נדרים עו
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אִם מַטְבִּילִין כְּלִי טָמֵא לִיטָּהֵר, יַטְבִּילוּ כְּלִי לִכְשֶׁיִּטְמָא לִיטָּהֵר? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ חָיְילִין.
The Gemara rejects this conclusion and refers back to the baraita. Say the latter clause of that baraita: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: If one immerses an impure vessel to purify it, shall one immerse a vessel in advance so that when it will become impure it will then be purified? Learn from this clause of the baraita that according to Rabbi Eliezer, vows nullified preemptively take effect momentarily and are then immediately nullified. The Rabbis’ objection is that according to Rabbi Eliezer, prior immersion should purify an item that momentarily became impure.
אָמְרִי: רַבָּנַן לָא קָיְימִי לְהוֹן בְּטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְהָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: מַאי סְבִירָא לָךְ? אִי סְבִירָא לָךְ דְּחָיְילִין וּבָטְלִין — תִּהְוֵי כְּלִי תְּיוּבְתָּךְ, אִי לָא סְבִירָא לָךְ דְּחָיְילִין — תִּהְוֵי מִקְוֶה תְּיוּבְתָּךְ.
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: One could say that the Rabbis could not determine the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, and this is what they said to him: What do you hold? If you hold that preemptively nullified vows take effect momentarily and are then nullified, then the example of a vessel will be your refutation, i.e., will serve to refute your opinion. If you do not hold that they take effect, but rather that they do not take effect at all, then the example of a ritual bath will be your refutation.
תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: וּמָה זְרָעִים טְמֵאִים, כֵּיוָן שֶׁזְּרָעָן בְּקַרְקַע טְהוֹרִין, זְרוּעִין וְעוֹמְדִים — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לָא חָיְילִין.
Come and hear: Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And just as ritually impure seeds, once one has sown them in the ground, become pure, then with regard to those which are already sown and then come into contact with impurity, should they not all the more so be pure? Similarly, vows that have been preemptively nullified should be nullified, since a husband can nullify vows after they have been taken. Learn from this baraita that according to Rabbi Eliezer preemptively nullified vows do not take effect at all, just as seeds that were already sown do not become impure at all.
וְרַבָּנַן לָא דָּרְשִׁי קַל וָחוֹמֶר? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: יָכוֹל יִמְכּוֹר אָדָם אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה? אָמְרַתְּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר: מְכוּרָה כְּבָר — יוֹצְאָה, אֵינָהּ מְכוּרָה — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא תִּימָּכֵר?
The Gemara comments: And the Rabbis, do they not teach halakhot based upon an a fortiori inference of this sort? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Can a person sell his daughter as a maidservant when she is a young woman? You can say an a fortiori inference to show that he cannot: A maidservant who was already sold goes free upon becoming a young woman; with regard to one who has not been sold, is it not logical that she cannot be sold once she already is a young woman? This baraita shows that the Rabbis do utilize similar a fortiori inferences.
אִין, בְּעָלְמָא דָּרְשִׁי קַל וָחוֹמֶר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״. אֶת שֶׁבָּא לִכְלַל הָקֵם — בָּא לִכְלַל הָפֵר, אֶת שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לִכְלַל הָקֵם — לֹא בָּא לִכְלַל הָפֵר.
The Gemara answers: Yes, generally they do teach halakhot based upon an a fortiori inference of this type, but here it is different, as the verse states: “Her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14). The Rabbis interpret this to mean: That which has become eligible for ratification, i.e., a vow that she has already taken, has become eligible for nullification. However, that which has not become eligible for ratification, i.e., a vow she has not yet taken, has not become eligible for nullification.
מַתְנִי׳ הֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כׇּל הַיּוֹם. יֵשׁ בַּדָּבָר לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחֲמִיר
MISHNA: The nullification of vows can be performed all day on the day on which the vow was heard. There is in this matter both a leniency, extending the nullification period, and a stricture, curtailing that period.
כֵּיצַד? נָדְרָה בְּלֵילֵי שַׁבָּת — יָפֵר בְּלֵילֵי שַׁבָּת וּבְיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת עַד שֶׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ. נָדְרָה עִם חֲשֵׁכָה — מֵפֵר עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ, שֶׁאִם חָשְׁכָה וְלֹא הֵפֵר — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר,
How so? If a woman took a vow on Shabbat evening, her father or husband can nullify the vow on Shabbat evening, and on Shabbat day until dark. This is an example of extending the nullification period. However, if she took a vow with nightfall approaching, her father or husband can nullify the vow only until nightfall, since, if it became dark and he had not yet nullified her vow, he cannot nullify it anymore. This is an example of a curtailed nullification period.
גְּמָ׳ תַּנְיָא: הֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כׇּל הַיּוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמְרוּ: מֵעֵת לְעֵת. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״בְּיוֹם שׇׁמְעוֹ״.
GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita: The nullification of vows can be performed all day on the day on which the vow was heard. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: A vow can be nullified for a twenty-four-hour period from the time it was heard. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna? The Gemara answers: Since the verse states: “But if her husband make them null and void on the day that he hears them” (Numbers 30:13), he derives that the husband can nullify his wife’s vow only until the end of the day on which he hears the vow.
וְרַבָּנַן מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ — דִּכְתִיב: ״מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם״.
The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, what is their reason? The Gemara answers: It is written: “From day to day” (Numbers 30:15), which indicates that a vow can be nullified from a particular hour on one day until the same hour on the following day.
וּלְתַנָּא קַמָּא, הָא כְּתִיב ״מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם״! אִיצְטְרִיךְ. דְּאִי ״בְּיוֹם שׇׁמְעוֹ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא בִּימָמָא — אִין, בְּלֵילְיָא — לָא, כְּתִיב ״מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם״.
The Gemara asks: And according to the first tanna, isn’t it written: “From day to day”? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary, as if it had said only “on the day that he hears them,” I would say that during the day, yes, he can nullify vows, but at night he is not able to. Therefore, it is written: “From day to day,” to teach that nullification can be performed even between one day and the next, i.e., night.
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם״, הָא כְּתִיב ״בְּיוֹם שׇׁמְעוֹ״! אִיצְטְרִיךְ, דְּאִי כְּתִיב ״מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא מֵחַד בְּשַׁבָּא לְחַד בְּשַׁבָּא לֵיפַר לָהּ, כְּתִיב ״בְּיוֹם שׇׁמְעוֹ״.
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said that “from day to day” indicates a twenty-four-hour period for nullification, isn’t it written: “On the day that he hears them?” The Gemara explains here, too: That verse was necessary, as if it had written only “from day to day,” I would say that he can nullify a vow for her until the same day in the following week, i.e., he can nullify her vow during the entire period from one Sunday to the next Sunday. Therefore, it is written: “On the day that he hears them” to teach that nullification is limited to a period of a single day of twenty-four hours.
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פַּזִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּאוֹתוֹ הַזּוּג. לֵוִי סָבַר לְמִיעְבַּד כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב, הָכִי אָמַר חֲבִיבִי: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּאוֹתוֹ הַזּוּג.
Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is not in accordance with that pair [zug], Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, who hold that one has an entire twenty-four-hour period to nullify vows. Rather, one can nullify only on that day, as stated in the mishna. The Gemara relates: Levi thought to act in accordance with the opinion of those two tanna’im. Rav said to him: So said my uncle [ḥavivi], Rabbi Ḥiyya: The halakha is not in accordance with that pair.
חִיָּיא בַּר רַב שָׁדֵי גִּירָא וּבָדֵיק. רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא יָתֵיב וְקָאֵים.
The Gemara relates that when a case of dissolving a vow was brought before Ḥiyya bar Rav, he would shoot an arrow [gira] and examine the vow at the same time. In other words, he would not examine the case in great depth, but would immediately dissolve it. Similarly, Rabba bar Rav Huna would sit to review the vow and stand immediately, without conducting a comprehensive examination.
