נדרים מז
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ וְכוּ׳. בָּעֵי אֲבִימִי: ״קֻוֽנָּם לְבַיִת זֶה שֶׁאַתָּה נִכְנָס״, מֵת אוֹ שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ לְאַחֵר, מַהוּ? אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּתוֹ לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ, אוֹ לָא?
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one who says to another: Entering your house is konam for me, and the owner dies or sells the house, the prohibition is lifted. But if he said: Entering this house is konam for me, he remains prohibited from entering the house even after the owner dies or sells the house. Avimi raises a dilemma: If the owner of a house said: Entering this house is konam for you, and then he died or sold it to another, what is the halakha? Do we say that a person can render an item in his possession forbidden even for a time after it will leave his possession, or not?
אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר לִבְנוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאִי אַתָּה נֶהֱנֶה לִי״, וּמֵת — יִירָשֶׁנּוּ. ״בְּחַיָּיו וּבְמוֹתוֹ״, וּמֵת — לֹא יִירָשֶׁנּוּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּתוֹ לִכְשֶׁיֵּצֵא מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rava said: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Bava Kamma 108b–109a): If one says to his son: Benefiting from me is konam for you, and dies, the son still inherits from him. If, however, the father explicitly states that benefit is forbidden both in his lifetime and after his death, and dies, the son does not inherit from him. Rava suggests: Conclude from the mishna that a person can render an item in his possession forbidden even for a time after it will leave his possession. The Gemara notes: Conclude from the mishna that this is so.
תְּנַן הָתָם: ״קֻוֽנָּם פֵּירוֹת הָאֵלּוּ עָלַי״, ״קֻוֽנָּם הֵן עַל פִּי״, ״קֻוֽנָּם הֵן לְפִי״ — אָסוּר בְּחִילּוּפֵיהֶן וּבְגִידּוּלֵיהֶן.
§ We learned in a mishna there (57a): If one says: This produce is konam upon me, or: It is konam upon my mouth, or: It is konam for my mouth, he is prohibited from eating even its replacements, should they be traded or exchanged, and anything that grows from it if it is replanted.
בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: אָמַר ״קֻוֽנָּם פֵּירוֹת הָאֵלּוּ עַל פְּלוֹנִי״, מַהוּ בְּחִילּוּפֵיהֶן? מִי אָמְרִינַן גַּבֵּי דִילֵיהּ, הוֹאִיל וְאָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל עַצְמוֹ, אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָא לְעוֹלָם עַל עַצְמוֹ. גַּבֵּי חֲבֵירוֹ, הוֹאִיל וְאֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל חֲבֵירוֹ, אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָא לְעוֹלָם עַל חֲבֵירוֹ.
Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one said: This produce is konam for so-and-so, what is the halakha with regard to their replacements? Do we say: With regard to himself, since a person can render another’s produce forbidden for himself, though it is not presently in his possession, so too, a person can render an entity that has not yet come into the world forbidden to himself? Is this why the replacement produce and anything that grows from it is forbidden to him, even if it did not yet exist when he took the vow? If so, with regard to another, since a person cannot render another’s produce forbidden to another, i.e., to that owner himself, similarly one cannot render an entity that has not yet come into the world forbidden to another. The produce’s replacements would therefore be permitted to him.
אוֹ דִילְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּחִילּוּפִין כְּגִידּוּלִין דָּמֵי, לָא שְׁנָא הוּא וְלָא שְׁנָא חֲבֵרוֹ.
Or perhaps the prohibition on replacement produce in the mishna is due to the fact that replacements of the produce are viewed as being like that which grows from them? They are both forbidden because they derive from the forbidden produce. If this is the case, it is no different for him and it is no different for another. Neither may derive benefit from the replacements.
אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי נֶהֱנֶה לִיךְ״, לוֹוָה וּבַעְלֵי חוֹבִין בָּאִין וְנִפְרָעִין. מַאי טַעְמָא בַּעְלֵי חוֹבִין נִפְרָעִין — לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּחִילּוּפִין לָאו כְּגִידּוּלִין דָּמֵי?
Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who says to his wife: Benefiting from me is konam for you, she may nevertheless borrow money to sustain herself, and the creditors can come and collect her debts from her husband. What is the reason that the creditors can collect from the husband? Is it not because she benefits only indirectly, and it must be that replacements, i.e., the creditors’ money, are not like that which grows from the original item?
אָמַר רָבָא: דִּילְמָא לְכַתְּחִילָּה הוּא דְּלָא, וְאִי עֲבַד — עֲבַד.
Rava said: This is not proof: Perhaps it is the case that one should not benefit from replacements ab initio, but if one did it, it is done after the fact. Since the wife lacks any other means to support herself, the case is considered to be after the fact, and it is permitted for her to benefit indirectly. Still, replacements of an item are considered to be like that which grows from it ab initio.
אֶלָּא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּעׇרְלָה — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מְכָרָן וְקִידֵּשׁ בִּדְמֵיהֶן — הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. הָכָא נָמֵי: לְכַתְּחִילָּה הוּא דְּלָא, וְאִי עֲבַד — עֲבַד.
Rather, come and hear a proof from another mishna (Kiddushin 56b): With regard to one who betroths a woman with fruit of orla, i.e., fruit of the first three years of a tree’s growth, from which it is forbidden to benefit, she is not betrothed because the fruits have no value. Betrothal can be performed only with an object worth at least one peruta. But if he sold them and betrothed her with the money he received, she is betrothed. Evidently, replacements of a forbidden item are permitted. The Gemara responds: Here also, one should not benefit from the replacement items given in exchange for the orla ab initio, but if one did it, it is done after the fact. Replacements of an item may still be considered to be like that which grows from it ab initio.
מַתְנִי׳ ״הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ חֵרֶם״ — הַמּוּדָּר אָסוּר. ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ עָלַי חֵרֶם״ — הַנּוֹדֵר אָסוּר. ״הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ וְאַתְּ עָלַי״ — שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִין, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם מוּתָּרִין בְּדָבָר שֶׁל עוֹלֵי בָּבֶל,
MISHNA: If someone says to another: I am hereby forbidden to you like an item dedicated to the Temple, then the one prohibited by the vow is prohibited from benefiting from the possessions of the one who took the vow. If someone says: You are hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, then the one who took the vow is prohibited from benefiting from the possessions of the other. If he says: I am hereby forbidden to you and you are hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, both are prohibited from benefiting from the possessions of the other. But it is permitted for both of them to benefit from the objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia, i.e., common property of the nation as a whole, which is not considered to be the property of any individual.
