Yevamot 94

Yevamot 94

דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: תְּנֵיתוּהָ. אָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בְּנֵךְ״ וְנִשֵּׂאת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״חִילּוּף הָיוּ הַדְּבָרִים״ — תֵּצֵא, וְהַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן וְאַחֲרוֹן מַמְזֵר.

hates the yavam, and she would therefore take advantage of any testimony to rid herself of him. Rav Sheshet said to them that you learned it in the mishna. If they said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, and she married another man, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, she must leave the other man, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי: אִילֵּימָא תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי — מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי, סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי? וְעוֹד, מַמְזֵר? סְפֵק מַמְזֵר הוּא. וְכִי תֵּימָא לָא דָּק — הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: הָרִאשׁוֹן מַמְזֵר וְהָאַחֲרוֹן אֵינוֹ מַמְזֵר, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דְּדַוְקָא קָתָנֵי!

Again, Rav Sheshet analyzes the case: What are the circumstances? If we say that they are two and two, i.e., the account of two witnesses was contradicted by two other witnesses, what did you see to make you rely on these second witnesses when you can equally rely on those? Why should she have to leave this man? And furthermore, why should the child be a mamzer? At worst he is an individual whose status as a mamzer is uncertain, as there is no proof that the second witnesses are more reliable. And if you would say that the tanna of the mishna was not precise in his language, but from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: The first is a mamzer and the last is not a mamzer, one can learn from here that the mishna was taught specifically in this manner.

אֶלָּא לָאו: חַד, וְטַעְמָא דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְּרֵי אַכְחֲשׁוּהּ, הָא לָאו הָכִי — מְהֵימַן! לָעוֹלָם תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה,

Rather, is it not the case that this is referring to one witness, and the reason is that two others came and contradicted him. It may be inferred from this that if it was not so, the sole witness is deemed credible. The Gemara refutes this proof: Actually, the mishna is speaking of a case when two witnesses came first, followed by another two witnesses, and the ruling is as Rav Aḥa bar Manyumi said, with regard to a different issue, that it is referring to witnesses of false, conspiring testimony. In other words, the second set of witnesses did not offer an alternative account of the same incident. Rather, they claimed that the first witnesses lied, as they were with them, elsewhere, during the time that they supposedly witnessed the husband’s death. In this case, the first witnesses are entirely disqualified, as the account of the second pair is accepted.

הָכָא נָמֵי בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה.

Here too, we are dealing with witnesses of false, conspiring testimony. Consequently, the question of whether the court believes one witness who testifies that a yavam is dead cannot be resolved from the mishna.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין הָאִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת לוֹמַר מֵת יְבָמִי, שֶׁאֶנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא מֵתָה אֲחוֹתִי, שֶׁאֶכָּנֵס לְבֵיתָהּ. הִיא נִיהִי דְּלָא מְהֵימְנָא, הָא עֵד אֶחָד — מְהֵימַן!

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi, and some say it was Rav Aḥa who said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a proof from a different source (Yevamot 118b): A woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam is dead, so that I may marry, i.e., to permit herself to marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says: My sister is dead, so that I may enter her house, i.e., to marry her husband. The Gemara infers: It is she herself who is not deemed credible. It may be inferred from this that if one witness issues this report, he is deemed credible.

וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֵין הָאִישׁ נֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר מֵת אָחִי, שֶׁאֲיַיבֵּם אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא מֵתָה אִשְׁתִּי, שֶׁאֶשָּׂא אֶת אֲחוֹתָהּ. הוּא נִיהוּ דְּלָא מְהֵימַן, הָא עֵד אֶחָד — מְהֵימַן, בִּשְׁלָמָא גַּבֵּי אִשָּׁה, מִשּׁוּם עִיגּוּנָא אַקִּילוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן, אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי אִישׁ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara refutes this argument. And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother is dead, so that I may enter into levirate marriage with his wife. And he is not deemed credible when he says: My wife is dead, so that I may marry her sister. Following the above reasoning, it is he himself who is not deemed credible, which indicates that one witness is deemed credible. Yet this cannot be correct: Granted, with regard to a woman, due to the concern that she be left a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient in her case, by allowing her to rely on a single witness. However, with regard to a man, what can be said? There is no concern that he will be left deserted, as a man can marry more than one woman, so he certainly cannot marry a woman on the basis of such flimsy testimony.

אֶלָּא, כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ — לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא יֵשׁ מַמְזֵר מֵחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין, אֵימָא חָיְישָׁא אַקִּלְקוּלָא דְזַרְעַאּ וְדָיְיקָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן (דְּאַקִּלְקוּלָא דִידַהּ חָיְישָׁא, אַקִּלְקוּלָא דְזַרְעַאּ לָא חָיְישָׁא).

Rather, the case of one witness cannot be decided from the mishna, as when is this halakha that a woman is not deemed credible when she says that her yavam is dead necessary to be stated? It is necessary for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Akiva said that the offspring born of intercourse for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer, which indicates that even the offspring of a yevama who unlawfully wed another man is a mamzer, one might say that she is concerned for the ruin of her offspring and is consequently exacting in her investigation and would marry only if she received clear, unambiguous testimony. The tanna therefore teaches us that she is concerned for her own ruin, e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether her husband died, which would force her to leave both him and her second husband, but she is not as concerned for the ruin of her offspring, and in this case she is likelier to marry unlawfully.

רָבָא אָמַר: עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בִּיבָמָה מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר. לְאִיסּוּר כָּרֵת הִתַּרְתָּ, לְאִיסּוּר לָאו לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: הִיא עַצְמָהּ תּוֹכִיחַ, דִּלְאִיסּוּר כָּרֵת הִתַּרְתָּ — לְאִיסּוּר לָאו לֹא הִתַּרְתָּ!

§ Rava said: One witness is deemed credible in the case of a yevama by means of an a fortiori inference: If for a prohibition involving karet, i.e., adultery of a married woman, you permitted the testimony of one witness, then for a regular prohibition, that of a yevama to another man, is it not all the more so? One of the Sages said to Rava: She herself, a woman who testifies with regard to herself, can prove otherwise: For a prohibition involving karet you permitted her, i.e., if she testifies that her husband is dead she may marry another man and there is no concern that she might still be a married woman, and yet for a regular prohibition you did not permit her, as she is not deemed credible when she claims that her yavam is dead.

וְאֶלָּא אִיהִי מַאי טַעְמָא לָא מְהֵימְנָא, דְּכֵיוָן דְּזִימְנִין דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ, לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא, עֵד אֶחָד נָמֵי: דְּכֵיוָן דְּזִמְנִין דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ, לָא דָּיְיקָא וּמִינַּסְבָא.

But rather, she herself, what is the reason that she is not deemed credible? Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her examination of the matter and marries. With regard to one witness, the same concern also applies: Since sometimes the woman may hate him, she is not exacting in her investigation before she marries again. The court believes one witness only because they assume that she herself is careful to examine the matter. The a fortiori inference is therefore groundless, and the question remains unresolved.

זֶה מִדְרָשׁ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן מַתְיָא וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְמִדְרַשׁ בֵּיהּ מַרְגָּנִיתָא וּדְרַשׁ בֵּיהּ חַסְפָּא.

§ The mishna states that this was an exposition taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7). This teaches that a woman is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood by a bill of divorce she receives from a man other than her husband. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Elazar should have taught this verse as a pearl but in fact he taught it as an earthenware shard. In other words, he could have arrived at a more significant conclusion.

מַאי מַרְגָּנִיתָא — דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאִישָׁהּ״, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא נִתְגָּרְשָׁה אֶלָּא מֵאִישָׁהּ — פְּסוּלָה לַכְּהוּנָּה, וְהַיְינוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט דְּפוֹסֵל בִּכְהוּנָּה.

The Gemara asks: What pearl does he mean? As it is taught in a baraita: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband,” even if she was divorced only from her husband. Even if the woman was separated from her husband and was not permitted to marry anyone else, e.g., if her husband wrote in the bill of divorce: This is your bill of divorce but you are not permitted to any other man, this document is certainly not considered a full-fledged bill of divorce, and yet she is disqualified from the priesthood. If her husband later passes away, she has the status of a divorcée, not a widow, which means that she is prohibited from marrying a priest. And this is the trace of a bill of divorce, which is not an actual bill of divorce and yet disqualifies from the priesthood.

מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁהָלְכָה אִשְׁתּוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, בָּאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵתָה אִשְׁתְּךָ״, וְנָשָׂא אֶת אֲחוֹתָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאת אִשְׁתּוֹ — מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר

MISHNA: In the case of one whose wife went overseas and people came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came back from overseas, the original wife is permitted to return

לוֹ. וּמוּתָּר בִּקְרוֹבוֹת שְׁנִיָּה, וּשְׁנִיָּה מוּתֶּרֶת בִּקְרוֹבָיו. וְאִם מֵתָה רִאשׁוֹנָה — מוּתָּר בַּשְּׁנִיָּה.

to him, as his erroneous marriage to her sister is considered licentious sexual relations, and one who has intercourse with his wife’s relatives has not rendered his first wife forbidden to himself. And he is permitted to the relatives of the second woman, e.g., her daughter, and this second woman is permitted to his relatives, e.g., his son, as the marriage was entirely invalid. And if the first woman died he is permitted to the second woman, despite the fact that he has already engaged in forbidden relations with her.

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מֵתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְנָשָׂא אֶת אֲחוֹתָהּ. וְאַחַר כָּךְ אָמְרוּ לוֹ: קַיֶּימֶת הָיְתָה, וּמֵתָה. הַוָּלָד רִאשׁוֹן — מַמְזֵר, וְהָאַחֲרוֹן — אֵין מַמְזֵר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל שֶׁפּוֹסֵל עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים — פּוֹסֵל עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין פּוֹסֵל עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים — אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ.

If they said to him that his wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward they said to him that she was alive when he married the sister and only later died, in this case the first child, born to the sister while his wife was still alive, is a mamzer, as he was born from the union of a man and his sister-in-law, and the last one is not a mamzer. Rabbi Yosei says: Whoever disqualifies others also disqualifies himself, and whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself either. Rabbi Yosei’s obscure statement will be explained by the Gemara.

גְּמָ׳ וְאַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲזוּל אִשְׁתּוֹ וְגִיסוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, דְּאַהֲנִי הָנֵי נִשּׂוּאִים דְּקָמִיתַּסְרָא אֵשֶׁת גִּיסוֹ אַגִּיסוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי: אֵשֶׁת גִּיסוֹ אֲסִירָא, אִשְׁתּוֹ שַׁרְיָא,

GEMARA: With regard to the case of a man who married his wife’s sister after he was informed that his wife was dead, the Gemara comments: And even if his wife and his brother-in-law both went overseas and he was told that they had died, the halakha is that this marriage he performed is effective only to the extent that his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden to his brother-in-law. The reason for this prohibition is that he performed a marriage ceremony with a married woman by mistake, and one who erroneously weds a married woman has thereby rendered her forbidden to her husband. The Gemara adds: Even so, it is only his brother-in-law’s wife who is forbidden to her husband, whereas his own wife remains permitted to him.

וְלָא אָמְרִינַן: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה אֵשֶׁת גִּיסוֹ אַגִּיסוֹ, תֵּיאָסֵר אִשְׁתּוֹ עָלָיו. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא — הָוְיָא לַהּ אֲחוֹת גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ.

It might have been thought that his own marriage, which caused this to be an act of forbidden sexual relations, would also be adversely affected. But the Gemara adds that we do not say: Since his brother-in-law’s wife is forbidden to his brother-in-law, his wife is likewise forbidden to him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The reason is that if the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his wife is now considered, with regard to him, the sister of his divorcée.

דְּתַנְיָא: כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה — אֵין צְרִיכוֹת הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט, חוּץ מֵאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מוֹסִיף אַף אֵשֶׁת אָח וַאֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה. וְכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא בָּעֲיָא גֵּט, מִמֵּילָא אִיתַּסְרָא עֲלֵיהּ, דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ אֲחוֹת גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ.

As it is taught in a baraita: None of those with whom relations are forbidden by Torah law require a bill of divorce from him, even if he married them in a proper manner, apart from a married woman who married by mistake by permission of the court. And Rabbi Akiva adds: Also a brother’s wife and a wife’s sister. Since it is possible that these two women could become permitted to him, by levirate marriage in the case of a brother’s wife, or a wife’s sister after his wife’s death, they too require a bill of divorce. And with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Akiva said that a wife’s sister requires a bill of divorce, this factor by itself indicates that his wife is forbidden to him, as his wife is considered the sister of his divorcée.

וְלָאו אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַב: הַאי אֵשֶׁת אָח הֵיכִי דָּמֵי — כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּדֵּשׁ אָחִיו אֶת הָאִשָּׁה, וְהָלַךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וְשָׁמַע שֶׁמֵּת אָחִיו, וְעָמַד וְנָשָׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: הָךְ קַמָּא, תְּנָאָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ בְּקִידּוּשִׁין, וְהַאי שַׁפִּיר נָסֵיב.

The Gemara refutes this claim: And wasn’t it stated with regard to this case that Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: In the case of this brother’s wife, mentioned by Rabbi Akiva, what are the circumstances? For example, if his brother betrothed a woman and then went overseas, and the man who was here heard that his brother was dead, and he arose and married his brother’s wife as a yevama. The reason for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling is that uninformed people will say: This first one had a condition in the betrothal with his wife, and his betrothal was canceled because the condition was left unfulfilled, and this other one married well, in compliance with the halakha, as she was not his brother’s wife. It is for this reason that Rabbi Akiva requires him to give her a bill of divorce.

וְהַאי אֲחוֹת אִשָּׁה נָמֵי הֵיכִי דָּמֵי — כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ אֶת אִשָּׁה, וְהָלְכָה לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וְשָׁמַע שֶׁמֵּתָה, עָמַד וְנָשָׂא אֶת אֲחוֹתָהּ. דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא, תְּנָאֵי הֲוָה לֵיהּ בְּקִדּוּשֶׁיהָ, וְהָא שַׁפִּיר נָסֵיב. אֶלָּא נִשּׂוּאִין, מִי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר תְּנָאָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ בְּנִשּׂוּאִין?

And in this case of a wife’s sister as well, what are the circumstances? For example, if he betrothed a woman and she went overseas, and he heard she died and arose and married her sister. As people will say: This first one, he had a condition in her betrothal, and as the condition was not fulfilled the betrothal is annulled, and this other one married well. However, with regard to the case of the mishna, which involves an actual previous marriage, can it be said that he had a condition in the marriage? There is a presumption that no man marries a woman conditionally. Once he marries her, it is assumed that he waived all prior conditions, and therefore even Rabbi Akiva agrees that a bill of divorce is not required in this case.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי חֲמוֹתוֹ. דְּהָא שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: חֲמוֹתוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה — לָאו בִּשְׂרֵפָה.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach the case of his mother-in-law, as she is another forbidden woman who nevertheless requires a bill of divorce, as we have heard him, Rabbi Akiva, say: One who has relations with his mother-in-law after his wife’s death is not liable to being executed by burning, because the prohibition lapses upon his wife’s death.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״בָּאֵשׁ יִשְׂרְפוּ אוֹתוֹ וְאֶתְהֶן״ — אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אַחַת מֵהֶן, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת שְׁתֵּיהֶן.

As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states, with regard to one who takes a woman and her daughter: “They shall be burned in fire, he and they [et’hen]” (Leviticus 20:14). Now this cannot literally mean that both women are burned, as the first woman he took did not sin at all. The Sages therefore explained that the word et’hen means he and one of them [mehen]. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: He and both of them. Since it is hard to understand how they could both deserve punishment, the amora’im suggested various interpretations of Rabbi Akiva’s opinion.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר מַשְׁמָעוּת דּוֹרְשִׁין אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: חֲדָא כְּתִיב, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: תַּרְתֵּי כְּתִיב — שַׁפִּיר.

Granted, this makes sense according to the explanation of this dispute suggested by Abaye, who said that the interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them. In other words, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva did not argue over the halakha itself, but merely over the manner in which the halakha is derived from the Torah. That is, Rabbi Yishmael holds that it states: One woman, and the plain meaning of the verse is: He and one of them. And Rabbi Akiva holds that it states: Two, e.g., if he took two women who were both forbidden to him, such as his mother-in-law and her mother, they are both liable to be executed by burning. If this is the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, it is fine, as there is no proof from here that the prohibition of a mother-in-law lapses upon his wife’s death.

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: חֲמוֹתוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ — לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי חֲמוֹתוֹ!

However, there is a difficulty according to the explanation of Rava, who said that the practical difference between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva’s opinion concerns one’s mother-in-law after his wife’s death. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that even after the death of one’s wife he is liable for marrying his mother-in-law. Rabbi Akiva maintains that one is liable only if both women are alive, as the verse mentions two women, but if the first one has already died his relations with the second woman are no longer punishable by Torah law. If so, let the tanna of the mishna, according to Rabbi Akiva, also teach that one must give a bill of divorce to his mother-in-law whom he married by mistake, as she too will be permitted to him after his wife’s death.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נְהִי דְּמַיעֲטַהּ קְרָא מִשְּׂרֵפָה — מֵאִיסּוּרָא מִי מַיעֲטַהּ קְרָא?

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the verse excluded her from the punishment of burning, did the verse also exclude her from a prohibition? Even Rabbi Akiva agrees that the Torah prohibits a man from marrying his mother-in-law after his wife’s death. Consequently, he cannot marry her in a permitted manner, despite the fact that according to Rava’s explanation Rabbi Akiva maintains that they are not executed by burning.

וְתֵאָסֵר בִּשְׁכִיבָה דַּאֲחוֹתָהּ, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם! לָא דָּמֵי: אִשְׁתּוֹ, דִּבְמֵזִיד אֲסִירָא מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, בְּשׁוֹגֵג גְּזַרוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן,

§ The Gemara asks another question, from a different perspective: And let his wife be forbidden by his sexual relations with her sister, just as it is in the case of a woman whose husband went overseas, who is forbidden to her husband if she had relations with another man by mistake. The Gemara answers: This is not comparable. With regard to his wife, who is forbidden to him by Torah law if she committed adultery intentionally, the Sages decreed concerning her that she is forbidden to him even if she did so unwittingly.