סנהדרין סב

סנהדרין סב

וְאִי לָא קַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ בֶּאֱלוֹהַּ – לָא כְּלוּם הוּא. אֶלָּא לָאו, מֵאַהֲבָה וּמִיִּרְאָה?

And if he did not accept that person upon himself as a god, but rather bowed to the statue in order to honor the person, e.g., the king, what he did is nothing. Rather, is the baraita not referring to a case where the High Priest unwittingly worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of someone? This proves that this is also considered idol worship.

וְרָבָא אָמַר לָךְ: לָא, בְּאוֹמֵר מוּתָּר.

And Rava could have said to you in response: No, the baraita is not referring to this case, but to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted.

אוֹמֵר מוּתָּר, הַיְינוּ הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר!

The Gemara challenges: If the baraita is referring to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted, this is a case of a lapse of awareness concerning the fundamental halakhot of idol worship, in which case the Rabbis concede that the High Priest is obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, what is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and that of the Sages?

בְּאוֹמֵר מוּתָּר לִגְמָרֵי. הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר – קִיּוּם מִקְצָת וּבִיטּוּל מִקְצָת.

The Gemara answers: It is a case where he says to himself that idol worship is entirely permitted, whereas the case of a lapse of awareness in which the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a case of upholding part of the prohibition and negating another part of it, i.e., a case where the High Priest recognizes that idol worship is prohibited but mistakenly assumes that certain idolatrous activities are permitted.

תָּנֵי רַבִּי זַכַּאי קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זִיבַּח, וְקִיטֵּר, וְנִיסֵּךְ, וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

§ Rabbi Zakkai taught the following baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering, and burned incense as an idolatrous offering, and poured a libation to an idol, and bowed to an idol, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that these actions were prohibited, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering; he is not obligated to bring an offering for each and every act of idol worship.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פּוֹק תְּנִי לְבָרָא.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go out and teach it outside; i.e., such a baraita must not be taught in the study hall, as the halakha is that one is obligated to bring an offering for each and every act of idol worship.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זַכַּאי מַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי נָתָן, דְּתַנְיָא: הַבְעָרָה לְלָאו יָצָאת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

Rabbi Abba says: That which Rabbi Zakkai says is subject to a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: The prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat was singled out from the general category of labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it is written explicitly in the Torah in the verse: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). This was done to teach that the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat is unlike other prohibited labors, as it is an ordinary prohibition, for which one is not liable to be killed by stoning. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

וְרַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת.

And Rabbi Natan says: Kindling a fire is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it was singled out to divide the prohibited labors of Shabbat. In other words, by stating one prohibited labor separately, the Torah teaches that each labor performed on Shabbat constitutes its own separate prohibition. Consequently, one who unwittingly violates several categories of labor is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act of prohibited labor.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַבְעָרָה לְלָאו יָצָאת, הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה נָמֵי לְלָאו יָצָאת.

Rabbi Abba concludes: According to the one who says that of all the labors that are prohibited on Shabbat, kindling a fire on Shabbat was singled out to be mentioned in the Torah to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition, then bowing, in the category of idol worship, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse: “You shall not bow to them nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5), was also singled out to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition, which is not punishable by stoning.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַבְעָרָה לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת, הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה נָמֵי לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת.

Whereas, according to the one who says that kindling a fire was singled out to divide the prohibited labors of Shabbat, bowing was also singled out to divide the rites of idol worship, i.e., to teach that one who unwittingly performs several forms of idol worship is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act of idol worship. Therefore, the baraita taught by Rabbi Zakkai, which states that such a person is obligated to bring only one sin-offering, is in accordance with the former opinion, i.e., the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: דִּילְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הָתָם הַבְעָרָה לְלָאו יָצָאת, דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ חִילּוּק מְלָאכוֹת מֵ״אַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״?

Rav Yosef objects to this: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei says there, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, that kindling a fire was singled out to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition only because he derives the division of labors on Shabbat, i.e., that one is obligated to bring an offering for each category of labor that he violated, from a different verse, namely: “From one of them” (Leviticus 4:2).

דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, ״וְעָשָׂה מֵאַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״ – פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן, פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says with regard to the verse: “If any one shall sin through error, in any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and performs from one of them” (Leviticus 4:2), that there are times when one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions together, and there are times when one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? דִּכְתִיב ״וְעָשָׂה מֵאַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״. ״אַחַת״, ״מֵאַחַת״. ״הֵנָּה״, ״מֵהֵנָּה״. אַחַת שֶׁהִיא הֵנָּה, וְהֵנָּה שֶׁהִיא אַחַת.

And Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And performs from one of them,” and Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse as follows: The word “one” is qualified, as the verse states: “From one.” Likewise, the word “them” is qualified, as the verse states: “Of them.” Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, is them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, i.e., several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.

״אַחַת״ – ״שִׁמְעוֹן״, ״מֵאַחַת״ – ״שֵׁם״ מִ״שִּׁמְעוֹן״.

Rabbi Yonatan delineates the implementation of this principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: “One” complete violation is, e.g., a case where one wrote a whole word as he intended, such as the name Shimon. The term “from one” is referring to a case where one performed only part of a complete act of labor, e.g., he wrote only some of the letters of a word, such as shin mem, from the name Shimon. These two letters spell the word shem. In such a case, one is obligated to bring an offering for his transgression of writing two letters, shin and mem, even though he did not complete his intended act of writing the entire name of Shimon.

״הֵנָּה״ – אָבוֹת, ״מֵהֵנָּה״ – תּוֹלָדוֹת. ״אַחַת״ שֶׁהִיא ״הֵנָּה״: זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת. ״הֵנָּה״ שֶׁהִיא ״אַחַת״: שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת.

Rabbi Yonatan continues: “Them” is referring to the primary categories of labor. The term “of them” includes the subcategories of labor. The cases of one transgression that with regard to punishment is them, i.e., it is counted as many transgressions, are those involving intention, i.e., awareness, on the part of the transgressor that it was Shabbat and unawareness on the part of the transgressor that the acts of labor that he was performing are prohibited on Shabbat. One who transgresses in this way is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every category of labor that he engages in. The cases of them, several transgressions, that with regard to punishment are one are those involving unawareness on the part of the transgressor that it was Shabbat and intention, i.e., awareness, that the acts of labor that he was performing are prohibited on Shabbat. One who transgresses in this way is obligated to bring only one sin-offering.

אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ חִילּוּק מְלָאכוֹת מִדּוּכְתָּא אַחֲרִיתִי, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת.

Rav Yosef concludes his objection to Rabbi Abba’s comparison between the status of the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat and the status of the prohibition against bowing to an idol: The fact that Rabbi Yosei derives that kindling a fire on Shabbat is not punishable by death can be attributed to the fact that he derives from a different verse that one who violates several categories of labor is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every category of labor that he engages in. But here, with regard to idol worship, where he does not derive the division of labors, i.e., the division of categories of idol worship, from another place, perhaps everyone agrees that bowing was singled out to divide the prohibition of idol worship into different categories and bowing to an idol is punishable by death just like other forms of worship.

חִילּוּק מְלָאכוֹת דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָמֵי תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מֵ״אַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״? ״אַחַת״ – זְבִיחָה, ״מֵאַחַת״ – סִימָן אֶחָד.

The Gemara asks according to both opinions, that of Rav Abba and that of Rav Yosef: Why not derive the division of labors with regard to idol worship, too, from the same verse from which Rabbi Yosei derives the division of labors with regard to Shabbat, namely: “From one of them”? Since this verse is not referring to the halakhot of Shabbat in particular, it can be interpreted with regard to idol worship in the same manner that it is interpreted with regard to Shabbat: The word “one” is referring to one complete, prohibited act of worship, such as sacrificing an animal as an idolatrous offering. The term “from one” is referring to one who performs part of an act of worship, e.g., one who did not finish slaughtering the offering, as he severed only one of the organs, i.e., the windpipe and gullet, that must be severed in ritual slaughter.

״הֵנָּה״ – אָבוֹת: זִיבּוּחַ, קִיטּוּר, נִיסּוּךְ, וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה. ״מֵהֵנָּה״ – תּוֹלָדוֹת: שָׁבַר מַקֵּל לְפָנֶיהָ.

The word “them” is referring to the primary categories of idol worship that are derived from the manner in which God is worshipped in the Temple, namely, sacrificing an animal as an offering, burning incense, pouring a libation, and bowing. The term “of them” is referring to the subcategories of idol worship, e.g., one who broke a stick before an idol that is worshipped in such a manner. Breaking a stick is a subcategory of sacrificing, as an animal’s neck is broken when it is slaughtered.

״אַחַת״ שֶׁהִיא ״הֵנָּה״: זְדוֹן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשִׁגְגַת עֲבוֹדוֹת. ״הֵנָּה״ שֶׁהִיא ״אַחַת״: שִׁגְגַת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּזְדוֹן עֲבוֹדוֹת.

The principle of one transgression that with regard to punishment is them, i.e., many, can be applied to a case of intention, i.e., awareness, on the part of the transgressor that idol worship is prohibited, and unawareness that the particular rites of worship that he was performing are prohibited. The principle of them, several transgressions, that with regard to punishment are one can be applied to a case of unawareness with regard to the prohibition of idol worship, i.e., the transgressor was unaware that idol worship is prohibited or that he was worshipping an idol, and intention, i.e., awareness, that the rites that he was performing are prohibited.

הַאי שִׁגְגַת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי קָסָבַר בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת הוּא וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לוֹ, הֲרֵי לִבּוֹ לַשָּׁמַיִם.

The Gemara responds to the suggestion that the division of categories of idol worship can be derived from this verse: What are the circumstances of unawareness with regard to idol worship? If the transgressor thought that a certain building was a synagogue and bowed to it, and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, he is certainly exempt, as his heart was directed toward Heaven.

אֶלָּא דַּחֲזָא אִנְדְּרָטָא וּסְגֵיד לֵיהּ. אִי קַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ – מֵזִיד הוּא, אִי לָא קַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ – לָא כְּלוּם הוּא.

Rather, it must be a case where the transgressor saw a statue [andarta] of a person and bowed to it. This case must also be clarified: If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor and is liable to receive the death penalty, not to bring an offering. If he did not accept him upon himself as a god, but rather bowed to the statue in order to honor the person, what he did is nothing.

אֶלָּא מֵאַהֲבָה וּמִיִּרְאָה. הָנִיחָא לְאַבַּיֵּי, דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב; אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

Rather, it is clearly a case where one worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of someone, and he was unaware that this is prohibited. This works out well according to Abaye, who says that one who engages in idol worship due to love or fear is liable; accordingly, one who does so unwittingly must bring an offering. But according to Rava, who says that one who does so is exempt, what can be said?

אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר ״מוּתָּר״. תִּפְשׁוֹט דִּבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הֶעְלֵם זֶה וָזֶה בְּיָדוֹ, מַהוּ?

Rather, according to Rava, unawareness with regard to idol worship can be explained as referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. If so, one can resolve the dilemma that Rava raised before Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha if one who violated Shabbat has a lapse of awareness of both this, i.e., that it was Shabbat, and that, i.e., that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat?

תִּיפְשׁוֹט, דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, וְתִפְשׁוֹט.

Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved. If the phrase “and performs from one of them” is interpreted as referring to a case where one engages in idol worship thinking that it is permitted to do so, one can resolve that the transgressor is obligated to bring only one sin-offering for all of his acts of idol worship, according to this interpretation of the verse. The fact that Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved therefore serves as a challenge to this interpretation. The Gemara refutes this challenge: This is not difficult; indeed, resolve the dilemma from here.

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לְהָנֵי קְרָאֵי בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה? דְּאִילּוּ הָכָא, כְּתִיב: בְּמָשִׁיחַ – פַּר, וּבְנָשִׂיא – שָׂעִיר, וּבְיָחִיד – כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה.

The Gemara asks: But can you interpret these verses, namely, “and performs from one of them,” with regard to idol worship at all? As here, in Leviticus, chapter 4, where this verse is written, it is written with regard to an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, stating that if he sinned unwittingly he brings a bull as a sin-offering, and with regard to a king who sinned unwittingly it is stated that he brings a goat as a sin-offering, and with regard to an ordinary individual it is stated that he brings a female lamb or a female goat.

וְאִילּוּ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה תְּנַן: וְשָׁוִין שֶׁבִּשְׂעִירָה כְּיָחִיד.

Whereas with regard to idol worship we learned in a baraita (61b): And they agree that a High Priest who unwittingly engages in idol worship brings a female goat as a sin-offering, as does an ordinary individual. Clearly, then, the halakhot of unwitting idol worship are derived from a different source, i.e., Numbers, chapter 15.

וְתוּ לָא מִידֵּי.

The Gemara concludes: And there is nothing more to be discussed. The suggestion to derive a division of categories with regard to idol worship from the phrase in the verse “and performs from one of them” is groundless, and Rav Yosef’s objection to Rabbi Abba’s opinion is justified.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה, אָמַר:

§ When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said:

הָכִי תְּנָא קַמֵּיהּ: חוֹמֶר בַּשַּׁבָּת מִשְּׁאָר מִצְוֹת, חוֹמֶר בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת מִבַּשַּׁבָּת. חוֹמֶר בַּשַּׁבָּת – שֶׁהַשַּׁבָּת עָשָׂה שְׁתַּיִם בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת. חוֹמֶר בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת – שֶׁבִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת שָׁגַג בְּלֹא מִתְכַּוֵּין חַיָּיב, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּשַּׁבָּת.

This is the baraita that Rabbi Zakkai taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat vis-à-vis other mitzvot, and conversely, there is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot vis-à-vis Shabbat. There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat, if one performed two distinct acts of labor in one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act, which is not so with regard to other mitzvot. Conversely, there is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, as with regard to other mitzvot, if one sinned unwittingly, without intent to perform the act of the transgression at all, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering, which is not so with regard to Shabbat.

אָמַר מָר: חוֹמֶר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁהַשַּׁבָּת עָשָׂה שְׁתַּיִם כּוּ׳. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דַּעֲבַד קְצִירָה וּטְחִינָה, דִּכְוָותַהּ גַּבֵּי שְׁאָר מִצְוֹת – דַּאֲכַל חֵלֶב וָדָם. הָכָא תַּרְתֵּי מִיחַיַּיב, וְהָכָא תַּרְתֵּי מִיחַיַּיב!

The Gemara examines this baraita in detail. The Master said: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat, if one performed two distinct acts of labor in one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each act. What are the circumstances? If we say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where one unwittingly consumed forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot; here, one is obligated to bring two sin-offerings, and there, one is obligated to bring two sin-offerings.

אֶלָּא, גַּבֵּי שְׁאָר מִצְוֹת דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דַּאֲכַל חֵלֶב וָחֵלֶב. דִּכְוָותַהּ גַּבֵּי שַׁבָּת, דַּעֲבַד קְצִירָה וּקְצִירָה. הָכָא חֲדָא מִיחַיַּיב, וְהָכָא חֲדָא מִיחַיַּיב.

Rather, what are the circumstances with regard to other mitzvot where one is obligated to bring only one sin-offering? One is obligated in a case where he consumed forbidden fat and again consumed forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. In that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot; here, one is obligated to bring one sin-offering, and there, one is obligated to bring one sin-offering.

וְהַיְינוּ דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״פּוֹק תְּנִי לְבָרָא!״

The Gemara comments: And that is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Zakkai: Go out and teach this baraita outside; it is not worthy of being taught in the study hall.

מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לְךָ דַּעֲבַד קְצִירָה וּטְחִינָה, ״מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת״ אֲתָאן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה כִּדְרַבִּי אַמֵּי, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: זִיבַּח וְקִיטֵּר וְנִיסֵּךְ בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty that caused Rabbi Yoḥanan to disregard the baraita? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the baraita is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, and when the baraita states: Which is not so with regard to other mitzvot, it is not referring to all mitzvot in general; rather, we arrive at the halakha of idol worship, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami. As Rabbi Ami says: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering and burned incense and poured a libation, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering.

לָא מִיתּוֹקְמָא לֵיהּ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: חוֹמֶר בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת, שֶׁבִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת שָׁגַג בְּלֹא מִתְכַּוֵּין – חַיָּיב.

The Gemara answers: The baraita cannot be interpreted as referring to idol worship, as it teaches in the last clause: There is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, as with regard to other mitzvot, if one sinned unwittingly, without the intent to perform the act at all, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering.

שׁוֹגֵג בְּלֹא מִתְכַּוֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּקָסָבַר בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת הוּא וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לוֹ, הֲרֵי לִבּוֹ לַשָּׁמַיִם. אֶלָּא דַּחֲזָא אִנְדְּרָטָא וּסְגֵיד לֵיהּ. אִי קַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ בֶּאֱלוֹהַּ – מֵזִיד הוּא, וְאִי לָא קַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ – לֹא כְּלוּם הִיא.

The Gemara explains why this cannot be referring to idol worship. What are the circumstances of one who unwittingly transgresses the prohibition of idol worship without the intent to perform the act? If he thought that a house of idol worship was a synagogue and bowed to it, he is certainly exempt, as his heart was directed toward Heaven. Rather, it must be a case where the transgressor saw the statue of a person and bowed to it. If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor and is liable to receive the death penalty, not to bring an offering. And if he did not accept him upon himself as a god, what he did is nothing.

אֶלָּא מֵאַהֲבָה וּמִיִּרְאָה. הָנִיחָא לְאַבַּיֵּי, דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב. אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case where one worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of a person, and he was unaware that this is prohibited. This works out well according to Abaye, who says that one who engages in idol worship due to love or fear is liable; accordingly, one who does so unwittingly must bring an offering. But according to Rava, who says that one who does so is exempt, what can be said?

אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר מוּתָּר, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּשַּׁבָּת דְּפָטוּר לִגְמָרֵי.

Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. Accordingly, the statement in the baraita: Which is not so in the halakhot of Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labor on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labor under those circumstances is completely exempt, while one who transgresses under those circumstances with regard to idol worship is obligated to bring a sin-offering.

עַד כָּאן לָא בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן הֶעְלֵם זֶה וָזֶה – אֶלָּא אִי לְחַיּוֹבֵי חֲדָא, אִי לְחַיּוֹבֵי תַּרְתֵּי. פָּטוּר לִגְמָרֵי – לֵיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר.

This interpretation of the baraita is difficult, as Rava asked Rav Naḥman about the halakha in a case where one violated Shabbat during a lapse of awareness of both this, that it was Shabbat, and that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat. And Rava’s question was only with regard to whether to deem the person obligated to bring one sin-offering or whether to deem him obligated to bring two sin-offerings. There is no one who says that such a person is entirely exempt, in accordance with this interpretation of the baraita. Therefore, the baraita cannot be referring to idol worship.

מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: רֵישָׁא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְסֵיפָא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת.

The Gemara challenges this conclusion: What is the difficulty in interpreting the baraita as referring to idol worship? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the first clause of the baraita is referring to the contrast between Shabbat and idol worship, and the last clause is referring to the contrast between Shabbat and other mitzvot.

וְשָׁגַג בְּלֹא מִתְכַּוֵּין, דְּקָסָבַר רוֹק הוּא וּבְלָעוֹ. מַה שֶׁאֵין כֵּן בַּשַּׁבָּת, דְּפָטוּר. שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּין לְהַגְבִּיהַּ אֶת הַתָּלוּשׁ וְחָתַךְ אֶת הַמְחוּבָּר – פָּטוּר.

And the halakha of one who transgressed other mitzvot unwittingly, without intent to perform the act, is referring to, e.g., a case where one has forbidden fat in his mouth and thinks it is spittle, and he swallows it. In that case he must bring an offering for his transgression, which is not so with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, where in a parallel case one would be exempt. As, for example, one who intended to lift a plant that was detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. One is not liable for an unintentional act of labor on Shabbat.

וְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר: הַמִּתְעַסֵּק בַּחֲלָבִים וּבַעֲרָיוֹת – חַיָּיב, שֶׁכֵּן נֶהֱנֶה; הַמִּתְעַסֵּק בְּשַׁבָּת – פָּטוּר, מְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה.

And this distinction is in accordance with the statement that Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says, as he says: One who acts unawares with forbidden fats or with those with whom sexual relations are forbidden, i.e., one who accidentally consumed forbidden fat or engaged in forbidden sexual intercourse, without intending to perform the act at all (see Yevamot 54a), is obligated to bring a sin-offering, since he derived pleasure from the transgression. But one who acts unawares on Shabbat, performing forbidden labor, is exempt, as the Torah prohibits only planned labor.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּלָא מוֹקֵים מַתְנִיתָא רֵישָׁא בְּחַד טַעְמָא וְסֵיפָא בְּחַד טַעְמָא.

Since the baraita can be explained in this manner, the Gemara explains why Rabbi Yoḥanan rejected it anyway: Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning, in that he does not interpret the first clause of a baraita with one explanation and the last clause of the same baraita with one other explanation. Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the premise that a baraita can be referring to a different matter in each clause unless it states so explicitly.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאן דִּמְתַרְגֵּם לִי חָבִית אַלִּיבָּא דְּחַד תַּנָּא, מוֹבֵילְנָא מָאנֵיהּ בָּתְרֵיהּ לְבֵי מַסּוּתָא.

As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whoever explains to me the mishna concerning a barrel (Bava Metzia 40b) in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, I will carry his clothes after him to the bathhouse, i.e., I will attend him as a servant, as although that mishna can be explained by dividing it into two different opinions, I do not accept that type of explanation. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the suggestion that the first clause of the baraita here is referring to idol worship and the last clause is referring to other mitzvot.

גּוּפָא,

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself, namely, whether one who engages in several forms of idol worship in the same lapse of awareness brings more than one sin-offering.