כתובות יב

כתובות יב

אָמַר רַבָּה: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת, כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת בְּתוּלָה, וְנִמְצֵאת בְּעוּלָה — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה מָנֶה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: בְּעָלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ לֵית לַהּ כְּלָל, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּנָסָהּ רִאשׁוֹן.

Rabba said: That is to say, if one married a woman with the presumptive status of a virgin, as there were witnesses that she did not engage in intercourse, and she was found to be a non-virgin, she is entitled to a marriage contract of one hundred dinars. The Gemara rejects the proof. Rav Ashi said: In general, actually, I would say to you that in that case she does not receive a marriage contract at all, as it is a mistaken transaction. But here it is different, and she does not totally lose her marriage contract, because the first husband brought her into his house. Therefore, the second husband should have considered that a woman who entered her husband’s home is no longer a virgin.

וְנֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא תַּחְתָּיו זִינְּתָה! אָמַר רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ וּבָעַל לְאַלְתַּר.

The Gemara asks: And since there are witnesses that she did not engage in intercourse with the first husband, let us be concerned that perhaps she committed adultery after betrothal, while under the jurisdiction of the second husband, and rule that she is forbidden to him due to suspicion of adultery and is not entitled to a marriage contract at all. Rav Sherevya said: The baraita is referring to a case where he betrothed her and engaged in intercourse immediately. Therefore, there was no opportunity to engage in adultery between her betrothal and her marriage to the second husband.

וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַמַּתְנִיתִין: בְּתוּלָה, אַלְמָנָה, גְּרוּשָׁה חֲלוּצָה מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין — כְּתוּבָּתָן מָנֶה, וְאֵין לָהֶן טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִין. בְּתוּלָה מִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה.

Others taught this statement of Rabba with regard to the mishna: Concerning a virgin who is a widow, a divorcée, or a ḥalutza who achieved that status from a state of marriage, for all these women their marriage contract is one hundred dinars, and they are not subject to a claim concerning their virginity. The Gemara asks: How can you find a virgin from a state of marriage? It is in a case where she entered the wedding canopy and did not engage in intercourse.

אָמַר רַבָּה: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת, כְּנָסָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת בְּתוּלָה וְנִמְצֵאת בְּעוּלָה — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מָנֶה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ בְּעָלְמָא לֵית לַהּ כְּלָל, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא שֶׁהֲרֵי נִכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה.

Rabba said: That is to say, if one married a woman with the presumptive status of a virgin and she was found to be a non-virgin, her marriage contract is one hundred dinars. The Gemara rejects the proof. Rav Ashi said: In general, actually, I would say to you that in general, she does not receive a marriage contract at all, as it is a mistaken transaction. But here it is different, and she does not totally lose her marriage contract, because she entered the wedding canopy. Therefore, the second husband should have considered that a woman who entered her husband’s home is no longer a virgin.

וְנֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא תַּחְתָּיו זִינְּתָה! אָמַר רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ וּבָעַל לְאַלְתַּר.

The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps she committed adultery after betrothal, while under the jurisdiction of the second husband. Rav Sherevya said: The baraita is referring to a case where he betrothed her and engaged in intercourse immediately. Therefore, there was no opportunity to engage in adultery between her betrothal and her marriage to the second husband.

מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַבָּרַיְיתָא — כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַמַּתְנִיתִין, וּמַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַמַּתְנִיתִין — אֲבָל אַבָּרַיְיתָא לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּמָצֵי אָמַר לַהּ: אֲנָא אַעֵדִים סְמַכִי.

The Gemara notes: The one who taught the exchange between Rabba and Rav Ashi with regard to the baraita, where there is explicit testimony that she did not engage in intercourse with the first husband and nevertheless no proof can be brought that if he discovers that she is not a virgin she receives a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, all the more so would he say that the same is true with regard to the mishna. And the one who taught the exchange with regard to the mishna, however, would not say the same with regard to the baraita, due to the fact that the husband could say to her: I relied on witnesses. Therefore, proof can be brought from the baraita that if he discovered that she is not a virgin, she receives a marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹכֵל אֵצֶל חָמִיו בִּיהוּדָה שֶׁלֹּא בְּעֵדִים — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִטְעוֹן טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמִּתְיַיחֵד עִמָּהּ.

MISHNA: A man who eats at the house of his father-in-law in Judea after betrothal and without witnesses to attest to the fact that he was not alone with his betrothed is unable to make a claim concerning virginity after marriage because in accordance with the custom in Judea, the assumption is that he secluded himself with her, and the concern is that it was he who engaged in intercourse with her.

גְּמָ׳ מִדְּקָתָנֵי ״הָאוֹכֵל״, מִכְּלָל דְּאִיכָּא דּוּכְתָּא בִּיהוּדָה נָמֵי דְּלָא אָכֵיל. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בִּיהוּדָה נָמֵי מְקוֹמוֹת מְקוֹמוֹת יֵשׁ. כִּדְתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: בִּיהוּדָה, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ מְיַיחֲדִין אֶת הֶחָתָן וְאֶת הַכַּלָּה שָׁעָה אַחַת קוֹדֶם כְּנִיסָתָן לַחוּפָּה, כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא לִבּוֹ גַּס בָּהּ, וּבַגָּלִיל לֹא הָיוּ עוֹשִׂין כֵּן.

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: From the fact that the mishna teaches the halakha employing the phrase: A man who eats, by inference one may conclude that there is also a place in Judea where the groom does not eat at the house of his father-in-law, and does not enter into seclusion with his betrothed. Abaye said: Conclude from it that in Judea too there are different places with different customs, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: In Judea, at first they would seclude the groom and bride together for a brief period before their entry into the wedding canopy, so that he would grow accustomed to her companionship in order to ease the awkwardness when they would consummate the marriage. And in the Galilee they did not do so.

בִּיהוּדָה, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶם שְׁנֵי שׁוֹשְׁבִינִין, אֶחָד לוֹ וְאֶחָד לָהּ, כְּדֵי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ אֶת הֶחָתָן וְאֶת הַכַּלָּה בִּשְׁעַת כְּנִיסָתָן לַחוּפָּה, וּבַגָּלִיל לֹא הָיוּ עוֹשִׂין כֵּן.

The baraita continues. In Judea, at first they would appoint for them two groomsmen [shushvinin], one for him and one for her, in order to examine the groom and the bride at the time of their entry into the wedding canopy and thereafter, to ensure that neither would engage in deception with regard to the presence or absence of blood from the rupture of the hymen. And in the Galilee they would not do so. As the custom of appointing groomsmen would be relevant only in a case where the groom and the bride had not been together in seclusion prior to marriage, this is apparently a custom in Judea different from the first custom cited in the mishna, where they would enter into seclusion prior to marriage.

בִּיהוּדָה, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ שׁוֹשְׁבִינִין יְשֵׁנִים בַּבַּיִת שֶׁחָתָן וְכַלָּה יְשֵׁנִים בָּהּ, וּבַגָּלִיל לֹא הָיוּ עוֹשִׂין כֵּן.

The baraita continues. In Judea, at first the groomsmen would sleep in the house in which the groom and bride sleep, in order to examine the sheet on which the marriage was consummated immediately following intercourse. This was in order to ensure that the groom would not attempt to obscure the blood of the rupture of the hymen and claim that the bride was not a virgin. And in the Galilee they would not do so.

וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא נָהַג כַּמִּנְהָג הַזֶּה — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִטְעוֹן טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַרֵישָׁא, ״כֹּל שֶׁנָּהַג״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

The baraita concludes: And anyone who did not conduct himself in accordance with this custom cannot make a claim concerning virginity against the bride. The Gemara asks: Concerning which case in the baraita was this principle stated? If we say it is concerning the first clause of the baraita, regarding the custom to seclude the couple prior to marriage, in that case, the phrase: Anyone who conducted himself in accordance with this custom cannot make a claim concerning virginity, is what it needed to say, due to the concern that perhaps they had sexual relations before the marriage.

אֶלָּא אַסֵּיפָא, ״כֹּל שֶׁלֹּא מוּשְׁמַשׁ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

Rather, it is concerning the latter clause of the baraita: They would appoint for them two groomsmen to examine them, that the principle was stated. In that case, the phrase: Anyone who was not examined by the groomsmen, is what it needed to say, as it is dependent on the family of the bride, and not the phrase: Anyone who did not conduct himself in accordance with this custom, which indicates that it depends on him.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם אַרֵישָׁא, וּתְנִי: ״כֹּל שֶׁנָּהַג״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְהָא ״כֹּל שֶׁלֹּא נָהַג״ קָתָנֵי. אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל שֶׁלֹּא נָהַג מִנְהַג גָּלִיל בַּגָּלִיל, אֶלָּא מִנְהַג יְהוּדָה בַּגָּלִיל — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִטְעוֹן טַעֲנַת בְּתוּלִים. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אַסֵּיפָא, וּתְנִי: ״כֹּל שֶׁלֹּא מוּשְׁמַשׁ״.

Abaye said: Actually, the principle is stated concerning the first clause; and emend the baraita and teach: Anyone who conducted himself in accordance with this custom. Rava said to him: But isn’t it teaching explicitly: Anyone who did not conduct himself in accordance with this custom? One should not corrupt a baraita due to a difficulty that arose in understanding it. Rather, Rava said that this is what the baraita is saying: Anyone who did not practice the custom of the Galilee in the Galilee, but instead observed the custom of Judea in the Galilee, cannot make a claim concerning virginity against the bride. Rav Ashi said: Actually, this principle could be applied concerning the latter clause, and teach: Anyone who was not examined. When it said in the baraita: Anyone who did not conduct himself in accordance with this custom, it is referring to the custom of being examined.

מַתְנִי׳ אַחַת אַלְמְנַת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאַחַת אַלְמְנַת כֹּהֲנִים — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מָנֶה. בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל כֹּהֲנִים הָיוּ גּוֹבִין לִבְתוּלָה אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת זוּז, וְלֹא מִיחוּ בְּיָדָם חֲכָמִים.

MISHNA: For both a widow who is an Israelite woman and a widow who is the daughter of priests, her marriage contract is one hundred dinars. A court of priests would collect a marriage contract of four hundred dinars for a virgin daughter of a priest, twice the sum of the standard marriage contract for a virgin, and the Sages did not reprimand them.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנָא: וְאַלְמְנַת כֹּהֲנִים — כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם. וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: אַחַת אַלְמְנַת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאַחַת אַלְמְנַת כֹּהֲנִים כְּתוּבָּתָן מָנֶה!

GEMARA: A Sage taught in a baraita: And for a widow who is the daughter of priests, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: For both a widow who is an Israelite woman and a widow who is the daughter of priests, their marriage contract is one hundred dinars?

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁתֵּי תַּקָּנוֹת הֲווֹ, מֵעִיקָּרָא תַּקִּינוּ לִבְתוּלָה אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת זוּז, וּלְאַלְמָנָה מָנֶה.

Rav Ashi said: There were two ordinances instituted: Initially, the court of priests instituted for a virgin daughter of a priest a marriage contract of four hundred dinars, and for a widow, a marriage contract of one hundred dinars.

כֵּיוָן דַּחֲזוֹ דִּמְזַלְזְלִי בְּהוּ, תַּקִּינוּ לְהוּ מָאתַן. כֵּיוָן דַּחֲזוֹ דְּקָא פָּרְשִׁין מִינַּיְיהוּ, דְּאָמְרִי: עַד דְּנָסְבִינַן אַלְמְנַת כֹּהֲנִים — נֵיזִיל נִיסֵּיב בְּתוּלָה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל, אַהְדְּרִינְהוּ לְמִלְּתַיְיהוּ.

Once the members of the court saw that the priests were demeaning the widows, they instituted for them a marriage contract of two hundred dinars, so that they would treat them with greater esteem. Once they saw that the grooms were distancing themselves from them, as they said: Instead of marrying a widow who is the daughter of priests and paying a marriage contract of two hundred, let us go marry a virgin Israelite woman for the same price. Since men would no longer marry widows from priestly families, they restored matters to their original status. This indicates that the mishna and the baraita are addressing different time periods and different ordinances.

בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל כֹּהֲנִים כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל כֹּהֲנִים בִּלְבַד אָמְרוּ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ מִשְׁפָּחוֹת הַמְיוּחָסוֹת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, אִם רָצוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהַכֹּהֲנִים עוֹשִׂין — עוֹשִׂין.

§ It is stated in the mishna that a court of priests would collect a marriage contract of four hundred dinars for a virgin daughter of a priest. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Not only with regard to a court of priests did the Sages say that they could collect a greater sum for the marriage contract of their daughters, but even families of distinguished lineage in Israel. If they wanted to act as the priests do, they may act in that manner.

מֵיתִיבִי: הָרוֹצֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהַכֹּהֲנִים עוֹשִׂין, כְּגוֹן בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, וּבַת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — עוֹשִׂין. בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן וּבַת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא דְּאִיכָּא צַד כְּהוּנָּה. אֲבָל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְיִשְׂרָאֵל — לָא!

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One who sought to act as the priests do, as in cases where an Israelite woman is married to a priest, or the daughter of a priest is married to an Israelite, may act in that manner. The Gemara infers: This allowance is specifically in cases where an Israelite woman is married to a priest, or the daughter of a priest is married to an Israelite, where there is an aspect of priesthood involved. However, apparently, in a case where the daughter of an Israelite is married to an Israelite, no, it is not allowed.

לָא מִבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִבַּעְיָא בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּלָא מָצֵי אָמַר לַהּ עַלּוֹיֵי קָא מְעַלֵּינָא לִיךְ, אֲבָל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, דְּמָצֵי אָמַר לַהּ עַלּוֹיֵי קָא מְעַלֵּינָא לִיךְ — אֵימָא לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara rejects that inference. The baraita is stated employing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state a case where the daughter of an Israelite is married to an Israelite, as in that case the groom cannot say to her: By marrying you, I am raising your social status, and it is clear that women from distinguished families would demand a marriage contract with a greater sum. However, in a case where an Israelite woman is married to a priest, where he can say to her: I am raising your social status, as you are marrying into the priesthood, you might think to say no, the woman cannot demand a marriage contract with a greater sum. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even in the case of a woman from a distinguished family of Israelites marrying a priest, she may demand a marriage contract with a greater sum.

מַתְנִי׳ הַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְלֹא מָצָא לָהּ בְּתוּלִים. הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: מִשֶּׁאֵרַסְתַּנִי נֶאֱנַסְתִּי, וְנִסְתַּחֲפָה שָׂדֵהוּ. וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִּי, אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁלֹּא אֵרַסְתִּיךָ, וְהָיָה מִקָּחִי מִקָּח טָעוּת — רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפִּיהָ אָנוּ חַיִּין, אֶלָּא הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת בְּעוּלָה עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְאָרֵס, וְהִטְעַתּוּ, עַד שֶׁתָּבִיא רְאָיָה לִדְבָרֶיהָ.

MISHNA: There is a case of one who marries a woman and did not find her hymen intact, and she says: After you betrothed me I was raped, and his, i.e., her husband’s, field was inundated, meaning that it is his misfortune that she is not a virgin, as she was raped after betrothal. And he says: No; rather, you were raped before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives; rather, this woman assumes the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse when she was not yet betrothed and she misled him, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

גְּמָ׳ אִתְּמַר: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ — רַב יְהוּדָה וְרַב הוּנָא אָמְרִי: חַיָּיב, וְרַב נַחְמָן וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרִי: פָּטוּר. רַב הוּנָא וְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמְרִי חַיָּיב — בָּרִי וְשֶׁמָּא בָּרִי עָדִיף. רַב נַחְמָן וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרִי פָּטוּר — אוֹקִי מָמוֹנָא בְּחֶזְקַת מָרֵיהּ.

GEMARA: It was stated: With regard to one who approaches another and says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says: I don’t know, Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna say: The respondent is obligated to pay, because he did not deny the claim, and Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say: He is exempt from payment. The Gemara elaborates. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda say that the respondent is obligated to pay based on the principle: When there is a certain claim, e.g., that of the claimant, and an uncertain claim, e.g., that of the respondent, the certain claim prevails. Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The respondent is exempt based on the principle: Establish the money in the possession of its owner, and the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Since the claimant does not support his claim with proof, the money remains in the possession of the respondent.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: הָא דְּרַב הוּנָא וְרַב יְהוּדָה — דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הִיא. דִּתְנַן: הָיְתָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת, וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: מָה טִיבוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר זֶה? מֵאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי, וְכֹהֵן הוּא — רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This ruling of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda is essentially the statement of Shmuel, as we learned in a mishna (13a): In the case of an unmarried woman who was pregnant, and the Sages said to her: What is the nature of this fetus, i.e., who is the father. And she says: It is from a man called so-and-so and he is a priest and is certainly of valid lineage. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and the fetus is deemed to be of valid lineage. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel.

וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה לְרַב יְהוּדָה: שִׁינָּנָא, אֲמַרְתְּ לַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אַף בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה. מַאי אַף בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה? אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר אוֹקֵי מָמוֹנָא בְּחֶזְקַת מָרֵיהּ — אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בָּרִי עָדִיף.

And Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: Big-toothed one [shinnana], you said to us in the name of Shmuel that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel even in the first dispute, the dispute cited in the mishna, which is the first in a series of disputes with regard to conflicting claims. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of even the first? What is unique about that dispute relative to the others? The Gemara answers: The novel element in the first dispute is that the claim of the bride is accepted despite the fact that although there is room to say: Establish the money in the possession of its owner, and since the money is in the possession of the husband and the woman is the claimant, Rabban Gamliel said that the certain claim of the bride prevails over the uncertain claim of the groom, who can only speculate about when she was raped.

לֵימָא רַב יְהוּדָה וְרַב הוּנָא דְּאָמְרִי כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְרַב נַחְמָן וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמְרִי כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna who say their ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who says that a certain claim prevails over an uncertain one even to collect money from the possession of the respondent. And it is Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan who say their ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, that one does not collect money based merely on a claim.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב נַחְמָן: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי, אֲפִילּוּ כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּאִיכָּא מִגּוֹ. אֲבָל הָכָא, מַאי מִגּוֹ אִיכָּא?

The Gemara rejects that suggestion. Rav Naḥman could have said to you: That which I said, is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. Rabban Gamliel says his ruling only there, with regard to claims of a groom and a bride, where there is a miggo, a halakhic argument that the ability to make a more advantageous claim grants credibility to the claim one actually makes, that bolsters the bride’s claim. She could have claimed that she wasn’t raped at all, but rather that her hymen was ruptured by wood. That is a more advantageous claim because she is not disgraced in the eyes of the groom. Therefore, her claim that she was raped is accorded credibility. However here, where one claims that another owes him money, what miggo is there bolstering his claim and according it credibility?

אִי נָמֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָתָם אֶלָּא דְּאָמְרִינַן אוֹקְמַהּ אַחֲזָקָה, אֲבָל הָכָא, מַאי חֲזָקָה אִית לֵיהּ לְהַאי?

Alternatively, Rav Naḥman could have said to you: Rabban Gamliel says his ruling only there, where we say: Establish her legal status according to her presumptive status as a virgin, and the husband’s claim seeks to undermine that presumptive status. However here, what presumptive status does this claimant have supporting the claim that another owes him money? Therefore, even Rabban Gamliel would concede that his certain claim does not prevail.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא כִּדְקָא מְשַׁנֵּינַן, דְּרַב נַחְמָן הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל,

The Gemara notes: Indeed, it is also reasonable to explain as we are teaching, that it is Rav Naḥman who said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel.