Yevamot 88

Yevamot 88

מַאי טַעְמָא קָא מְחַיְּיבִי רַבָּנַן? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דִּמְהֵימַן — וְהָא תְּרֵי בְּעָלְמָא, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא מַכְחִישׁ לְהוּ אִינְהוּ — מְהֵימְנִי, וְקָא פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן. אֶלָּא לָאו, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִישְׁתִּיק — וּשְׁתִיקָה כְּהוֹדָאָה דָמְיָא.

of the mishna, what is the reason that when he remains silent, the Rabbis obligate him to bring to an offering based on the testimony of one witness? If we say it is because the witness is deemed credible, but there is the case of an ordinary pair of witnesses, where even though he contradicts their claim they are deemed credible, and yet the Rabbis exempt him from bringing an offering. If so, they would certainly not obligate him to bring an offering due to the testimony of a lone witness. Rather, is it not because he remained silent, and silence is considered like an admission? If this is the reason why he brings an offering, there is no proof from here that the testimony of one witness is accepted.

אֶלָּא סְבָרָא הִיא, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַחֲתִיכָה סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וַאֲתָא עֵד אֶחָד וְאָמַר: בָּרִי לִי, דְּשׁוּמָּן הוּא — דִּמְהֵימַן.

Rather, this is evidently based on logical reasoning: Just as it is in the case of a piece of meat about which it is uncertain if it is forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat, and there is no way of clarifying which it is, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, the halakha is that he is deemed credible. Here too, the testimony of a single witness can resolve the uncertainty.

מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם לָא אִיתַּחְזַק אִיסּוּרָא, הָכָא אִיתַּחְזַק אִיסּוּרָא דְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְאֵין דָּבָר שֶׁבְּעֶרְוָה פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנַיִם!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is it comparable? There, the presumption of a prohibition has not been established, as there is no proof that the piece was ever forbidden, and one can therefore rely on the witness who permits it, whereas here, the presumption of the prohibition with regard to a married woman is established, and there is a principle that nothing involving those with whom relations are forbidden can be determined by fewer than two witnesses.

הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לַחֲתִיכָה דְּוַדַּאי חֵלֶב, וַאֲתָא עֵד אֶחָד וְאָמַר: בָּרִי לִי דְּשׁוּמָּן הֲוָה — דְּלָא מְהֵימַן! מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם, אֲפִילּוּ אָתוּ בֵּי מְאָה לָא מְהֵימְנִי. הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּכִי אָתוּ בֵּי תְרֵי מְהֵימְנִי — חַד נָמֵי לְהֵימְנֵיהּ, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַטֶּבֶל, הֶקְדֵּשׁ, וְקֻוֽנָּמוֹת.

In fact, this is comparable only to a case involving a piece of meat that is definitely forbidden fat, and one witness comes and says: It is clear to me that it is permitted fat, as the halakha is that he is not deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this claim: Is it comparable? There, when it is established as forbidden fat, even if one hundred witnesses come they are not deemed credible. Here, since if two witnesses come and say the husband is dead they would be deemed credible, let us also deem one witness credible. This is just as it is in the case of untithed produce, i.e., produce from which neither teruma nor tithe has been separated, consecrated property, and konamot, an alternative term for offerings [korbanot] used in vows creating prohibitions. Such vows are called by the generic term: Konamot.

הַאי טֶבֶל, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּידֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְתַקְּנוֹ. אֶלָּא דְּאַחֵר, מַאי קָסָבַר:

The Gemara asks: With regard to this case of untithed produce, what are the circumstances? If it is his, and he testifies that terumot and tithes have been separated from it, he should be deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare the produce for consumption by separating tithes whenever he wishes. Rather, you must say that he testifies with regard to untithed produce of another, but if so, what does the anonymous Sage who cited this example hold in this case?

אִי קָא סָבַר: תּוֹרֵם מִשֶּׁלּוֹ עַל שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ דַּעַת בְּעָלִים — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְתַקְּנוֹ, וְאִי קָסָבַר: צָרִיךְ דַּעַת בְּעָלִים, וְאָמַר: אֲנָא יָדַעְנָא בֵּיהּ דִּמְתַקַּן, הִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן?

The Gemara elaborates: If he holds that one who separates tithes from his produce for that of another does not require the owner’s knowledge, and he can prepare his friend’s produce for consumption whenever he chooses, in this case too his testimony is deemed credible because it is within his power to prepare it. And if he holds that the owner’s knowledge is required before someone else can separate the gifts, and this is referring to a situation where the witness comes and says: I know with regard to it that it is prepared, in that case, it itself, this very halakha, from where do we derive it? Why is the case of untithed produce more obvious than the testimony with regard to a missing husband?

הֶקְדֵּשׁ נָמֵי, אִי קְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לִפְדּוֹתוֹ. אִי קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף, אִי דִּידֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְאִיתְּשׁוֹלֵי עֲלֵיהּ. אֶלָּא דְּאַחֵר, וְאָמַר: יָדַעְנָא בֵּיהּ דְּאִיתְּשִׁיל מָרֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ, הִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן?

Similarly, with regard to consecrated property too, if it is merely sanctity that inheres in its value, i.e., it is not an actual offering but an item that has been dedicated to the Temple upkeep, then the reason why the testimony of one witness who says it is not consecrated is accepted is due to the fact that it is within his power to redeem it. And if this is referring to inherent sanctity, the matter still remains to be clarified: If it is his offering, then the reason is due to the fact that it is within his power to request from a Sage that the vow be dissolved, like any other vow. Rather, you must say that it is referring to the offering of another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, here too, in this case itself, from where do we derive that he is deemed credible?

קֻוֽנָּמוֹת נָמֵי, אִי קָסָבַר: יֵשׁ מְעִילָה בְּקֻוֽנָּמוֹת, וּקְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים נָחֲתָא לְהוּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לִפְדּוֹתוֹ, וְאִי קָסָבַר: אֵין מְעִילָה בְּקֻוֽנָּמוֹת, וְאִיסּוּר בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּרָכֵיב לְהוּ אַכַּתְפֵּיהּ, אִי דִּידֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְיָדוֹ לְאִיתְּשׁוֹלֵי עֲלֵיהּ,

In the case of konamot too, if he holds that there is misuse of consecrated objects with regard to konamot, i.e., he holds that articles sanctified by a konam have the status of consecrated property, and that the sanctity that inheres in its value applies to them, then his claim is accepted because it is within his power to redeem it. And if he maintains that there is no misuse of consecrated objects in the case of konamot, and it is an ordinary prohibition that rides on its shoulders, i.e., it is forbidden due to its similarity to consecrated property despite the fact that is not fully sacred, even in this case the above argument applies: If the property in question is his, it is permitted because it is within his power to request from a Sage that his vow be dissolved.

אֶלָּא דְּאַחֵר, וְאָמַר: אֲנָא יָדַעְנָא דְּאִיתְּשִׁיל מָרֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ — הִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן?

Rather, you will say that the konam must belong to another, and he said: I know with regard to it that its owner requested from a Sage that his vow be dissolved. However, with regard to this halakha itself, that one witness is deemed credible in this case, from where do we derive it? Consequently, after the Gemara has refuted these attempts to explain why one witness should be deemed credible, the question remains: Why is the testimony of a single witness accepted in the case of a missing husband?

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מִתּוֹךְ חוֹמֶר שֶׁהֶחְמַרְתָּ עָלֶיהָ בְּסוֹפָהּ — הֵקַלְתָּ עָלֶיהָ בַּתְּחִלָּה. לָא לַיחְמַיר וְלָא לַיקֵּיל!

Rabbi Zeira said: Due to the stringency that you were stringent with her, the woman who married on the basis of a single witness, at the end, i.e., if it turns out that the testimony was incorrect and the husband is still alive, the halakha is very severe with her and she loses out in all regards, you are lenient with her at the beginning, by accepting the testimony of a single witness to enable the woman to marry. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us not be stringent at the end and not be lenient at the beginning.

מִשּׁוּם עִיגּוּנָא אַקִּילוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן.

The Gemara answers: Due to the case of a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with her. Since it is not always easy to find two witnesses to attest to a husband’s death, the Sages realized that if the testimony of one witness were not accepted, the woman would be likely to remain a deserted wife, unable to remarry. However, to prevent this leniency from causing mistakes and licentiousness, they were very stringent with her in a case where the testimony is found to be erroneous, to ensure that she is very careful not to accept untrustworthy accounts.

תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּיסֵּת בְּעֵד אֶחָד, אֲבָל נִיסֵּת עַל פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים — לֹא תֵּצֵא. מַחֲכוּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא: אֲתָא גַּבְרָא וְקָאֵי, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לֹא תֵּצֵא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּלָא יָדְעִינַן לֵיהּ.

§ The mishna teaches that if she was informed that her husband was dead and she married another man, and her husband later returned, she must leave this one and this one. Rav said: They taught this halakha only if she married by virtue of the testimony of one witness, but if she married on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, she does not have to leave him. They laughed at him in the West, Eretz Yisrael: The man, the first husband, has come and stands before us, and yet you say she does not have to leave her second husband. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a situation when we do not know the man who comes before us claiming to be the first husband.

אִי דְּלָא יָדְעִינַן לֵיהּ, בְּעֵד אֶחָד אַמַּאי תֵּצֵא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְרֵי וְאָמְרִי: אֲנַן הֲוֵינַן בַּהֲדֵיהּ מִכִּי נְפַק וְעַד הַשְׁתָּא, וְאַתּוּן הוּא דְּלָא יָדְעִיתוּ לֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּכֵּר יוֹסֵף אֶת אֶחָיו וְהֵם לֹא הִכִּירוּהוּ״, וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מְלַמֵּד שֶׁיָּצָא בְּלֹא חֲתִימַת זָקָן, וּבָא בַּחֲתִימַת זָקָן.

The Gemara asks: If we do not know him, even if she married by one witness, why should she leave? The testimony of the witness who says the husband is dead should be accepted. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for a case when two others came and said: We were with him from when he left until now, and it is you who do not recognize him, as his appearance has changed over the course of time. This is as it is written: “And Joseph recognized his brothers but they did not recognize him” (Genesis 42:8), and Rav Ḥisda said that this verse teaches that Joseph left his brothers without a full beard, and he came with a full beard, which is why they failed to recognize him. This shows that one’s appearance can change so much over time that even his own family members are unable to identify him.

סוֹף סוֹף תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי נִינְהוּ,

The Gemara asks: Even in this case, ultimately they are two against two. Initially, two witnesses testified that the man was dead, and now another pair arrives saying he is alive. Why should the testimony of the witnesses who say he is dead be accepted, allowing her to remain with the second husband, while other witnesses claim he is still alive?

וְהַבָּא עָלֶיהָ בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָאֵי! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּיסֵּת לְאֶחָד מֵעֵדֶיהָ.

And as this is an uncertain case, one who has intercourse with her stands obligated to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. Since before she remarried some witnesses say she is a married woman while others claim she is now a widow, her relations with her second husband involve a possible prohibition that entails karet, and whoever mistakenly performs an action of this kind is liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. If so, this second husband must certainly divorce her. Rav Sheshet said: We are dealing with a case where that woman married one of her witnesses, who testified that her husband had died. Since the witness himself has no doubt as to the truth, he is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering.

הִיא גּוּפַהּ בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָיְימָא! בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״בָּרִי לִי״. אִי הָכִי, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא כְּשֶׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִיסֵּת, אֲבָל נִיסֵּת וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים — לָא אָמַר.

The Gemara asks: Even so, she herself stands obligated to bring a uncertain guilt-offering, as she has no personal knowledge of the matter and relied on the witness. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where she says: It is clear to me. For whatever reason, she is certain that this is not her husband and that he is dead, and therefore she too is not liable to bring an uncertain guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating this? That is, if Rav is referring only to this particular case, he has not taught anything new, as even Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, stated his opinion only with regard to a case where witnesses came and afterward she married, but in the case where she married and afterward witnesses came, he did not state his halakha with regard to this case.

דְּתַנְיָא: שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״מֵת״ וּשְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״לָא מֵת״, שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״נִתְגָּרְשָׁה״ וּשְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״לֹא נִתְגָּרְשָׁה״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְאִם נִיסֵּת — לֹא תֵּצֵא. רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אָמַר: תֵּצֵא. אָמַר רַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אֵימַת אֲנִי אוֹמֵר תֵּצֵא? בִּזְמַן שֶׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִיסֵּת. אֲבָל נִיסֵּת וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תֵּצֵא!

To what ruling is the Gemara referring? As it is taught in a baraita: If two witnesses say that the husband is dead and two say he is not dead, or if two say that this woman was divorced and two say she was not divorced, this woman may not marry; and if she married regardless, she need not leave her new husband, as there is no uncontroverted testimony that she is forbidden to him. Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: She must leave him. Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, further said: When do I say she must leave him? When the witnesses who contradicted the first pair by claiming she is still married came and afterward she married, despite their testimony. However, if she married and afterward the second pair of witnesses came, this woman need not leave her second husband.

כִּי קָאָמַר רַב נָמֵי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִיסֵּת. לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמַר: טַעְמָא דְּנִיסֵּת וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים, אֲבָל בָּאוּ עֵדִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִיסֵּת — תֵּצֵא. כְּמַאן — כְּרַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Gemara answers: When Rav spoke too, he was referring to a case when the second pair of witnesses came and testified that this is her husband, and afterward she married. Rav claims that even in that case she need not leave her second husband. His ruling serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, in favor of that of the first tanna. And some say that Rav’s teaching should be understood as follows: The reason is that she married and afterward witnesses came; however, if witnesses came and afterward she married, she must leave him. According to whose opinion is this ruling of Rav? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei.

מֵתִיב רָבָא: מִנַּיִן שֶׁאִם לֹא רָצָה — דׇּפְנוֹ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְקִדַּשְׁתּוֹ״, בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ.

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: From where is it derived that if a priest does not want to observe the strictures against disqualified women, that the court forces him [dafno] by flogging him, and it sanctifies him despite his wishes? The verse states, at the end of the chapter that deals with the prohibitions of the priesthood: “And you shall sanctify him…he shall be sacred for you” (Leviticus 21:8), which indicates that this is performed even against his will.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי, אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא נִיסֵּת לְאֶחָד מֵעֵדֶיהָ וְלֹא קָאָמְרָה ״בָּרִי לִי״, צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר דְּדׇפְנוֹ? אֶלָּא לָאו, דְּנִיסֵּת לְאֶחָד מֵעֵדֶיהָ, וְקָאָמְרָה ״בָּרִי לִי״, וְקָתָנֵי דׇּפְנוֹ. אַלְמָא, מַפְּקִינַן לַהּ מִינֵּיהּ!

Rava analyzes this baraita: What are the circumstances? Assuming that this is referring to a priest who married a woman whose status as a divorced woman or a zona is uncertain, if we say that she did not marry one of her witnesses and did not say: It is clear to me, that the opposing witnesses were speaking the truth, need this be said that the court forces him? Since both of them are clearly in violation of a transgression, it is obvious that they must be separated. Rather, is it not referring to a case when she married one of her witnesses and she says: It is clear to me, and even so the baraita is teaching that the court forces him? Apparently, the halakha is that they remove her from him, which contradicts Rav’s opinion that one who married based on the testimony of two witnesses need not leave her second husband.

אִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה שָׁאנֵי. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מַאי דׇּפְנוֹ — דׇּפְנוֹ בְּעֵדִים. וְאִבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כְּשֶׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִיסֵּת, וְרַבִּי מְנַחֵם בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא.

The Gemara answers: A prohibition with regard to the priesthood is different, as uncertainties with regard to priests are treated stringently, as though they were definite. And if you wish, say: What is the meaning of the phrase: The court forces him? It means that it forces him by witnesses. In other words, only if another pair of witnesses comes and clarifies the matter does the court prevent the marriage ab initio. However, if she has already married she need not leave her husband. And if you wish, say instead that it is referring to a situation when witnesses came and afterward she married, and this baraita, which claims that the court forces him to divorce her in that case, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei.

רַב אָשֵׁי אוֹמֵר: מַאי ״לֹא תֵּצֵא״ דְּקָאָמַר רַב — לֹא תֵּצֵא מֵהֶיתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן.

Rav Ashi said: What is the meaning of the phrase: She need not leave him, that Rav said? It means that she need not leave her state of being permitted to her first husband. Since she married according to halakha, on the basis of witness testimony, she is considered to have acted under duress. Like any other woman not married to a priest who was unfaithful against her will, she may return to her first husband upon his return.

הָא אַמְרַהּ רַב חֲדָא זִימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: נִיסֵּת שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר לוֹ. וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אֲמַר רַב: הָכִי הִלְכְתָא! חֲדָא מִכְּלָלָא דַּחֲבֶרְתַּהּ אִיתְּמַר.

The Gemara asks: If that is what he meant, Rav already said it once. As we learned in the mishna: If she married without the consent of the court, but rather by witnesses’ testimony, it is permitted for her to return to him. And Rav Huna said that Rav said: That is the halakha. Evidently, Rav already ruled that she does not forfeit her original permitted status. The Gemara answers: One ruling was stated by inference from the other. In other words, Rav did not state both halakhot explicitly, but only one of them, from which his other statement was inferred.

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא מַכְחַשְׁתּוֹ, אֲבָל מַכְחַשְׁתּוֹ — לֹא תֵּצֵא. בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּבֵי תְרֵי, כִּי מַכְחֲשָׁא לֵיהּ מַאי הָוֵי! אֶלָּא בְּחַד, טַעְמָא דְּמַכְחַשְׁתּוֹ, הָא שָׁתְקָה — תֵּצֵא.

Shmuel said: They taught that she must leave her second husband only if she does not contradict the witness who claims her first husband is alive. However, if she contradicts him, she need not leave her second husband. The Gemara inquires: With what are we dealing here? If we say we are dealing with two witnesses who testified that her husband is still alive, even if she contradicts him, what of it? The testimony of the two witnesses is fully accepted. Rather, it must be referring to one witness, from which it may be inferred that the reason that she need not leave her second husband is that she contradicts him, which indicates that if she remains silent and does not contradict his testimony, she must leave him.

וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁהֶאֱמִינָה תּוֹרָה עֵד אֶחָד, הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם, וְאֵין דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל אֶחָד בִּמְקוֹם שְׁנַיִם! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בִּפְסוּלֵי עֵדוּת, וְכִדְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Ulla say that wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, this is a full testimony equal to that of two witnesses, and the statement of one witness has no bearing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses? If so, there is no difference between one witness and two witnesses in this case. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the pair who said he was alive were disqualified from giving testimony, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁהֶאֱמִינָה תּוֹרָה עֵד אֶחָד — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב דֵּעוֹת. וְעָשׂוּ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים בְּאִישׁ אֶחָד כִּשְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים בְּאִישׁ אֶחָד.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions. If the testimony is valid, the account of two witnesses is the same as one hundred, as no greater credence is granted to the larger number. However, when the testimony is invalid the majority opinion is accepted. And in these cases they established the testimony of two women against one man like the testimony of two men against one man, whose claim is not considered equivalent to two. In this case, if the wife also contradicts their account she joins the single witness, and therefore the testimony of the disqualified witnesses is not accepted.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כֹּל הֵיכָא דַּאֲתָא עֵד אֶחָד כָּשֵׁר מֵעִיקָּרָא, אֲפִילּוּ מֵאָה נָשִׁים — כְּעֵד אֶחָד דָּמְיָין. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן דְּאָתְיָא אִשָּׁה מֵעִיקָּרָא.

And if you wish, say instead that anywhere that one valid witness came initially and testified that the husband was dead, even one hundred women claiming that he is alive are considered like one witness, and their contrary account is not accepted. And with what are we dealing here? In a case where a woman came and testified initially.

וְתָרְצַהּ לִדְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה הָכִי: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁהֶאֱמִינָה תּוֹרָה עֵד אֶחָד — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב דֵּעוֹת, וְעָשׂוּ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת — כִּשְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים בְּאִישׁ אֶחָד אֲבָל שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים בְּאִישׁ אֶחָד — כְּפַלְגָא וּפַלְגָא דָּמֵי.

And you must accordingly amend the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya so that it reads as follows: Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions, and they established two women against one woman like two men against one man. However, in a case involving two women against one man who is a valid witness, this is like half against half, i.e., they are equal. With regard to Shmuel’s statement, if the wife herself remains silent, the testimony of the first woman that the husband is dead has been negated, as her account was contradicted by two women. But if the claim of the wife is joined to that of the first woman she need not leave her second husband.

צְרִיכָה גֵּט מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה. בִּשְׁלָמָא מֵרִאשׁוֹן תִּבְעֵי גֵּט, אֶלָּא מִשֵּׁנִי אַמַּאי? זְנוּת בְּעָלְמָא הוּא!

§ The mishna teaches that if she remarried as the result of an error, then when her first husband returns she requires a bill of divorce from this one and from that one. The Gemara asks: Granted, from the first husband she requires a bill of divorce, as she is his actual wife. But from the second, why does she need a bill of divorce? Surely their relationship is merely licentious. Since her first husband was alive at the time, her marriage to the second is entirely invalid, as one cannot betroth a married woman. A woman does not require a bill of divorce for engaging in sexual relations.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ גֵּירַשׁ זֶה וְנָשָׂא זֶה, וְנִמְצֵאת אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ יוֹצְאָה בְּלָא גֵּט. אִי הָכִי, סֵיפָא דְּקָתָנֵי: אָמְרוּ לָהּ ״מֵת בַּעְלִךְ״ וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בַּעְלָהּ — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר לוֹ. הָתָם נָמֵי, נֵימָא: גֵּירַשׁ זֶה וְקִדֵּשׁ זֶה, וְנִמְצֵאת אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ יוֹצְאָה שֶׁלֹּא בַּגֵּט!

Rav Huna said: It is a rabbinic decree lest those who are unaware of the entire story say that this first husband divorced her and afterward this second man married her. And if she subsequently leaves him without a bill of divorce, they will claim that we find a married woman leaving her husband without a bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: If so, consider the latter clause of the mishna (92a), that teaches that if they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she became betrothed to another, and afterward her husband came, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. There too, let us say that people might think that this one divorced her and that one betrothed her, and we find a married woman leaving her husband, i.e., her second husband, without a bill of divorce.

לְעוֹלָם בָּעֲיָא גֵּט. אִי הָכִי, נִמְצָא זֶה מַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ מִשֶּׁנִּתְאָרְסָה! כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן כִּיפָּר, דְּאָמַר: מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — אֲסוּרָה, מִן הָאֵירוּסִין — מוּתֶּרֶת.

The Gemara answers: Actually, even if she was merely betrothed she requires a bill of divorce from the second man before she can return to her first husband. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, people will say that we find this one remarrying his divorcée after she was betrothed to another. The Gemara answers: In this regard the tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, who stated a principle with regard to a divorcée who formed a relationship with another man, that if she came from marriage it is prohibited for her to return to her first husband, but if she came from betrothal it is permitted. Consequently, even if people do claim as above, there is no cause for concern.

הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אַף עַל פִּי

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna (92a) teaches: Even though