סנהדרין עב

סנהדרין עב

גְּמָ׳ תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: וְכִי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָכַל זֶה תַּרְטֵימָר בָּשָׂר וְשָׁתָה חֲצִי לוֹג יַיִן הָאִיטַלְקִי אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה יֵצֵא לְבֵית דִּין לִיסָּקֵל? אֶלָּא הִגִּיעָה תּוֹרָה לְסוֹף דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, שֶׁסּוֹף מְגַמֵּר נִכְסֵי אָבִיו וּמְבַקֵּשׁ לִמּוּדוֹ וְאֵינוֹ מוֹצֵא, וְיוֹצֵא לְפָרָשַׁת דְּרָכִים וּמְלַסְטֵם אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת.

GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that further elaborates upon the words of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that the Torah states that he shall be taken out to court to be stoned? Rather, the Torah penetrated the ultimate mind-set of the stubborn and rebellious son and the inevitable results of his actions, and it is understood that he will continue on this path, and in the end he will squander his father’s property, and then, seeking the pleasures to which he had become accustomed but not finding them, he will go out to the crossroads and rob people.

אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: יָמוּת זַכַּאי וְאַל יָמוּת חַיָּיב, שֶׁמִּיתָתָן שֶׁל רְשָׁעִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶם וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם, וְלַצַּדִּיקִים – רַע לָהֶם וְרַע לָעוֹלָם. שֵׁינָה וְיַיִן לָרְשָׁעִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶם וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם, לַצַּדִּיקִים – רַע לָהֶם וְרַע לָעוֹלָם. שֶׁקֶט לָרְשָׁעִים – רַע לָהֶם וְרַע לָעוֹלָם, וְלַצַּדִּיקִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶם וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם. פִּיזּוּר לָרְשָׁעִים – הֲנָאָה לָהֶם וַהֲנָאָה לָעוֹלָם, וְלַצַּדִּיקִים – רַע לָהֶם וְרַע לָעוֹלָם.

The Torah said that it is better that he should die now when he is still innocent, and he should not die later when he is guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them and also beneficial to the world, while the death of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The sleep and wine of the wicked is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, while that of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the wicked is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, while the dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world.

מַתְנִי׳ הַבָּא בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת נִידּוֹן עַל שֵׁם סוֹפוֹ. הָיָה בָּא בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת וְשָׁבַר אֶת הֶחָבִית, אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ דָּמִים – חַיָּיב, אִם אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים – פָּטוּר.

MISHNA: A burglar who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is sentenced on account of his ultimate end, as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is exempt from paying for the barrel.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַחְתֶּרֶת? חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מַעֲמִיד עַצְמוֹ עַל מָמוֹנוֹ, וְהַאי מֵימָר אָמַר: אִי אָזֵילְנָא, קָאֵי לְאַפַּאי וְלָא שָׁבֵיק לִי, וְאִי קָאֵי לְאַפַּאי – קָטֵילְנָא לֵיהּ. וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: אִם בָּא לְהוֹרְגְּךָ – הַשְׁכֵּם לְהוֹרְגוֹ.

GEMARA: Rava says: What is the reason for this halakha concerning a burglar who breaks into a house? He explains: There is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore this burglar must have said to himself: If I go in and the owner sees me, he will rise against me and not allow me to steal from him, and if he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah stated a principle: If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.

אָמַר רַב: הַבָּא בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת וְנָטַל כֵּלִים וְיָצָא – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? בְּדָמִים קְנָנְהוּ. אָמַר רָבָא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרַב בְּשֶׁשִּׁיבֵּר, דְּלֵיתַנְהוּ, אֲבָל נָטַל – לָא.

Rav says: If a burglar broke into a house and took certain vessels, and he then left and was caught only afterward, he is exempt from the obligation to pay restitution for the vessels. What is the reason? He acquired the vessels with his blood. When he broke into the house, he risked his life, as the owner could have killed him. This grave risk that he took exempts him from any other more lenient punishments that could otherwise have been imposed upon him, including the obligation to pay restitution. Rava says: Rav’s statement is reasonable in a case where he broke the vessels in the course of robbing, so that they no longer exist, and the issue is only whether he has to pay for them. But if he took the vessels and they are still extant, Rav’s ruling does not apply.

וְהָאֱלֹהִים! אָמַר רַב: אֲפִילּוּ נָטַל – דְּהָא יֵשׁ לוֹ דָּמִים וְנֶאֶנְסוּ, חַיָּיב. אַלְמָא בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ קָיְימִי. הָכָא נָמֵי, בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ קָיְימִי.

The Gemara comments: But by God! Rav states his ruling even with regard to a case where the burglar took the vessels and they are still extant. That is to say, Rav himself does not distinguish between the two cases, as in a case where there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, e.g., in a case where a father came to steal from his son, if an accident occurred to the vessels, the burglar is liable to pay for them. Apparently, the vessels are established in the burglar’s possession, and he must pay for any damage that occurs to them. Here also, then, where there is no blood-guiltiness, the vessels are established as being in the burglar’s possession and they are his.

וְלָא הִיא, כִּי אוֹקְמִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ לְעִנְיַן אֳנָסִין, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן מִקְנָא – בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּמָרַיְיהוּ קָיְימִי, מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַשּׁוֹאֵל.

Rava explains: But this is not so, i.e., there is no proof from that case that can be applied to this one. One can claim that when the Merciful One established the vessels in the burglar’s possession, that was only concerning accidents, so he should be liable to pay for any damage that occurs to them. But as for ownership, they remain in the possession of their owner, just as it is in the case of a borrower. Even though a borrower is liable to pay for all the accidental damage caused to the item he borrowed, nevertheless the borrowed item does not become his property.

תְּנַן: בָּא בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת וְשִׁיבֵּר אֶת הֶחָבִית, יֵשׁ לוֹ דָּמִים – חַיָּיב, אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים – פָּטוּר. טַעְמָא דְּשִׁיבֵּר, דְּכִי אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים פָּטוּר. הָא נָטַל – לָא.

The Gemara raises an objection against Rav: We learned in the mishna that if the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay the value of the barrel. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, he is exempt from paying for the barrel. A precise reading of the mishna indicates that the reason he is exempt is that he broke the barrel, so where there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, he is exempt from paying for it. But if he took the barrel, he would not be exempt; rather, he would be liable, counter to the ruling of Rav.

הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ נָטַל נָמֵי, וְהָא דְּקָא תָנֵי ״שָׁבַר אֶת הֶחָבִית״, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכִי יֵשׁ לוֹ דָּמִים, אַף עַל גַּב דְּשִׁיבֵּר נָמֵי – חַיָּיב.

The Gemara explains: The same is true, i.e., that the burglar would be exempt, even if he took the barrel. And that which was taught in the mishna: He broke the barrel, serves to teach us that when there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, then even though he broke the barrel and it is no longer extant, he is also liable to pay for it.

פְּשִׁיטָא, מַזִּיק הוּא! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דַּאֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? אָדָם מוּעָד לְעוֹלָם? תְּנֵינָא: אָדָם מוּעָד לְעוֹלָם, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן! קַשְׁיָא.

The Gemara raises an objection: Isn’t it obvious that he is liable? This burglar is like any other person who causes damage and is liable to pay for it. The Gemara answers: This mishna teaches us that he is liable even if he broke the barrel unintentionally. The Gemara objects once again: What is the mishna teaching us with this ruling? Does it teach that the legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, and therefore he is liable even for unintentional damage? But we already learn this in a baraita: The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, whether the damage was done unintentionally or intentionally, whether by unavoidable accident or whether it was done willingly. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this presents a difficulty for Rav.

מֵתִיב רַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: הַגּוֹנֵב כִּיס בְּשַׁבָּת – חַיָּיב, שֶׁהֲרֵי נִתְחַיֵּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye raises an objection to the ruling of Rava from a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat and takes it out into a public domain is liable to pay for what he stole even though he also desecrated Shabbat, which is a transgression for which one is executed by stoning. Ordinarily, one who is liable to receive two punishments for the same offense is administered only the more severe punishment and exempt from the other one. Here, however, he is liable to pay for the purse and is executed, because he was already liable to pay for the theft as soon as he lifted the purse, and this took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying the purse into the public domain.

הָיָה מְגָרֵר וְיוֹצֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁהֲרֵי אִיסּוּר גְּנֵבָה וְאִיסּוּר סְקִילָה בָּאִין כְּאֶחָד.

The baraita continues: If he did not lift the purse, but rather was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for what he stole, as in this case, since he did not lift the purse, he would become liable to pay for the stolen item only when he drags it out of its owner’s property into the public domain. Accordingly, the prohibition of theft and the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat, which is punishable with death by stoning, are violated simultaneously, and one who is liable to receive the death penalty is exempt from monetary liability that he incurred with the selfsame act. This poses a difficulty to Rava, who ruled that if the stolen item is extant the burglar must return it, whereas this baraita indicates that if one commits a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, he is exempt from all payments.

וְהִלְכְתָא: דִּשְׁדָנְהוּ בְּנַהֲרָא.

The Gemara answers: And the halakha is that the baraita must be understood as referring to a case where the burglar threw the purse into a river. Since the purse is no longer extant, he is exempt from having to pay for it even though he caused the damage intentionally. But if the purse is extant, he is in fact required to return it.

רָבָא אִיגְּנַבוּ לֵיהּ דִּיכְרֵי בְּמַחְתַּרְתָּא. אַהְדְּרִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וְלָא קַבְּלִינְהוּ. אָמַר: הוֹאִיל וּנְפַק מִפּוּמֵּיהּ דְּרַב.

It is related that rams were once stolen from Rava by burglars who broke into his house. The burglars came to return the animals to him, but Rava did not accept them. Rava said: Since a ruling issued from Rav’s mouth that a burglar who may be killed acquires the items he stole, I no longer agree to take them.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים. אִם זָרְחָה הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ עָלָיו״. וְכִי הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ עָלָיו בִּלְבַד זָרְחָה? אֶלָּא, אִם בָּרוּר לְךָ הַדָּבָר כַּשֶּׁמֶשׁ שֶׁאֵין לוֹ שָׁלוֹם עִמְּךָ – הׇרְגֵהוּ, וְאִם לָאו – אַל תַּהְרְגֵהוּ.

§ Apropos a burglar who breaks into a house, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verses state: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account. If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1–2). A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood in a metaphoric sense: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is not coming to you in peace, but rather his intention is to kill you, arise and kill him first. But if you are not sure about his intentions, do not kill him.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״אִם זָרְחָה הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ עָלָיו דָּמִים לוֹ״. וְכִי הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ עָלָיו בִּלְבַד זָרְחָה? אֶלָּא, אִם בָּרוּר לְךָ כַּשֶּׁמֶשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שָׁלוֹם עִמְּךָ – אַל תַּהַרְגֵהוּ, וְאִם לָאו – הׇרְגֵהוּ. קַשְׁיָא סְתָמָא אַסְּתָמָא!

It is taught in another baraita: The verse states: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account.” A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood as follows: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is coming to you in peace, do not kill him. But if you are not sure about his intentions, arise and kill him. The Gemara notes a difficulty: The halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the first baraita contradicts the halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the second baraita. The first baraita indicates that if the homeowner is unsure about the burglar’s intentions, he is prohibited from killing the burglar, whereas the second baraita indicates that in such a case, he is permitted to kill the burglar.

לָא קַשְׁיָא,

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.

כָּאן – בְּאָב עַל הַבֵּן, כָּאן – בְּבֵן עַל הָאָב.

Here, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is prohibited for him to kill him, it is referring to a father who comes to rob his son. A father has great compassion for his son, and therefore it may be presumed that he will not kill his son if he resists. Accordingly, the son is prohibited from killing his father unless he knows for certain that his father has the intention of killing him. There, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is permitted for him to kill him, it is referring to a son who comes to rob his father. Since a son has less compassion for his father, it may be presumed that he would be ready to kill his father if he resists. Therefore, the father is permitted to kill his son unless he knows for certain that his son would never kill him.

אָמַר רַב: כֹּל דְּאָתֵי עֲלַאי בְּמַחְתַּרְתָּא – קָטֵילְנָא לֵיהּ, לְבַר מֵרַב חֲנִינָא בַּר שֵׁילָא. מַאי טַעְמָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּצַדִּיק הוּא – הָא קָאָתֵי בְּמַחְתַּרְתָּא! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקִים לִי בְּגַוֵּויהּ דִּמְרַחֵם עָלַי כְּרַחֵם אָב עַל הַבֵּן.

Rav says: With regard to anyone who breaks into my house, I would kill him, as I would presume that he is ready to kill me, except for Rav Ḥanina bar Sheila, whom I would not kill. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav excludes Rabbi Ḥanina bar Sheila? If we say that Rav trusts him because he is a righteous person, this is difficult, as the case is one where he broke into his house, which indicates that he is not a righteous person. Rather, it is because he would say: I am certain that he would have mercy upon me just like a father would have mercy on a son.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״דָּמִים לוֹ״ – בֵּין בַּחוֹל בֵּין בַּשַּׁבָּת, ״אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים״ – בֵּין בַּחוֹל בֵּין בַּשַּׁבָּת.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:2), both during the week and on Shabbat. “If a burglar is found breaking in…there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), both during the week and on Shabbat.

בִּשְׁלָמָא ״אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים״ בֵּין בַּחוֹל בֵּין בַּשַּׁבָּת אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַהֲרוּגֵי בֵּית דִּין, דִּבְשַׁבָּת לָא קָטְלִינַן. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּקָטְלִינַן. אֶלָּא ״דָּמִים לוֹ״ בֵּין בַּחוֹל בֵּין בַּשַּׁבָּת? הַשְׁתָּא בַּחוֹל לָא קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ, בַּשַּׁבָּת מִבַּעְיָא?

The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted that with regard to “there shall not be blood shed on his account,” it was necessary to say that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat, as it might enter your mind to say that this is just as it is in the case of those who are executed by the court, who are not executed on Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the burglar may be slain in self-defense even on Shabbat. But with regard to “there shall be blood shed on his account,” the statement that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat is puzzling. Now, if on a weekday he may not be slain, is it necessary to say that he may not be slain on Shabbat?

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לָא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לְפַקֵּחַ עָלָיו אֶת הַגַּל.

Rav Sheshet says: This ruling is necessary only to teach that if a building collapsed on the burglar on Shabbat, one is obligated to clear the pile of stones from on top of him and perform any action necessary to rescue him, even if it involves the desecration of Shabbat; one does not say that while he is not permitted to actively kill him, he is also not obligated to save him.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהֻכָּה״ – בְּכׇל אָדָם, ״וָמֵת״ – בְּכׇל מִיתָה שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲמִיתוֹ. בִּשְׁלָמָא ״וְהֻכָּה״ בְּכׇל אָדָם אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא דְּקִים לֵהּוֹ, דְּאֵין אָדָם מַעֲמִיד עַצְמוֹ עַל מָמוֹנוֹ, אֲבָל אַחֵר – לָא.

§ Concerning the verse that states: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), the Sages taught a baraita: “And is smitten,” by any person who strikes him; “and dies,” by any means of death by which you can put him to death. The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted, with regard to the words “and is smitten,” it was necessary to say that he may be struck by any person, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only the owner of the house whom the burglar is certain will resist him, because there is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore it is only the homeowner’s life that is in danger from the burglar. But as for another person, the burglar is not sure that he will try to stop him, and therefore that other person may not kill him, since the burglar did not come with the intention of killing him.

קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּרוֹדֵף הוּא, וַאֲפִילּוּ אַחֵר נָמֵי. אֶלָּא ״וָמֵת״ בְּכׇל מִיתָה שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲמִיתוֹ, לְמָה לִי?

Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this burglar is considered a pursuer, and he is subject to the same halakha as anyone who pursues another in order to kill him, namely, that anyone may kill the pursuer in order to rescue the one being pursued. Therefore, even another person is permitted to kill the burglar in order to save the homeowner. But that which the baraita teaches, that the words “and dies” teach that he may be slain by any means of death by which you can put him to death, why do I need this?

מֵרוֹצֵחַ נָפְקָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״מוֹת יוּמַת הַמַּכֶּה רֹצֵחַ הוּא״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּמִיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה בּוֹ. וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאִם אִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲמִיתוֹ בְּמִיתָה הַכְּתוּבָה בּוֹ, שֶׁאַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לַהֲמִיתוֹ בְּכׇל מִיתָה שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לַהֲמִיתוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מוֹת יוּמַת״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This can be derived from the halakha governing a murderer, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse with regard to a murderer states: “He that smote him shall be put to death, for he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is put to death with the mode of execution stated concerning him, namely, killing by decapitation. From where do I derive that if you cannot put him to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, e.g., if he is escaping, that you can put him to death with any mode of execution with which you can put him to death? The verse states: “He that smote him shall be put to death [mot yumat],” the doubled verb teaching that he is put to death in any case, by any mode of execution. Why not derive the halakha of a burglar from the halakha of a murderer?

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מוֹת יוּמַת״.

The Gemara rejects this reasoning: There it is different, as the verse explicitly states: “Mot yumat,” which serves to include all modes of execution.

וְנִיגְמַר מִינֵּיהּ? מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה רוֹצֵחַ וְגוֹאֵל הַדָּם שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara asks: But why not learn from it a principle that can be applied to all people who may be put to death? The Gemara rejects this reasoning: This case does not serve as a source for a principle, because the halakhot of a murderer and of a blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of one who was killed who is allowed to kill his relative’s killer (see Makkot 11b), are two verses that come as one, and two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. In other words, if a halakha is stated with regard to two specific cases in the Torah, the halakha is understood to apply only to those cases. Had the halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. Therefore, the baraita had to teach us that this halakha also applies to a burglar who breaks into a person’s house.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״מַחְתֶּרֶת״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא מַחְתֶּרֶת. גַּגּוֹ, חֲצֵירוֹ וְקַרְפֵּיפוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מַחְתֶּרֶת״? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרוֹב גַּנָּבִים מְצוּיִין בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: From the words: “If a burglar is found breaking in” (Exodus 22:1), I have derived only that this halakha applies to a burglar who came breaking in through a wall. But from where do I derive that the same halakha applies if he was found on his roof, in his yard, or in the enclosed area behind his house? Therefore, the verse states: “If a burglar is found,” which teaches that the halakha applies in any case. If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Breaking in”? Because the Torah speaks of a common case, and most thieves are found breaking in.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״מַחְתֶּרֶת״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא מַחְתֶּרֶת. גַּגּוֹ, חֲצֵירוֹ וְקַרְפֵּיפוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מַחְתֶּרֶת״? מַחְתַּרְתּוֹ זוֹ הִיא הַתְרָאָתוֹ.

It is taught in another baraita: From the words: “If a burglar is found breaking in,” I have derived only that this halakha applies to a burglar who came breaking in through a wall. But from where do I derive that the same halakha applies if he was found on his roof, in his yard, or in the enclosed area behind his house? Therefore, the verse states: “If a burglar is found,” which teaches that the halakha applies in any case. If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Breaking in”? This teaches that his breaking in is his forewarning. If a burglar is found breaking into a house, the owner need not formally forewarn him before killing him. If he is found elsewhere, such a forewarning is necessary.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: קָטָן הָרוֹדֵף, נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילוֹ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ. קָסָבַר, רוֹדֵף אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ הַתְרָאָה, לָא שְׁנָא גָּדוֹל וְלָא שְׁנָא קָטָן.

§ Rav Huna says: If a minor was pursuing another person in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved with the pursuer’s life. That is to say, one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, and one does not say that since the minor lacks halakhic competence, he is not subject to punishment. The Gemara explains: Rav Huna maintains that a pursuer, in general, does not require forewarning, and there is no difference with regard to this matter between an adult and a minor. The essence of the matter is rescuing the pursued party from death, and therefore the pursuer’s liability to receive the death penalty is irrelevant.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב הוּנָא: יָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ – אֵין נוֹגְעִין בּוֹ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין דּוֹחִין נֶפֶשׁ מִפְּנֵי נֶפֶשׁ. וְאַמַּאי? רוֹדֵף הוּא! שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּמִשְּׁמַיָּא קָא רָדְפִי לַהּ.

Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother.

נֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: רוֹדֵף שֶׁהָיָה רוֹדֵף אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְהוֹרְגוֹ, אוֹמְרִין לוֹ: רְאֵה שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל הוּא וּבֶן בְּרִית הוּא, וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה ״שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ״. אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: הַצֵּל דָּמוֹ שֶׁל זֶה בְּדָמוֹ שֶׁל זֶה.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a baraita supports the ruling of Rav Huna, who said that a pursuer does not require a forewarning: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, a third party says to the pursuer: See that he whom you are pursuing to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The Torah stated: Save the blood of this person who is being pursued with the blood of that person who is pursuing him. The fact that there is no indication here that the pursuer must say that he heard the forewarning suggests that forewarning is not required, as stated by Rav Huna.

הָהִיא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, חָבֵר אֵין צָרִיךְ הַתְרָאָה, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה הַתְרָאָה אֶלָּא לְהַבְחִין בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג לְמֵזִיד.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Perhaps this baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A ḥaver, who is thoroughly knowledgeable in halakha, does not need to be issued a forewarning by witnesses in order to become liable to be punished, because forewarning is given only to distinguish between unintentional sin and intentional sin, and a ḥaver is certainly aware of the halakha. The same may be said about a pursuer: Since his malice is clear, he does not require a forewarning; his sin is obviously intentional. Those who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and say that even a ḥaver needs to be issued a forewarning would say that a pursuer must be forewarned as well.

תָּא שְׁמַע: רוֹדֵף שֶׁהָיָה רוֹדֵף אַחַר חֲבֵירוֹ לְהוֹרְגוֹ, אֹמְרִין לוֹ: רְאֵה שֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל הוּא וּבֶן בְּרִית הוּא, וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה ״שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ״. אִם אָמַר: יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁהוּא כֵּן – פָּטוּר. עַל מְנָת כֵּן אֲנִי עוֹשֶׂה – חַיָּיב.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that a pursuer must be forewarned, and therefore one may not save a pursued party by killing a minor who is pursuing him, from a baraita: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, and a third party said to him: See that he whom you are pursuing to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6), in this case, if the pursuer said: I know this to be so, he is exempt from being killed, but if he said: I am doing it on this condition, i.e., knowing that I am liable to be killed for this, he is liable to be slain. This indicates that even a pursuer must be issued a forewarning.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקָאֵי בִּתְרֵי עִיבְרֵי דְנַהְרָא, דְּלָא מָצֵי אַצּוֹלֵיה. מַאי אִיכָּא? דְּבָעֵי אֵיתוֹיֵי לְבֵי דִינָא. בֵּי דִינָא בָּעֵי הַתְרָאָה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: This forewarning is not necessary except in a case where the pursuer and the person issuing the warning are standing on two opposite sides of a river, so that the latter cannot save the party being pursued by killing the pursuer. What is there for him to do? Unable to save the pursued party, he wants at least to bring the pursuer to court, so that he will be convicted and have the death penalty administered to him. But in order to administer punishment, the court requires that the offender receive proper forewarning. It is for this reason that the baraita speaks of forewarning, but a pursuer may be killed by a bystander even without having been forewarned.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: אָמַר לְךָ רַב הוּנָא, אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי כְּתַנָּא דְּמַחְתֶּרֶת, דְּאָמַר: מַחְתַּרְתּוֹ זוֹ הִיא הַתְרָאָתוֹ.

If you wish, say instead that Rav Huna could have said to you: I stated my opinion that it is permitted to kill a minor pursuer in accordance with the tanna who spoke of the issue of a burglar who breaks into a house. As this tanna says that his breaking in is his forewarning, that is, a burglar who breaks into a house needs no further forewarning. Here, too, anyone who is pursuing another in order to kill him does not require forewarning since his pursuit is his forewarning.