There is a debate regarding a Toda that is sacrificed for someone else who needs to bring a Toda offering. Rava brings a number of halachot regarding problems with intentions during the sacrifical rites. From where is the halacha derived that a Pesach sacrifice that is done with the intention of being a different type of sacrifice or for the wrong people it is entirely disqualified (like the sin offering)?
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Zevachim 7
לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֵין נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים, לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִין!
according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the baraita can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.
וְעוֹד, הָא בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מֵרַבִּי זֵירָא: שְׂעִירֵי עֲצֶרֶת שֶׁקִּבֵּל דָּמָן בִּשְׁנֵי כּוֹסוֹת, וְנִזְרַק דָּמוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן; שֵׁנִי לָמָה הוּא בָּא? עַל טוּמְאָה שֶׁאוֹרְעָה בֵּין [זְרִיקָה שֶׁל] זֶה לָזֶה. (נִזְרַק דָּמוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי לָמָה הוּא קְרֵיבִין)
And furthermore, continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on Shavuot that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the goats sacrificed on Shavuot were slaughtered simultaneously and their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of the first goat was sprinkled, for what sin is the second goat brought? There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones for any incident involving impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the blood of that first goat and the sprinkling of the blood of this second goat.
עַד כָּאן לָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – אֶלָּא עֲשֵׂה דִּלְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל עָשָׂה דִּלְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה – לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ!
One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma only about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of a positive mitzva committed after its slaughter and before the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after the designation of the offering, before its slaughter, he did not raise the dilemma. Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.
דִּלְמָא ״אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר״ קָאָמַר.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because he was saying: Even if you say that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.
אִיתְּמַר: תּוֹדָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדַת חֲבֵירוֹ (כְּשֵׁרָה) – רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה.
§ It was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering: Rabba says that it is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation, and Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit in this regard.
רַבָּה אָמַר כְּשֵׁרָה – תּוֹדָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה נִשְׁחֲטָה. רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר פְּסוּלָה – לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים דִּידֵיהּ נִשְׁחֲטָה בָּעֵינַן.
Rabba says it is fit because the thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit because it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.
אָמַר רַבָּה: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו בְּיוֹם הַקְרִיבוֹ אֶת זִבְחוֹ וְגוֹ׳״ – אַבָּא חָנִין אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, בָּא לְלַמֵּד: תּוֹדָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרָה, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – פְּסוּלִים. וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? תּוֹדָה קְרוּיָה שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין שְׁלָמִים קְרוּיִין תּוֹדָה.
Rabba said: From where do I say that it is fit? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering…on the day that he presents his offering it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:15–16). Abba Ḥanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit, whereas a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. And what is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in the verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.
שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – פְּסוּלָה, הָא תּוֹדָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – כְּשֵׁרָה; מַאי, לָאו דְּחַבְרֵיהּ?
Rabba explains: The baraita indicates that a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, but a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of some other thanks offering is fit. What, is it not referring to the thanks offering of another, teaching that it satisfies its owner’s obligation?
לָא, דִּידֵיהּ.
The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to another thanks offering of his own, which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.
אֲבָל דְּחַבְרֵיהּ מַאי – פְּסוּלָה? אַדְּתָנֵי ״שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה פְּסוּלָה״, לִיתְנֵי ״תּוֹדָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה״ – וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה!
The Gemara asks: But if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of another’s thanks offering, what is the halakha? Is it unfit, i.e., does it not satisfy the owner’s obligation? If so, rather than teaching that a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, let the baraita teach that a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering is unfit, and one could infer that all the more so a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit.
שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה דִּידֵיהּ אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: מִדְּתוֹדָה קְרוּיָה ״שְׁלָמִים״, שְׁלָמִים נָמֵי קְרוּיִין ״תּוֹדָה״ – וְכִי שָׁחֵיט לְהוּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה לִיכַּשְּׁרוּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to specify a case where a peace offering was slaughtered for the sake of his own thanks offering. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and therefore when one slaughters a peace offering for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this is not the case.
אָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת – כְּשֵׁירָה, לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה – פְּסוּלָה.
§ Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering he was obligated to bring is fit; but if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַהֲרֵי חַטָּאת לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת נִשְׁחֲטָה. לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה – פְּסוּלָה.
What is the reason for this distinction? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), and therefore, as long as the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה. עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב עוֹלָה – כְּשֵׁרָה.
And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner, but who nevertheless was obligated to bring a sin offering, is unfit. But if one slaughtered it for one who was obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו״ – עָלָיו וְלֹא עַל חֲבֵירוֹ; חֲבֵירוֹ דּוּמְיָא דִידֵיהּ, בִּמְחוּיָּיב כַּפָּרָה כְּמוֹתוֹ.
What is the reason for this distinction? The Torah states: “And he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically he, the owner, who shall be forgiven, and not another person. The other person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably similar to the owner in that he is also obligated to achieve atonement similar to the owner’s by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּיָּיב כְּלוּם – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵין לְךָ אָדָם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּיָּיב עֲשֵׂה.
And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not obligated to bring anything is unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated to bring an offering for violating a positive mitzva. Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר – עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת מְכַפֶּרֶת, עַל חַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
And Rava says that a sin offering atones for those obligated to bring a burnt offering for violating a positive mitzva, due to an a fortiori inference: If a sin offering atones for those who are liable for transgressions for which one receives excision from the World-to-Come if he performs them intentionally, all the more so is it not clear that it atones for those liable for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva?
לְמֵימְרָא דְּבַת מִינַהּ הִיא?! וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה, עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב עוֹלָה – כְּשֵׁרָה!
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the violation of a positive mitzva is of the same type as the sins atoned for by a sin offering? But doesn’t Rava say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who was obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, but if it was slaughtered for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit, as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions.
מִקִּיבְעָא לָא מְכַפְּרָא, מִקּוּפְיָא מְכַפְּרָא.
The Gemara answers: A sin offering does not atone for violating a positive mitzva by its essence, since prohibitions and positive mitzvot are not of the same type, but it atones for it incidentally.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.
And Rava says: As for a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְגוֹ׳״. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּשַׁנִּי בַּהּ כּוּ׳, כִּדְרֵישׁ פִּירְקָא.
Why is this so? If you wish, cite a verse; and if you wish, propose a logical argument. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The derivation from this verse was explained in 2a. If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its slaughter, shall he continue to deviate from protocol in the rest of the sacrificial process? This is as it was stated at the beginning of the chapter (2a).
וְאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה לְאַחַר מִיתָה; שְׁחָטָהּ בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – פְּסוּלָה, בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים – כְּשֵׁרָה, דְּאֵין בְּעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
And Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that is brought by its owner’s heirs after his death, if one slaughtered it with a deviation from the type of offering, i.e., for the sake of another type of offering, it is unfit, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, and the heirs must therefore bring another offering. But if it was slaughtered with a deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., for the sake of another person, it is fit, as the offering has no legal owner after the owner’s death.
וְרַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי אָמַר: יֵשׁ בְּעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי: דַּוְקָא קָאָמַר מָר יֵשׁ בְּעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה – וּבָעֵי לְאֵיתוֹיֵי עוֹלָה אַחֲרִיתִי; אוֹ דִּלְמָא, דְּאִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבֵּיהּ מְכַפְּרָא?
And Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, says that an offering has an owner after its owner’s death, specifically, the heir. Rav Ashi said to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami: Is the Master saying that an offering actually has an owner after its owner’s death, and that if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir must bring another burnt offering, contrary to the opinion of Rava? Or perhaps the Master is merely saying that if the heir has several violations of positive mitzvot, the offering atones for them, but still if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir is not required to bring another offering.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דַּוְקָא קָאָמֵינָא.
Rav Pineḥas said to him: I am saying that the heir is actually the owner, and if the offering was slaughtered for someone else, he must bring another offering.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה – דּוֹרוֹן הִיא. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלֵיכָּא תְּשׁוּבָה – ״זֶבַח רְשָׁעִים תּוֹעֵבָה״! וְאִי דְּאִיכָּא תְּשׁוּבָה – הָתַנְיָא: עָבַר עַל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה וְשָׁב, לֹא זָז מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁמּוֹחֲלִים לוֹ! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דּוֹרוֹן הוּא.
And Rava says: A burnt offering is a gift [doron] to God; its essential purpose is not atonement. Rava supports his assertion: What are the circumstances under which a burnt offering atones for violating a positive mitzva? If one brings a burnt offering without repentance for his transgression, he may not sacrifice it at all, as “the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination” (Proverbs 21:27). And if there is repentance, isn’t it taught in a baraita that if one violates a positive mitzva and repents, God forgives him before he even moves from his place? If so, why is he required to bring an offering? Rather, conclude from it that a burnt offering is a gift that one brings in order to appease God even after he is forgiven.
חַטָּאת עַל מִי מְכַפֵּר, עוֹלָה לְאַחַר דּוֹרוֹן – סִימָן.
The Gemara states a mnemonic for this series of statements by Rava: A sin offering atones for who, a burnt offering after a gift.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: חַטָּאת לָמָּה בָּאָה? לָמָּה בָּאָה?! לְכַפֵּר! אֶלָּא לָמָּה בָּאָה לִפְנֵי עוֹלָה? לִפְרַקְלִיט שֶׁנִּכְנָס, [רִיצָּה פְּרַקְלִיט – נִכְנָס] דּוֹרוֹן אַחֲרָיו.
This last statement of Rava is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: For what purpose is a sin offering brought? The Gemara interrupts: For what purpose is it brought? Is it not brought to atone for a transgression? Rather, Rabbi Shimon clearly meant: For what reason is it brought before a burnt offering in all circumstances where both are brought? Rabbi Shimon answered: It is comparable to an advocate [lifraklit] who enters before the king to convince him to pardon the defendant. Once the advocate has appeased the king, the gift is brought in after him.
חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת כּוּ׳. פֶּסַח מְנָלַן?
§ The mishna teaches that all offerings are fit even if slaughtered not for their sake, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a Paschal offering is required to be slaughtered for its sake?
דִּכְתִיב: ״שָׁמוֹר אֶת חֹדֶשׁ הָאָבִיב וְעָשִׂיתָ פֶּסַח״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ כׇּל עֲשִׂיּוֹתָיו לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח.
The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “Observe the month of the spring and offer [ve’asita] the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaching that all of the actions [asiyyotav] of the Paschal offering, all of its sacrificial rites, must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that deviation from the type of offering is prohibited. From where do we derive that deviation with regard to the owner is also prohibited?
דִּכְתִיב: ״וַאֲמַרְתֶּם זֶבַח פֶּסַח הוּא״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח; אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים.
The Gemara answers that this is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that the slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering. If the verse is not necessary in order to derive the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as that halakha is derived from Deuteronomy 16:1, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner.
אַשְׁכְּחַן לְמִצְוָה, לְעַכֵּב מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that these intentions are indispensable and, if lacking, disqualify the offering?
אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall sacrifice [vezavaḥta] the Paschal offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). By repeating the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner, the Torah indicates that these two intentions are both indispensable to the sacrificial process.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב סָפְרָא: הַאי ״וְזָבַחְתָּ״ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן – דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מִנַּיִן לְמוֹתַר פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּרֵב שְׁלָמִים? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ צֹאן וּבָקָר״ – וַהֲלֹא אֵין פֶּסַח בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים וּמִן הָעִזִּים! מִכָּאן לְמוֹתַר הַפֶּסַח שֶׁיְּהֵא לְדָבָר הַבָּא מִן הַצֹּאן וּמִן הַבָּקָר, וּמַאי נִיהוּ – שְׁלָמִים.
Rav Safra objects to this: Does this verse: “And you shall sacrifice,” come to teach this halakha? It is necessary for the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.” The verse is difficult: But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? From here it is derived that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח״ – לְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן; ״שָׁמוֹר אֶת חֹדֶשׁ הָאָבִיב״ – לְמִצְוָה בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ; ״וַאֲמַרְתֶּם זֶבַח פֶּסַח״ – בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים לְמִצְוָה; ״הוּא״ – לְעַכֵּב בֵּין הָכָא וְהָכָא.
Rather, Rav Safra says that the verses should be expounded as follows: The verse “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” teaches the statement of Rav Naḥman, that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. The verse: “Observe the month of the spring and offer the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaches that there is a mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering without deviation from the type of offering. The verse: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), teaches that there is a mitzva to slaughter it without deviation with regard to the owner. The term “it is” in the latter verse teaches that both here and there, i.e., with regard to both the offering and the owner, proper intent is indispensable.
וְאַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה, שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת מְנָלַן? הוֹאִיל וְגַלִּי – גַּלִּי.
Rav Safra continues: And we found a source for slaughter. From where do we derive that other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner or the offering is disqualified? Since the Torah revealed that this intention is indispensable to the proper slaughter of the Paschal offering, it thereby revealed that it is critical to proper performance of the other rites as well.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הוֹאִיל וְגַלִּי גַּלִּי לָא אָמְרִינַן. אֶלָּא [עֲבוֹדוֹת] מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה לָעוֹלָה וְלַמִּנְחָה וְגוֹ׳״;
Rav Ashi says: We do not say that since the Torah revealed that this halakha is indispensable to slaughter, it thereby revealed that it is indispensable to the other rites as well. Rather, from where do we derive that it is indispensable to the other sacrificial rites? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “This is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), indicating that all offerings must, like a peace offering, be sacrificed for their own sake.
וְתַנְיָא: ״בְּיוֹם צַוֹּתוֹ אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְהַקְרִיב אֶת קׇרְבְּנֵיהֶם״ – זֶה בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר וָפֶסַח;
And it is taught in a baraita: In the verse: “In the day that he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings” (Leviticus 7:38), this word, i.e., “offerings,” is referring to the firstborn animal, the animal tithe, and the Paschal offering, which are not mentioned in the previous verse.
הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִשְׁלָמִים. מָה שְׁלָמִים – בֵּין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ בֵּין שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים, בָּעֵינַן לְמִצְוָה; אַף כׇּל – בֵּין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ בֵּין שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים, לְמִצְוָה.
The text juxtaposes all types of offerings mentioned in both verses with a peace offering, indicating that just as one who sacrifices a peace offering is required to do so with the proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, and in addition, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva, not as an indispensable requirement, so too, in the case of any type of offering that must have proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva. Therefore, the mitzva ab initio is derived from the halakha of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier repeat the halakha to teach that it is indispensable with regard to slaughter.
וְכִשְׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים – בֵּין זְבִיחָה בֵּין שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת, לֹא חָלַקְתָּ בָּהֶן, לְמִצְוָה; אַף פֶּסַח – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין זְבִיחָה לִשְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת, לְעַכֵּב. (מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הוּא״ בִּזְבִיחָה – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְעַכֵּב.)
And the juxtaposition of the peace offering with the Paschal offering indicates that a Paschal offering is similar to a peace offering in another respect: Just as with regard to a peace offering, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other rites with regard to the mitzva ab initio of proper intent, so too, with regard to the Paschal offering, do not distinguish between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites with regard to the halakha that proper intent is indispensable.
אֶלָּא, ״הוּא״ לְמָה לִי?
The Gemara asks: Rather, since the indispensability of proper intent with regard to the Paschal offering is derived from its juxtaposition with the peace offering, why do I need the term “it is” to be written in Exodus 12:27? What is derived from there?
כִּדְתַנְיָא: נֶאֱמַר בְּפֶסַח ״הוּא״ בִּשְׁחִיטָה – לְעַכֵּב; אֲבָל אָשָׁם לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הוּקְטְרוּ אֵימוּרָיו – כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara answers: This is written to teach that this requirement is indispensable only in the case of a Paschal offering, and not in the case of a guilt offering. As it is taught in a baraita: Concerning the Paschal offering, the term “it is” is stated with regard to slaughter in Exodus 12:27 to teach that intent for the owner is indispensable. But concerning a guilt offering, the term “it is” is stated only after the verse mentions the burning of the sacrificial portions, and since a guilt offering itself is fit even when its portions were not burned on the altar at all, intent for the sake of the owner at this point is certainly not indispensable.
חַטָּאת מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁחִיטָה לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת.
§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that if a sin offering is sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or one other than its owner, it is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaching that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה, קַבָּלָה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב:
The Gemara asks: We found a source with regard to slaughter. From where do we derive this with regard to collection of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written:
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Zevachim 7
לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֵין נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים, לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִין!
according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the baraita can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.
וְעוֹד, הָא בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מֵרַבִּי זֵירָא: שְׂעִירֵי עֲצֶרֶת שֶׁקִּבֵּל דָּמָן בִּשְׁנֵי כּוֹסוֹת, וְנִזְרַק דָּמוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן; שֵׁנִי לָמָה הוּא בָּא? עַל טוּמְאָה שֶׁאוֹרְעָה בֵּין [זְרִיקָה שֶׁל] זֶה לָזֶה. (נִזְרַק דָּמוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי לָמָה הוּא קְרֵיבִין)
And furthermore, continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on Shavuot that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the goats sacrificed on Shavuot were slaughtered simultaneously and their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of the first goat was sprinkled, for what sin is the second goat brought? There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones for any incident involving impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the blood of that first goat and the sprinkling of the blood of this second goat.
עַד כָּאן לָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – אֶלָּא עֲשֵׂה דִּלְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל עָשָׂה דִּלְאַחַר הַפְרָשָׁה – לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ!
One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma only about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of a positive mitzva committed after its slaughter and before the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after the designation of the offering, before its slaughter, he did not raise the dilemma. Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.
דִּלְמָא ״אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר״ קָאָמַר.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because he was saying: Even if you say that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.
אִיתְּמַר: תּוֹדָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדַת חֲבֵירוֹ (כְּשֵׁרָה) – רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה, רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה.
§ It was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering: Rabba says that it is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation, and Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit in this regard.
רַבָּה אָמַר כְּשֵׁרָה – תּוֹדָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה נִשְׁחֲטָה. רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר פְּסוּלָה – לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים דִּידֵיהּ נִשְׁחֲטָה בָּעֵינַן.
Rabba says it is fit because the thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit because it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.
אָמַר רַבָּה: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּבְשַׂר זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו בְּיוֹם הַקְרִיבוֹ אֶת זִבְחוֹ וְגוֹ׳״ – אַבָּא חָנִין אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, בָּא לְלַמֵּד: תּוֹדָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרָה, שְׁלָמִים שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – פְּסוּלִים. וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? תּוֹדָה קְרוּיָה שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין שְׁלָמִים קְרוּיִין תּוֹדָה.
Rabba said: From where do I say that it is fit? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering…on the day that he presents his offering it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:15–16). Abba Ḥanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit, whereas a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. And what is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in the verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.
שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – פְּסוּלָה, הָא תּוֹדָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה – כְּשֵׁרָה; מַאי, לָאו דְּחַבְרֵיהּ?
Rabba explains: The baraita indicates that a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, but a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of some other thanks offering is fit. What, is it not referring to the thanks offering of another, teaching that it satisfies its owner’s obligation?
לָא, דִּידֵיהּ.
The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to another thanks offering of his own, which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.
אֲבָל דְּחַבְרֵיהּ מַאי – פְּסוּלָה? אַדְּתָנֵי ״שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה פְּסוּלָה״, לִיתְנֵי ״תּוֹדָה לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה״ – וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה!
The Gemara asks: But if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of another’s thanks offering, what is the halakha? Is it unfit, i.e., does it not satisfy the owner’s obligation? If so, rather than teaching that a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, let the baraita teach that a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering is unfit, and one could infer that all the more so a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit.
שְׁלָמִים לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה דִּידֵיהּ אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: מִדְּתוֹדָה קְרוּיָה ״שְׁלָמִים״, שְׁלָמִים נָמֵי קְרוּיִין ״תּוֹדָה״ – וְכִי שָׁחֵיט לְהוּ לְשֵׁם תּוֹדָה לִיכַּשְּׁרוּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to specify a case where a peace offering was slaughtered for the sake of his own thanks offering. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and therefore when one slaughters a peace offering for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this is not the case.
אָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת – כְּשֵׁירָה, לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה – פְּסוּלָה.
§ Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering he was obligated to bring is fit; but if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וַהֲרֵי חַטָּאת לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת נִשְׁחֲטָה. לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה – פְּסוּלָה.
What is the reason for this distinction? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), and therefore, as long as the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה. עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב עוֹלָה – כְּשֵׁרָה.
And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner, but who nevertheless was obligated to bring a sin offering, is unfit. But if one slaughtered it for one who was obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit.
מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו״ – עָלָיו וְלֹא עַל חֲבֵירוֹ; חֲבֵירוֹ דּוּמְיָא דִידֵיהּ, בִּמְחוּיָּיב כַּפָּרָה כְּמוֹתוֹ.
What is the reason for this distinction? The Torah states: “And he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically he, the owner, who shall be forgiven, and not another person. The other person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably similar to the owner in that he is also obligated to achieve atonement similar to the owner’s by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּיָּיב כְּלוּם – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵין לְךָ אָדָם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחוּיָּיב עֲשֵׂה.
And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not obligated to bring anything is unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated to bring an offering for violating a positive mitzva. Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר – עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת מְכַפֶּרֶת, עַל חַיָּיבֵי עֲשֵׂה לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
And Rava says that a sin offering atones for those obligated to bring a burnt offering for violating a positive mitzva, due to an a fortiori inference: If a sin offering atones for those who are liable for transgressions for which one receives excision from the World-to-Come if he performs them intentionally, all the more so is it not clear that it atones for those liable for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva?
לְמֵימְרָא דְּבַת מִינַהּ הִיא?! וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב חַטָּאת – פְּסוּלָה, עַל מִי שֶׁמְּחוּיָּיב עוֹלָה – כְּשֵׁרָה!
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the violation of a positive mitzva is of the same type as the sins atoned for by a sin offering? But doesn’t Rava say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who was obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, but if it was slaughtered for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit, as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions.
מִקִּיבְעָא לָא מְכַפְּרָא, מִקּוּפְיָא מְכַפְּרָא.
The Gemara answers: A sin offering does not atone for violating a positive mitzva by its essence, since prohibitions and positive mitzvot are not of the same type, but it atones for it incidentally.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.
And Rava says: As for a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְגוֹ׳״. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּשַׁנִּי בַּהּ כּוּ׳, כִּדְרֵישׁ פִּירְקָא.
Why is this so? If you wish, cite a verse; and if you wish, propose a logical argument. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The derivation from this verse was explained in 2a. If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its slaughter, shall he continue to deviate from protocol in the rest of the sacrificial process? This is as it was stated at the beginning of the chapter (2a).
וְאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה הַבָּאָה לְאַחַר מִיתָה; שְׁחָטָהּ בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ – פְּסוּלָה, בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים – כְּשֵׁרָה, דְּאֵין בְּעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה.
And Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that is brought by its owner’s heirs after his death, if one slaughtered it with a deviation from the type of offering, i.e., for the sake of another type of offering, it is unfit, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, and the heirs must therefore bring another offering. But if it was slaughtered with a deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., for the sake of another person, it is fit, as the offering has no legal owner after the owner’s death.
וְרַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי אָמַר: יֵשׁ בְּעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי: דַּוְקָא קָאָמַר מָר יֵשׁ בְּעָלִים לְאַחַר מִיתָה – וּבָעֵי לְאֵיתוֹיֵי עוֹלָה אַחֲרִיתִי; אוֹ דִּלְמָא, דְּאִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבֵּיהּ מְכַפְּרָא?
And Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, says that an offering has an owner after its owner’s death, specifically, the heir. Rav Ashi said to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami: Is the Master saying that an offering actually has an owner after its owner’s death, and that if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir must bring another burnt offering, contrary to the opinion of Rava? Or perhaps the Master is merely saying that if the heir has several violations of positive mitzvot, the offering atones for them, but still if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir is not required to bring another offering.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דַּוְקָא קָאָמֵינָא.
Rav Pineḥas said to him: I am saying that the heir is actually the owner, and if the offering was slaughtered for someone else, he must bring another offering.
וְאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה – דּוֹרוֹן הִיא. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלֵיכָּא תְּשׁוּבָה – ״זֶבַח רְשָׁעִים תּוֹעֵבָה״! וְאִי דְּאִיכָּא תְּשׁוּבָה – הָתַנְיָא: עָבַר עַל מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה וְשָׁב, לֹא זָז מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁמּוֹחֲלִים לוֹ! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דּוֹרוֹן הוּא.
And Rava says: A burnt offering is a gift [doron] to God; its essential purpose is not atonement. Rava supports his assertion: What are the circumstances under which a burnt offering atones for violating a positive mitzva? If one brings a burnt offering without repentance for his transgression, he may not sacrifice it at all, as “the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination” (Proverbs 21:27). And if there is repentance, isn’t it taught in a baraita that if one violates a positive mitzva and repents, God forgives him before he even moves from his place? If so, why is he required to bring an offering? Rather, conclude from it that a burnt offering is a gift that one brings in order to appease God even after he is forgiven.
חַטָּאת עַל מִי מְכַפֵּר, עוֹלָה לְאַחַר דּוֹרוֹן – סִימָן.
The Gemara states a mnemonic for this series of statements by Rava: A sin offering atones for who, a burnt offering after a gift.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: חַטָּאת לָמָּה בָּאָה? לָמָּה בָּאָה?! לְכַפֵּר! אֶלָּא לָמָּה בָּאָה לִפְנֵי עוֹלָה? לִפְרַקְלִיט שֶׁנִּכְנָס, [רִיצָּה פְּרַקְלִיט – נִכְנָס] דּוֹרוֹן אַחֲרָיו.
This last statement of Rava is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: For what purpose is a sin offering brought? The Gemara interrupts: For what purpose is it brought? Is it not brought to atone for a transgression? Rather, Rabbi Shimon clearly meant: For what reason is it brought before a burnt offering in all circumstances where both are brought? Rabbi Shimon answered: It is comparable to an advocate [lifraklit] who enters before the king to convince him to pardon the defendant. Once the advocate has appeased the king, the gift is brought in after him.
חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וְהַחַטָּאת כּוּ׳. פֶּסַח מְנָלַן?
§ The mishna teaches that all offerings are fit even if slaughtered not for their sake, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a Paschal offering is required to be slaughtered for its sake?
דִּכְתִיב: ״שָׁמוֹר אֶת חֹדֶשׁ הָאָבִיב וְעָשִׂיתָ פֶּסַח״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ כׇּל עֲשִׂיּוֹתָיו לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח.
The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “Observe the month of the spring and offer [ve’asita] the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaching that all of the actions [asiyyotav] of the Paschal offering, all of its sacrificial rites, must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that deviation from the type of offering is prohibited. From where do we derive that deviation with regard to the owner is also prohibited?
דִּכְתִיב: ״וַאֲמַרְתֶּם זֶבַח פֶּסַח הוּא״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא זְבִיחָה לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח; אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לְשִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים.
The Gemara answers that this is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice [zevaḥ] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that the slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering. If the verse is not necessary in order to derive the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as that halakha is derived from Deuteronomy 16:1, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner.
אַשְׁכְּחַן לְמִצְוָה, לְעַכֵּב מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that these intentions are indispensable and, if lacking, disqualify the offering?
אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall sacrifice [vezavaḥta] the Paschal offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). By repeating the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner, the Torah indicates that these two intentions are both indispensable to the sacrificial process.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב סָפְרָא: הַאי ״וְזָבַחְתָּ״ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן – דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מִנַּיִן לְמוֹתַר פֶּסַח שֶׁקָּרֵב שְׁלָמִים? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ צֹאן וּבָקָר״ – וַהֲלֹא אֵין פֶּסַח בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַכְּבָשִׂים וּמִן הָעִזִּים! מִכָּאן לְמוֹתַר הַפֶּסַח שֶׁיְּהֵא לְדָבָר הַבָּא מִן הַצֹּאן וּמִן הַבָּקָר, וּמַאי נִיהוּ – שְׁלָמִים.
Rav Safra objects to this: Does this verse: “And you shall sacrifice,” come to teach this halakha? It is necessary for the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.” The verse is difficult: But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? From here it is derived that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ פֶּסַח״ – לְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן; ״שָׁמוֹר אֶת חֹדֶשׁ הָאָבִיב״ – לְמִצְוָה בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ; ״וַאֲמַרְתֶּם זֶבַח פֶּסַח״ – בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים לְמִצְוָה; ״הוּא״ – לְעַכֵּב בֵּין הָכָא וְהָכָא.
Rather, Rav Safra says that the verses should be expounded as follows: The verse “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” teaches the statement of Rav Naḥman, that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. The verse: “Observe the month of the spring and offer the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaches that there is a mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering without deviation from the type of offering. The verse: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), teaches that there is a mitzva to slaughter it without deviation with regard to the owner. The term “it is” in the latter verse teaches that both here and there, i.e., with regard to both the offering and the owner, proper intent is indispensable.
וְאַשְׁכְּחַן זְבִיחָה, שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת מְנָלַן? הוֹאִיל וְגַלִּי – גַּלִּי.
Rav Safra continues: And we found a source for slaughter. From where do we derive that other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner or the offering is disqualified? Since the Torah revealed that this intention is indispensable to the proper slaughter of the Paschal offering, it thereby revealed that it is critical to proper performance of the other rites as well.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הוֹאִיל וְגַלִּי גַּלִּי לָא אָמְרִינַן. אֶלָּא [עֲבוֹדוֹת] מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה לָעוֹלָה וְלַמִּנְחָה וְגוֹ׳״;
Rav Ashi says: We do not say that since the Torah revealed that this halakha is indispensable to slaughter, it thereby revealed that it is indispensable to the other rites as well. Rather, from where do we derive that it is indispensable to the other sacrificial rites? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “This is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), indicating that all offerings must, like a peace offering, be sacrificed for their own sake.
וְתַנְיָא: ״בְּיוֹם צַוֹּתוֹ אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְהַקְרִיב אֶת קׇרְבְּנֵיהֶם״ – זֶה בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר וָפֶסַח;
And it is taught in a baraita: In the verse: “In the day that he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings” (Leviticus 7:38), this word, i.e., “offerings,” is referring to the firstborn animal, the animal tithe, and the Paschal offering, which are not mentioned in the previous verse.
הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִשְׁלָמִים. מָה שְׁלָמִים – בֵּין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ בֵּין שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים, בָּעֵינַן לְמִצְוָה; אַף כׇּל – בֵּין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ בֵּין שִׁינּוּי בְעָלִים, לְמִצְוָה.
The text juxtaposes all types of offerings mentioned in both verses with a peace offering, indicating that just as one who sacrifices a peace offering is required to do so with the proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, and in addition, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva, not as an indispensable requirement, so too, in the case of any type of offering that must have proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, the halakha of proper intent is only as a mitzva. Therefore, the mitzva ab initio is derived from the halakha of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier repeat the halakha to teach that it is indispensable with regard to slaughter.
וְכִשְׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים – בֵּין זְבִיחָה בֵּין שְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת, לֹא חָלַקְתָּ בָּהֶן, לְמִצְוָה; אַף פֶּסַח – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין זְבִיחָה לִשְׁאָר עֲבוֹדוֹת, לְעַכֵּב. (מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הוּא״ בִּזְבִיחָה – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְעַכֵּב.)
And the juxtaposition of the peace offering with the Paschal offering indicates that a Paschal offering is similar to a peace offering in another respect: Just as with regard to a peace offering, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other rites with regard to the mitzva ab initio of proper intent, so too, with regard to the Paschal offering, do not distinguish between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites with regard to the halakha that proper intent is indispensable.
אֶלָּא, ״הוּא״ לְמָה לִי?
The Gemara asks: Rather, since the indispensability of proper intent with regard to the Paschal offering is derived from its juxtaposition with the peace offering, why do I need the term “it is” to be written in Exodus 12:27? What is derived from there?
כִּדְתַנְיָא: נֶאֱמַר בְּפֶסַח ״הוּא״ בִּשְׁחִיטָה – לְעַכֵּב; אֲבָל אָשָׁם לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הוּקְטְרוּ אֵימוּרָיו – כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara answers: This is written to teach that this requirement is indispensable only in the case of a Paschal offering, and not in the case of a guilt offering. As it is taught in a baraita: Concerning the Paschal offering, the term “it is” is stated with regard to slaughter in Exodus 12:27 to teach that intent for the owner is indispensable. But concerning a guilt offering, the term “it is” is stated only after the verse mentions the burning of the sacrificial portions, and since a guilt offering itself is fit even when its portions were not burned on the altar at all, intent for the sake of the owner at this point is certainly not indispensable.
חַטָּאת מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ – שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁחִיטָה לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת.
§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that if a sin offering is sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or one other than its owner, it is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaching that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה, קַבָּלָה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב:
The Gemara asks: We found a source with regard to slaughter. From where do we derive this with regard to collection of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written:
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