בבא מציעא לה

בבא מציעא לה

אִיתָא לִדְרַב הוּנָא כֵּיוָן דְּמִשְׁתְּבַע מִלְוֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, הֵיכִי מָצֵי מַפֵּיק לַהּ? אָמַר רָבָא: שֶׁיֵּשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁנִּשְׂרְפָה.

the statement of Rav Huna is so, once the creditor takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, how can he produce it thereafter? Rava said: The mishna is referring to a case where there are witnesses that the collateral was burned. Therefore, the creditor need not take an oath that it is not in his possession.

אִי הָכִי, מֵהֵיכָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: שֶׁיֵּשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁנִּגְנְבָה. סוֹף סוֹף מֵהֵיכָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ? דְּטָרַח וּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, the question remains: Why is the obligation to take the oath transferred from the debtor to the creditor? There is no concern that the creditor will produce the collateral. From where will he bring it if it was burned? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is referring to a case where there are witnesses that the collateral was stolen. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, in that case too, from where will the creditor bring the collateral if it was stolen? The Gemara answers: Although the collateral had been stolen, it is possible the creditor will exert himself to locate the thief and bring the collateral, thereby proving that the debtor took a false oath.

אִי הָכִי, כִּי מִשְׁתְּבַע מַלְוֶה נָמֵי, לִטְרַח לֹוֶה וְלַיְתֵי! בִּשְׁלָמָא מַלְוֶה יָדַע מַאן קָא עָיֵיל וְנָפֵק בְּבֵיתֵיהּ, וְאָזֵיל וְטָרַח וּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ. אֶלָּא לֹוֶה, מִי יָדַע מַאן עָיֵיל וְנָפֵיק בְּבֵיתֵיהּ דְּמַלְוֶה?

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case where the creditor takes an oath as well, let the debtor exert himself and bring the collateral, thereby proving that the creditor took a false oath. The Gemara answers: This is unlikely. Granted, there is concern that the creditor will recover the stolen collateral, as he knows who enters and exits his house, so he may have some inkling of the identity of the thief. And therefore, he goes and exerts himself and brings the collateral. But with regard to the debtor, does he know who enters and exits the creditor’s house? He has no inkling who the thief might be.

אַבָּיֵי אוֹמֵר: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִטְעוֹן וְיֹאמַר לוֹ: אַחַר שְׁבוּעָה מְצָאתִיהָ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְזֶה נִשְׁבָּע, זֶה נִשְׁבָּע שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, וְזֶה נִשְׁבָּע כַּמָּה הָיָה שָׁוֶה. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: מִי נִשְׁבָּע תְּחִילָּה? מַלְוֶה נִשְׁבָּע תְּחִילָּה, שֶׁמָּא יִשָּׁבַע זֶה וְיוֹצִיא הַלָּה אֶת הַפִּקָּדוֹן.

Abaye says: Although the creditor takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, the obligation to take an oath for partial admission is transferred from the debtor to the creditor, as the Sages issued a decree lest the debtor take the oath for his partial admission and the creditor claim and say to him: I found the collateral after you took the oath. Rav Ashi says: This party, the creditor, takes an oath and that party, the debtor, takes an oath. This party, the creditor, takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession. And that party, the debtor, takes an oath as to how much the collateral was worth. And this is what the mishna is saying: Who takes an oath first? The creditor takes an oath first that the collateral is not in his possession, lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit.

רַב הוּנָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: רֵישָׁא דְסֵיפָא תְּיוּבְתָּא לְרַב הוּנָא, סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, שְׁתַּיִם הָיָה שָׁוֶה. וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו, סֶלַע הָיָה שָׁוֶה – פָּטוּר. וְאִם אִיתָא לִדְרַב הוּנָא מִגּוֹ דְּמִשְׁתְּבַע מַלְוֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, לִישְׁתְּבַע נָמֵי אַגִּילְגּוּל שְׁבוּעָה כַּמָּה הָיָה שָׁוֶה!

Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa said in the name of Rava: The first part of the latter clause of the mishna is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who said that the creditor is obligated to take an oath that the collateral is not in his possession. In that clause, the debtor said: You loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case, rather, I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. In this case, the creditor is exempt. And if the statement of Rav Huna is so, once the creditor takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, let him also take an oath by means of extension of an oath as to how much the collateral was worth, as one obligated to take an oath can be forced to take other oaths as well.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא וְאָמַר לִי: תְּהֵא בְּמַאֲמִינוֹ. וּנְהֵמְנֵיהּ לֹוֶה לְמַלְוֶה נָמֵי בְּהָא כַּמָּה הֲוָה שָׁוֶה? לָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ. וּנְהֵמְנֵיהּ מַלְוֶה לְלֹוֶה, דְּקִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ? לָא מְהֵימַן לֵיהּ.

Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Let the halakha in the mishna be understood with regard to a case where the debtor trusts the creditor that the collateral is no longer in his possession. The Gemara challenges: But if so, let the debtor trust the creditor with regard to this matter of how much the collateral was worth. The Gemara explains: The creditor is not certain about the value of the collateral, as the item did not belong to him, which is why the debtor does not rely upon him to take an oath concerning its value. The Gemara challenges: But let the creditor trust the debtor, as the debtor is certain about the value of the collateral, as it is his. The Gemara answers: The creditor does not trust the debtor.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא לֹוֶה דִּמְהֵימַן לֵיהּ לְמַלְוֶה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא מַלְוֶה דְּלָא מְהֵימַן לֵיהּ לְלֹוֶה? לֹוֶה מְקַיֵּים בֵּיהּ בְּמַלְוֶה ״תֻּמַּת יְשָׁרִים תַּנְחֵם״, מַלְוֶה מְקַיֵּים בֵּיהּ בְּלֹוֶה ״וְסֶלֶף בּוֹגְדִים יְשָׁדֵּם״.

The Gemara asks: And what is different so that the debtor trusts the creditor that the collateral is not in his possession, and what is different that the creditor does not trust the debtor to accurately assess the value of the collateral? The Gemara answers: The debtor sees in the creditor fulfillment of the verse: “The integrity of the upright shall guide them” (Proverbs 11:3). He believes that God blesses the creditor with wealth to lend because he is an upright person. The creditor sees in the debtor fulfillment of the end of that verse: “But the perverseness of the faithless shall destroy them” (Proverbs 11:3). The creditor believes that God made the debtor poor because he is a deceitful person.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאַפְקֵיד כִּיפֵּי גַּבֵּי חַבְרֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַב לִי כִּיפַּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא יָדַעְנָא הֵיכָא אוֹתְבִי[תִי]נְהוּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל לָא יָדַעְנָא פְּשִׁיעוּתָא הִיא, זִיל שַׁלֵּים! לָא שַׁילֵּם. אֲזַל רַב נַחְמָן אַגַּבְּיֵהּ לְאַפַּדְנֵיהּ מִינֵּיהּ, לְסוֹף אִישְׁתְּכֻח כִּיפֵּי וְאִיַּקּוּר. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הָדְרִי כִּיפֵּי לְמָרַיְיהוּ. וְהָדְרָא אַפַּדְנָא לְמָרַהּ.

§ The Gemara relates: A certain man deposited jewels [keifei] with another. When the period of the deposit was complete, the owner of the jewels said to the bailee: Give me the jewels. The bailee said to him in response: I do not know where I placed them. The matter came before Rav Naḥman, who said to the bailee: Every circumstance where a bailee claims: I do not know where I placed them, is in and of itself negligence. Go pay him for the jewels. The bailee did not pay. Rav Naḥman went and gave instructions to repossess his palace and sell it to pay for the jewels. Ultimately, not only were the jewels found, but they had also increased in value. Rav Naḥman said: The jewels return to their initial owner, and the palace returns to its owner, and the bailee does not profit from the increase in the value of the jewels.

אָמַר רָבָא: הֲוָה יָתֵיבְנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, וּפִרְקִין ״הַמַּפְקִיד״ הֲוָה, וַאֲמַרִי לֵיהּ: שִׁילֵּם וְלֹא רָצָה לִישָּׁבַע. וְלָא אַהְדַּר לִי.

Rava said: I was sitting at that time studying before Rav Naḥman, and our chapter of study was this chapter: One who deposits, which is relevant to this case. And I said to Rav Naḥman: Isn’t this the case of a bailee who paid the owner and did not wish to take an oath? And it is the bailee who receives the double payment, ostensibly because once he paid, the owner transfers ownership of the item to him. And Rav Naḥman did not answer me, and he did well that he did not answer me, as the question was not worthy of an answer.

וְשַׁפִּיר עֲבַד דְּלָא אַהְדַּר לִי. מַאי טַעְמָא? הָתָם לָא אַטְרְחֵיהּ לְבֵי דִינָא, הָכָא אַטְרְחֵיהּ לְבֵי דִינָא.

Rava continues: What is the reason he did not answer me? The reason is that the cases cannot be compared. There, in the case of the mishna, the bailee paid at his own initiative. He did not inconvenience the owner by compelling him to go to court. Therefore, the owner transfers ownership of the deposit to the bailee. Here, in the case involving the jewels, the bailee inconvenienced the owner and compelled him to go to court. Consequently, the owner does not transfer ownership of the deposit to the bailee.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבַר רַב נַחְמָן דְּשׁוּמָא הָדַר? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּשׁוּמָא בְּטָעוּת הֲוָה, (דְּקָא) [דְּהָא] הֲוָה כִּיפֵּי מֵעִיקָּרָא.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman holds that after property is repossessed in order to pay an unpaid debt based on the court’s appraisal of the article’s value, it is returned if the debtor pays the debt? The Gemara rejects that conclusion: In general, the item is not returned. But it is different there, in the case of the jewels, as it was an erroneous appraisal, in that the jewels were in the possession of the bailee from the outset and he was merely unable to locate them.

אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: שׁוּמָא הָדַר עַד תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא. וְאָמַר אַמֵּימָר: אֲנָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אֲנָא, וּסְבִירָא לִי שׁוּמָא הָדַר לְעוֹלָם. וְהִלְכְתָא: שׁוּמָא הָדַר לְעוֹלָם, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וְעָשִׂיתָ הַיָּשָׁר וְהַטּוֹב״.

With regard to the reversal of an appraisal, the Sages of Neharde’a say: After property is repossessed in order to pay an unpaid debt based on the court’s appraisal of the article’s value, it is returned to the debtor, provided he repays the debt from the time of the appraisal until the twelve months of the year have passed. And Ameimar said: I am from Neharde’a, and nevertheless, I hold that repossession based on an appraisal of an article’s value can always be returned. If the debtor pays his debt, he can reclaim his property at any point. The Gemara rules: And the halakha is that repossession based on an appraisal can always be returned, due to the fact that it is stated: “And you shall do that which is right and good” (Deuteronomy 6:18). The owner of property appreciates his property more than another person would. Therefore, once the debtor repays his debt to the creditor, legal formalism should not prevent return of the debtor’s property.

פְּשִׁיטָא: שָׁמוּ לֵיהּ לְבַעַל חוֹב, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וְשָׁמַהּ לְבַעַל חוֹב דִּידֵיהּ, אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: לָא עֲדִיף אַתְּ מִגַּבְרָא דַּאֲתֵית מִינֵּיהּ. זַבְּנַהּ, אוֹרְתַאּ, וְיַהֲבַהּ בְּמַתָּנָה, וַדַּאי הָנֵי מֵעִיקָּרָא אַדַּעְתָּא דְּאַרְעָא נְחוּת וְלָאו אַדַּעְתָּא דְּזוּזֵי נְחוּת.

§ The Gemara clarifies related matters. It is obvious that if the court appraised property to repay a debt to a creditor, and this creditor went and had the property appraised and repaid his debt to his creditor, we say to the second creditor: Your rights are not superior to those of the man through whom you came to possess the property. Just as the first debtor can repay the debt and reclaim his property from his creditor, he can also reclaim the property from the creditor of his creditor. If a creditor who received appraised land sold it or bequeathed it to his heirs or gave it as a gift, the debtor cannot reclaim the land from those who acquired their land. It is certain that from the outset, when those people acquired the land, it was with the intent to acquire the land itself that they descended to it, and it was not with the intent to receive money that they descended to the land.

שָׁמוּ לַהּ לְאִשָּׁה וְאִינְּסִיבָא, אוֹ שָׁמוּ מִינַּהּ דְּאִשָּׁה וְאִינְּסִיבָא וּמֵתָה בַּעַל בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ לוֹקֵחַ הָוֵי – לָא מַיהְדַּר וְלָא מַהְדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ.

If the court appraised property to repay a debt to a woman and she then married, or if the court appraised property from a woman to repay her debt and she then married and died, since the legal status of a husband with regard to his wife’s property is that of a buyer, he does not return property that was appraised and repossessed to pay his wife’s debt. And we do not return to him property that was repossessed from his wife if he pays her debt.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: בְּאוּשָׁא הִתְקִינוּ – הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ וָמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.

This is as Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: In Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold part of her usufruct property during the life of her husband and she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The property belongs to the wife, while the profits accrued after marriage belong to the husband. Therefore, the woman does not have the right to sell the property as long as they are married. If she sold the property and died, and her husband is her heir, the Sages instituted that his legal status is that of a buyer and not an heir. His rights to the land precede those of the subsequent buyers. He repossesses the land and reimburses them the sale price of the property.

אַגְבְּיֵהּ אִיהוּ בְּחוֹבוֹ, פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא. חַד אָמַר: הָדְרָה, וְחַד אָמַר: לָא הָדְרָה.

With regard to a case where the debtor, not the court, authorized his creditor to repossess the land for his debt, and now he seeks to pay his debt and reclaim it, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One says: If he pays the debt, the repossession based on the appraisal is reversed and he reclaims the land. And one says: The repossession based on the appraisal is not reversed.

מַאן דְּאָמַר לָא הָדְרָה סָבַר: הַאי זְבִינֵי מְעַלְּיָא הִיא, דְּהָא מִדַּעְתָּא דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ אַגְבְּיֵהּ. וּמַאן דְּאָמַר הָדְרָה סָבַר: לָא זְבִינֵי מְעַלְּיָא הוּא, וְהַאי דְּאַגְבְּיֵהּ מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ וְלָא אֲתָא לְדִינָא – מֵחֲמַת כִּיסּוּפָא הוּא דְּאַגְבְּיֵהּ.

The Gemara elaborates: The one who says that the repossession based on the appraisal is not reversed holds that this is a full-fledged sale, as he authorized the repossession at his own initiative. Consequently, he cannot retract it. And the one who says that the repossession based on the appraisal is reversed holds that it is not a full-fledged sale. And the fact that he authorized the repossession at his initiative and did not wait to come to court for a ruling that his land be repossessed does not make it a full-fledged sale. It was only due to his desire to avoid embarrassment that he authorized the repossession.

וּמֵאֵימַת אָכֵיל פֵּירֵי? רַבָּה אָמַר: מִכִּי מָטְיָא אַדְרַכְתָּא לִידֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: עֵדָיו בַּחֲתוּמָיו זָכִין לוֹ.

The Gemara clarifies the halakhot of repossession: And when a creditor repossesses the debtor’s land, from when does he consume the produce of that land? Rabba said: He consumes the produce from the time when the document of authorization reaches his possession. This is a document that authorizes him to repossess the property of the debtor in payment of the debt wherever that property is located. Abaye said: He need not wait until he receives that document. Rather, the document’s witnesses, with their signatures, acquire the debtor’s land on his behalf. From the moment they sign the document, the land is his.

רָבָא אָמַר: מִכִּי שְׁלִימוּ יְמֵי אַכְרַזְתָּא.

Rava said: He consumes the produce from the time when the days of proclamation conclude. After property belonging to the debtor is located, the court proclaims that the property will be auctioned to raise funds to repay the debt. Therefore, even after the document of authorization reaches him, the creditor is not entitled to the produce, as someone else may purchase it. If the creditor enters the highest bid, he is entitled to the produce.

מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׂוֹכֵר פָּרָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְהִשְׁאִילָהּ לְאַחֵר, וּמֵתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – יִשָּׁבַע הַשּׂוֹכֵר שֶׁמֵּתָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל יְשַׁלֵּם לַשּׂוֹכֵר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: כֵּיצַד הַלָּה עוֹשֶׂה סְחוֹרָה בְּפָרָתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ? אֶלָּא תַּחְזוֹר פָּרָה לַבְּעָלִים.

MISHNA: In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and this renter then lends it to another person, and the cow dies in its typical manner, i.e., of natural causes, in the possession of the borrower, the renter takes an oath to the owner of the cow that the cow died in its typical manner, and the borrower pays the renter for the cow that he borrowed. A renter is exempt in a case of damage due to circumstances beyond his control, including death, but a borrower is liable to compensate the owner even for damage due to circumstances beyond his control. Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party, i.e., the renter, do business with and profit from another’s cow? Rather, the value of the cow should be returned to the owner. The renter need not take an oath, but the borrower must compensate the owner of the cow.

גְּמָ׳ אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין לְאַבָּיֵי: מִכְּדֵי, שׂוֹכֵר בְּמַאי קָנֵי לְהַאי פָּרָה? בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

GEMARA: Rav Idi bar Avin said to Abaye: After all, with regard to the renter, with what does he acquire this cow to the extent that one who borrows the cow from him is liable to compensate him if it dies? He acquires it with an oath that he took to the owner of the cow that the cow died of natural causes.

וְנֵימָא לֵיהּ מַשְׂכִּיר לְשׂוֹכֵר: דַּל אַנְתְּ וְדַל שְׁבוּעֲתָךְ, וַאֲנָא מִשְׁתַּעֵינָא דִּינָא בַּהֲדֵי שׁוֹאֵל. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי סָבְרַתְּ, שׂוֹכֵר בִּשְׁבוּעָה הוּא דְּקָא קָנֵי לַהּ? מִשְּׁעַת מִיתָה הוּא דְּקָנֵי. וּשְׁבוּעָה כְּדֵי לְהָפִיס דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת.

The Gemara asks: But since the acquisition is effected by the renter’s oath, let the one who rented his animal for hire say to the renter: Remove yourself and remove your oath. I do not want to deal with you at all in this case, and I will litigate with the borrower to recover my cow. Abaye said to Rav Idi bar Avin: Do you hold that it is with an oath that the renter acquires the cow? That is not so, as from the moment of the cow’s death, the renter acquires the cow. From the moment the cow dies in the possession of the borrower, the renter has the right to receive another cow in exchange. And this oath that the renter takes to the owner of the cow is not required by the halakha. Rather, he takes the oath to alleviate the concerns of the owner, so that the owner will not suspect him of negligence. Consequently, the owner of the cow cannot litigate with the borrower, and even if he waives his right to demand an oath from the renter, he is unable to receive a cow from the borrower.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: פְּעָמִים שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מְשַׁלְּמִין כַּמָּה פָּרוֹת לַשּׂוֹכֵר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אַגְרַהּ מִינֵּיהּ מְאָה יוֹמֵי, וַהֲדַר שַׁיְילַהּ מִינֵּיהּ תִּשְׁעִין יוֹמֵי, הֲדַר אַגְרַהּ מִינֵּיהּ תְּמָנַן יוֹמֵי, וַהֲדַר שַׁיְילַהּ מִינֵּיהּ שִׁבְעִין יוֹמֵי, וּמֵתָה בְּתוֹךְ יְמֵי שְׁאֵלָתָהּ, דְּאַכֹּל שְׁאֵלָה וּשְׁאֵלָה מִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא פָּרָה.

Rabbi Zeira says: According to the halakha in the mishna, there are times when the owner pays several cows to the renter. What are the circumstances? In a case where the renter rented a cow from him for one hundred days, and the owner of the cow then borrowed that cow from the renter for ninety days, and the renter then rented that cow from the owner for eighty days, and the latter then borrowed that cow from the renter for seventy days, and that cow died within the seventy-day period of its borrowing, then for each and every occasion of borrowing of the cow, the owner, who then became the borrower, owes one cow. Since there were two discrete acts of borrowing and two discrete acts of rental, the owner owes him four cows, two outright as compensation for the borrowed cows that died, and two cows for the renter to use for the duration of his rental periods.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: מִכְּדִי חֲדָא פָּרָה הִיא, עַיְילַהּ וְאַפְּקַהּ, אַפְּקַהּ מִשְּׂכִירוּת וְעַיְּילַהּ לִשְׁאֵילָה, אַפְּקַהּ מִשְּׁאֵילָה וְעַיְּילַהּ לִשְׂכִירוּת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּמִי אִיתַהּ לְפָרָה בְּעֵינָא דְּנֵימָא לֵיהּ הָכִי?

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina concerning this halakha: After all, it is one cow, and he introduced it into one legal status and removed it from another legal status. He removed it from the status of rental and he introduced it into the status of borrowing; he removed it from the status of borrowing and introduced it into the status of rental. How then does the owner pay multiple cows for one cow? Ravina said to Rav Aḥa: And is the cow intact so that the owner could say this to the renter: Here is your cow? Since the borrower cannot return the cow to the creditor, he is liable to return that which he committed to return, and he committed to return two cows, not one.

מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֵין לוֹ עֲלֵיהֶן אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי פָּרוֹת, חֲדָא דִּשְׁאֵלָה וַחֲדָא דִּשְׂכִירוּת. שׁוּם שְׁאֵלָה אַחַת הִיא, וְשׁוּם שְׂכִירוּת אַחַת הִיא. דִּשְׁאֵלָה קָנֵי לִגְמָרֵי, דִּשְׂכִירוּת – עָבֵד בַּהּ יְמֵי שְׂכִירוּתֵיהּ, וּמַיהְדַּר לַיהּ לְמָרַהּ.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said a third opinion: The renter has against the owner only a claim of two cows, one for the borrowing done by the owner, and one for fulfillment of his rental agreement. This is because the category of borrowing is one and the category of rental is one. As for the cow that is repayment for the borrowing, the renter acquires it completely. And as for the one for the rental, he works with it for the duration of its rental period and then he returns it to its owner.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: פְּעָמִים שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם בְּחַטָּאת,

Apropos the situations described in the mishna, Rabbi Yirmeya says: If the renter and the borrower each took a false oath and are liable to bring offerings for their false oaths, there are times that both are liable to bring a sin-offering;