Zevachim 48

Zevachim 48

פַּר וְשָׂעִיר שֶׁל יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים כּוּ׳. מִכְּדֵי צָפוֹן בְּעוֹלָה כְּתִיב, נִיתְנֵי עוֹלָה בְּרֵישָׁא!

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna list these sin offerings first? After all, while the halakha that slaughter must be in the north of the Temple courtyard is written in the Torah with regard to a burnt offering (Leviticus 1:11), the Torah does not explicitly state that the other offerings must be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, let the tanna of the mishna teach the halakha of a burnt offering first.

חַטָּאת – אַיְּידֵי דְּאָתֵי מִדְּרָשָׁא, חַבִּיבָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: Since the location for slaughtering the sin offering is derived through interpretation, it is dear to the tanna, and he therefore he gives it precedence. The verse states: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18). The Gemara (55a) derives from this verse that the sin offering must be slaughtered in the same place as the burnt offering, i.e., in the north of the Temple courtyard.

וְנִיתְנֵי חַטָּאוֹת הַחִיצוֹנוֹת! אַיְּידֵי דְּנִכְנַס דָּמָן לִפְנַי וְלִפְנִים, חַבִּיבָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara challenges: But let the tanna of the mishna teach first the halakha of the external sin offerings, since those are the offerings to which the verse is referring. The Gemara explains: Since the blood of the Yom Kippur sin offerings enters the innermost sanctum, these offerings are dear to the tanna, and he taught them first.

וְצָפוֹנָה בְּעוֹלָה הֵיכָא כְּתִיבָא? ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ עַל יֶרֶךְ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ צָפֹנָה״.

The Gemara asks: And where is it written that a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers that with regard to a sheep that is brought as a burnt offering the Torah states: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord; and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall dash its blood against the altar round about” (Leviticus 1:11).

אַשְׁכְּחַן בֶּן צֹאן, בֶּן בָּקָר מְנָא לַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם מִן הַצֹּאן״ – וָי״ו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן, וְיִלְמַד עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן.

The Gemara clarifies: We have found that this verse provides a source that a young sheep burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north. From where do we derive that a young bull burnt offering must also be slaughtered in the north? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And if his offering be of the flock, whether of the sheep, or of the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it a male without blemish” (Leviticus 1:10). The conjunctive “and” represented by the letter vav adds to the previous matter. The previous passage addresses cattle offerings. And let the upper passage, the place of the slaughter of a bull, be learned from the lower passage, the place of slaughtering a sheep.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that we learn halakhot in this manner. But according to the one who says that we do not learn halakhot in this manner, what is there to say?

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ וְגוֹ׳״ – לְחַיֵּיב עַל סְפֵק מְעִילוֹת אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר לְמֵידִין, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין לְמֵידִין?

As it is taught in a baraita: Immediately following the passage in the Torah addressing a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, the Torah discusses the halakhot of a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. The verse states: “And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). This serves to render him liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis deem him exempt in such a case. The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that we learn halakhot of the upper passage from the lower passage, and the other Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that we do not learn halakhot in this manner?

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לְמֵידִין; וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מִצְוֹת״, וְנֶאֱמַר בְּחַטַּאת חֵלֶב ״מִצְוֹת״;

Rav Pappa said: This is not correct, as everyone holds that we learn halakhot of the upper passage from the lower passage. And this is the reason that the Rabbis exempt from bringing an offering one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property: They learn a verbal analogy. It is stated here: “And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done” (Leviticus 5:17). And it is stated with regard to the sin offering for eating forbidden fat: “And if any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27).

מָה לְהַלָּן – דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן – שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.

The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, the sin offering is brought only for an act that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin offering, so too here, one brings a provisional guilt offering only for an act that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin offering, which is not the case concerning misuse of consecrated property.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – מָה לְהַלָּן בִּקְבוּעָה, אַף כָּאן בִּקְבוּעָה; לְאַפּוֹקֵי חַטָּאת דְּטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, דְּעוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד הוּא.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Akiva derive from this verbal analogy? He learns that just as there the verse obligates one to bring a fixed sin offering, so too here, with regard to the provisional guilt offering, one brings it for a case of uncertain transgression of a prohibition for which one would be liable to bring a fixed sin offering, to exclude a sin offering brought for uncertain transgression of the defiling of the Temple or sacrificial foods, as the sin offering for that transgression is not fixed, but is a sliding-scale offering. If the sinner is poor he brings a meal offering or a bird offering; if he is rich he brings an animal offering. In a case of uncertainty one does not bring a provisional guilt offering.

וְרַבָּנַן – אֵין גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לְמֶחֱצָה. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי, אֵין גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לְמֶחֱצָה!

And as for the Rabbis, who derived a different halakha from the verbal analogy, they hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter. Once a provisional guilt offering is compared to a sin offering, it must be completely similar, and both matters are derived from the verbal analogy. The Gemara asks: But Rabbi Akiva also must hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter, so why does he not agree with the derivation of the Rabbis?

אִין הָכִי נָמֵי; וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ״ כְּתִיב – וָי״ו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן;

The Gemara reconsiders: Yes, this is indeed so. And here they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Akiva holds that it is written with regard to the provisional guilt offering: “And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). The word “and” represented by the letter vav adds to the previous matter. When a phrase begins with the conjunction vav, it is a continuation of the previous matter, and the halakhot of the previous passage can be learned from the subsequent passage. Therefore one brings a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

וְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי, הָכְתִיב ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ״! לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר הֶיקֵּשׁ עֲדִיף, וּמָר סָבַר גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה עֲדִיף?

The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of the Rabbis also, isn’t it written: “And if anyone sin”? Let us say that they disagree about this: As one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that a derivation from a juxtaposition is preferable, and derives from the juxtaposition of the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property to the halakhot of a provisional guilt offering that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that a derivation from a verbal analogy is preferable, and therefore derive from a verbal analogy between the passage of misuse of consecrated property and the passage of a sin offering for eating forbidden fat that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא – דְּהֶיקֵּשׁ עֲדִיף; וְאָמְרִי לָךְ רַבָּנַן: תַּחְתּוֹן הוּא דְּגָמַר מֵעֶלְיוֹן –

The Gemara rejects this: No, it may be that everyone agrees that a derivation from a juxtaposition is preferable. And the Rabbis would say to you that the reason one is exempt from bringing a provisional guilt offering in a case of uncertain mis-use of consecrated property is that the juxtaposition should be understood in the opposite manner. It is the lower passage that is derived from the upper passage.

לְאָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים. שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר: לֹא יְהֵא סְפֵיקוֹ חָמוּר מִוַּדָּאוֹ; מָה וַדָּאוֹ חַטָּאת בַּת דַּנְקָא, אַף סְפֵיקוֹ אָשָׁם בַּר דַּנְקָא.

The juxtaposition teaches that a provisional guilt offering must be a ram worth a minimum of two silver shekels, as is the halakha with regard to the offering brought for misuse of consecrated property. This derivation is needed so that you should not say that a provisional guilt offering, brought for his uncertain transgression, should not be more stringent than the offering one brings in a case of his definite transgression. According to that claim, one would say that just as for his definite transgression one may bring a sin offering worth only one-sixth [danka] of a dinar, so too, for his uncertain transgression one may bring a provisional guilt offering worth only one-sixth of a dinar.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הָא סְבָרָא מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״זֹּאת תּוֹרַת הָאָשָׁם״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הָאֲשָׁמוֹת.

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive this conclusion? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse that states: “And this is the law of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:1), which teaches that there is one law for all of the guilt offerings and they must all be worth at least two shekels, provisional guilt offerings included.

תִּינַח מַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ ״תּוֹרַת״; מַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ ״תּוֹרַת״ מֵהֵיכָא גָּמַר? גָּמַר ״בְּעֶרְכְּךָ״–״בְּעֶרְכְּךָ״.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to one who holds that there is a derivation from the word “law,” but according to the one who does not hold that there is a derivation from the word “law,” from where does he learn that all guilt offerings must have the same minimum value? The Gemara answers: He learns it from a verbal analogy between the term “according to your valuation” stated with regard to a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:15) and the term “according to your valuation” stated with regard to a provisional guilt offering (Leviticus 5:18) and a guilt offering for robbery (Leviticus 5:25).

תִּינַח הֵיכָא דִּכְתִיב ״בְּעֶרְכְּךָ״; אֲשַׁם שִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה דְּלָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״בְּעֶרְכְּךָ״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: This works out well concerning guilt offerings where it is written “according to your valuation,” but with regard to a guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant, concerning which it is not written in the Torah “according to your valuation,” what is there to say? How does one derive that the guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant must be worth a minimum of two silver shekels?

גָּמַר ״בְּאֵיל״–״בְּאֵיל״.

The Gemara answers that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the term “with the ram” stated with regard to a guilt offering for mis-use of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:16) and the term “with the ram” stated with regard to the guilt offering for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant (Leviticus 19:22).

חַטָּאת מְנָא לַן דְּבָעֲיָא צָפוֹן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם הָעוֹלָה״.

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna. From where do we derive that a sin offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to an individual sin offering: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). Just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, so too, a sin offering must also be slaughtered in the north.

אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה, קַבָּלָה מְנָא לַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן מִדַּם הַחַטָּאת״.

The Gemara asks: We have found from this verse that the slaughter must be in the north. From where do we derive that collection of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and all its remaining blood he shall pour out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As this verse immediately follows the verse discussing the slaughter of a sin offering, evidently the taking of the blood is performed in the same place as the slaughter.

מְקַבֵּל עַצְמוֹ מְנָא לַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלָקַח״ – ״לוֹ יִקַּח״.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one collecting the blood must himself stand in the north of the Temple courtyard? Perhaps he may stand near the north and extend his arm to collect the blood. The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And the priest shall take [velakaḥ]” (Leviticus 4:34), which can be read, as: He will take himself [lo yikkaḥ].

אַשְׁכְּחַן לְמִצְוָה, לְעַכֵּב מִנַּיִן? קְרָא אַחְרִינָא כְּתִיב: ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הָעוֹלָה״, וְתַנְיָא: הֵיכָן עוֹלָה [נִשְׁחֶטֶת] – בַּצָּפוֹן; אַף זֶה בַּצָּפוֹן.

The Gemara asks: We have found that the offering must be slaughtered in the north and the blood collected in the north to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. From where is it derived that if one slaughters the offering or collects the blood anywhere else the offering is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is written in another verse which speaks of a goat sin offering brought by a king who sins: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). And it is taught in a baraita: Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? In the north. This sin offering of a king must also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.

וְכִי מִכָּאן אַתָּה לָמֵד?! וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּשָּׁחֵט הָעוֹלָה תִּשָּׁחֵט הַחַטָּאת״! הָא לְמָה יָצָא – לִקְבּוֹעַ לוֹ מָקוֹם, שֶׁאִם לֹא שְׁחָטָהּ בַּצָּפוֹן פָּסוּל.

The Gemara asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why did the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: To fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if it was not slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified even after the fact.

אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְכָךְ יָצָא; אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם הָעוֹלָה״ – זֶה בָּנָה אָב לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת, שֶׁיְּהוּ טְעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן.

The Gemara asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). This established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they require slaughter in the north.

אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׂעִיר נָשִׂיא – בֵּין לְמִצְוָה בֵּין לְעַכֵּב; שְׁאָר חַטָּאוֹת נָמֵי – אַשְׁכְּחַן לְמִצְוָה; לְעַכֵּב מְנָא לַן?

The Gemara continues its explanation: We have found that the Torah writes with regard to the goat sin offering of a king that it requires slaughter in the north both to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner and to disqualify the offering even after the fact. We have also found with regard to the other sin offerings that the Torah states that to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner they must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard. From where do we derive the halakha to disqualify other sin offerings if they were not slaughtered in the north?

דִּכְתִיב בְּכִשְׂבָּה וּכְתִיב בִּשְׂעִירָה.

The Gemara explains: As it is written with regard to a lamb sin offering that it must be slaughtered in the north: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:33) and it is also written with regard to a she-goat sin offering: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter it for a sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). This repetition teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if it is not slaughtered in the north.

אֶלָּא ״אוֹתוֹ״ לְמָה לִי?

§ Having derived from these verses that all sin offerings are disqualified if they are slaughtered not in the north, the Gemara questions its earlier explanation. Rather, why do I need the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king in the verse: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24)?

מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן״ – וְאֵין שְׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן בַּצָּפוֹן.

The Gemara answers: It is required for that which is taught in a baraita: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle, but the goat offered by Nahshon and the other princes was not slaughtered in the north. Nahshon was the prince of the tribe of Judah. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (Numbers, chapter 7). Although the offerings were classified as sin offerings because they shared some characteristics of sin offerings, they were not brought to atone for any particular sin. Therefore, the term “it” teaches that the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.

וְתַנְיָא: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׂעִיר״ – לְרַבּוֹת שָׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן לִסְמִיכָה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לִסְמִיכָה.

And the reason that it is necessary for the Torah to exclude Nahshon’s sin offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north is because it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.

סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתְרַבּוֹ לִסְמִיכָה – אִיתְרַבּוֹ נָמֵי לְצָפוֹן; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement of being slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that for the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon and the other princes there was no requirement of slaughter in the north.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבִינָא: הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה; לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

Ravina objects to this interpretation: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon required him to place his hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב טָבִי לְרָבִינָא: וּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מִי נִיחָא?! לְמַאי דְּאִיתְרַבִּי אִיתְרַבִּי, וּמַאי דְּלָא אִיתְרַבִּי לָא אִיתְרַבִּי!

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Tavi, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does it work out well? Why is it necessary for the Torah to specifically exclude the offerings of the princes from the requirement of slaughter in the north? Why not say that for that for which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included, and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included.

וְכִי תֵּימָא, אִי לָא מַעֲטֵיהּ קְרָא – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא תֵּיתֵי בְּבִנְיַן אָב; אִם כֵּן, סְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ תֵּיתֵי מִבִּנְיַן אָב! אֶלָּא מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא גָּמְרִינַן; הָכָא נָמֵי מִדּוֹרוֹת לָא גָּמְרִינַן!

And if you would say that if the verse had not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was only for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.

וְאֶלָּא ״אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן״ – וְאֵין שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן?

Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters it.

שׁוֹחֵט – מִדְּרַבִּי אַחִיָּא נָפְקָא! דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אַחִיָּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ עַל יֶרֶךְ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ צָפוֹנָה״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר?

The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters the offering has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term “it”?

לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ עוֹמֵד בַּצָּפוֹן וּמְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאִם עָמַד בַּדָּרוֹם וְקִיבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן פָּסוּל; יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֹתוֹ״ – אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן.

He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it,” to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters it is not required to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. Therefore, the question must be addressed: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?

אֶלָּא ״אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן״ – וְאֵין בֶּן עוֹף בַּצָּפוֹן. דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא בֶּן עוֹף טָעוּן צָפוֹן? וְדִין הוּא; וּמָה בֶּן צֹאן, שֶׁלֹּא קָבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן – קָבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן; בֶּן עוֹף, שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ כֹּהֵן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיִּקְבַּע לוֹ צָפוֹן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a young bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. This is as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that a male bird requires pinching of the nape in the north of the Temple courtyard. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as a young sheep brought as a burnt offering is an offering for which the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest but nevertheless fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a young bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its killing must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a male bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.

מָה לְבֶן צֹאן, שֶׁכֵּן קָבַע לוֹ כְּלִי!

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a young sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. A bird, by contrast, is killed by the priest using his fingernail. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation.

אֶלָּא, ״אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן״ – וְאֵין פֶּסַח בַּצָּפוֹן.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל יְהֵא פֶּסַח טָעוּן צָפוֹן? וְדִין הוּא; וּמָה עוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן לָא קָבַע לוֹ זְמַן לִשְׁחִיטָתוֹ – קָבַע לוֹ צָפוֹן; פֶּסַח, שֶׁקָּבַע לוֹ זְמַן לִשְׁחִיטָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיִּקְבַּע לוֹ צָפוֹן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֹתוֹ״.

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as a burnt offering is an offering for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter but fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, as it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.

מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל!

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

מֵחַטָּאת – מָה לְחַטָּאת, שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar but is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins that render one liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

מֵאָשָׁם – מָה לְאָשָׁם, שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים! מִכּוּלָּן נָמֵי – שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים!

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, which does not atone for those sins punishable by karet, and which is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it has the status of an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings as well, the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them, since they all have the status of offerings of the most sacred order.

לְעוֹלָם כְּדַאֲמַרַן מֵעִיקָּרָא: ״אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן״ – וְאֵין שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן. וּדְקַשְׁיָא לָךְ מִדְּרַבִּי אַחִיָּא נָפְקָא לַן – לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן; אֶלָּא אֵין שׁוֹחֵט בַּצָּפוֹן, אֲבָל מְקַבֵּל בַּצָּפוֹן.

The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Actually, the term “it” teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation from the term “it” is not to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that halakha is known already from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya. Rather, the derivation is that it is only one who slaughters the animal who does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.

מְקַבֵּל מִ״לָּקַח״–״וְלָקַח״ נָפְקָא! ״לָקַח״–״וְלָקַח״ לָא מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ.

The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: “And the priest shall take” [velakaḥ] (Leviticus 4:34), which may be read as: He will take himself [lo yikaḥ], as explained on the previous amud. The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: “And the priest shall take.” He does not agree with this derivation, and therefore he must derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.

אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה בְּעוֹלָה – לְמִצְוָה, קַבָּלָה נָמֵי – לְמִצְוָה אַשְׁכְּחַן; שְׁחִיטָה וְקַבָּלָה לְעַכֵּב מְנָלַן?

§ The Gemara asks: We found a source for the requirement of slaughter in the north with regard to a burnt offering in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. We also found a source for the requirement of collecting the blood while standing in the north in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. From where do we derive that slaughter and collection of the blood are disqualified if they are not performed in the north?

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבָּה בַּר שֵׁילָא: קַל וָחוֹמֶר; וּמָה חַטָּאת, הַבָּאָה מִכֹּחַ עוֹלָה – מְעַכֶּבֶת; עוֹלָה, שֶׁבָּאָה חַטָּאת מִכֹּחָהּ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּעַכֶּבֶת?

Rav Adda bar Ahava says, and some say it was Rabba bar Sheila who says: It is derived via an a fortiori inference: Just as the halakha that the slaughter and blood collection of a sin offering be performed in the north comes by virtue of a comparison to the halakha of a burnt offering, as the verse states: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), yet if the animal was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north it disqualifies the offering, with regard to the burnt offering itself, as the halakha that the slaughter and blood collection of a sin offering be in the north comes by virtue of it, is it not logical that if it was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north, this should disqualify the offering?

מָה לְחַטָּאת, שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!

The Gemara rejects this logical inference: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins that render one liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a burnt offering.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: הָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה – כְּלוּם מָצִינוּ טָפֵל חָמוּר מִן הָעִיקָּר?!

Ravina said: This is what is difficult for Rav Adda bar Ahava. In other words, regardless of the notable characteristic of a sin offering, he still is of the opinion that his logical inference stands. Have we ever found that a secondary prohibition is more stringent than a primary prohibition? Since the halakha of a sin offering is derived via a comparison to the halakha of a burnt offering, the former cannot have stringencies that the latter lacks.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: וְלָא?!

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But have we not found a secondary prohibition that is more stringent than the primary one?