קידושין נב

קידושין נב

הָאֶחָד חוֹלֵץ לִשְׁתֵּיהֶן, וְהַשְּׁנַיִם – אֶחָד חוֹלֵץ וְאֶחָד מְיַבֵּם. אִם קָדְמוּ וְכָנְסוּ – אֵין מוֹצִיאִין אוֹתָן מִיָּדָם.

the one brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, and of the two brothers, one performs ḥalitza with one of the sisters and one, if he so desires, performs levirate marriage with the other sister. If they married the widows before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage, and they are permitted to remain married.

דַּוְקָא מִיחְלָץ וַהֲדַר יַבּוֹמֵי, אֲבָל יַבּוֹמֵי וַהֲדַר מִיחְלָץ – לָא, דְּקָא פָּגַע בִּיבָמָה לַשּׁוּק.

The Gemara explains the novelty of the latter clause: This is effective specifically if one of the two brothers first performs ḥalitza and afterward the other brother performs levirate marriage, but if one of the two brothers first performs levirate marriage and afterward the other brother performs ḥalitza, the levirate marriage would not take effect, as he is possibly encountering a yevama getting married to a member of the public. This is because it is possible that the woman he married was not his yevama but someone else’s yevama, and until the other man’s brother performs ḥalitza with her it is still prohibited for her to marry other men.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי טָבְיוֹמֵי: לְזֶה חֲמִשָּׁה בָּנִים וּלְזֶה חֲמִשָּׁה בָּנוֹת, וְאָמַר: ״אַחַת מִבְּנוֹתֶיךָ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לְאֶחָד מִבָּנַי״ – כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת צְרִיכָה חֲמִשָּׁה גִּיטִּין. מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶם – כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת צְרִיכָה אַרְבָּעָה גִּיטִּין, וַחֲלִיצָה מֵאֶחָד מֵהֶן.

The Gemara derives a proof: Come and hear, as the Sage Tavyumei taught the following baraita: If this man had five sons and that man had five daughters, and the first man said: One of your daughters is betrothed to one of my sons, each and every one of the daughters requires five bills of divorce, one from each of the sons, due to the uncertainty of who is betrothed to whom. If one of the sons died before giving his bill of divorce, each and every one of the daughters requires four bills of divorce, one from each of the surviving brothers, and ḥalitza from one of them, in case she was betrothed to the deceased son. The ḥalitza of one of the brothers suffices to release her from her levirate bond. According to Rava this betrothal should not be valid, as it is not given to consummation. Why, then, do they each require bills of divorce?

וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָכִי נָמֵי כְּשֶׁהוּכְּרוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִתְעָרְבוּ, הָא ״אַחַת מִבְּנוֹתֶיךָ לְאֶחָד מִבָּנַי״ קָתָנֵי, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא. וְהִילְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי בְּיַעַ״ל קַגַ״ם.

And if you would say that here too it is referring to a case where they were identified and later intermingled, that cannot be. This is as the baraita teaches: One of your daughters to one of my sons, indicating that the betrothal could never have been given to consummation, and yet it is a valid betrothal. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is a conclusive refutation. The Gemara further notes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye when he has a dispute with Rava with regard to six halakhot, as represented by the mnemonic yod, ayin, lamed, kuf, gimmel, mem: Despair that is not conscious [yeush shelo mida’at], conspiring witnesses [eidim] who are disqualified retroactively, a side post [leḥi] standing alone, betrothal [kiddushin] that is not given to consummation, revealing intent with a bill of divorce [get], and an apostate [mumar] who sins rebelliously. Although the halakha generally is in accordance with the opinion of Rava in his disputes with Abaye, in these six cases the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.

מַעֲשֶׂה בְּחָמֵשׁ נָשִׁים. אָמַר רַב: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִמַּתְנִיתִין אַרְבַּע, וְנָקֵיט רַב בִּידֵיהּ תְּלָת.

§ The mishna teaches: An incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters. And one person gathered a basket of figs that were from their field, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year. And he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. And the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed. Rav says: One can learn four halakhot from the mishna. The Gemara adds: And Rav held three of them in his hand, i.e., knew what they were, but he was uncertain about the fourth.

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֵירוֹת שְׁבִיעִית – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: קִידְּשָׁהּ בְּגָזֵל – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, אֲפִילּוּ בְּגָזֵל דִּידַהּ. מִמַּאי? מִדְּקָתָנֵי: שֶׁלָּהֶם הָיְתָה וְשֶׁל שְׁבִיעִית הָיְתָה – טַעְמָא דִּשְׁבִיעִית, דְּהֶפְקֵר הוּא, הָא דִּשְׁאָר שְׁנֵי שָׁבוּעַ – לָא.

Rav clarifies: Learn from it that with regard to one who betroths a woman with produce of the Sabbatical Year, she is betrothed, and you do not say that this produce can be used only for eating and not for any other purpose. And learn from it that if one betroths a woman with a stolen item, even if it was her stolen item, she is not betrothed. You do not say that her accepting from him an item that he stole from her indicates that she released him from his obligation to return it, rendering it his to use in order to betroth her. From where can these two halakhot be deduced? It is from the fact that it teaches that the produce was from their field, and was of the Sabbatical Year, which indicates: The reason it could be used for betrothal is that the produce was of the Sabbatical Year, which causes the figs to be ownerless property. But if it was one of the other years of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, the betrothal would not take effect with stolen property, even if she accepted it for her betrothal.

וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: אִשָּׁה נַעֲשֵׂית שָׁלִיחַ לַחֲבֶירְתָּהּ, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית לָהּ צָרָה.

And learn from it: A woman can become an agent to accept a betrothal for another woman, and this is so even in a situation where she thereby becomes the rival wife of the other, as in the case of the mishna.

וְאִידַּךְ מַאי הִיא? קִידּוּשִׁין שֶׁאֵין מְסוּרִים לְבִיאָה. וְנִיחְשְׁבַהּ! מִשּׁוּם דִּמְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי כְּאַבָּיֵי אִי כְּרָבָא.

The Gemara asks: And what is the other halakha, the fourth one mentioned by Rav? It is the halakha of betrothal that is not given to consummation. The Gemara suggests: And let Rav also count this halakha. The Gemara explains: He does not do so, because he is uncertain whether the correct interpretation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Abaye, who maintains that such a betrothal is valid, or whether the correct interpretation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rava, which would mean it is not betrothal.

כִּי סְלֵיק רַבִּי זֵירָא אַמְרַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי אָמַר רַב הָכִי? וְהוּא לָא אֲמַר?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גָּזַל וְלֹא נִתְיָיאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם אֵינָם יְכוֹלִים לְהַקְדִּישׁ, זֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְזֶה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ. הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: מִי אָמַר רַב כְּווֹתִי?

The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Zeira ascended to Eretz Yisrael he stated this halakha before Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said to him: Did Rav actually say so? This indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with the statement of Rav that these halakhot can be learned from the mishna, which leads the Gemara to ask: But didn’t he himself say so? And didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If one robbed another of an item and its owner has not despaired of recovering it, neither of them can consecrate the stolen item? This one, the robber, cannot consecrate it because it is not his, and that one, the owner, cannot consecrate it because it is not in his possession. By the same logic, one should not be able to betroth a woman with stolen property, as it is not his. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan was not objecting to Rav’s opinion, but this is what he said to him: Did Rav actually say in accordance with my opinion?

מֵיתִיבִי: קִידְּשָׁהּ בְּגָזֵל, בְּחָמָס, וּבִגְנֵיבָה, אוֹ שֶׁחָטַף סֶלַע מִיָּדָהּ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! הָתָם בְּגָזֵל דִּידַהּ.

The Gemara raises an objection against Rav’s opinion that one cannot betroth a woman with stolen property, from a baraita (Tosefta 4:5): If one betrothed her with an item taken in robbery, in a forced transaction, or in theft, or if he grabbed a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it, she is betrothed. This indicates that one can betroth a woman with stolen property. The Gemara answers: There it is referring to her stolen property, and by accepting it from him as betrothal, she indicates that she has released him from his obligation to return it.

הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אוֹ שֶׁחָטַף סֶלַע מִשֶּׁלָּהּ – מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא בְּגָזֵל דְּעָלְמָא עָסְקִינַן! פָּירוּשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: קִידְּשָׁהּ בְּגָזֵל, בְּחָמָס, וּבִגְנֵיבָה כֵּיצַד? כְּגוֹן שֶׁחָטַף סֶלַע מִיָּדָהּ וְקִדְּשָׁהּ בּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the last clause of the baraita teaches: Or if he grabbed a sela of hers, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are dealing with property stolen from others. The Gemara explains: These are not two separate cases. Instead, the tanna is explaining his earlier statement: If one betrothed a woman with an item taken in robbery, in a forced transaction, or in theft; how so? For example, if he grabbed a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it.

וְהָא מַתְנִיתִין, דְּגָזֵל דִּידַהּ, וְקָאָמַר רַב: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא – דְּשַׁדֵּיךְ, הָא – דְּלָא שַׁדֵּיךְ.

The Gemara questions this analysis: But doesn’t the mishna deal with a case where the stolen item is hers, and yet Rav says she is not betrothed. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this case, in the baraita, is referring to a situation where he had arranged to betroth her beforehand, which indicates that she has released him from his obligation to return it, but that case, in the mishna, is referring to a situation where he had not arranged his marriage with her, so it is stolen property and she is not betrothed.

הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא דַּהֲוָה קָא מָשְׁיָא כַּרְעַאּ בִּמְשִׁיכְלָא דְמַיָּא, אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא, חֲטַף זוּזֵי מֵחַבְרֵיהּ וּשְׁדָא לַהּ. אֲמַר לַהּ: מִיקַּדְּשַׁתְּ לִי. אֲתָא הָהוּא גַּבְרָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר: לֵית דְּחָשׁ לְהָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: סְתַם גְּזֵילָה – יֵאוּשׁ בְּעָלִים הָוֵי.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was washing her feet in a vessel of water. A certain man came along, grabbed a few dinars from another person, and threw them to her, and said to her: You are betrothed to me. That man subsequently came before Rava, to inquire as to the status of the woman. Rava said: There is not anyone who is concerned for this opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: In an ordinary case of robbery the owner has despaired of recovering the stolen item, and it belongs to the robber. Rather, the assumption is that the owner has not despaired of recovering the stolen item. In this case, since the stolen dinars do not belong to the man, his betrothal is of no effect.

הָהוּא אֲרִיסָא דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּמוֹזָא דְשַׁמְכֵי, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן אַחֲלָךְ? וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּמוֹזָא, אֲבָל כִּישָׁא, מָצֵי אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא שְׁקַלִי כִּישָׁא, שְׁקֵיל אַתְּ כִּישָׁא, כִּישָׁא כִּי כִישָׁא.

The Gemara relates another incident: The was a certain sharecropper who betrothed a woman with a handful [bemoza] of onions [deshamkhei] taken from the field where he worked. He came before Rava to ask about the status of the woman. Rava said to him: Who relinquished these onions to you? Since the owner did not allow you to take them, they are stolen property, and the woman is not betrothed. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to a handful, but if he took a bundle of onions and betrothed a woman with them, the sharecropper can say to the owner: I took a bundle, you take a bundle; one bundle for another bundle. Since in any case they divide the crop between them, it is not considered theft.

הָהוּא סְרָסְיָא דְּקַדֵּישׁ בִּפְרוּמָא דְשִׁיכְרָא. אֲתָא מָרֵיהּ דְּשִׁיכְרָא אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמַּאי לָא תִּיתֵּיב מֵהַאי חָרִיפָא? אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. אֲמַר: לֹא אָמְרוּ ״כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת״, אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן תְּרוּמָה בִּלְבָד.

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain brewer [sarseya] who was making date beer for someone, who betrothed a woman with sediment [bifruma] from the beer. The owner of the beer came and found him. The owner said to him: Why don’t you give her the betrothal from this, the sharp sediments that are of better quality than the kind you chose? The brewer came before Rava to ask whether the owner’s comment indicated that he had relinquished his rights to the sediment, which would mean the woman is betrothed. Rava said to him: The Sages said that if the owner discovers that someone has taken something of his without permission and says: Go to and take the item of better quality, that it is a sign he agrees with the man’s action only with regard to teruma alone, and you did not have the right to use the sediment.

דְּתַנְיָא: כֵּיצַד אָמְרוּ: תּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה? הֲרֵי שֶׁיָּרַד לְתוֹךְ שְׂדֵה חֲבֵירוֹ וְלִיקֵּט וְתָרַם שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת, אִם חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לָאו – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.

The Gemara explains the previous statement: As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:5): When did they say that in the case where one separates teruma without the owner’s consent, his teruma is considered teruma? The baraita clarifies: In a case where there was someone who entered another’s field and gathered produce from it, and separated teruma without the owner’s permission, if the owner is concerned about his actions and view it as robbery, his teruma is not teruma, but if he is not concerned, his teruma is teruma.

וּמִנַּיִן הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ אִם חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל אִם לָאו? הֲרֵי שֶׁבָּא בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וּמְצָאוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת״ אִם נִמְצְאוּ יָפוֹת מֵהֶם – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. הָיוּ הַבְּעָלִים מְלַקְּטִים וּמוֹסִיפִים, בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.

The baraita continues: And from where would the gatherer know whether he should be concerned that the owner objects and views it as robbery or not? If the owner came and found him separating teruma and said to him: Go to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that, then if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma, since the owner is assumed to have been sincere and pleased that the other has separated teruma from his produce. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, as it may be assumed that the owner was angry at him and was speaking sarcastically. The baraita adds: If the owners were gathering and adding to the teruma he had separated, indicating that they agree to his act of separation, either way, whether or not better-quality produce was found, his teruma is considered teruma.

אֲבָל הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם כִּיסּוּפָא הוּא דַּעֲבַד, וְאֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

Rava concludes the explanation of his ruling: This halakha applies only to teruma, which is a mitzva that the owner must in any case perform. But here, in the case of the brewer who betrothed a woman with sediment from the beer, the owner acts because of embarrassment, and while he does not feel comfortable protesting, he did not in fact relinquish his rights to the sediment, and she is not betrothed.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּחֶלְקוֹ, בֵּין קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים, בֵּין קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג בֵּין מֵזִיד – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ, בְּמֵזִיד – קִידֵּשׁ.

MISHNA: With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he did so with offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not betrothed. One who betroths a woman with second tithe, whether unwittingly or intentionally, has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so unwittingly he has not betrothed her, but if he did so intentionally he has betrothed her.

וּבַהֶקְדֵּשׁ, בְּמֵזִיד – קִידֵּשׁ, וּבְשׁוֹגֵג – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – קִידֵּשׁ, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ.

And with regard to one who betroths a woman with consecrated property belonging to the Temple treasury, if he does so intentionally he has betrothed her, and if he does so unwittingly he has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says the opposite: If he does so unwittingly he has betrothed her, but if he does so intentionally he has not betrothed her.

גְּמָ׳ נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּה׳״ – לְרַבּוֹת קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁהֵן מָמוֹנוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states with regard to the obligation to bring an offering for taking a false oath concerning unlawful possession of the property of another: “If any one sin, and he commits a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). As the verse is discussing property belonging to another, the phrase “a trespass against the Lord” serves to include in the obligation of an offering a false oath with regard to possession of offerings of lesser sanctity of another person, which are the property of the owner; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the portion of an offering of lesser sanctity that the priest receives belongs to him, so he should be able to betroth a woman with it.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי – מֵחַיִּים, אֲבָל לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָה – לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא? כִּי קָא זָכוּ – מִשֻּׁלְחַן גָּבוֹהַּ קָא זָכוּ.

The Gemara rejects this: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that an offering of lesser sanctity belongs to its owner only while the animal is still alive, but after its slaughter it does not belong to the priest who receives portions from it. What is the reason for this? When the priests receive their portion after the animal has been slaughtered they receive their portion from the table of the Most High, and do not own the portion itself.

דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּחֶלְקוֹ, בֵּין קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים וּבֵין קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he used offerings of lesser sanctity, has not betrothed her. The mishna does not speak of a priest who betroths a woman with a living offering of lesser sanctity but of one who betroths with the portion of the slaughtered animal he has received. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that it is only in this case that she is not betrothed.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְאַחַר פְּטִירָתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְתַלְמִידָיו: אַל יִכָּנְסוּ תַּלְמִידֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְכָאן, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקַּנְתְּרָנִים הֵם, וְלֹא לִלְמוֹד תּוֹרָה הֵם בָּאִים אֶלָּא לְקַפְּחֵנִי בַּהֲלָכוֹת הֵם בָּאִים. דָּחַק סוֹמְכוֹס וְנִכְנַס. אָמַר לָהֶם: כָּךְ שָׁנָה לִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּחֶלְקוֹ, בֵּין קׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים וּבֵין קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים – לֹא קִידֵּשׁ.

The Sages taught: After the death of Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda said to his students: Do not let the students of Rabbi Meir enter here into our house of study, because they are vexatious [kanteranim]. And they do not come to study Torah, but rather they come to overwhelm me with halakhot. Sumakhos, a student of Rabbi Meir, pushed and entered anyway. He said to them: This is what Rabbi Meir taught me: With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of the offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he used offerings of lesser sanctity, he has not betrothed her.

כָּעַס רַבִּי יְהוּדָה (עֲלֵיהֶם). אָמַר לָהֶם: לֹא כָּךְ אָמַרְתִּי לָכֶם: אַל יִכָּנְסוּ מִתַּלְמִידֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְכָאן מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקַּנְתְּרָנִים הֵם, וְלֹא לִלְמוֹד תּוֹרָה הֵם בָּאִים אֶלָּא לְקַפְּחֵנִי בַּהֲלָכוֹת הֵם בָּאִים. וְכִי אִשָּׁה בַּעֲזָרָה מִנַּיִן?!

Upon hearing this, Rabbi Yehuda became angry with his students. He said to them: Didn’t I say this to you: Do not let the students of Rabbi Meir enter here into our house of study, because they are vexatious? And they do not come to study Torah, but rather they come to overwhelm me with halakhot. Rabbi Yehuda explained his objection to the statement of Rabbi Meir: This halakha is not relevant, as from where would a woman appear in the Temple courtyard? Women may not enter the area of the Temple courtyard where the priests eat the offerings of the most sacred order, so there is no reason to address an impossible scenario.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: יֹאמְרוּ: מֵאִיר שָׁכַב, יְהוּדָה כָּעַס, יוֹסֵי שָׁתַק – (דִּבְרֵי) תוֹרָה מָה תְּהֵא עָלֶיהָ? וְכִי אֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְקַבֵּל קִידּוּשִׁין לְבִתּוֹ בַּעֲזָרָה? וְאֵין אִשָּׁה עֲשׂוּיָה לַעֲשׂוֹת לָהּ שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ בַּעֲזָרָה? וְעוֹד: דָּחֲקָה וְנִכְנְסָה מַאי?

Rabbi Yosei, who was present, said: They will say: Meir died, Yehuda grew angry, and Yosei remained silent; what will become of the words of Torah? He said: In fact, this halakha is relevant; but isn’t it common for a man to accept betrothal for his daughter in the Temple courtyard? There is no need to give the betrothal item directly to the woman; it can be given to her father. And additionally, isn’t it common for a woman to designate an agent for herself to accept her betrothal in the courtyard? And furthermore: What would be the halakha if the woman pushed and entered? Since it is possible for her to do so, the halakha in such a case must be determined.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁנֵיהֶם מִקְרָא אֶחָד דָּרְשׁוּ: ״זֶה יִהְיֶה לְךָ מִקֹּדֶשׁ הַקֳּדָשִׁים מִן הָאֵשׁ״. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: ״לְךָ״ – וּלְכׇל צְרָכֶיךָ. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: כְּאֵשׁ. מָה אֵשׁ לַאֲכִילָה, אַף הוּא נָמֵי לַאֲכִילָה.

It is taught in a baraita that the Sages discussed the issue of a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings of the most sacred order: Rabbi Yehuda says she is betrothed, and Rabbi Yosei says she is not betrothed. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both of them derived their opinions from one verse, which states that the priests have a right to a portion of offerings of the most sacred order, but they explained it in different ways. The verse states: “This shall be yours of the most holy things, reserved from the fire” (Numbers 18:9). Rabbi Yehuda holds that the term “yours” indicates that the portion the priest receives is intended for you, i.e., a priest, and for all your needs, including betrothing a woman. And Rabbi Yosei holds that the verse compares the priest’s portion to the fire on the altar: Just as the portion burned on the fire is for the fire’s consumption, so too, the priest’s portion is also for consumption alone, and not for any other purpose.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: