּוּשִׁין דְּעָלְמָא: מָה קִדּוּשִׁין דְּעָלְמָא — מִדַּעְתָּהּ, אַף קִדּוּשִׁין דִּיבָמָה — מִדַּעְתָּהּ.

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion? He learned this from the case of a yavam engaging in intercourse with a yevama. Just as even non-consensual intercourse with the yevama renders her his wife, as the matter does not require her consent, so too, betrothal of a yevama can be non-consensual. But the Rabbis learned from the halakhot of betrothal in general; just as betrothal in general requires consent by the woman, so too, betrothal of a yevama for purposes of levirate marriage requires consent.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר מִילֵּי דִיבָמָה מִמִּילֵּי דִיבָמָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, וּמָר סָבַר: מִילֵּי דְקִדּוּשִׁין מִמִּילֵּי דְקִדּוּשִׁין הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף.

The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree? One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that halakhic matters concerning yevamot must be inferred from matters concerning yevamot and not from other areas of halakha. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that halakhic matters concerning levirate betrothal must be inferred from matters concerning betrothal.

עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַאֲמָר וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד לוֹ אָח, אוֹ שֶׁנּוֹלַד לוֹ אָח וְאַחַר כָּךְ עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַאֲמָר, וָמֵת — רִאשׁוֹנָה יוֹצְאָה מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּעוֹלָמוֹ, וּשְׁנִיָּה — חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: בִּיאָתָהּ אוֹ חֲלִיצָתָהּ שֶׁל אַחַת מֵהֶן פּוֹטֶרֶת צָרָתָהּ.

The Gemara clarifies another segment of the baraita. It is taught: If the second brother performed levirate betrothal with her, and afterward his brother was born, or if his brother was born and then he performed levirate betrothal and died, the first woman goes out and is free to remarry because she is the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, and the second, the wife of the second brother, performs ḥalitza but does not enter into levirate marriage. Rabbi Shimon says: Intercourse or ḥalitza with one of them exempts her rival wife.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַהֵיָיא קָאֵי? אִילֵּימָא אַנּוֹלַד לוֹ אָח וְאַחַר כָּךְ עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַאֲמָר — הָא אָמְרַתְּ בְּנוֹלַד וּלְבַסּוֹף יִיבֵּם לָא פְּלִיג רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אֶלָּא אַעָשָׂה בָּהּ מַאֲמָר וְאַחַר כָּךְ נוֹלַד לוֹ אָח.

The Gemara asks: To which case is Rabbi Shimon referring? If we say that he is referring to the case when his brother was born and then he performed levirate betrothal with her, didn’t you already say that Rabbi Shimon did not dispute the case where the brother was born and then ultimately he performed a levirate marriage, and she would be forbidden as the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. Rather, one must say that Rabbi Shimon disputed the case where he performed levirate betrothal with her and afterward his brother was born.

חָלַץ לְבַעֲלַת מַאֲמָר לֹא נִפְטְרָה צָרָה. מַאי טַעְמָא — מִשּׁוּם דַּהֲוַאי צָרָה וַדַּאי, וּבַעֲלַת מַאֲמָר סָפֵק, וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי.

Later in the baraita it is taught: If the third brother performed ḥalitza with the wife of the first brother, to whom the second brother performed levirate betrothal, her rival wife is not exempt. The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason for this? It is because the rival wife, the widow of the second brother, has a definite legal status that requires an act to free her to remarry, as she is the wife of a brother with whom he did coexist, whereas the widow of the first brother with whom the second brother performed levirate betrothal had only an uncertain legal status, as it is not clear if she is to be considered truly the wife of the second brother by means of the levirate betrothal or not. And the principle is that an uncertainty does not override a certainty. Therefore, even if the third brother performs ḥalitza, since the status of the first woman’s obligation is uncertain, the status of the ḥalitza itself is uncertain, as it is possible that she did not require ḥalitza at all. Consequently, this ḥalitza is not sufficient to exempt her rival wife. This teaches that he must perform ḥalitza or levirate marriage with the woman who is definitely obligated, and then the other will be exempt.

יָתֵיב רַב מְנַשֶּׁה בַּר זְבִיד קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן?! כִּדְאָמַר טַעְמָא: הוֹאִיל וּבָא וּמְצָאָהּ בְּהֶיתֵּר, וְלֹא עָמְדָה עָלָיו שָׁעָה אַחַת בְּאִיסּוּר!

Rav Menashe bar Zevid sat before Rav Huna. He sat and said: What is the reason that Rabbi Shimon allows the third brother to marry the wife of his brother with whom he did not coexist where she was taken in levirate marriage prior to his birth? The Gemara also wonders: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason? The reason is as he stated in that same baraita: Since the third brother came and found her in a permitted state, and she was never for a moment prohibited to him he may perform levirate marriage with her.

אֶלָּא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּלְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה וְיִבְּמָהּ״, עֲדַיִין יִבּוּמִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים עָלֶיהָ. אֶלָּא הָא דִּתְנַן: כְּנָסָהּ — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ לְכׇל דָּבָר. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: מְלַמֵּד

Rather, the question was as follows: Rabbi Shimon gave such a persuasive explanation of his opinion that it raises the question: What is the reason for the Rabbis’ opinion? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will…take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage [veyibbema]” (Deuteronomy 25:5). This means that the first levirate bond is still upon her. Even after she is taken as a wife by the second brother, her earlier status as wife of her late first husband is still in effect. The Gemara challenges this: But what about that which we learn in a mishna (38a): If he took his yevama in marriage as his wife, then her legal status is that of his wife in every sense; and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: This teaches