בבא קמא סג

בבא קמא סג

דְּהָא כֹּל חַד וְחַד כְּלָל וּפְרָט בְּאַפֵּי נַפְשֵׁיהּ דָּרְשִׁינַן לֵיהּ; אֲבָל עוֹפוֹת – לָא!

This line of reasoning is correct, because we expound each one of the listed items in the generalization, and detail, and generalization by itself. Each item is treated individually as representing a category, but the different items are not grouped together into one broad category. Since several animals are listed, it is concluded that if the stolen item is an animal it must resemble the listed animals. But since birds do not transmit impurity through contact or carrying, they are not subject to double payment.

אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא חַד פְּרָטָא!

The Gemara rejects this: If so, let the Merciful One write just one detail, i.e., animal, and that would have been enough to teach that animals are subject to double payment only if they transmit impurity through contact and carrying, so birds are excluded. Since the Torah listed several animals, birds are included.

הֵי נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא? אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – אִין, שֶׁאֵין קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – לָא. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חֲמוֹר״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה – אִין, שֶׁאֵין קָדוֹשׁ בִּבְכוֹרָה – לָא!

The Gemara questions this assertion: Which individual animal should the Merciful One have written? If the Merciful One had written only “ox,” I would say that only an animal that is similar to an ox, in that it is sacrificed on the altar, yes, it is subject to double payment. But an animal that is not sacrificed on the altar, no, it is not subject to double payment. And if the Merciful One had written only “donkey,” I would say that only an animal that is similar to a donkey, in that its firstborn male offspring is sacred with the sanctity of a firstborn, yes, it is subject to double payment. But an animal that is not sacred with the sanctity of a firstborn, no, it is not subject to double payment. The principle of double payment would then include cattle, sheep, goats, and donkeys, but not other animals (see Exodus 13:13 and Deuteronomy 15:19).

אָמְרִי: אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר״, ״שֶׂה״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לְאֵתוֹיֵי עוֹפוֹת.

The Gemara responds: Say in answer to this question: If so, if the Torah had wished to limit double payment to cases where cattle, sheep, goats, or donkeys were stolen, let the Merciful One write just “ox” and “donkey”; why do I need the verse to mention “sheep”? Conclude from it that the Torah intends to include even animals that do not meet these criteria, e.g., birds.

וְאֵימָא לְאֵתוֹיֵי עוֹפוֹת טְהוֹרִים – דּוּמְיָא דְשֶׂה, דִּמְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים אַבֵּית הַבְּלִיעָה; אֲבָל עוֹפוֹת טְמֵאִים – דְּלֵית בְּהוּ טוּמְאָה, דְּלָא מְטַמְּאִי בְּגָדִים אַבֵּית הַבְּלִיעָה, לָא! ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא.

The Gemara asks further: But say that the verse mentions sheep in order to include only kosher birds, which are similar to the sheep listed in the verse, in that a carcass of these birds renders both the one who eats it and his garments ritually impure when it passes through his esophagus, as the carcass of a sheep also transmits ritual impurity. But non-kosher birds, whose carcasses do not have ritual impurity at all, as they do not render either the one who eats them or his garments impure when they pass through his esophagus, no, they are not subject to double payment. The Gemara answers: The word “any [kol],” in the phrase “for any [kol] matter of trespass” is an amplification, and serves to include even non-kosher birds in the principle of double payment.

וְכֹל הֵיכָא דִּכְתַב ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא? וְהָא גַּבֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר, דִּכְתִיב ״כֹּל״, וְקָא דָרְשִׁינַן לֵיהּ בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט!

The Gemara asks: But is it so that anywhere that the Torah wrote the word kol it is an amplification? But isn’t it so that with regard to second tithe, the word kol is written in the verse: “And you shall bestow the money for whatever [bekhol] your soul desires, for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink, or for whatever your soul asks of you” (Deuteronomy 14:26)? And yet we expound that verse as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְנָתַתָּ הַכֶּסֶף בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תְּאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ״ – כָּלַל, ״בַּבָּקָר וּבַצֹּאן וּבַיַּיִן וּבַשֵּׁכָר״ – פָּרַט, ״וּבְכֹל אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁאׇלְךָ נַפְשֶׁךָ״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל; כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַפְּרָט, מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – פְּרִי מִפְּרִי וְגִידּוּלֵי קַרְקַע, אַף כֹּל פְּרִי מִפְּרִי וְגִידּוּלֵי קַרְקַע.

As it is taught in a baraita: “And you shall bestow the money for whatever your soul desires,” is a generalization, as no particular type of food is specified. “For oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink,” is a detail, as specific types of food are mentioned. When the verse concludes with “or for whatever your soul asks of you,” it has generalized again. Since the verse is formulated as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. This indicates that just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as the produce of produce, i.e., they grow from a parent organism, e.g., agricultural produce or animals, and they are grown from the ground, i.e., their sustenance comes from the ground, so too the category of items one may purchase with second-tithe money includes all items that are the produce of produce and are grown from the ground.

אָמְרִי: ״בַּכֹּל״ – כְּלָלָא, ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: ״כֹּל״ – כְּלָלָא הוּא, מִיהוּ ״כֹּל״ דְּהָכָא – רִיבּוּיָא הוּא.

The Gemara responds: Say in answer to this question that the term bekhol is a generalization, whereas the term kol is an amplification. And if you wish, say an alternate answer: The word kol is usually a generalization. But the word kol that is written here, in the verse concerning double payment (Exodus 22:8), is an exception. It is regarded as an amplification, as the Gemara will explain.

מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב מֵעִיקָּרָא כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל רֵעֵהוּ״ – כָּלַל, ״כֶּסֶף אוֹ כֵלִים״ – פָּרַט, ״לִשְׁמוֹר״ – (הֲדַר) [חָזַר] וְכָלַל;

After all, there is another generalization, and a detail, and a generalization written at the beginning of this passage, as it is written: “If a man gives his neighbor money or vessels to safeguard and it was stolen from the house of the man, if the thief shall be found he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:6). “If a man gives his neighbor” is a generalization. “Money or vessels” is a detail. When the verse concludes “to safeguard,” it has generalized again.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ הַאי ״עַל כׇּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע״ נָמֵי לִכְלָל וּפְרָט הוּא דַּאֲתָא, נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא לְהָנֵי פְּרָטֵי גַּבֵּי הַאיְךְ כְּלָל וּפְרָט; ״עַל כׇּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: רִיבּוּיָא הוּא.

And if it enters your mind to say that this later verse: “For any matter of trespass” (Exodus 22:8), is also coming to state a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, let the Merciful One write these details, i.e., ox, donkey, sheep, and garment, which are cited in the later verse, together with that previous generalization, and detail, and generalization. Why do I need the latter verse beginning with “for any matter of trespass”? Conclude from it that the word kol is an amplification in this instance, and it includes all animals.

הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ ״כֹּל״ – רִיבּוּיָא, כֹּל הָנֵי פְּרָטֵי לְמָה לִי? חַד לְמַעוֹטֵי קַרְקַע, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי עֲבָדִים, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי שְׁטָרוֹת. ״שַׂלְמָה״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְסוּיָּים, ״עַל כׇּל אֲבֵדָה״ – לְכִדְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב

The Gemara asks: Now that you said that the word kol is an amplification, why do I need all these details listed in the verse, i.e., ox, donkey, sheep, and garment? The Gemara answers: As for the three animals listed, one is mentioned to exclude land, one to exclude Canaanite slaves, and one to exclude financial documents. The example of a garment is mentioned to exclude an item that is not clearly delineated in size or quantity. “Or for any manner of lost thing” is written to teach that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole

בַּאֲבֵידָה, מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עַל כׇּל אֲבֵדָה אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר״.

a lost item that he had found, which he had been obligated to safeguard until it could be returned to its owner, he pays double payment, as it is stated: “For any manner of lost thing about which one shall say: This is it…the one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:8).

תְּנַן הָתָם: ״הֵיכָן פִּקְדוֹנִי?״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״אָבַד״, ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״; וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן. הוֹדָה עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ וְאָשָׁם.

§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (108b) about a case where an owner of an item said to the bailee: Where is my deposit? The bailee said to him: It was lost. The owner said: I administer an oath to you that it was actually lost, and the bailee said: Amen, thereby accepting the oath; and subsequently the witnesses testify about the bailee that he himself consumed the deposit. In this case, the bailee pays the principal, i.e., the value of the deposit, to the owner. If the bailee admitted on his own that he stole the deposit before any witnesses testified to this effect, he pays the principal and an additional one-fifth of the principal amount to the owner, and he brings a guilt-offering to atone for his sin (see Leviticus 5:20–26).

״הֵיכָן פִּקְדוֹנִי?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״נִגְנַב״, ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״; וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁגְּנָבוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. הוֹדָה מֵעַצְמוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ וְאָשָׁם.

The mishna continues with another case: The owner said to the bailee: Where is my deposit? The bailee said to him: It was stolen. The owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he stole the deposit. In this case, the bailee pays double payment. If he admitted his theft on his own, he pays the principal and an additional one-fifth to the owner, and he brings a guilt-offering to atone for his sin.

קָתָנֵי מִיהָא בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב דִּמְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל – אֲבָל בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת אָבַד לָא מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. וַאֲפִילּוּ טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – בִּשְׁבוּעָה הוּא דִּמְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל.

The Gemara says: In any event, the mishna teaches that in the case of a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, he pays double payment, but in the case of a bailee who falsely claims that a deposit was lost, he does not pay double payment. And it also teaches that even with regard to one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, it is only by taking an oath to substantiate his claim that he pays double payment, but for simply lying without taking an oath he does not pay double payment.

מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The Torah states: “If a man gives his neighbor money or vessels to safeguard and it was stolen from the house of the man, if the thief shall be found he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:6). The verse is speaking of a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole.

אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּגַנָּב עַצְמוֹ? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

The baraita continues: Do you say that the verse is speaking about one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen, or is it speaking only about the thief himself, teaching that if the actual thief is caught he must pay double payment? When the Torah says in the following verse: “If the thief shall not be found…the one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:7–8), the verse is speaking of one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, as it states that no other thief was found. Since the latter verse is speaking of one who falsely claims that a deposit was stolen, it stands to reason that the earlier verse is speaking of this case as well.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – בְּגַנָּב עַצְמוֹ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּגַנָּב עַצְמוֹ, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – הֲרֵי טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב אָמוּר, הָא מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים: ״אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״? בְּגַנָּב עַצְמוֹ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

It is taught in another baraita: When the Torah states: “If the thief shall be found he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:6), the verse is speaking of the thief himself. Do you say that it is speaking about the thief himself, or is it speaking only about one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole? If so, then when the verse then says: “If the thief shall not be found…the one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:7–8), the case of one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit is already stated. How, then, do I realize the first verse about paying double: “If the thief shall be found,” so that it not be superfluous? It must be that the first verse is speaking of the thief himself.

דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהַת, ״אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב כְּתִיב. מַאי מַשְׁמַע? אָמַר רָבָא: ״אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא״ כְּמָה שֶׁאָמַר, אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא עַצְמוֹ גְּנָבוֹ – יְשַׁלֵּם שְׁנַיִם.

The Gemara comments: Although the two baraitot disagree about the meaning of the earlier verse, in any event everyone agrees that the latter verse, which states: “If the thief be not found [im lo yimmatze hagannav]…shall pay double to his neighbor,” is referring to a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit. From where is this interpretation inferred from the verse? Rava said that the verse should be understood as follows: If it is not found [im lo yimmatze] to be as he said, i.e., if his claim that the deposit was stolen is found to be untrue, but he himself stole it, he shall pay double to his neighbor.

וּמְנָלַן דְּבִשְׁבוּעָה?

The Gemara turns its attention to another facet of this halakha: And from where do we derive that this double payment of one who falsely claims that the deposit was stolen applies only when the bailee has taken an oath that it was stolen?

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים״ – לִשְׁבוּעָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לִשְׁבוּעָה, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְדִין? נֶאֱמַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד לְמַטָּה, וְנֶאֱמַר שְׁלִיחוּת יָד לְמַעְלָה; מָה לְהַלָּן לִשְׁבוּעָה, אַף כָּאן לִשְׁבוּעָה.

The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “If the thief shall not be found, the homeowner shall approach the judges to determine if he laid his hand [shalaḥ yado] on his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:7). This means that he shall come to court for the purpose of taking an oath. Do you say he comes to court for the purpose of taking an oath, or is it only for the purpose of facing judgment? The meaning may be determined by means of a verbal analogy. Laying the hand [shliḥut yad], referring to misappropriation, is stated later, in the verse: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both, to see whether he has not laid his hand [shalaḥ yado] on his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:10), and laying the hand is stated above, i.e., Exodus 22:7. Just as laying the hand later is referring explicitly to an oath, so too laying the hand here is referring to an oath.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַד בְּגַנָּב וְחַד בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיבִי תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב, תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי לְמָה לִי?

The Gemara analyzes the two baraitot cited earlier: Granted, according to the one who says in the second baraita that one verse about double payment is speaking about the thief and one verse is speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, this is why two verses are written, as each verse teaches a different halakha. But according to the one who says in the first baraita that both of the verses are speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, why do I need two verses? One verse should be sufficient.

אָמְרִי: חַד לְמַעוֹטֵי טַעֲנַת אָבַד.

The Sages say: Both verses are necessary because one verse serves to exclude from double payment the case of one who falsely states the claim that the item has been lost. Double payment is paid only when the bailee falsely claims that the item under his care was stolen.

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַד בְּגַנָּב וְחַד בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב, דְּלָא מְיַיתַּר, לְמַעוֹטֵי טַעֲנַת אָבַד מְנָא לֵיהּ? מִ״גַּנָּב–הַגַּנָּב״.

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that one verse is speaking about the thief and one verse is speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, so that there is no superfluous verse, from where does he learn to exclude from double payment a bailee who falsely states the claim that the item has been lost? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the fact that the verse could have stated: If a thief [gannav] shall not be found, but it states instead: “If the thief [hagannav] shall not be found.”

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב, דְּמַיעֵט לֵיהּ טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת אָבַד, ״גַּנָּב–הַגַּנָּב״ מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בֵּיהּ?

The Gemara asks: And since according to the one who says that both verses are speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit one of the verses excludes the case of a bailee who falsely claims that the deposit was lost, what does he derive from the fact that the verse did not state: If a thief shall not be found, but it states instead: “If the thief shall not be found”?

אָמַר לָךְ: מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. טָבַח וּמָכַר – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.

The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that this terminology is necessary to teach what Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit pays double payment, and if the deposit was an ox or sheep and he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַד בְּגַנָּב וְחַד בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב, דְּהַאי ״גַּנָּב–הַגַּנָּב״ אַפְּקֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי טַעֲנַת אָבַד, דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא מְנָא לֵיהּ?

The Gemara notes: According to the one who says that one verse is speaking about a thief and one verse is speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, who employed this change in terminology, i.e., the fact that the verse could have stated: If a thief shall not be found, but states instead: “If the thief shall not be found,” to exclude the case of a bailee who falsely states the claim that the deposit was lost, there seems to be no source to teach the halakha stated by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. Accordingly, from where does he derive the halakha taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, that if the bailee slaughtered or sold the animal he pays a fourfold or fivefold payment?

אָמַר לָךְ: הֶקֵּישָׁא הוּא, וְאֵין מְשִׁיבִין עַל הֶקֵּישָׁא.

The Gemara answers: He could have said to you: It is a juxtaposition, as liability for double payment for a thief and for a bailee who falsely claims that the deposit was stolen are juxtaposed to each other. Therefore, just as a thief pays a fourfold or fivefold payment if he slaughtered or sold the animal, so must the bailee. And although these two cases are not entirely comparable, this derivation cannot be refuted on that basis, as there is a principle that one cannot refute a derivation based on juxtaposition by drawing distinctions between the two juxtaposed cases.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַד בְּגַנָּב וְחַד בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – גַּנָּב עַצְמוֹ מְנָא לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks further: Granted, according to the one who says that one verse is speaking about the thief and one verse is speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, it is well. But according to the one who says that both verses are speaking about a bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, from where does he derive that a thief himself must pay double payment for stealing?

וְכִי תֵּימָא: לֵיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב; דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מָה לְהַלָּן בִּשְׁבוּעָה – אַף כָּאן בִּשְׁבוּעָה!

And if you would say: Let it be derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of the bailee who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, because if one is obligated to pay double payment for falsely claiming that a deposit was stolen, which constitutes passive theft, all the more so must a thief himself pay double payment, this derivation is not possible. The reason is that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. In other words, a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference cannot be more stringent than the halakha of the source from which it is derived. Consequently, on the basis of this a fortiori inference, it would have to be concluded that just as there, in the source case, the double payment is required only when the guilty party took an oath, so too here, when the thief himself pays double, it is only when he took an oath that he did not steal it.

נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה, דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: יֵאָמֵר ״שׁוֹר״ וּ״גְנֵיבָה״ – וְהַכֹּל בַּכְּלָל!

The Gemara responds: He derives the obligation of a thief to pay double payment without having taken an oath from a third verse: “If the theft shall be found in his possession alive, whether it is an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:3). The double payment in this verse applies to all items, as is derived from what the school of Ḥizkiyya taught. As the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: Let the verse state only “ox” and “theft,” and all items would be included. Why was it necessary to also mention “donkey” and “sheep”?

אִילּוּ כָּךְ, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, אַף כֹּל קָרֵב לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ. מָה יֵשׁ לְךָ לְהָבִיא – שֶׂה,

Had the verse had been written this way I would have said: Just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item that is sacrificed on the altar, so too everything that is sacrificed on the altar is subject to double payment, but other items are not. What else is there for you to include in this category? Sheep, which, like oxen, can be sacrificed on the altar.