Yevamot 55
אַלְמָא אֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ, בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם — אֲסוּרוֹת. מְנָלַן? יָלֵיף מֵאֲחוֹתוֹ. מָה אֲחוֹתוֹ — בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם, אַף כָּאן — בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם.
Apparently, this mishna indicates that his wife’s sister, whether from the father, i.e., a paternal sister, or from the mother, i.e., a maternal sister, is forbidden. From where do we derive this halakha that the prohibition applies even to his wife’s maternal sister? The Gemara responds: It is derived from the prohibition proscribing his sister. Just as his sister is forbidden whether she is his sister from his father or from his mother, so too here, a wife’s sister is forbidden whether from the father or from the mother.
וְלֵילַף מִדּוֹדָתוֹ: מָה דּוֹדָתוֹ מִן הָאָב וְלֹא מִן הָאֵם, אַף כָּאן מִן הָאָב וְלֹא מִן הָאֵם! מִסְתַּבְּרָא מֵאֲחוֹתוֹ הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן קְרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ מִקְּרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara challenges the validity of this source: And let it be derived from the halakha with regard to his aunt: Just as the prohibition with regard to his aunt applies only to the wife of his father’s brother from his father but not from his mother, i.e., the wife of his father’s paternal brother but not the wife of his father’s maternal brother, so too here, the prohibition with regard to his wife’s sister should apply only to her sister from her father but not to her sister from her mother. The Gemara answers: It is reasonable that he should derive the halakha in this case from the case of his sister, as the tanna thereby derives the halakha of one’s own relatives from another case of his own relatives, whereas his aunt is forbidden as his father’s relative.
אַדְּרַבָּה מִדּוֹדָתוֹ הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן דָּבָר עַל יְדֵי קִדּוּשִׁין מִדָּבָר שֶׁעַל יְדֵי קִדּוּשִׁין. אֶלָּא מֵאֵשֶׁת אָח יָלְפִינַן, דְּשֶׁכֵּן דָּבָר עַל יְדֵי קִדּוּשִׁין, וּקְרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara counters: On the contrary, he should derive the halakha in this instance from the case of his aunt, as he thereby derives the halakha in a matter prohibited through betrothal from another matter prohibited through betrothal. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the halakha of a wife’s sister is derived from that of a brother’s wife, as they are both something forbidden by means of betrothal and they are his own relatives.
וְאֵשֶׁת אָח גּוּפַהּ מְנָא לַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״עֶרְוַת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיךָ לֹא תְגַלֵּה״, בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם.
The Gemara asks: And in the case of a brother’s wife itself, from where do we derive that the prohibition applies to the wife of both a paternal and a maternal brother? As it is taught in a baraita: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife” (Leviticus 18:16), which indicates: Whether from the father or from the mother.
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא מִן הָאָב וְלֹא מִן הָאֵם? וְדִין הוּא: חַיָּיב כָּאן, וְחַיָּיב בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ. מָה אֲחוֹתוֹ — בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם, אַף כָּאן — בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם.
The baraita elaborates: Do you say the prohibition applies whether she is the wife of one’s brother from his father or from his mother, i.e., whether she is the wife of one’s paternal brother or maternal brother? Or perhaps it is only the wife of one’s brother from his father and not from his mother? It may be inferred logically from the fact that the Torah rendered him liable here and rendered him liable with regard to his sister: Just as with regard to his sister he is liable to receive punishment whether she is his sister from his father or from his mother, so too here, he is liable to receive punishment whether she is the wife of his brother from his father or from his mother.
אוֹ כְּלָךְ לְדֶרֶךְ זוֹ: חַיָּיב כָּאן וְחַיָּיב בְּדוֹדָתוֹ, מָה דּוֹדָתוֹ — מִן הָאָב וְלֹא מִן הָאֵם, אַף כָּאן — מִן הָאָב וְלֹא מִן הָאֵם?!
Or perhaps go this way and compare this case to the case of an aunt. The Torah rendered him liable here and rendered him liable with regard to his aunt, i.e., the wife of his father’s brother: Just as with regard to his aunt, he is liable to receive punishment only for the wife of his father’s brother from his father and not for the wife of his father’s brother from his mother, so too here, he is liable to receive punishment only for the wife of his brother from his father and not from his mother.
נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה: דָּנִין קְרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ מִקְּרוֹבֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְאַל תּוֹכִיחַ דּוֹדָתוֹ שֶׁקְּרוֹבֵי הָאָב. אוֹ כְּלָךְ לְדֶרֶךְ זוֹ: דָּנִין דָּבָר שֶׁעַל יְדֵי קִדּוּשִׁין, מִדָּבָר שֶׁעַל יְדֵי קִדּוּשִׁין, וְאַל תּוֹכִיחַ אֲחוֹתוֹ, שֶׁאִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו.
The Gemara analyzes these two possibilities: Let us see to which case it is more similar. We should derive the halakha with regard to his own relatives, i.e., his brother’s wife, from another case of his own relatives, i.e., his sister, and the halakha with regard to his aunt cannot be used to prove otherwise, as she is his father’s relative. Or perhaps go this way: We should derive the halakha of a matter prohibited through betrothal, i.e., a brother’s wife, from another matter prohibited through betrothal, i.e., his father’s brother’s wife, and the halakha with regard to his sister cannot be used to prove otherwise, as it is a prohibition that comes on its own.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עֶרְוַת אָחִיךָ הִיא״, בֵּין מִן הָאָב בֵּין מִן הָאֵם.
Since it is impossible to prove which halakha should serve as the model for the case of a brother’s wife, the verse states a second time in the same verse: “It is your brother’s nakedness” (Leviticus 18:16), in order to emphasize that she is forbidden whether she is the wife of his brother from his father or from his mother.
וְאֵימָא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּאֵשֶׁת אָח מִן הָאָב, חֲדָא דְּיֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וַחֲדָא דְּאֵין לָהּ בָּנִים בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ! אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ מִדְּרַב הוּנָא נָפְקָא.
The Gemara challenges this interpretation of the extra phrase in the verse: Say that both this first part of the verse and that latter part refer to the wife of a brother from the father, i.e., the wife of one’s paternal brother. As for the repetition, one part of the verse renders prohibited a woman who has children, who is prohibited from marrying her husband’s brother during her husband’s lifetime even after they are divorced, and the other one renders prohibited a woman who does not have children, who is also prohibited from marrying her husband’s brother during her husband’s lifetime, even after she is divorced. The Gemara responds: The prohibition proscribing a woman who does not have children for the duration of her husband’s lifetime is derived from the statement of Rav Huna (54b), and it requires no further source.
וְאֵימָא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּאֵשֶׁת אָח מִן הָאָב, חֲדָא דְּיֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וַחֲדָא דְּיֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ!
The Gemara presents another challenge: Say that both this first part of the verse and that latter part refer to the wife of a brother from the father, i.e., the wife of one’s paternal brother. As for the repetition, one part of the verse renders a woman who has children prohibited from marrying her husband’s brother for the duration of her husband’s lifetime, even after she is divorced, and the other one renders prohibited a woman who has children and indicates that it is prohibited for her to marry her husband’s brother even after her husband’s death.
יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ לָא צְרִיכָא קְרָא, מִדְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא שֶׁאֵין לָהּ בָּנִים מוּתֶּרֶת, הָא יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים אֲסוּרָה.
The Gemara responds: The halakha that it is prohibited for a woman who has children to marry her husband’s brother even after her husband’s death does not require a verse. From the fact that the Merciful One says that one who has no children is permitted to marry the brother after her husband’s death, it can be inferred that if she has children, it is prohibited for her to marry her husband’s brother.
וְדִלְמָא: אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים אֲסוּרָה לְעָלְמָא וְשַׁרְיָא לְיָבָם, יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים שַׁרְיָא לְעָלְמָא וְשַׁרְיָא לְיָבָם! אִי נָמֵי: אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים מִצְוָה, יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים רְשׁוּת!
The Gemara raises another challenge: But perhaps if she does not have children it is prohibited for her to marry everyone else and permitted for her to marry her yavam, as specified by the Torah. However, if she does have children it is permitted for her to marry everyone and it is permitted for her to marry her yavam as well. Alternatively, perhaps if she does not have children it is a mitzva for her husband’s brother to marry her, and if she does have children it is optional. Consequently, the extra phrase in the verse should be necessary in order to indicate that the prohibition against marriage applies in all of these cases.
אִי נָמֵי: אֵין לָהּ בָּנִים — אִין, יֵשׁ לָהּ בָּנִים — לָא, וְלָאו הַבָּא מִכְּלַל עֲשֵׂה — עֲשֵׂה!
Alternatively, if she does not have children, yes, she is permitted to her husband’s brother, and if she does have children, no, she is not permitted to him, but the punishment of karet does not apply to this prohibition. This is because the source of the prohibition is the mitzva for them to marry after the husband’s death, and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva, but nothing more. Consequently, the extra phrase in the verse should be necessary in order to indicate that the punishment of karet is still applicable.
כְּתַב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״עֶרְוַת אָחִיו גִּלָּה״.
The Gemara responds: The Torah wrote a different verse to teach that the prohibition against marrying one’s brother’s wife is in full force, including the punishment of karet, in these cases: “He has uncovered his brother’s nakedness; they shall be childless” (Leviticus 20:21). Therefore, the extra phrase mentioned in the baraita can indicate that the prohibition against marrying one’s brother’s wife applies both to the wife of a paternal brother and to the wife of a maternal brother.
וְאֵימָא אֵשֶׁת אָח מִן הָאֵם — כְּאֵשֶׁת אָח מִן הָאָב: מָה אֵשֶׁת אָח מִן הָאָב — לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ שַׁרְיָא, אַף אֵשֶׁת אָח מִן הָאֵם — לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ שַׁרְיָא! אָמַר קְרָא ״הִיא״, בַּהֲוָיָיתָהּ תְּהֵא.
The Gemara suggests: Say that the halakha of the wife of a brother from one’s mother should be just like that of the wife of a brother from his father: Just as the wife of a brother from one’s father is permitted, i.e., one can marry her, after her husband’s death, so too, the wife of a brother from his mother should be permitted after her husband’s death. The Gemara responds: The verse states: “She is your brother’s nakedness,” thereby emphasizing that she shall remain after her husband’s death as she is during his life.
אֲחוֹתוֹ דִּכְתַב בָּהּ כָּרֵת לְמָה לִי?
§ The Gemara above stated that all of the instances of forbidden intercourse are compared to one another. Therefore, since there is already a verse that states: “For whoever shall do any of these abominations, the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29), the Gemara asks: Why do I need the phrase written with regard to one’s sister that states that intercourse is punishable by karet?
לְכִדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן שֶׁאִם עֲשָׂאָן כּוּלָּם בְּהֶעְלֵם אַחַת — חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.
The Gemara answers that it is necessary for that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said that if he performed all of them, i.e., he violated every prohibition against engaging in forbidden intercourse in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable to receive punishment for each and every one. One might have thought that there is one prohibition against engaging in forbidden intercourse, and many different ways to violate the prohibition. Therefore, if one violated the prohibition in different ways during one lapse of awareness, one is liable to bring only one sin-offering. This verse therefore indicates that each act of intercourse with a relative with whom intercourse is forbidden is a violation of an independent prohibition.
וּלְרַבִּי יִצְחָק דְּאָמַר: כׇּל חַיָּיבֵי כָּרֵיתוֹת בַּכְּלָל הָיוּ, וְלָמָּה יָצְתָה כָּרֵת בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ — לְדוּנוֹ בְּכָרֵת וְלֹא בְּמַלְקוֹת. לְחַלֵּק, מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yitzḥak, who said that all forbidden relations for which one is liable to receive karet were included in the verse: “The souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people,” why was the punishment of karet with regard to one’s sister singled out? In order to sentence him to karet and not to flogging. Although he has violated a prohibition, which generally carries a punishment of flogging, he is not flogged due to the fact that he is liable to receive the more severe punishment of karet. Since he has used the verse to teach this halakha, from where do we know to divide the prohibitions against engaging in forbidden intercourse and consider each an independent prohibition?
נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וְּאֶל אִשָּׁה בְּנִדַּת טוּמְאָתָהּ״, לְחַיֵּיב עַל כׇּל אִשָּׁה וְאִשָּׁה.
The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse “And you shall not approach a woman to uncover her nakedness as long as she is impure by her uncleanness” (Leviticus 18:19), which serves to render him liable to receive punishment for each and every woman.
דּוֹדָתוֹ דִּכְתַב בַּהּ רַחֲמָנָא ״עֲרִירִים יִהְיוּ״, לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְרַבָּה. דְּרַבָּה רָמֵי, כְּתִיב: ״עֲרִירִים יִהְיוּ״, וּכְתִיב: ״עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ״, הָא כֵּיצַד? יֵשׁ לוֹ בָּנִים — קוֹבְרָן, אֵין לוֹ בָּנִים — הוֹלֵךְ עֲרִירִי.
The Gemara poses another question: Why do I need the phrase that the Merciful One writes with regard to one’s aunt, which states: They shall be childless? The death of one’s children is included in the punishment of karet, and it has already been established that all of the forbidden intercourse is punishable by karet. The Gemara answers that it is necessary for that which Rabba said, as Rabba raised a contradiction: It is written with regard to one who had intercourse with his brother’s wife: “They shall be childless” (Leviticus 20:22), and it also states with regard to one who had intercourse with his aunt: “They shall die childless” (Leviticus 20:21). How so? If he already has children, he will eventually bury them; if he does not have children, he will go childless.
וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִכְתַּב ״עֲרִירִים יִהְיוּ״, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִכְתַּב ״עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ״, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עֲרִירִים יִהְיוּ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: עַד חִטְאֵיהּ, אֲבָל מֵחִטְאֵיהּ וְאֵילָךְ — לָא. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ״, וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מֵחִטְאֵיהּ וְאֵילָךְ, אֲבָל מֵעִיקָּרָא — לָא, צְרִיכָא.
The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state: They shall be childless, and it is also necessary to state: They shall die childless. As, if the Merciful One had written only: They shall be childless, I would have said that only those children he had before his sin will die, but those born to him from the time of his sin and on, no, they will not die. The Torah therefore states: They shall die childless, indicating that even if he has children afterward they will die and he will remain childless. And similarly, if the Merciful One had written only: They shall die childless, I would have said that this is referring to children born from the time of his sin and on, but those born from the beginning, before he sinned, no, they will not die. It is therefore necessary to mention both expressions.
הַעֲרָאָה דְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין, מְנָלַן?
§ The Gemara above (54a–54b) derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse with regard to prohibitions that are punishable by capital punishment or karet. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse with regard to those liable to receive punishment for violating ordinary Torah prohibitions?
מִדְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ גַּבֵּי שִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה. מִכְּלָל דְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין — בְּהַעֲרָאָה.
The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One reveals with regard to a designated maidservant that the prohibition has been violated only through an act of cohabitation with seed, i.e., a complete act of sexual intercourse, in the verse “And whoever lies with a woman in cohabitation with seed, and she is a bondmaid designated to a man” (Leviticus 19:20), by inference, those liable to receive punishment for violating ordinary prohibitions are liable even through the initial stage of intercourse.
אַדְּרַבָּה: מִדְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא הַעֲרָאָה בְּחַיָּיבֵי כָּרֵיתוֹת, מִכְּלָל דְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין בִּגְמַר בִּיאָה! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִם כֵּן — לִשְׁתּוֹק קְרָא מִשִּׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה.
The Gemara responds: On the contrary, from the fact that the Merciful One reveals that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to forbidden relationships for which one is liable to receive karet, then, by inference, those liable for violating ordinary prohibitions are liable only through the completion of the act of sexual intercourse and not merely for the initial stage of intercourse. Rav Ashi said: If so, let the verse remain silent in the case of a designated maidservant, and it would be assumed that one is liable to receive punishment only for completing the act of sexual intercourse. The fact that the Torah specified that in this case one is liable to receive punishment only for completing the act of sexual intercourse indicates that with regard to other ordinary prohibitions one is liable even for the initial stage of intercourse.
הַעֲרָאָה דְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין דִּכְהוּנָּה מְנָלַן? אָתְיָא ״קִיחָה״ ״קִיחָה״.
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse with regard to those liable to receive punishment for violating prohibitions specific to the priesthood? Since these prohibitions are unique in that they apply only to priests, their parameters cannot be derived from prohibitions that apply to the entire population. The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the words taking and taking. This verb appears in prohibitions punishable by karet, e.g., “And if a man shall take his sister” (Leviticus 20:17), and in prohibitions of the priesthood, where it states: “They shall not take a woman that is a harlot” (Leviticus 21:7).
דְּחַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks further: From where do we derive that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse with regard to those liable to receive punishment for violating a positive mitzva, e.g., one who has intercourse with an Egyptian or Edomite convert? The verse states: “The children that are born to them of the third generation may enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:9). It is therefore a positive mitzva that only the grandchildren of these converts may have intercourse with a Jew.
אָתְיָא ״בִּיאָה״ ״בִּיאָה״.
It is derived from a verbal analogy between the terms entering and entering. The verse states in the context of a prohibition: “A mamzer shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:3), and in the context of a prohibition derived from a positive mitzva: “The children that are born to them of the third generation may enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:9). Consequently, these types of prohibitions are equated.
יְבָמָה לַשּׁוּק, מְנָלַן? אִי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לָאו — לָאו, אִי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר עֲשֵׂה — עֲשֵׂה.
The Gemara poses another question: From where do we derive that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to the prohibition against a yevama having intercourse with a man from the general public? The Gemara answers that there is no need for an independent source in this case: If you are asking according to the one who said that this is an ordinary prohibition, it is a prohibition like any other. If you are asking according to the one who said that this is a positive mitzva, it is a positive mitzva like any other.
אֶלָּא: יְבָמָה לְיָבָם מְנָלַן? אָתְיָא ״בִּיאָה״ ״בִּיאָה״.
Rather, the question is as follows: From where do we derive that a yevama is acquired by her yavam via the initial stage of intercourse? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the words entering and entering. This verb is used with regard to ordinary Torah prohibitions, as mentioned above, and also with regard to levirate marriage, in the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5).
אִשָּׁה לְבַעְלָהּ מְנָלַן? אָתְיָא ״קִיחָה״ ״קִיחָה״.
The Gemara asks further: From where do we derive that a woman is betrothed to her husband through the initial stage of intercourse? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the words taking and taking. With regard to betrothal, the verse states: “When a man takes a wife and marries her” (Deuteronomy 24:1). This verb is also used with regard to forbidden intercourse, as in the verse: “And if a man shall take his sister” (Leviticus 20:17).
אָמַר רָבָא: לְמָה לִי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ בְּשִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה, ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ בְּסוֹטָה?
§ Rava said: Now that it has been established that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse, why do I need the expression “cohabitation with seed” (Leviticus 19:20) that the Merciful One writes with regard to a designated maidservant; the expression “cohabitation with seed” (Leviticus 18:20) written with regard to a married woman; and the expression “cohabitation with seed” (Numbers 5:13) written with regard to a sota?
דְּשִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה — כְּדַאֲמַרַן. דְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ פְּרָט לִמְשַׁמֵּשׁ מֵת.
The Gemara explains that the expression is necessary with regard to a designated maidservant as we said above (55a), because it indicates that one is liable to receive punishment only for a complete act of intercourse with a designated maidservant but not for the initial stage of intercourse. With regard to a married woman, the word seed excludes one who has intercourse with a dead organ, i.e., one that is not erect, as this cannot lead to childbirth.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְשַׁמֵּשׁ מֵת בַּעֲרָיוֹת פָּטוּר, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא: פְּרָט לִמְשַׁמֵּשׁ מֵתָה. דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא [הוֹאִיל] לְאַחַר מִיתָה נָמֵי אִיקְּרַי ״שְׁאֵרוֹ״, אֵימָא לִיחַיַּיב עֲלַהּ בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara questions this resolution: This works out well according to the one who said that one who has intercourse while his organ is dead with those with whom relations are forbidden, is exempt, as this is not considered an act of intercourse. However, according to the one who said that he is liable, what is there to say? Rather, according to this opinion, the verse excludes one who has intercourse with a dead woman. As it might enter your mind to say: Since after death she is also called her husband’s kin, say that one who had intercourse with her should be liable to receive punishment for committing adultery with a married woman. It therefore teaches us that intercourse with a dead woman is not considered intercourse at all.
דְּסוֹטָה לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״שִׁכְבַת זָרַע״, פְּרָט לְדָבָר אַחֵר. מַאי ״דָּבָר אַחֵר״? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: פְּרָט לְשֶׁקִּינֵּא לָהּ שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: ״מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה״ כְּתִיב!
The Gemara addresses the third case: Why do I need the expression cohabitation with seed in the context of a sota? It is needed for that which is taught in a baraita, that the expression a cohabitation with seed excludes something else. The Gemara asks: What is this something else? Rav Sheshet said: It excludes a case where the husband was jealous with regard to her and warned her not to seclude herself and have atypical, i.e., anal, sexual intercourse with another man. Rava objected to this explanation and said to him: It is written: “The cohabitations of a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), indicating that there are two types of intercourse with a woman, and the same halakha applies to both.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: פְּרָט לְשֶׁקִּינֵּא לָהּ דֶּרֶךְ אֵבָרִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: פְּרִיצוּתָא אֲסַר רַחֲמָנָא?
Rather, Rava said: It excludes a situation where the husband was jealous with regard to her and warned her not to seclude herself with another man and engage in intimate contact by way of other limbs. The verse indicates that the wife does not become prohibited to her husband if she secludes herself with the man after this warning. Abaye said to him: Does the Merciful One prohibit a woman to her husband due merely to licentious behavior without sexual intercourse? Since this behavior would not render a woman prohibited to her husband, it is obvious that a warning that explicitly mentions this behavior is insufficient to cause the woman to become a sota if she then secludes herself with the man.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: פְּרָט לְשֶׁקִּינֵּא לָהּ בִּנְשִׁיקָה. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַעֲרָאָה זוֹ הַכְנָסַת עֲטָרָה. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר זוֹ נְשִׁיקָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
Rather, Abaye said: It excludes a case where he was jealous with regard to her and warned her not to seclude herself with another man and kiss, i.e., have external contact of the sexual organs. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that the definition of the initial stage of intercourse is the insertion of the corona; therefore, mere external contact is not considered sexual intercourse. However, according to the one who said that the definition of the initial stage of intercourse is a kiss, what is there to say?
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם לְשֶׁקִּינֵּא לָהּ דֶּרֶךְ אֵבָרִים, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: בִּקְפֵידָא דְבַעַל תְּלָה רַחֲמָנָא, וְהָא קָא קָפֵיד, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rather, the expression: Something else, in the baraita, is actually referring to a case where the husband was jealous with regard to her and warned her not to seclude herself with another man and engage in intimate contact by way of other limbs. And it is necessary to state that the woman does not become prohibited to her husband as a sota in this case, as it might enter your mind to say that the Merciful One made this halakha dependent on the husband’s objection, as it is his decision to warn his wife, and since he objects to contact of this nature, she becomes a sota if she secludes herself after this warning. The Torah therefore teaches us that this is not considered a warning.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַעֲרָאָה זוֹ נְשִׁיקָה. מָשָׁל לְאָדָם שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ אֶצְבָּעוֹ עַל פִּיו, אִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא יִדְחוֹק הַבָּשָׂר.
§ The Gemara returns to the precise definition of the initial stage of intercourse. Shmuel said: The definition of the initial stage of intercourse is a kiss, i.e., external contact of the sexual organs. Shmuel explains: This is comparable to a person who places his finger on his mouth; it is impossible that he not press the flesh of his lips. Similarly, when there is contact of the sexual organs, there will certainly be at least a small amount of penetration, and this is considered an act of sexual intercourse.
כִּי אֲתָא רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גְּמַר בִּיאָה בְּשִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה זוֹ הַכְנָסַת עֲטָרָה. מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״, אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל בִּיאַת הַמֵּירוּק. מַאי לָאו — מֵירוּק גִּיד?! לָא, מֵירוּק עֲטָרָה.
When Rabba bar bar Ḥana came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The completion of intercourse stated with regard to a designated maidservant is the insertion of the corona, and no more. Rav Sheshet raised an objection based upon the following baraita: The phrase cohabitation with seed indicates that one is liable to receive punishment only for a complete act of sexual intercourse. What, does this not refer to the complete insertion of the member? The Gemara responds: No, it is possible that it is referring to the complete insertion of the corona.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַעֲרָאָה זוֹ הַכְנָסַת עֲטָרָה. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה לָא אָמַר הָכִי! אֲמַר לְהוּ: אוֹ אִיהוּ שַׁקְרַאי אוֹ אֲנָא שַׁקְרַי.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The definition of the initial stage of intercourse is the insertion of the corona. They said to him: But Rabba bar bar Ḥana did not say so, as he taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the insertion of the corona constitutes a complete act of sexual intercourse and is not considered merely the initial stage of intercourse. He said to them: Either he lied or I am lying. There is clearly a contradiction, and one of us cited Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion incorrectly.
כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַעֲרָאָה זוֹ הַכְנָסַת עֲטָרָה. אַדְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה וַדַּאי פְּלִיג. אַדִּשְׁמוּאֵל מִי לֵימָא פְּלִיג?
When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The definition of the initial stage of intercourse is the insertion of the corona. The Gemara comments: He certainly disagrees with Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who cited Rabbi Yoḥanan as stating that insertion of the corona constitutes a complete act of sexual intercourse. Shall we say that he also disagrees with Shmuel, who defined the initial stage of intercourse as external contact of the sexual organs?
לֹא, מִנְּשִׁיקָה וְעַד הַכְנָסַת עֲטָרָה — הַעֲרָאָה קָרֵי לַהּ.
The Gemara responds: No; it is possible that there is no dispute between them, and Ravin said that Rabbi Yoḥanan calls the entire process from a kiss until the insertion of the corona the initial stage of intercourse, while anything beyond that point is a complete act of sexual intercourse.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַעֲרָאָה זוֹ הַכְנָסַת עֲטָרָה, גְּמַר בִּיאָה — גְּמַר בִּיאָה מַמָּשׁ.
When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The definition of the initial stage of intercourse is the insertion of the corona, whereas a complete act of sexual intercourse is literally a complete act of sexual intercourse, i.e., insertion of the male organ beyond the corona.
