פסחים ס

פסחים ס

אוֹ דִילְמָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת תְּנַן, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן — הָנֵי מִילֵּי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אֲבָל בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת — מוֹדֶה דְּמִיפְּסִיל.

Or perhaps the mishna meant to teach a case of two rites. During the first rite, one had a particular intent, and during the second rite he had a different intent. Then, even according to Rabbi Meir, who said that in general we hold one accountable for the first expression, this rule applies only in one rite, but in two rites even he concedes that it disqualifies. Since the second statement was made during a different rite, it too is significant.

אָמְרִי: אַהֵיָיא? אִי נֵימָא אַשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ, בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת בֵּין בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, בֵּין לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — אִיפְּסִיל לֵיהּ מִקַּמָּיְיתָא, דְּהָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי נָמֵי, אַף בִּגְמַר דְּבָרָיו אָדָם נִתְפָּס אִית לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא: אַלִּשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — מַאי?

They said: To which part of the mishna does this discussion refer? If we say that the discussion pertains to the case in the mishna of slaughtering an offering first for a different purpose and then for its own purpose, then whether these intentions are verbalized during one rite or during two rites, whether according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir or according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, the offering is disqualified from the first statement, as also Rabbi Yosei holds that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement. That does not mean that the final statement is primary but that it too has value and complements the previous one. Therefore, since one initially intended to offer the Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it was immediately disqualified. Rather, the question is concerning the case of slaughtering an animal first for its own purpose and then for a different purpose; what exactly are the parameters of that case?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא כִּדְקָתָנֵי, לְמָה לִי עַד דִּמְחַשֵּׁב לְכוּלְּהוּ? מִקַּמָּיְיתָא אִיפְּסִיל לֵיהּ!

The Gemara cites a series of sources in order to resolve this question. Come and hear a resolution to the question from what is taught in the mishna: A Paschal lamb that one sacrificed for a different purpose, and he received the blood, and carried it to the altar, and sprinkled it for a different purpose, is disqualified. This needs clarification: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that the case is exactly as it was taught, that these four rites are all performed for a different purpose, why do I need to say that he intended to perform all of them, i.e., the slaughter, receiving of the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it upon the altar, for a different purpose? The offering has been disqualified from the first improper intention during slaughter.

אֶלָּא לָאו, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אִי נָמֵי שְׁחָטוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. אִי נָמֵי שְׁחָטוֹ וְקִבֵּל וְהִלֵּךְ לִשְׁמוֹ, וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ שְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

Rather, is this not what the mishna is teaching: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it for its own purpose, but received the blood, and carried the blood, and sprinkled the blood for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it, and received the blood, and carried the blood for its own purpose, but sprinkled the blood for a different purpose, in all these situations the offering is disqualified? If so, it is a case of different intentions in two rites, and the mishna can also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת — הַיְינוּ רֵישָׁא! אֶלָּא לָאו, בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אַף בִּגְמַר דְּבָרָיו אָדָם נִתְפָּס.

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: For its own purpose and for a different purpose. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that one had these two intentions during two different rites, that is precisely the meaning of the first clause and there is no need to repeat it. Rather, must we not say that in this part of the mishna, one had both intentions during one rite, and the mishna is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement?

לָא, לְעוֹלָם בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְרֵישָׁא — דְּקָאֵי בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּשְׁחִיטָה, אִי נָמֵי, קָאֵי בִּזְרִיקָה וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בִּזְרִיקָא.

This proof is refuted: No, actually it is possible to explain that even the latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case in which one has conflicting intentions during two different rites, and the difference between the first clause and the latter clause of the mishna is as follows: The first clause is referring to a case in which one is standing at the time of the slaughter and thinking about slaughtering the animal as a different offering; alternatively, he is standing at the time of the sprinkling of the blood and thinking about sprinkling for a different purpose.

סֵיפָא — דְּקָאֵי בִּשְׁחִיטָה וְקָחָשֵׁיב בִּזְרִיקָה, דְּאָמַר: הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפֶּסַח לִשְׁמוֹ לִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ. וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְהַיְינוּ בַּעְיָא דְּרַב פָּפָּא.

The latter clause of the mishna, on the other hand, is referring to a case in which one is standing at the time of the slaughter and thinking about sprinkling for a different purpose. For example, where he said: I am hereby slaughtering the Paschal lamb for its own purpose, but my intent is to sprinkle its blood for a different purpose. And the mishna teaches us a new halakha, that one can intend from one rite to another rite, meaning that one can disqualify an offering through an improper intention about an upcoming rite while performing an earlier rite. And this was the question raised by Rav Pappa on a different occasion. He asked if intent during one rite concerning the performance of a different rite can disqualify an offering.

תָּא שְׁמַע: אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ פָּסוּל. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, הַשְׁתָּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ אָמְרַתְּ פָּסוּל, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ מִיבַּעְיָא?!

Since our question has not been resolved, it is necessary to bring another proof: Come and hear that which is taught in the last clause of the mishna: Or for a different purpose and for its own purpose, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara analyzes this statement: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that it speaks about two rites, there is a difficulty: Now that you have already said that if the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be for its own purpose, and then performed a rite with the intention that it be for a different purpose, the Paschal lamb is disqualified, is it necessary to say that it is disqualified when the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be for a different purpose, and then performed a rite with the intention that it be for its own purpose? It is obvious that the offering is disqualified immediately with the first expression of intent.

אֶלָּא לָאו, בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת. וּמִדְּסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת — רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת!

Rather, isn’t the mishna addressing a case in which the priest has two intentions during one rite? And since the last clause of the mishna talks about one rite, the earlier clause of the mishna must also speak about one rite, and the mishna is according to Rabbi Yosei.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וּבְדִין הוּא דְּלָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ, וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, תְּנָא נָמֵי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וְלִשְׁמוֹ.

The Gemara refutes this proof: No, actually it is possible to explain that the last clause speaks about two rites, and by right it was not necessary to include this case, as it could have been inferred from the previous case. It was included for stylistic considerations: Since the mishna taught the case in which the rites are performed for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it also taught the case in which the rites are performed for a different purpose and for its own purpose.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו, וְשֶׁלֹּא לִמְנוּיָו, לַעֲרֵלִים וְלִטְמֵאִין — פָּסוּל. הָכָא פְּשִׁיטָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, וּמִדְּסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת — רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בָּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת!

The Gemara again attempts to bring a proof: Come and hear that which is taught in a different mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be for those who cannot eat it, i.e., for people who physically cannot consume it; or for those who were not registered for it, i.e., for people who did not register in advance for this particular offering; or for uncircumcised or ritually impure people, whom the Torah forbids from consuming the Paschal lamb, it is disqualified. Here, in the mishna cited, it is obvious that one had this intent during one rite, as the mishna explicitly states that he had this intent during the slaughtering. And since the latter clause, which is the next mishna, speaks about one rite, the first clause, which is the current mishna, must also speak about one rite, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתָא וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא: סֵיפָא — בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, רֵישָׁא — אִי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אִי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

The Gemara refutes this proof. Are the two cases comparable? Need they be exactly parallel? Perhaps this case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The latter clause, the next mishna, speaks about one rite, whereas the first clause, the current mishna, speaks either about one rite and is not according to Rabbi Meir or about two rites and is even according to Rabbi Meir.

תָּא שְׁמַע: לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — כָּשֵׁר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְטַעְמָא דְּחַשֵּׁיב בִּזְרִיקָה, דְּאֵין מַחְשְׁבֶת אוֹכְלִין בִּזְרִיקָה —

The Gemara further proposes: Come and hear a solution based on what was taught later in that other mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid. This ruling must be clarified: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that one had two intentions during two different rites, e.g., he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and sprinkled the blood for those who cannot eat it, then the reason that the sacrifice is valid is that he had the disqualifying intention at the time of the sprinkling, which does not invalidate the offering because there is no intent concerning those who can eat it during the sprinkling. That is, intent to feed the Paschal lamb to those who are unable to eat it invalidates the offering only during the slaughter but not during the sprinkling.

הָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, כְּגוֹן בִּשְׁחִיטָה דְּמַהְנְיָא בַּיהּ מַחְשְׁבֶת אוֹכְלִין — פָּסוּל, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן מִקְצָת אוֹכְלִין לָא פָּסְלָא!

But if one had both intentions during one rite, such as the slaughter, during which intent with regard to those who will eat the offering is effective, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, this conclusion is difficult, for we maintain that if only some of those who are to eat the Paschal lamb are unable to do so, such as in this case, the offering is not disqualified.

אֶלָּא לָאו: בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, וּמִדְּסֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת — רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת!

Rather, doesn’t it refer to a case in which one had both intentions during one rite, and nevertheless it is valid? And since the latter clause speaks about one rite, the first clause, the current mishna, must also speak about one rite, and yet the offering is disqualified, because even the conclusion of one’s statement is significant, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתָא וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא. סֵיפָא בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, וְרֵישָׁא אוֹ בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אוֹ בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

The Gemara refutes this proof as it refuted the previous one: Are the two cases comparable? Perhaps this case is as it is and that case is as it is. There is no reason to equate the cases, as it is possible to say that the latter clause speaks about one rite, whereas the first clause, the current mishna, speaks either about one rite or about two rites. Therefore, there is no conclusive resolution to Rav Pappa’s question.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: פֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָתֵי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ מִידֵי לִשְׁמוֹ וּמַכְשִׁיר לֵיהּ, אוֹ לָא?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year other than the eve of Passover for its own purpose and for a different purpose, what is its status? The Gemara clarifies the two sides of the issue: Does the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose come and nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose and thereby make it valid, or not? The law is that a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered for a different purpose at a time other than Passover eve attains the status of a peace-offering and is therefore valid. The question raised here is whether or not partial intent to slaughter the animal as a peace-offering rather than as a Paschal lamb suffices to validate the offering.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר, אַמְרִיתָא לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הוֹאִיל וְלִשְׁמוֹ מַכְשִׁירוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ מַכְשִׁירוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּזְמַנּוֹ: מָה לִשְׁמוֹ הַמַּכְשִׁירוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ — אֵין מוֹצִיאוֹ מִידֵי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אַף שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ הַמַּכְשִׁירוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּזְמַנּוֹ — אֵין מוֹצִיאוֹ מִידֵי לִשְׁמוֹ, וּפָסוּל.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: I raised this question in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya and expressed my opinion: Since intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose validates it at its proper time, i.e., on the eve of Passover, and intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose validates it not at its proper time, i.e., the rest of the year, there is room to equate the two situations. Just as intent for its own purpose, which validates it at its proper time, does not nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose, i.e., if one intends to offer the sacrifice both for its own purpose and for a different purpose it is disqualified, so too, intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose, which validates it not at its proper time, does not nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose, and it is disqualified. It can be concluded from here that whenever one’s thoughts concerning an offering are a combination of validating and disqualifying intentions, the offering is disqualified.

וַאֲמַר לִי: לֹא! אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֵג בְּכׇל הַזְּבָחִים, תֹּאמַר בְּלִשְׁמוֹ שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּכׇל הַזְּבָחִים אֶלָּא בַּפֶּסַח בִּלְבַד.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said to me: No, this reasoning is not to be relied upon. If you say this rule concerning the intent to offer a Paschal lamb applies when it is sacrificed for a different purpose, it is because this disqualification applies to all offerings, as slaughtering an offering for a purpose other than its own disqualifies all offerings to one extent or another. Therefore, intent for the sacrifice’s own purpose does not nullify intent for a different purpose. But can you necessarily say the same thing about the intent to slaughter a Paschal lamb for its own purpose at other times of the year, a disqualification that does not apply to all offerings but to the Paschal lamb alone? Only the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is slaughtered for its own purpose not at its proper time, and therefore intent for a different purpose can indeed nullify intent for its own purpose.

מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רָבָא: פֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — כָּשֵׁר. דְּהָא סְתָמוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ קָאֵי, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, כִּי שָׁחֵיט לֵיהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — כָּשֵׁר,

Rav Dimi’s argument having been refuted, the Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about Rav Dimi’s question? Rava said: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with the intent that it be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is valid. The reason for this is as follows: In an otherwise undetermined situation, the animal stands to be offered for its own purpose, for one did not rescind its status as a Paschal lamb either verbally or by intent. But nevertheless, when he slaughters it for a different purpose, it is valid.

אַלְמָא: אָתֵי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ מִידֵי לִשְׁמוֹ. כִּי שָׁחֵיט נָמֵי לִשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ — אָתֵי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ מִידֵי לִשְׁמוֹ.

Apparently, then, the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose comes and nullifies the presumed intent to offer it for its own purpose; the statement that one makes to slaughter the offering as a peace-offering rather than as a Paschal lamb has the power to remove it from its previous status as a Paschal lamb. Accordingly, we should also say that when the priest slaughters the animal both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the intent to offer it for a different purpose carries more weight and comes and nullifies the stated intent to offer it for its own purpose.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה לְרָבָא: דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר מֵהֵיכָא דְּלָא אָמַר. דְּהָא לְאוֹכְלָיו וְשֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו כָּשֵׁר, וְכׇל הֵיכָא דְּשָׁחֵיט לֵיהּ שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו לְחוֹדֵיהּ — פָּסוּל, וְאַמַּאי? הָא סְתָמָא לְאוֹכְלָיו קָאֵי. אֶלָּא שָׁאנֵי הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר מֵהֵיכָא דְּלָא אָמַר. הָכִי נָמֵי, שָׁאנֵי הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר מֵהֵיכָא דְּלָא אָמַר!

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: Perhaps a case where one explicitly said that he was slaughtering the offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose is different from a case where he did not say this. The proof of this is that if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it, it is valid, but wherever he slaughters it only for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is disqualified. Now, why should this be? Surely in an otherwise undetermined situation, the animal stands to be offered for those who can eat it. This indicates that presumed intention cannot be equated with intention that is explicitly verbalized. Rather, a case where one explicitly said that he is slaughtering the animal for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it is different from a case where he did not say this. So too, a case where he explicitly said that he is slaughtering the offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose is different from a case where he did not say this.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵי אִירְיָא? בִּשְׁלָמָא הָתָם כַּמָּה דְּלָא עָקַר לֵיהּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה — סְתָמֵיהּ וַדַּאי לִשְׁמוֹ קָאֵי. אֶלָּא הָכָא — סְתָמֵיהּ לְאוֹכְלָיו קָאֵי?!

Rava said to him: Are the two cases comparable? Granted, there, with regard to the Paschal lamb and the purpose for which it is offered, as long as one did not uproot the animal’s status as a Paschal lamb at the time of slaughter, in an otherwise undetermined situation, it certainly stands to be offered for its own purpose; its standing as a Paschal lamb can be changed only if it is explicitly designated as something else. But here, with regard to a Paschal lamb and the people for whom it is slaughtered, in an otherwise undetermined situation, does it stand to be slaughtered for those who are registered to eat it?

דִּילְמָא מִימַּשְׁכִי הָנֵי וְאָתֵי אַחֲרִינֵי וּמִימְּנִי עִלָּוֵיהּ, (אַחֲרִינֵי) דִּתְנַן: נִמְנִין וּמוֹשְׁכִין אֶת יְדֵיהֶם מִמֶּנּוּ, עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁחַט.

This is not the case, for in the instance of every Paschal lamb, there is the possibility that perhaps these will withdraw and others will come and register for it. For we learned in a mishna: People can register for a particular Paschal lamb and withdraw from it until it is slaughtered. Therefore, it is possible that this Paschal lamb will not be suitable for its subscribers at the time of its slaughter, and it makes sense to distinguish between a situation in which one explicitly stated that it is for people who can eat it, in which case it is valid even if he intended it also for people who cannot eat it, and a situation in which he did not make an explicit statement. This is different from slaughtering a Paschal lamb not in its time, for in that case the offering maintains its previous status as a Paschal lamb until its status is explicitly changed through a verbal statement.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: פֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים, מַהוּ? שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים כְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ דָּמֵי — וּמַכְשַׁיר לֵיהּ, אוֹ לָא?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with a change of owner, i.e., he slaughtered it not for the sake of its original owner, what is its status? Is a change of owner like a change of sanctity? A Paschal lamb whose sanctity is changed to that of a peace-offering now has the status of a peace-offering, and so too, a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered not for the sake of its original owner, an intention that at its proper time would disqualify the sacrifice, now has the status of a peace-offering. And it validates it, for a peace-offering that was slaughtered not for the sake of its original owner is valid. Or, perhaps not, for it remains a Paschal lamb and is disqualified.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, אַמְרִיתָא לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא: הוֹאִיל וְשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ פּוֹסְלוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ, וְשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים פּוֹסְלוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ. מָה שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ שֶׁפּוֹסְלוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ — מַכְשִׁירוֹ לְאַחַר זְמַנּוֹ, אַף שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים שֶׁפּוֹסְלוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ — מַכְשִׁירוֹ לְאַחַר זְמַנּוֹ.

Rav Pappa said: I raised this question in the presence of Rava and expressed my opinion: Since a change in sanctity invalidates it as an offering in its proper time, as if one intended it in its proper time as a peace-offering it is invalid, and a change in owner, i.e., one intended that the offering be for someone other than its owner, also invalidates it in its proper time, the following analogy is made: Just as a change in sanctity, which invalidates it in its proper time, validates it as an offering after its proper time, a change in owner, which invalidates it in its proper time, also validates it as an offering after its proper time.

וְאָמַר לִי: לֹא! אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ — שֶׁכֵּן פְּסוּלוֹ בְּגוּפוֹ, וְיֶשְׁנוֹ בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת,

And Rava said to me: No, this analogy is not to be accepted: If you say this about a change in sanctity, it is because the disqualification it causes is in the offering itself, for the disqualification relates to the very sanctity of the offering, and it applies to all four of the rites, for the disqualification caused by a change in sanctity can occur not only during the slaughter but also during any of the four rites performed with an offering.