פסחים כה

פסחים כה

מָה לְעׇרְלָה שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר — תֹּאמַר בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר! חָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח יוֹכִיחַ — שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר, וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה.

The Gemara rejects this inference: What comparison can be made to orla, which is more stringent than meat in milk, as it never had a time when it was fit? Can you say the same with regard to meat in milk, which had a time when it was fit? Unlike orla fruits, which were prohibited from the beginning of their existence, both meat and milk were permitted on their own before they were cooked together. Therefore, the Gemara brings other proofs: Let leavened bread on Passover prove that this issue is not a factor, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

מָה לְחָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח — שֶׁכֵּן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, תֹּאמַר בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁאֵינוֹ עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת! כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם יוֹכִיחוּ, שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת — וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה.

The Gemara rejects this: What comparison can be made to leavened bread on Passover, which is a stringent prohibition, as one who eats it is punished with karet? Can you say the same with regard to one who eats meat in milk, who is not punished with karet? The Gemara answers: Let the case of diverse kinds planted in the vineyard prove that this is not relevant, as one who violates that prohibition is not punished with karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the resulting mixtures.

וְאִם אִיתָא, נִיפְרוֹךְ: מָה לְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם — שֶׁכֵּן לוֹקִין עֲלֵיהֶן אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא כְּדֶרֶךְ הֲנָאָתָן.

The Gemara returns to the issue of Abaye’s statement with regard to the unique stringency of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard: And if it is so that one is flogged for deriving benefit from diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, even if one derives benefit from them in an unusual manner, we can challenge this last proof: How can one compare meat in milk to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, one is flogged even if he derives benefit from them in an unusual manner?

וְאַבָּיֵי, ״תֹּאמַר״ בְּמַאי?! תֹּאמַר בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁאֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו אֶלָּא דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָתוֹ — אַטּוּ בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב אֲכִילָה כְּתִיבָה בֵּיהּ?!

And how would Abaye respond to this question? When one draws this challenge to its logical conclusion with the phrase: Can you say, and explains in detail how the prohibition of meat in milk differs from that of diverse kinds in a vineyard, with regard to what difference would the challenge be raised? You may say that with regard to meat in milk one is flogged only for deriving benefit in the usual manner, as opposed to the halakha with regard to diverse kinds, according to which one is flogged even for deriving benefit in an unusual manner. However, is that to say that the term eating is written in the Torah with regard to meat in milk? The basis for this halakha with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard is the lack of the term eating in the verse; however, the prohibition of meat in milk is also missing that term. Therefore, there are no grounds for this challenge: If the lack of the word eating leads to the conclusion that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner, logically that punishment should apply to both diverse kinds and meat in milk.

וְאִידַּךְ דְּקָא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ! סָבַר, לְהָכִי קָא גָּמַר מִנְּבֵילָה. מָה נְבֵילָה דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָתָהּ — אַף בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who raised this objection, holds that for this reason Isi ben Yehuda derives this aspect of the prohibition from the case of an animal carcass. Just as with regard to an animal carcass one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner, as the verse that prohibits it uses the term eating, so too, with regard to meat in milk, one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner. Despite what is written in the Gemara, the fact that one is flogged only for deriving benefit from the animal in the usual manner is not derived from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal but from tereifa, an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months. With regard to tereifa it is written: “And you shall be holy men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30). From the fact that one may cast it to the dogs it can be derived that one may derive benefit in any manner other than the usual manner, i.e., eating.

וְאַבָּיֵי: לְהָכִי לֹא כָּתַב אֲכִילָה בְּגוּפוֹ, לוֹמַר שֶׁלּוֹקִין עָלָיו אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא כְּדֶרֶךְ הֲנָאָתוֹ.

And Abaye holds that for this reason it did not write the term eating in the verse itself with regard to the prohibition of meat in milk: In order to say that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner.

וְלִיפְרוֹךְ: מָה לְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר! אָמַר רַבִּי אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם עִיקָּרָן נֶאֱסָרִין, הוֹאִיל וְהָיְתָה לָהֶן שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר קוֹדֶם הַשְׁרָשָׁה.

The Gemara continues. Let Isi ben Yehuda challenge: What comparison can be made to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as the forbidden produce had no time that it was fit because the prohibition came into effect as soon as the produce began to grow? Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said: Apparently, since this question was not asked, that is to say that with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, their roots are forbidden as well, including the seeds and saplings from which the mature plants grow. Therefore, no challenge can be raised, since they had a time when they were fit, before taking root.

מֵתִיב רַב שְׁמַעְיָה: הַמַּעֲבִיר עָצִיץ נָקוּב בַּכֶּרֶם, אִם הוֹסִיף מָאתַיִם — אָסוּר. הוֹסִיף אִין, לֹא הוֹסִיף לָא!

Rav Shemaya raised an objection based on what was taught in a mishna: With regard to one who transfers a perforated pot with seeds in it into a vineyard, if the size of the seeds growing in the pot increases by one two-hundredth of their previous size, such that the permitted portion is not two hundred times the forbidden, newly grown portion, then the mixture is prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard. The forbidden portion is nullified only if it comprises less than one two-hundredth of the mixture. The Gemara reads precisely: If it increases, yes, it is prohibited; if it does not increase, no, it is not prohibited. Apparently, only additional growth is prohibited, and not the seeds themselves.

אָמַר רָבָא, תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי: כְּתִיב ״הַזָּרַע״ וּכְתִיב ״הַמְּלֵאָה״, הָא כֵּיצַד? זָרוּעַ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ — בְּהַשְׁרָשָׁה. זָרוּעַ וּבָא, הוֹסִיף — אִין, לֹא הוֹסִיף — לָא.

Rava said: Two verses are written about this halakha, i.e., two separate terms in one verse indicate two separate prohibitions. The verse states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the fullness of the seed which you have sown be forfeited together with the increase of the vineyard” (Deuteronomy 22:9). It is written: “The seed,” indicating that it is prohibited once it is planted and takes root, and it is written: “The fullness,” indicating that it is prohibited only if it has grown. How can these two terms be reconciled? If it were planted initially in the vineyard, it becomes prohibited immediately upon taking root. If it were planted elsewhere and brought into the vineyard later, such as in a perforated pot, then the following distinction applies: If its size increases in the vineyard, yes, it is prohibited; if its size does not increase, no, it is not prohibited.

אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בַּכֹּל מִתְרַפְּאִין, חוּץ מֵעֲצֵי אֲשֵׁירָה. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי נֵימָא דְּאִיכָּא סַכָּנָה — אֲפִילּוּ עֲצֵי אֲשֵׁירָה נָמֵי! וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא סַכָּנָה — אֲפִילּוּ כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה נָמֵי לָא?!

The Gemara discusses another matter pertaining to deriving benefit. Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit: One may heal oneself with any substance except for wood of a tree designated for idolatry [asheira]. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case in which there is danger to a person’s life, then it is permitted to use even the wood of an asheira. And if it is a situation where there is no danger, then all the prohibited substances in the Torah also may not be used, as one may not derive benefit from them.

לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיכָּא סַכָּנָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי עֲצֵי אֲשֵׁירָה לָא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אִם נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״. וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״?

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is danger, and even so, one my not derive benefit from the wood of an asheira. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,” why is it stated: “And with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it stated: “With all your soul”? One of these statements appears to be superfluous.

אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ: אִם יֵשׁ אָדָם שֶׁגּוּפוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִמָּמוֹנוֹ — לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״. וְיֵשׁ אָדָם שֶׁמָּמוֹנוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִגּוּפוֹ — לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״.

Rather, it is to tell you that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: “With all your soul.” The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name. And there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: “With all your might.” Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase: “With all your might,” to mean: With all your possessions. Apparently, there are circumstances in which a person must be prepared to die rather than be healed with a prohibited substance.

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בַּכֹּל מִתְרַפְּאִין, חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְגִילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת

When Ravin came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may heal oneself with any substance from which one may not derive benefit, except for idolatry or forbidden sexual relations

וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים.

or bloodshed.

עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. גִּילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה״. וְכִי מָה עִנְיַן רוֹצֵחַ אֵצֶל נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה?

That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context?

הֲרֵי זֶה בָּא לְלַמֵּד, וְנִמְצָא לָמֵד. מַקִּישׁ רוֹצֵחַ לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה: מָה נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה — נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילָהּ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ, אַף רוֹצֵחַ — נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ. וְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה מֵרוֹצֵחַ: מָה רוֹצֵחַ — יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר, אַף נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה — תֵּהָרֵג וְאַל תַּעֲבוֹר.

Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations.

וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים גּוּפֵיהּ מְנָלַן? סְבָרָא הוּא: כִּי הָהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מָרֵי דּוּרַאי אֲמַר לִי: זִיל קַטְלֵיהּ לִפְלָנְיָא, וְאִי לָא — קָטְלִינָא לָךְ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִיקְטְלוּךְ וְלָא תִּיקְטוֹל, מַאי חָזֵית דִּדְמָא דִידָךְ סוּמָּק טְפֵי? דִּילְמָא דְּמָא דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא סוּמָּק טְפֵי.

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.

מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרָבִינָא דְּשָׁיֵיף לַהּ לִבְרַתֵּיהּ בְּגוּהַרְקֵי דְעׇרְלָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵימוֹר דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן בִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה, שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה מִי אֲמוּר?

The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי אִישָּׁתָא צְמִירְתָּא נָמֵי כִּשְׁעַת הַסַּכָּנָה דָּמְיָא. אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵּי דֶּרֶךְ הֲנָאָה קָא עָבֵידְנָא?

Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter’s life was not in danger.

אִיתְּמַר: הֲנָאָה הַבָּאָה לוֹ לְאָדָם בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת, וְרָבָא אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה.

The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one’s circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited.

אֶפְשָׁר וְקָא מִיכַּוֵּין, לָא אֶפְשָׁר וְקָמִיכַּוֵין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר. לָא אֶפְשָׁר וְלָא מִיכַּוֵּין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי דְּאֶפְשָׁר וְלָא מִיכַּוֵּין.

The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it.

וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין אָסוּר — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר. כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר. אַבָּיֵי כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וְרָבָא אָמַר: עַד כָּאן לָא קָא אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר — לָא.

The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one’s action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אֶפְשָׁר וְלָא מִיכַּוֵּין — הַיְינוּ פְּלוּגְתַּיְיהוּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. לָא אֶפְשָׁר וְלָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי, דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר וְקָא מִיכַּוֵּין. וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָזֵיל בָּתַר כַּוּוֹנָה — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: לָא שְׁנָא מִתְכַּוֵּין וְלָא שְׁנָא שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, אֶפְשָׁר אָסוּר.

Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one’s intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited.

אַבָּיֵי כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted.