Zevachim 110

Zevachim 110

בְּמָנָא. מָר סָבַר: קְבִיעוּת מָנָא מִילְּתָא הִיא, וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא.

by placing them in a vessel. One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the designation of a measure of incense larger than an olive-bulk by placing it in a vessel is a significant matter that renders one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed there. Therefore, one who then burned only an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is exempt. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it is nothing and does not render one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed in the vessel. Therefore, one who then burned an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is liable.

אָמַר רָבָא: הַשְׁתָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר קְבִיעוּתָא דְּמָנָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא – קָבַע שִׁשָּׁה לְפַר, וּמָשַׁךְ מֵהֶן אַרְבָּעָה וְהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב; שֶׁרְאוּיִין לְאַיִל.

Rava said: Now, according to the one who says that designation by placing in a vessel is nothing, if one designated in a vessel six log of wine as a libation to accompany the sacrificing of a bull, which is the required amount, and then removed four log from it and brought those four log as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be liable, as a libation of four log of wine is fit for the sacrificing of a ram (see Numbers 28:14).

קָבַע אַרְבָּעָה לְאַיִל, וּמָשַׁךְ מֵהֶן שְׁלֹשָׁה וְהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, שֶׁרְאוּיִין לְכֶבֶשׂ.

Similarly, if one designated by placing in a vessel four log of wine for a libation to accompany the sacrificing of a ram and then removed three log of wine from it and brought those three log as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be liable, as three log of wine is a fit libation for the sacrificing of a lamb (see Numbers 28:14).

חָסְרוּ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא, וְהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר.

But if those three log were lacking any amount, and one brought them as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be exempt because less than three log of wine is never a fit libation.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: נִיסּוּךְ מֵהַקְטָרָה לָא יָלְפִי רַבָּנַן.

Rava inferred from the baraita that the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the pouring of a libation, from one performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the burning of incense. From that he concluded that the Rabbis would certainly not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the inner sanctum from a rite performed in the outer sanctum. This refuted Abaye’s claim that the Rabbis derive the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the inner sanctum from the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the outer sanctum. Rav Ashi said in defense of Abaye’s opinion: Indeed, as is indicated by the baraita, the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for pouring a libation outside the courtyard from the measure for liability for burning incense, which are two different rites performed in the outer sanctum.

אַף עַל גַּב דְּחוּץ מֵחוּץ, לָא יָלְפִי. הַקְטָרָה מֵהַקְטָרָה יָלְפִי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּחוּץ מִפְּנִים.

Rav Ashi continues: Even though the Rabbis do not derive the halakhot of a rite performed in the outer sanctum from a different rite performed in the outer sanctum, they do derive the measure for liability for burning the incense of the outer sanctum from the identical rite of burning of the incense of the inner sanctum, even though it involves deriving the halakhot of a rite performed in the outer sanctum from one performed in the inner sanctum.

וְכוּלָּן שֶׁחָסְרוּ. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: חֶסְרוֹן דְּחוּץ, שְׁמֵיהּ חֶסְרוֹן אוֹ לָא שְׁמֵיהּ חֶסְרוֹן?

§ After enumerating various items that are burned entirely on the altar, the mishna states: And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt. Concerning this ruling, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is a lack that occurs to an offering outside the courtyard considered a lack in order to exempt one who sacrifices the remainder outside the courtyard? Or is it not considered a lack?

מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דִּנְפַק – אִיפַּסְלוּ לְהוּ, מָה לִי חָסֵר מָה לִי יָתֵר; אוֹ דִילְמָא, יוֹצֵא דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ – אִין, דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ – לָא?

Do we say that once an offering emerges from the courtyard it is in any event disqualified, and yet the Torah deems one liable for offering it there, so what difference is there to me if there is an additional disqualification of being lacking and what difference is there to me if it is still complete? Or perhaps it is only with regard to emerging from the courtyard, where it is still in its original state, that yes, one is liable despite the fact that it was disqualified by emerging from the courtyard, but where it is not in its original state, one would not be liable.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹטֵר עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב אֶת כּוּלָּן.

Abaye said: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. It is apparent then that the offering must remain complete.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה בַּר רַב חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: מִדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פָּשֵׁיט מָר?!

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Can the Master resolve the dilemma from the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, and hold that one is liable for sacrificing even an olive-bulk, and the dilemma was raised according to their opinion.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַב: עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר– אֶלָּא דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ; אֲבָל בְּחֶסְרוֹן – מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ. לָאו דַּחֲסַר בַּחוּץ? לָא, דַּחֲסַר בִּפְנִים.

Abaye said to him: I heard explicitly from Rav that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only where the offering is still in its original form, i.e., complete. But where it is lacking, they concede to him that one is not liable. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Was Rav not referring to a case where it became lacking outside the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even according to the Rabbis a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: No, he was referring to a case where it became lacking inside the courtyard. Accordingly, this mishna cannot serve as a proof.

תָּא שְׁמַע: וְכוּלָּן שֶׁחָסְרוּ וְהִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. לָאו דַּחֲסַר בַּחוּץ? לָא, דַּחֲסַר בִּפְנִים.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the continuation of the mishna: And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices them outside the courtyard, he is exempt. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Is the mishna not referring to a case where it became lacking outside the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a case where it became lacking inside the courtyard. Accordingly, this cannot serve as a proof.

הַמַּקְרִיב קָדָשִׁים. אַמַּאי? וְהָאִיכָּא חֲצִיצָה!

§ The mishna teaches: One who sacrifices sacrificial meat, which is eaten, and sacrificial portions, i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, outside the courtyard, is liable for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions, but not for the meat. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? If the meat is placed directly on the altar’s fire and then the sacrificial portions are placed upon the meat, isn’t there an interposition between the altar and the sacrificial portions? Since if they were offered in the Temple in that manner, one would not have fulfilled the obligation, one should not be liable if he offers them up in this manner outside the Temple.

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כְּשֶׁהֲפָכָן.

Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where he turned them over and the sacrificial portions lay directly on the altar’s fire.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא שֶׁלֹּא הֲפָכָן; וְהָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע – חַיָּיב.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said there is another explanation: You may even say that the mishna is referring to a case where they did not turn them over. And in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says (108a) that even if one offered it up on a rock he is liable. According to him, it is clear that in order for one to be liable, the mode of offering up performed outside the Temple does not need to entirely parallel the mode of offering up in the Temple.

רַב אָמַר: מִין בְּמִינוֹ אֵינוֹ חוֹצֵץ.

Rav said there is another explanation: Even in the Temple, burning the sacrificial meat and sacrificial portions in this manner would be valid as both items are from the same animal, and a substance in contact with the same type of substance does not interpose.

מַתְנִי׳ מִנְחָה שֶׁלֹּא נִקְמְצָה, וְהִקְרִיבָהּ בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר. קְמָצָהּ, וְחָזַר קוּמְצָהּ לְתוֹכָהּ, וְהִקְרִיבוֹ בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: If there is a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, and one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt from liability, because until the handful is actually removed it is not fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple. But if a priest took a handful from it and then returned its handful into the remainder of the meal offering, and one sacrificed the entire mixture outside the courtyard, he is liable, as once the handful has been removed it is fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple, and one is liable for offering it up outside even though it is mixed into the remainder.

גְּמָ׳ וְאַמַּאי? (לִיבַטְּלִי) [לִיבַטְּלוּ] שִׁירַיִם לְקוֹמֶץ!

GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the final clause: But why is he liable? Let the remainder of the meal offering, which is certainly the majority of the mixture, nullify the handful.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: נֶאֶמְרָה הַקְטָרָה בַּקּוֹמֶץ, וְנֶאֶמְרָה הַקְטָרָה בַּשִּׁירַיִם; מָה הַקְטָרַת קוֹמֶץ – אֵין קוֹמֶץ מְבַטֵּל חֲבֵירוֹ, אַף הַקְטָרַת שִׁירַיִם – אֵין שִׁירַיִם מְבַטְּלִין קוֹמֶץ.

Rabbi Zeira said: A term of burning is stated with regard to the handful removed from the meal offering, and a term of burning is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering. With regard to the handful, referred to by the Torah as “the memorial part,” it is written: “And the priest shall burn the memorial part upon the altar” (Leviticus 2:2), and with regard to the remainder of the meal offering it is written: “Do not burn it as a fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). This provides a verbal analogy that teaches that just as with regard to the burning of the handful, if two handfuls are mixed together one handful does not nullify another, so too, with regard to the burning of the remainder, if the remainder and the handful are mixed together, the remainder does not nullify the handful.

מַתְנִי׳ הַקּוֹמֶץ וְהַלְּבוֹנָה, שֶׁהִקְרִיב אֶת אֶחָד מֵהֶן בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹטֵר עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב אֶת הַשֵּׁנִי. אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: The burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the consumption of the remainder of the meal offering by the priests. With regard to the handful and the frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second. Since the remainder of the meal offering becomes permitted only once both have been burned, he considers each one alone to be an incomplete offering, and he holds one is not liable for sacrificing only one of them. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable.

שְׁנֵי בְּזִיכֵי לְבוֹנָה, שֶׁהִקְרִיב אֶת אֶחָד מֵהֶם בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹטֵר, עַד שֶׁיַּקְרִיב אֶת הַשֵּׁנִי. אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.

The burning of two bowls of frankincense permits the consumption of the shewbread. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second, since the shewbread becomes permitted only once both bowls of frankincense are burned. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable.

גְּמָ׳ בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא: קוֹמֶץ, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּתִּיר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בַּשִּׁירַיִם? מִישְׁרָא שָׁרֵי, אוֹ (קלושי) [אִקְּלוֹשֵׁי] מִיקְּלֵשׁ?

GEMARA: The mishna is based on the fact that it is permitted for the priests to consume the remainder of the meal offering only once both the handful and the frankincense have been burned. With regard to this, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raises a dilemma: If one burned the handful but not the frankincense, what is the halakha with regard to whether this will permit the consumption of the corresponding half of the remainder? Since the burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the entire remainder, it seems that each one of them affects half of the remainder. Accordingly, it is unclear whether burning one of them will entirely permit half of the remainder, or whether it will merely weaken the prohibition concerning the remainder, and it will still be prohibited to eat any of it.

אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר – מִישְׁרֵא שָׁרֵי!

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raise this dilemma? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: One can render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption, i.e., during either one of them, then it should be obvious that the offering of the handful alone should entirely permit half of the remainder. The fact that Rabbi Meir holds that intention during just one of the acts can render the offering piggul demonstrates that he holds that each act alone has the power to permit part of the offering. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to Rabbi Meir’s opinion.

אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: אֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר – לָא מִישְׁרָא שָׁרֵי, וְלָא [אִקְּלוֹשֵׁי] מִקְּלֵשׁ (קָלֵישׁ)!

If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption; rather, one must have piggul intention during both acts, then it is evident that neither act alone has the power to affect the offering, and so the burning of the handful alone should neither permit any of the remainder nor weaken the prohibition that applies to it. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to the Rabbis’ opinion.

אֶלָּא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: אֵין מְפַגְּלִין בַּחֲצִי מַתִּיר!

Rather, the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer as taught in the mishna. Rabbi Eliezer rules that one who sacrifices outside only the handful or the frankincense is not liable. Evidently, he holds that neither of these alone can permit the consumption of the meal offering. The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well: Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption. Accordingly, he would hold that the offering of only the handful neither permits any of the remainder, nor weakens the prohibition concerning it, and it would not make sense to raise the dilemma according to him.

אֶלָּא אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן דְּהָכָא. מַאי? מִישְׁרָא שָׁרֵי, אוֹ (קָלֵישׁ) [אִקְּלוֹשֵׁי] מִקְּלֵשׁ?

Rather, it must be that the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that is taught here in the mishna. They hold that one is liable even for sacrificing outside only the handful or only the frankincense. Evidently, they hold that each one alone has the power to affect the status of the remainder. Accordingly, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa asked concerning a case where one of them is burned on the altar in the Temple, what is the halakha? Does it entirely permit half of the remainder, or does it weaken the prohibition concerning the entire remainder?

תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

מַתְנִי׳ הַזּוֹרֵק מִקְצָת דָּם בַּחוּץ –

MISHNA: One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard

חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמְנַסֵּךְ מֵי הֶחָג בֶּחָג בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁיָרֵי הַדָּם (שֶׁהִקְרִיבוּ) [שֶׁהִקְרִיבָן] בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב.

is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water consecrated for the libation of the festival of Sukkot, during the Festival, outside the courtyard, is liable. Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּדָמִים.

GEMARA: Rava says: Rabbi Elazar generally holds that one is liable for sacrificing outside only when he sacrifices a complete offering, but Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to the sprinkling of the blood of an offering, that one is liable for sprinkling outside even part of the blood, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four. This is clearly the halakha with regard to offerings whose blood is sprinkled on the external altar, as a single sprinkling renders such an offering valid (see 36b), and it can be regarded as a complete offering. Rabbi Elazar concedes that this is the halakha even with regard to offerings whose blood is sprinkled on the inner altar, despite the fact that such offerings are valid only once all the sprinklings have been completed.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁפָּסַק הוּא מַתְחִיל.

The fact that Rabbi Elazar concedes this point is apparent from that which is taught in a mishna (Yoma 60a) with regard to the numerous sprinklings of blood performed in the Holy of Holies, upon the Curtain, and on the inner altar, as part of the Yom Kippur Temple service: If during the sprinklings the blood spills and it is necessary to bring the blood of a second animal in order to complete them, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: From the place that the High Priest stopped sprinkling the blood of the first animal, there he begins to sprinkle the blood of the second animal; it is unnecessary to repeat any of the sprinklings that have already been performed. From this ruling it is apparent that each sprinkling is considered an independent and complete act of service, and one will be liable for even a single act of sprinkling done outside the Temple.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמְנַסֵּךְ מֵי הֶחָג [בֶּחָג] בַּחוּץ. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מְנַחֵם יוֹדְפָאָה: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – בְּשִׁטַּת רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא רַבּוֹ אֲמָרָהּ, דְּאָמַר: נִיסּוּךְ הַמַּיִם דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״וּנְסָכֶיהָ״ – בִּשְׁנֵי נִיסּוּכִים הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד נִיסּוּךְ הַמַּיִם וְאֶחָד נִיסּוּךְ הַיַּיִן.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water consecrated for the libation of the festival of Sukkot, during the Festival, outside the courtyard, is liable. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Menaḥem Yodfa’a: Rabbi Elazar said that halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his teacher, who says: The water libation on Sukkot is a mitzva by Torah law. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says concerning the verse: “Beside the daily burnt offering, its meal offering, and its libations” (Numbers 29:31), the fact that the Torah makes reference to “libations” in the plural indicates that the verse is speaking of two types of libations. One is the water libation, which is unique to the festival of Sukkot; and the other one is the wine libation, which always accompanies the daily offering. If the water libation was not a mitzva by Torah law, one would not be liable for pouring it as a libation outside the Temple courtyard.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אִי – מָה לְהַלָּן שְׁלֹשֶׁת לוּגִּין, אַף כָּאן שְׁלֹשֶׁת לוּגִּין?! וְהָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר ״מֵי הֶחָג״ קָאָמַר! אִי – מָה לְהַלָּן בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה, אַף כָּאן בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה?! [וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר] ״בֶּחָג״ קָאָמַר!

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: If Rabbi Elazar derives the mitzva of the water libation through the derivation taught by Rabbi Akiva, according to which both the wine libation and water libation are derived from the same word, then he should hold that just as there, with regard to wine, one is liable only if he pours three log, so too here, with regard to water, one should be liable only if he pours three log. But in the mishna, Rabbi Elazar says simply: Water of the festival of Sukkot, which seems to include any amount. Furthermore, he should hold that just as with regard to pouring a libation of wine outside the Temple, one is liable for pouring a libation during the rest of the days of the year and not only on Sukkot, so too, with regard to pouring a libation of water, one should be liable for pouring a libation during the rest of the days of the year. But in the mishna Rabbi Elazar says that one is liable only if he pours the water libation during the Festival. It is apparent that Rabbi Elazar derived the mitzva of the water libation from a different source.

אִישְׁתְּמִיטְתֵּיהּ הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא אִישׁ בִּקְעַת בֵּית חוֹרְתָן: עֶשֶׂר נְטִיעוֹת, עֲרָבָה וְנִיסּוּךְ הַמַּיִם – הֲלָכָה לְמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי.

That which Rabbi Asi says escaped him, as Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Neḥunya, a man of the valley of Beit Ḥortan: The halakha of ten saplings, the practice of taking a willow in the Temple during Sukkot, and the obligation to perform the water libation during Sukkot, each of these is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. According to Rabbi Asi, the mitzva of the water libation is not derived from the same source as the wine libation, and it is possible that there will be differences in the halakhot that apply to them.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמְנַסֵּךְ שְׁלֹשֶׁת לוּגִּין מַיִם בֶּחָג בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר (בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן) אוֹמֵר: אִם מִלְּאָן לְשֵׁם חַג – חַיָּיב.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: One who pours as a libation three log of water during the festival of Sukkot outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If he filled a service vessel with the three log in order to consecrate them for the sake of the Festival, he is liable.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: בְּיֵשׁ שִׁיעוּר בְּמַיִם קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two opinions? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They disagree with regard to whether there is a precise measure of water that can be consecrated as a libation. The first tanna holds that even if one fills a service vessel with more than three log, the water is thereby consecrated. Therefore, if one then pours at least three log of that water outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar holds that if one attempts to consecrate more than three log, the consecration of the water is ineffective. Therefore, if one then pours three log of that water as a libation outside the courtyard, he is not liable.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר:

Rav Pappa said: