Yevamot 96

Yevamot 96

וְדִלְמָא אַ״אֵינוֹ פּוֹסֵל״?! אִי נָמֵי: מִמַּאי דְּאִיתַהּ לִדְרַב הוּנָא? דִּלְמָא לֵיתַהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא כְּלָל, וּבִדְרַב הַמְנוּנָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁזִּינְּתָה — אֲסוּרָה לִיבָמָהּ.

But perhaps Shmuel’s ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is referring to the ruling that he does not disqualify his brother-in-law’s wife to his brother-in-law, in a case where his wife and brother-in-law left. Alternatively, the contradiction can be resolved in the following manner: From where do we know that there is a reason to accept the explanation of Rav Huna with regard to the dispute between Rav and Shmuel? Perhaps there is no cause to agree with Rav Huna at all, and it can be explained that Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the statement of Rav Hamnuna. As Rav Hamnuna said: A widow waiting for her yavam who engaged in licentious sexual relations is forbidden to her yavam.

דְּרַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וּמִיפַּסְלָא בִּזְנוּת. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֵינָהּ כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְלָא מִיפַּסְלָא בִּזְנוּת. וְאִי נָמֵי, בְּקִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בִּיבָמָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַב אָמַר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְלָא תָּפְסִי בַּהּ קִדּוּשִׁין. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֵינָהּ כְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְתָפְסִי בַּהּ קִדּוּשִׁין.

According to this interpretation, the dispute is as follows: As Rav said, she is like a married woman and she is therefore disqualified by licentious sexual relations. And Shmuel said that she is not like a married woman and is not disqualified by licentious sexual relations. And alternatively, one can explain that Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the issue of whether betrothal takes effect with a yevama: As Rav said, she is like a married woman with regard to all men other than her yavam, and therefore betrothal performed by anyone else does not take effect with her. And Shmuel said that she is not like a married woman, and this means that betrothal does take effect with her.

וְהָא אִפְּלִיגוּ בַּהּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא? חֲדָא מִכְּלָל דַּחֲבֶרְתַּהּ אִיתְּמַר.

The Gemara asks with regard to this last answer: How can the dispute be explained in this manner? But Rav and Shmuel already disagreed over this once. The Sages would certainly not record the same dispute twice. The Gemara answers: It is possible that they did not in fact disagree twice with regard to the same case. Rather, one ruling was stated by inference from the other. In other words, their dispute was recorded in two different ways, the second time by inference from their original dispute.

מַתְנִי׳ אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״מֵתָה אִשְׁתְּךָ״, וְנָשָׂא אֲחוֹתָהּ מֵאָבִיהָ. מֵתָה, וְנָשָׂא אֲחוֹתָהּ מֵאִמָּהּ. מֵתָה, וְנָשָׂא אֲחוֹתָהּ מֵאָבִיהָ. מֵתָה, וְנָשָׂא אֲחוֹתָהּ מֵאִמָּהּ, וְנִמְצְאוּ כּוּלָּן קַיָּימוֹת — מוּתָּר בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה וּבַשְּׁלִישִׁית וּבַחֲמִישִׁית, וּפוֹטְרוֹת צָרוֹתֵיהֶן.

MISHNA: Witnesses said to a husband: Your wife is dead, and he married her paternal sister, and witnesses subsequently told him that his second wife was dead and he married her maternal sister; afterward witnesses said that this one too was dead and he married her paternal sister; finally they told him that she was dead and he married the last woman’s maternal sister, and then they were all discovered to be alive. In this case he is permitted to his first wife, and to the third and to the fifth. Since these women are not sisters, his betrothal to them is effective. Consequently, if he died and one of them entered into levirate marriage, they exempt their rival wives.

וְאָסוּר בַּשְּׁנִיָּה וּבָרְבִיעִית, וְאֵין בִּיאַת אַחַת מֵהֶן פּוֹטֶרֶת צָרָתָהּ.

But he is forbidden to the second and fourth wife, each of whom is the sister of his original wife. Therefore, if he passed away and the yavam had relations with one of them, his relations with any one of them does not exempt her rival wife, as she was forbidden to his brother, which means there was no mitzva of levirate marriage here at all.

וְאִם בָּא עַל הַשְּׁנִיָּה לְאַחַר מִיתַת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה — מוּתָּר בַּשְּׁנִיָּה וּבָרְבִיעִית, וּפוֹטְרוֹת צָרוֹתֵיהֶן, וְאָסוּר בַּשְּׁלִישִׁית וּבַחֲמִישִׁית, וְאֵין בִּיאַת אַחַת מֵהֶן פּוֹטֶרֶת צָרָתָהּ.

And if he had relations with the second woman in the aforementioned list after the death of the first, i.e., the first one indeed died but the other rumors were all false, in that case he is permitted to the second and the fourth, who are his lawful wives, and they exempt their rival wives, and he is forbidden to the third and the fifth, the sisters of the women married to him, and the sexual relations of the brother with any one of them does not exempt her rival wife.

בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד — הוּא פּוֹסֵל עַל יְדֵי אַחִין, וְהָאַחִין פּוֹסְלִין עַל יָדוֹ. אֶלָּא הוּא פּוֹסֵל תְּחִלָּה, וְהָאַחִין פּוֹסְלִין תְּחִלָּה וָסוֹף.

§ The mishna addresses a different issue: If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama he thereby disqualifies his brothers from levirate marriage, despite the fact that as a minor he has not acquired the yevama through this act of intercourse, and the brothers likewise disqualify the woman from him if they have intercourse with the yevama. However, there is a difference between them, as he disqualifies them only if he engaged in relations with her first, and the brothers disqualify him whether they had relations first or last.

כֵּיצַד? בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ — פָּסַל עַל יְדֵי אַחִין. בָּאוּ עָלֶיהָ אַחִין וְעָשׂוּ בָּהּ מַאֲמָר, נָתְנוּ גֵּט אוֹ חָלְצוּ — פּוֹסְלִין עַל יָדוֹ.

The mishna explains: How so? A boy aged nine years and one day who had relations with his yevama has disqualified his brothers, as they are no longer eligible to marry her. If his brothers had relations with her, or performed levirate betrothal with her, or gave her a bill of divorce, or performed ḥalitza with her, they permanently disqualify him from engaging in relations with her.

גְּמָ׳ אַטּוּ כּוּלְּהוּ לָאו לְאַחַר מִיתַת רִאשׁוֹנָה נִינְהוּ? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לְאַחַר מִיתַת רִאשׁוֹנָה וַדַּאי.

GEMARA: The mishna states: And if he had relations with the second after the death of the first. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that all of them, all the other cases in the mishna, are not dealing with a situation after the death of the first woman? The entire case starts with the report: Your wife is dead. Rav Sheshet said: After the definite death of the first one. In other words, the mishna means that this did not follow a mere rumor that she was dead, but it was positively established that she had actually died.

בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְכוּ׳. בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד, תְּחִלָּה פָּסֵיל בְּסוֹף לָא פָּסֵיל? וְהָתָנֵי רַב זְבִיד בַּר רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: הָעוֹשֶׂה מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא אָחִיו שֶׁהוּא בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד עָלֶיהָ — פְּסָלָהּ!

§ The mishna teaches that a boy aged nine years and one day who had relations with his yevama has disqualified her from his brothers. Throughout this discussion, whenever the Gemara refers to a nine-year-old boy, it is understood that he is actually nine years and one day old. The Gemara asks: Does a boy aged nine years and one day disqualify her to the brothers only if he had relations with her first, but if he had relations last he does not disqualify them? But didn’t Rav Zevid bar Rav Oshaya teach: One who performs levirate betrothal with his yevama, and afterward his brother, who is nine years and one day old, had relations with her, he has disqualified her. This indicates that the intercourse of a nine-year-old disqualifies his brother even if it occurred after that of his brother.

אָמְרִי: בִּיאָה — פָּסֵיל אֲפִילּוּ בְּסוֹף, מַאֲמָר — תְּחִלָּה פָּסֵיל, בְּסוֹף לָא פָּסֵיל. וּבִיאָה אֲפִילּוּ בְּסוֹף פָּסֵיל? וְהָא קָתָנֵי: אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא פּוֹסֵל תְּחִלָּה, וְהֵן תְּחִלָּה וָסוֹף. כֵּיצַד? בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ וְכוּ׳!

They say in response: The intercourse of a nine-year-old disqualifies his brothers even if it happens last; however, in the case of a boy who merely performed levirate betrothal with her, if he did so first he disqualifies his brothers, whereas if he was last, he does not disqualify his brothers. The Gemara asks: And do the sexual relations of a nine-year-old disqualify his brothers even when performed last? But isn’t it taught in the mishna: However, he disqualifies them only if was first, and the brothers disqualify him whether they were first or last. How so? A boy aged nine years and one day who had relations with his yevama has disqualified his brothers. The example the mishna uses for a boy who disqualifies his brothers first is an act of intercourse.

חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד — הוּא פּוֹסֵל תְּחִלָּה, וְהֵן פּוֹסְלִין תְּחִלָּה וָסוֹף. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּמַאֲמָר, אֲבָל בִּיאָה פּוֹסֶלֶת אֲפִילּוּ בַּסּוֹף. כֵּיצַד: בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד הַבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ — פָּסַל עַל יְדֵי אַחִין.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: With regard to a boy aged nine years and one day, he disqualifies his brothers first, and they disqualify him first and last. In what case is this statement said? This is said with regard to levirate betrothal, i.e., if they performed levirate betrothal with her. However, if the minor had relations with her, he disqualifies them even if he did so last. How so? If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama after his brother performed levirate betrothal with her, he has disqualified his brothers.

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ מַאֲמָר כְּלָל עַל יְדֵי אַחִין? וְהָתַנְיָא: בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד, הוּא פּוֹסֵל בְּדָבָר אֶחָד, וְהָאַחִין פּוֹסְלִין עַל יָדוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים. הוּא פּוֹסֵל עַל יְדֵי אַחִין בְּבִיאָה, וְהָאַחִין פּוֹסְלִין עַל יָדוֹ בְּבִיאָה, בְּמַאֲמָר, בְּגֵט, בַּחֲלִיצָה!

The Gemara asks: And does a nine-year-old boy have the ability to perform levirate betrothal at all that would have any effect with regard to the eligibility of his brothers in levirate marriage? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a boy aged nine years and one day, he disqualifies the yevama to his brothers in one way, and the brothers disqualify him in four ways. How so? He disqualifies the brothers by relations, i.e., the yevama is forbidden to the other brothers if she has sexual relations with him, and the brothers disqualify him by relations, by levirate betrothal, by a bill of divorce, and by ḥalitza. The tanna does not mention the levirate betrothal of a minor at all.

בִּיאָה דְּפָסְלָה בֵּין בִּתְחִלָּה בֵּין בְּסוֹף — פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ, מַאֲמָר דְּבִתְחִילָּה פָּסֵיל, בְּסוֹף לָא פָּסֵיל — לָא פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this claim: No proof can be derived from that source, as with regard to the sexual relations of a minor, which disqualifies his brothers whether it came first or last, the tanna can teach a definite ruling, i.e., he can state this halakha in an unambiguous and unqualified manner. Conversely, with regard to the levirate betrothal of a minor, which if it occurred first disqualifies his brothers but if it happened last, after one of the brothers performed levirate marriage with her, it does not disqualify them, the tanna cannot teach it in a definite and unqualified manner, but would have to elaborate and explain the precise circumstances. Therefore he omitted this case entirely.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יֵשׁ לוֹ גֵּט. וְכֵן אָמַר רַב תַּחְלִיפָא בַּר אֲבִימִי: יֵשׁ לוֹ מַאֲמָר. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: יֵשׁ לוֹ גֵּט, וְיֵשׁ לוֹ מַאֲמָר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

§ It was also stated by other amora’im: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A minor boy has the ability to give a bill of divorce in the case of a yevama, i.e., if he gave her a bill of divorce he has disqualified her to his brothers. And similarly Rav Taḥalifa bar Avimi said: He has the ability to perform levirate betrothal. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: A minor has the ability to give a bill of divorce and he has the ability to perform levirate betrothal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר יֵשׁ לוֹ גֵּט? וְהָתַנְיָא: עָשׂוּ בִּיאַת בֶּן תֵּשַׁע כְּמַאֲמָר בַּגָּדוֹל, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: עָשׂוּ חֲלִיצַת בֶּן תֵּשַׁע כְּגֵט בַּגָּדוֹל. וְאִם אִיתָא — לִיתְנֵי: כְּגִיטּוֹ! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אִית לֵיהּ וְזוּטַר.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Meir hold that a minor boy has the ability to give a bill of divorce? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: They established the sexual relations of a nine-year-old like a levirate betrothal performed by an adult. Rabbi Meir says: They established the ḥalitza of a nine-year-old like a bill of divorce of an adult. The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, let Rabbi Meir teach: They established the ḥalitza of a nine-year-old like his own bill of divorce, as he too can give a yevama a bill of divorce. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: He does have the ability to give a bill of divorce, but it is less powerful than the bill of divorce of an adult yavam, as explained by Rav Huna below.

לְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאָמַר אֵין גֵּט אַחַר גֵּט — הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּגָדוֹל אַחַר גָּדוֹל וְקָטָן אַחַר קָטָן, אֲבָל גָּדוֹל אַחַר קָטָן — מַהֲנֵי.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, elaborates: According to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who said that there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for a yevama, i.e., if one of the brothers gave her a bill of divorce, no bill of divorce given later by a different brother is of any significance, this applies only when the bill of divorce was given by an adult after an adult, or by a minor after a minor. However, if an adult gave a bill of divorce after a minor, the bill of divorce of the adult is effective and disqualifies the yevama, as the bill of divorce of a minor is of less importance.

לְרַבָּנַן, דְאָמְרִי יֵשׁ גֵּט אַחַר גֵּט — הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּגָדוֹל אַחַר גָּדוֹל, אוֹ בְּקָטָן אַחַר קָטָן, אֲבָל קָטָן אַחַר גָּדוֹל — לָא מַהֲנֵי.

According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, this applies only to the case of an adult after an adult, or to a minor after a minor. However, they too agree that the bill of divorce of a minor after an adult is not effective, as a minor’s bill of divorce is certainly weaker than that of an adult. For this reason Rabbi Meir said that they established the ḥalitza of a nine-year-old like a bill of divorce of an adult, to emphasize that a subsequent bill of divorce of a minor is of no account.

מַתְנִי׳ בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא עָלֶיהָ אָחִיו שֶׁהוּא בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד — פּוֹסַל עַל יָדוֹ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא פָּסַל. בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא עַל צָרָתָהּ — פָּסַל עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא פָּסַל.

MISHNA: If a boy aged nine years and one day had sexual relations with his yevama, and afterward his brother, who is also nine years and one day old, had relations with her, the second brother disqualifies her to the first one. Rabbi Shimon says he does not disqualify her. If a minor aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama, and afterward that same boy had relations with her rival wife, he thereby disqualifies her to himself, and both women are now forbidden to him. Rabbi Shimon says he does not disqualify her.

גְּמָ׳ תַּנְיָא, אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לַחֲכָמִים: אִם בִּיאָה רִאשׁוֹנָה בִּיאָה — בִּיאָה שְׁנִיָּיה אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה. וְאִם בִּיאָה רִאשׁוֹנָה אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה — בִּיאָה שְׁנִיָּיה נָמֵי אֵינָהּ בִּיאָה.

GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If the first sexual act of a nine-year-old is considered a proper act of sexual relations, then the second act is not an act of consequence, just as the intercourse of one adult yavam after that of another adult yavam is of no effect. And if you say that the first sexual act is not considered a sexual act, the second act of himself or his brother is also not a sexual act. However, the Rabbis maintain that as the intercourse of a nine-year-old is like a levirate betrothal, one sexual act can take effect after another.

מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּבֶן עַזַּאי. דְּתַנְיָא, בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר בִּשְׁנֵי יְבָמִין וִיבָמָה אַחַת.

The Gemara comments that according to this explanation, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai. As it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: There is levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal in a case of two yevamin and one yevama. In other words, if they both performed levirate betrothal with her, their actions are effective and she is forbidden to them both. The reason is that she has ties to each of the two men, which means that each levirate betrothal is effective in forbidding the other man.

וְאֵין מַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר בִּשְׁתֵּי יְבָמוֹת וְיָבָם אֶחָד.

But there is no levirate betrothal after a levirate betrothal in a case of two yevamot and one yavam, as the yavam did not have a full-fledged levirate bond with both of them. Therefore, if he performs a levirate betrothal with one of them, he has completed the bond. In contrast, the conclusion of the mishna is that the sexual relations of a nine-year-old with two yevamot is effective, and as the intercourse of a boy of this age is considered like a levirate betrothal the tanna of the mishna evidently maintains that there is levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal even in a case of one yavam.

מַתְנִי׳ בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ וּמֵת — חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה וָמֵת — הֲרֵי זוֹ פְּטוּרָה. בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא עַל יְבִמְתּוֹ, וּמִשֶּׁהִגְדִּיל נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה אַחֶרֶת, וָמֵת, אִם לֹא יָדַע אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה מִשֶּׁהִגְדִּיל — הָרִאשׁוֹנָה חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת, וְהַשְּׁנִיָּיה אוֹ חוֹלֶצֶת אוֹ מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

MISHNA: If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama and died, that yevama performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. If the minor married a woman in a regular manner and died, she is exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza, as by Torah law a minor cannot marry. If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama, and after he matured he married a different woman and then died childless, if he did not carnally know the first woman after he matured, but only when he was a minor, the first one performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as she is in essence a yevama who had relations with a minor, and the second woman either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage, as she is his full-fledged wife.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מְיַיבֵּם לְאֵי זוֹ שֶׁיִּרְצֶה, וְחוֹלֵץ לַשְּׁנִיָּיה. אֶחָד שֶׁהוּא בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד, וְאֶחָד שֶׁהוּא בֶּן עֶשְׂרִים שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת.

Rabbi Shimon says: The brother consummates levirate marriage with whichever woman he chooses, and performs ḥalitza with the second one. The mishna comments: This is the halakha both for a boy who is nine years and one day old, and also for one who is twenty years old who has not developed two pubic hairs. He has the status of a nine-year-old boy in this regard, as his intercourse is not considered a proper act of intercourse.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבָא: הָא דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן זִיקַּת שְׁנֵי יְבָמִין, מִיחְלָץ חָלְצָה יַבּוֹמֵי לָא מִיַּבְּמָה, לָא תֵּימָא הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא צָרָה, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִגְזַר מִשּׁוּם צָרָה.

GEMARA: If a brother performed levirate betrothal with a yevama and died, she has a levirate bond in relation to the remaining brothers from two deceased brothers. Rava said: With regard to that which the Rabbis said, that when the bond of two yevamin exists, she performs ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage, you should not say that this applies only when there is a rival wife, as there is reason to decree due to a rival wife. The suggestion is that as the rival wife can enter into levirate marriage by Torah law, if the woman who performed levirate betrothal with the second brother was also permitted to enter into levirate marriage, people might mistakenly permit levirate marriage to two rival wives from the same family.

דְּהָא הָכָא לֵיכָּא צָרָה, מִיחְלָץ חָלְצָה, יַבּוֹמֵי לָא מִיַּבְּמָה.

The proof that this is not the case is that here, in the first clause of the mishna, there is no rival wife, as it is referring to one woman, which means that this yevama who had relations with the nine-year-old is tied by the bonds of both her first husband and the underage yavam, whose intercourse is like levirate betrothal, and even so she performs ḥalitza but she does not enter into levirate marriage.

נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה וּמֵת כּוּ׳. תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן שֶׁנָּשְׂאוּ וּמֵתוּ — נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן פְּטוּרוֹת מִן הַחֲלִיצָה וּמִן הַיִּיבּוּם.

§ The mishna teaches that if a nine-year-old boy married a woman and died, she is exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza. The Gemara comments: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to an imbecile and a minor who married women and died, their wives are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage, as the marriage of a minor or an imbecile is of no account.

בֶּן תֵּשַׁע וְכוּ׳ מִשֶּׁהִגְדִּיל וְכוּ׳. וְיַעֲשׂוּ בִּיאַת בֶּן תֵּשַׁע כְּמַאֲמָר בַּגָּדוֹל, וְתִדָּחֶה צָרָה מִיִּבּוּם! אָמַר רַב: לֹא עָשׂוּ בִּיאַת בֶּן תֵּשַׁע כְּמַאֲמָר בַּגָּדוֹל. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: עָשׂוּ וְעָשׂוּ. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָשׂוּ וְעָשׂוּ.

§ The mishna further teaches the case of a nine-year-old boy who had relations with his yevama and after he matured married another woman. The Gemara asks: And let the Sages at least establish the sexual relations of a nine-year-old to be like the levirate betrothal of an adult, and it would therefore override the requirement of the rival wife to enter into levirate marriage, in accordance with the halakha of the rival wife of a woman who has the bond of two yevamin. Rav said: They did not establish the intercourse of a nine-year-old to be like the levirate betrothal of an adult in all regards, and Shmuel said: They certainly did. And similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They certainly did.

וְיַעֲשׂוּ? תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. הָךְ תַּנָּא דְּאַרְבָּעָה אַחִין גָּזַר מִשּׁוּם צָרָה.

If so, the question remains: And let them establish the sexual relations of a nine-year-old to be considered like levirate betrothal. Why is he able to perform levirate marriage with her rival wife? The Gemara answers: This is a dispute between tanna’im. This tanna who discusses the case of four brothers, one of whom died, followed by the brother who performed levirate betrothal with the yevama (31b), he maintains that the yevama and her rival wife may not perform levirate marriage with one of the surviving brothers. The reason is that he maintains that the Sages decreed that a woman who has the bond of two deceased brothers may not perform levirate marriage due to a rival wife. They must both perform ḥalitza so that people will not say that two yevamot from one family can perform levirate marriage.

וְאַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּגָדוֹל, וְהוּא הַדִּין בְּקָטָן. וְהַאי דְּאָמַר גָּדוֹל — מִשּׁוּם דִּבְגָדוֹל קָאֵי.

And that tanna taught us this halakha with regard to an adult brother who performed levirate marriage, and the same is true of a minor who had relations with her. And the reason that he stated the case of an adult in particular is because he was referring to an adult.

וְהַאי תַּנָּא דְּהָכָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ עָשׂוּ, וְלָא גָּזַר מִשּׁוּם צָרָה. וְאַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּקָטָן, וְהוּא הַדִּין בְּגָדוֹל. וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר בְּקָטָן — דִּבְקָטָן קָאֵי.

And conversely, this tanna, of the mishna here, holds that they established the sexual relations of a minor entirely like the levirate betrothal of an adult, and he maintains that the Sages did not decree that a woman who has the bond of two deceased brothers may not perform levirate marriage due to the case of a rival wife. And he taught us this halakha with regard to a minor, and the same is true of an adult. And the reason that he stated the case of a minor in particular is because he was referring to a minor.

אֲזַל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֲמַר לִשְׁמַעְתָּא בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא, וְלָא אַמְרַהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. שְׁמַע רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אִיקְּפַד. עוּל לְגַבֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי וְרַבִּי אַסִּי. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה הַמַּעֲשֶׂה בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת שֶׁל טְבֶרְיָא בְּנֶגֶר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּרֹאשׁוֹ גְּלוֹסְטְרָא,

§ Rabbi Elazar went and said this halakha in the study hall, but he did not state it in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Instead, he issued the halakha without attribution. Rabbi Yoḥanan heard that Rabbi Elazar omitted mention of his name and became angry with him. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi visited Rabbi Yoḥanan, to placate him so that he would not be annoyed with his beloved disciple. They said to him: Wasn’t there an incident in the synagogue of Tiberias involving a bolt that secures a door in place and that has a thick knob [gelustera] at its end? The question was whether it may be moved on Shabbat as a vessel, or whether it is considered muktze as raw material.

שֶׁנֶּחְלְקוּ בּוֹ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, עַד שֶׁקָּרְעוּ סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה בַּחֲמָתָן. קָרְעוּ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ?! אֶלָּא אֵימָא שֶׁנִּקְרַע סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה בַּחֲמָתָן. וְהָיָה שָׁם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן קִיסְמָא, אָמַר: תָּמֵיהַּ אֲנִי אִם לֹא יִהְיֶה בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְכֵן הֲוָה.

And it was stated that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei argued over this case until they became so upset with each other that they tore a Torah scroll in their anger. The Gemara interrupts this account to clarify exactly what happened: Tore? Can it enter your mind that such great Sages would intentionally tear a Torah scroll? Rather, you must say that a Torah scroll was torn through their anger. In the heat of their debate they pulled the scroll from one side to another until it tore. And Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma, who was there at the time, said: I would be surprised if this synagogue does not become a place of idolatrous worship. This unfortunate event is a sign that this place is unsuitable for a synagogue. And indeed this eventually occurred.

הֲדַר אִיקְּפַד טְפֵי, אֲמַר: חַבְרוּתָא נָמֵי?!

Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi cited this baraita to hint to Rabbi Yoḥanan how careful one must be to avoid anger. However, Rabbi Yoḥanan grew even angrier, saying: You are even making us colleagues now? Those two Sages were peers, whereas Rabbi Elazar is merely my student.

עוּל לְגַבֵּיהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ אֶת מֹשֶׁה עַבְדּוֹ כֵּן צִוָּה מֹשֶׁה אֶת יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְכֵן עָשָׂה יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לֹא הֵסִיר דָּבָר מִכׇּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ אֶת מֹשֶׁה״, וְכִי עַל כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁאָמַר יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָיָה אוֹמֵר לָהֶם: כָּךְ אָמַר לִי מֹשֶׁה? אֶלָּא יְהוֹשֻׁעַ יוֹשֵׁב וְדוֹרֵשׁ סְתָם, וְהַכֹּל יוֹדְעִין שֶׁתּוֹרָתוֹ שֶׁל מֹשֶׁה הִיא. אַף רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר תַּלְמִידְךָ יוֹשֵׁב וְדוֹרֵשׁ סְתָם, וְהַכֹּל יוֹדְעִין כִּי שֶׁלְּךָ הִיא.

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi visited Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: The verse states: “As God commanded His servant Moses, so did Moses command Joshua, and so did Joshua, he left nothing undone of all that the Lord commanded Moses” (Joshua 11:15). Now did Joshua, with regard to every matter that he said, say to the Jews: Thus Moses said to me? Rather, Joshua would sit and teach Torah without attributing his statements, and everyone would know that it was from the Torah of Moses. So too, your disciple Rabbi Elazar sits and teaches without attribution, and everyone knows that his teaching is from your instruction. Hearing this, Rabbi Yoḥanan was appeased.

אָמַר לָהֶם: מִפְּנֵי מָה אִי אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִין לְפַיֵּיס כְּבֶן אִידִי חֲבֵרֵינוּ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מַאי טַעְמָא קָפֵיד כּוּלֵּי הַאי? דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַאי דִּכְתִיב: ״אָגוּרָה בְּאׇהׇלְךָ עוֹלָמִים״, וְכִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְאָדָם לָגוּר בִּשְׁנֵי עוֹלָמִים? אֶלָּא אָמַר דָּוִד לִפְנֵי הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: רִבּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם, יְהִי רָצוֹן

Later, after calming down, he said to Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi: Why don’t you know how to appease me like our colleague ben Idi? The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason that he was so angry about this matter? The Gemara answers that this is as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I will dwell in Your tent in worlds” (Psalms 61:5), literally, forever? And is it possible for a person to live in two worlds simultaneously? Rather, David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, let it be Your will