סנהדרין עו

סנהדרין עו

מָה לְהִיא – שֶׁכֵּן אִמָּהּ בִּשְׂרֵפָה, תֹּאמַר בְּהוּא – שֶׁאִמּוֹ בִּסְקִילָה?

What is notable about her relatives? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of burning. Will you then say that there is a prohibition with regard to his relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of stoning?

וְעוֹד, הוּא כְּהִיא: מָה הִיא – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּה בָּהּ בֵּין בִּתָּהּ לְאֵם אִמָּהּ, אַף הוּא – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין בִּתּוֹ לְאֵם אִמּוֹ.

And furthermore, one must say that the status of his relatives is like the status of her relatives; and just as with regard to her relatives, you did not distinguish between her daughter and the mother of her mother, and one who engages in intercourse with either is executed by burning, so too with regard to his relatives, you should not distinguish between his daughter and the mother of his mother and he should receive the same punishment for engaging in intercourse with either. Since one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother is executed by stoning and one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning, the parallel between his relatives and her relatives is incomplete, and the prohibition cannot be derived.

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר סְקִילָה חֲמוּרָה, מֵהַאי קוּשְׁיָא לָא נְידוּנַהּ.

The Gemara continues: And according to the one who says that stoning is more severe than burning, due to this third difficulty, the fact that intercourse with the mother of his mother is forbidden, this halakha is not derived, as the parallel between his relatives and her relatives is incomplete.

אִי: מָה הוּא – כַּלָּתוֹ אֲסוּרָה, אַף הִיא – כַּלָּתָהּ אֲסוּרָה?

The Gemara asks: If a parallel is drawn between his relatives and the relatives of his wife with regard to the prohibition, just as with regard to his relatives, his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him, so too with regard to her relatives, her daughter-in-law is prohibited to him?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֵשֶׁת בִּנְךָ הִיא״. מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת בִּנְךָ אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת בְּנָהּ.

Abaye says: That is not so, as the verse states: “You shall not expose the nakedness of your daughter-in-law; she is your son’s wife, you shall not expose her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:15). Due to his intercourse with the wife of his son you deem him liable to be executed, but you do not deem him liable to be executed due to his intercourse with the wife of the son of his wife.

רָבָא אָמַר: בֵּין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ״, בֵּין לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְאַתְרַהּ״ – לָא אָתְיָא.

Rava says: That derivation is unnecessary, as with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy, both according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and derive the details from it, and according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, it is not derived that intercourse with one’s wife’s daughter-in-law renders him liable to be executed.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ, מָה הוּא – כַּלָּתוֹ אֲסוּרָה, אַף הִיא נָמֵי – כַּלָּתָהּ אֲסוּרָה. וּמִינַּהּ: מָה הוּא בִּסְקִילָה, אַף הִיא נָמֵי בִּסְקִילָה.

The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and derive the details from it, one might infer: Just as with regard to his relatives, his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him, so too with regard to her relatives, her daughter-in-law is forbidden to him. And derive again from it: Just as with regard to his relatives, he is liable to be executed by stoning due to his intercourse with his daughter-in-law, so too with regard to her relatives, he is also liable to be executed by stoning due to his intercourse with her daughter-in-law.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: סְקִילָה חֲמוּרָה, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְהוּא – שֶׁכֵּן אִמּוֹ בִּסְקִילָה, תֹּאמַר בְּהִיא – שֶׁאִמָּהּ בִּשְׂרֵפָה?

The Gemara proceeds to explain why this is not a valid derivation. According to the one who says: Execution by stoning is more severe than execution by burning, the inference can be refuted: What is notable about his relatives? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of stoning. Will you then say that the same is true with regard to her relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with her mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of burning?

וְעוֹד: בִּתָּהּ בִּשְׂרֵפָה וְכַלָּתָהּ בִּסְקִילָה? הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ יוֹכִיחַ, דְּבִתּוֹ בִּשְׂרֵפָה וְכַלָּתוֹ בִּסְקִילָה.

And furthermore, as one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife, is executed by the less severe punishment of burning, is it possible that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter-in-law of his wife, a more distant relative, is executed by the more severe punishment of stoning? The Gemara rejects that refutation: He himself, with regard to his own relatives, will prove that it is in fact possible, as one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning, and one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is executed by stoning.

אֶלָּא: מָה הוּא – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין אִמּוֹ לְכַלָּתוֹ, אַף הִיא – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בָּהּ בֵּין אִמָּהּ לְכַלָּתָהּ. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׂרֵפָה חֲמוּרָה, מֵהַאי קוּשְׁיָא לָא נְידוּנֵין.

Rather, just as with regard to his relatives, you did not distinguish between his mother and his daughter-in-law, and one who engages in intercourse with either is executed by stoning, so too with regard to her relatives, you should not distinguish between her mother and her daughter-in-law. Since one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife is executed by burning, apparently, one who engages in intercourse with her daughter-in-law is punished by stoning, not burning. Therefore the parallel between his relatives and her relatives is incomplete, and the prohibition cannot be derived. And according to the one who says that burning is more severe than stoning, although the refutations based on the fact that execution by stoning is more severe are not relevant, due to this difficulty, this halakha is not derived.

וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְאַתְרַהּ, מָה הוּא – כַּלָּתוֹ אֲסוּרָה, אַף הִיא – כַּלָּתָהּ אֲסוּרָה. וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ: הָתָם הוּא דְּבִסְקִילָה, אֲבָל הָכָא – בִּשְׂרֵפָה, כִּדְאַשְׁכְּחַן בְּאִמָּהּ.

And according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, one might infer: Just as with regard to his relatives, his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him, so too with regard to her relatives, her daughter-in-law is forbidden to him. And interpret the halakha according to its own place: It is there, with regard to his relatives, that one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is executed by stoning; but here, with regard to her relatives, one who engages in intercourse with her daughter-in-law is executed by burning, as we found that this is the punishment with regard to one who engages in intercourse with her mother.

לְמַאן דְּאָמַר סְקִילָה חֲמוּרָה, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְהוּא – שֶׁכֵּן אִמּוֹ בִּסְקִילָה, תֹּאמַר בְּהִיא – שֶׁאִמָּהּ בִּשְׂרֵפָה?

The Gemara proceeds to explain why this is not a valid derivation. According to the one who says: Execution by stoning is more severe than execution by burning, the inference can be refuted: What is notable about his relatives? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of stoning. Will you then say that the same is true with regard to her relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with her mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of burning?

וְעוֹד: מָה הוּא – חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין בִּתּוֹ לְכַלָּתוֹ? אַף הִיא – תַּחְלוֹק בָּהּ בֵּין בִּתָּהּ לְכַלָּתָהּ. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר נָמֵי שְׂרֵפָה חֲמוּרָה, מֵהַאי קוּשְׁיָא לָא נְידוּנֵין.

And furthermore, just as with regard to his relatives, you distinguished between his daughter and his daughter-in-law, and one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning while one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is executed by stoning, so too with regard to her relatives, distinguish between her daughter and her daughter-in-law. This is contrary to the parallel drawn between his relatives and her relatives, and the halakha cannot be derived. And according to the one who says that burning is more severe than stoning, although the refutations based on the fact that execution by stoning is more severe are not relevant, due to this latter difficulty, this halakha is not derived.

בִּתּוֹ מֵאֲנוּסָתוֹ מִנַּיִן? הָאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, עַל בַּת בִּתּוֹ עָנוּשׁ – עַל בִּתּוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?

§ Throughout, it is clear from the Gemara that one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning. The Gemara asks: With regard to one’s daughter born from a woman whom he raped, from where is it derived that she is forbidden to him? The Gemara answers: Doesn’t Abaye say that this is inferred a fortiori: If one is punished for engaging in intercourse with the daughter of his daughter, for engaging in intercourse with his daughter is it not all the more so that he is punished?

וְכִי עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין? גַּלּוֹיֵי מִילְּתָא בְעָלְמָא הוּא.

The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference without an explicit source? The Gemara replies: This is a mere disclosure of the matter, not a derivation by means of an inference. Presumably, the punishment administered to one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his daughter stems from the kinship with his daughter. When the verse states with regard to the daughter of his daughter: “For theirs is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), his daughter is included.

רָבָא אָמַר, אָמַר לִי רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי: אָתְיָא ״הֵנָּה״ ״הֵנָּה״, אָתְיָא ״זִמָּה״ ״זִמָּה״.

Rava says: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter who is not the daughter of his wife is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “henna,” written with regard to his descendants: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness you shall not uncover; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word “henna” written with regard to the descendants of his wife: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). Then, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14).

תָּנֵי אֲבוּהּ דְּרַבִּי אָבִין: לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא לָמַדְנוּ לְבִתּוֹ מֵאֲנוּסָתוֹ, הוּצְרַךְ הַכָּתוּב לוֹמַר ״וּבַת אִישׁ כֹּהֵן״.

The father of Rabbi Avin teaches: Due to the fact that we did not learn a punishment for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter born from a woman whom he raped from an explicit verse in the Torah, it was necessary for the verse to state: “And if the daughter of any priest profanes herself by acting licentiously, it is her father [et aviha] whom she is profaning; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9). The verse can be interpreted: And if the daughter of any priest profanes herself by acting licentiously with her father [et aviha]…she shall be burned with fire.

אִי: מָה בַּת כֹּהֵן – הִיא בִּשְׂרֵפָה וְאֵין בּוֹעֲלָהּ בִּשְׂרֵפָה, אַף בִּתּוֹ מֵאֲנוּסָתוֹ – הִיא בִּשְׂרֵפָה וְאֵין בּוֹעֲלָהּ בִּשְׂרֵפָה?

The Gemara asks: If so, why not say that just as in the case of the daughter of a priest who commits adultery, she is executed by burning but her paramour is executed by strangulation, not by burning, so too in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter born from a woman whom he raped, she is executed by burning but her paramour, i.e., her father, is executed by other means and not by burning?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָמַר קְרָא ״אֶת אָבִיהָ הִיא מְחַלֶּלֶת״, מִי שֶׁמְּחַלֶּלֶת אֶת אָבִיהָ – יָצְתָה זוֹ שֶׁאָבִיהָ מְחַלְּלָהּ.

Abaye says that the verse states: “It is her father whom she is profaning,” from which it is inferred that one who profanes her father by acting licentiously is executed with a court-imposed death penalty different from the death penalty imposed upon her paramour; excluded from that halakha is this case of a daughter whose father engaged in intercourse with her, where it is her father who profanes her.

רָבָא אָמַר: בִּשְׁלָמָא הָתָם, אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ מִדִּינָא דְּבַת כֹּהֵן וְאוֹקֵימְתֵּהּ אַדִּינָא דְּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל. הָכָא, אַדִּינָא דְּמַאן מוֹקְמַתְּ לֵיהּ? אַדִּינָא דִּפְנוּיָיה מוֹקְמַתְּ לֵיהּ?

Rava says: Granted, there, in the case of the daughter of a priest who commits adultery, based on the inference, you excluded the paramour from the punishment of the daughter of a priest, execution by burning, and you established his punishment to correspond with the punishment of an adulterous Israelite woman, who is executed by strangulation. But here, in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter, to correspond with whose punishment do you establish the father’s punishment? The Torah does not state any other form of execution in that case. Will you establish his punishment to correspond with the punishment of an unmarried woman who engages in intercourse, who is not liable to be executed at all? Therefore, there is no alternative to the conclusion that the father, too, is executed by burning.

אַזְהָרָה לְבִתּוֹ מֵאֲנוּסָתוֹ מִנַּיִין? בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא, מֵהֵיכָא דְּנָפְקָא לְהוּ עוֹנֶשׁ, מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לְהוּ אַזְהָרָה.

§ The Gemara asks: From where is the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with his daughter born from a woman whom he raped derived? Granted, according to Abaye and Rava, who, respectively, derive the punishment a fortiori or by means of a verbal analogy, from the same source from which they derive the punishment, from there they derive the prohibition as well, as the source includes a prohibition.

אֶלָּא לִדְתָנֵי אֲבוּהּ דְּרַבִּי אָבִין, מַאי? אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: אָמַר קְרָא, ״אַל תְּחַלֵּל אֶת בִּתְּךָ לְהַזְנוֹתָהּ״.

But according to that which Rabbi Avin’s father teaches, that the punishment is derived from the verse written with regard to the daughter of a priest, what is the source for the prohibition? Rabbi Ile’a says that the prohibition is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously [lehaznotah], lest the land falls into licentiousness, and the land becomes full of lewdness” (Leviticus 19:29), from which it is derived that one may not engage in intercourse with his daughter.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אֲחוּהּ דְּרַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב: הַאי ״אַל תְּחַלֵּל אֶת בִּתְּךָ לְהַזְנוֹתָהּ״ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״אַל תְּחַלֵּל אֶת בִּתְּךָ לְהַזְנוֹתָהּ״ – יָכוֹל בְּכֹהֵן הַמַּשִּׂיא אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְלֵוִי וְיִשְׂרָאֵל הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְהַזְנוֹתָהּ״ – בְּחִילּוּל שֶׁבִּזְנוּת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, בְּמוֹסֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִישׁוּת.

Rabbi Ya’akov, brother of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, objects to this: Does this verse: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously,” come to teach that halakha? This verse is necessary to derive that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously,” one might have thought that it is with regard to a priest who marries his daughter to a Levite or Israelite that the verse is speaking, since marrying an Israelite disqualifies her from partaking of teruma. To counter this, the verse states “by causing her to act licentiously,” indicating that it is with regard to profaning that involves licentiousness that the verse is speaking. The reference is to one who gives his daughter to a man for the purpose of intercourse that is not for the sake of marriage.

אִם כֵּן, לֵימָא קְרָא ״אַל תַּחֵל״! מַאי ״אַל תְּחַלֵּל״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי. וְאַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא, הַאי ״אַל תְּחַלֵּל אֶת בִּתְּךָ לְהַזְנוֹתָהּ״ מַאי עָבְדִי לֵיהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי מָנִי: זֶה הַמַּשִּׂיא אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְזָקֵן.

The Gemara answers: If so, and that is the sole derivation from the verse, let the verse say: Do not profane [taḥel]. What is the reason that the verse uses the more complex form: Do not profane [teḥalel]? Conclude two derivations from it. The Gemara asks: And according to Abaye and Rava, who derive the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter from a different source, what do they do with this verse: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously”? Rabbi Mani says: This verse is referring to one who marries his daughter to an old man. Since she will not be satisfied with him, it will ultimately lead her to engage in adultery, and her father is responsible for causing that situation.

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״אַל תְּחַלֵּל אֶת בִּתְּךָ לְהַזְנוֹתָהּ״. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: זֶה הַמַּשִּׂיא אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְזָקֵן. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: זֶה הַמַּשְׁהֶא בִּתּוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת.

This derivation is as it is taught in a baraita: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously.” Rabbi Eliezer says: This is referring to one who marries his daughter to an old man. Rabbi Akiva says: This is referring to one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman. Since she finds no permissible outlet for her sexual desire, she is apt to engage in licentiousness.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אֵין לְךָ עָנִי בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אֶלָּא רָשָׁע עָרוּם, וְהַמַּשְׁהֶא בִּתּוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת. אַטּוּ הַמַּשְׁהֶא בִּתּוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת לָאו רָשָׁע עָרוּם הוּא?

Rav Kahana says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: You do not have a pauper among the Jewish people other than one who is a conniving wicked person, who seeks to conceal his true nature, and one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman is not a conniving, wicked person? He connives to delay her marriage to ensure that she will stay at home and do the housework, sparing him the cost of domestic help, and thereby causes her to sin.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי:

Abaye says:

הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵיזֶהוּ עָנִי רָשָׁע עָרוּם? זֶה הַמַּשְׁהֶא בִּתּוֹ בּוֹגֶרֶת. וְאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הֱוֵי זָהִיר מִן הַיּוֹעֶצְךָ לְפִי דַּרְכּוֹ.

This is what Rav Kahana is saying: Who is a pauper who, due to his poverty, becomes a conniving, wicked person? This is one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman. And Rav Kahana says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: Beware of one who advises you according to his own interests, as he is likely motivated by personal gain.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הַמַּשִּׂיא אֶת בִּתּוֹ לְזָקֵן, וְהַמַּשִּׂיא אִשָּׁה לִבְנוֹ קָטָן, וְהַמַּחְזִיר אֲבֵידָה לְנׇכְרִי – עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״לְמַעַן סְפוֹת הָרָוָה אֶת הַצְּמֵאָה. לֹא יֹאבֶה ה׳ סְלֹחַ לוֹ״.

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: One who marries his daughter to an old man, and one who takes a wife for his minor son, and one who returns a lost item to a gentile are all individuals who are the cause of sin. Marriage to an old man or a minor leaves the woman unsatisfied and is apt to lead to licentiousness. One who returns lost property to gentiles adds to the property that they stole from Jews. With regard to each of them the verse states: “Lest there should be among you a man or a woman…whose heart turns away this day from the Lord…saying: I will have peace, even though I walk in the stubbornness of my heart, that the quenched shall be added to the thirsty. The Lord will not be willing to pardon him” (Deuteronomy 29:17-19).

מֵיתִיבִי: הָאוֹהֵב אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ כְּגוּפוֹ, וְהַמְכַבְּדָהּ יוֹתֵר מִגּוּפוֹ, וְהַמַּדְרִיךְ בָּנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו בְּדֶרֶךְ יְשָׁרָה, וְהַמַּשִּׂיאָן סָמוּךְ לְפִירְקָן – עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״וְיָדַעְתָּ כִּי שָׁלוֹם אׇהֳלֶךָ וּפָקַדְתָּ נָוְךָ וְלֹא תֶחֱטָא״. סָמוּךְ לְפִירְקָן – שָׁאנֵי.

The Gemara raises an objection to one element of the ruling of Rav from a baraita: One who loves his wife as he loves himself, and who esteems her by giving her clothing and jewelry more than he esteems himself, and one who instructs his sons and daughters to follow an upright path, and who marries them to appropriate spouses adjacent to their reaching puberty, ensures that his home will be devoid of quarrel and sin. Concerning him the verse states: “And you shall know that your tent is in peace; and you shall visit your habitation and shall miss nothing” (Job 5:24). The baraita indicates that it is a mitzva to marry one’s children to appropriate spouses while they are young, contrary to the statement of Rav that one who takes a wife for his minor son causes sin. The Gemara replies: Adjacent to their reaching puberty is different from marrying her to a minor, as there is no concern that his daughter will sin during the brief period until her husband reaches puberty.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָאוֹהֵב אֶת שְׁכֵינָיו, וְהַמְקָרֵב אֶת קְרוֹבָיו, וְהַנּוֹשֵׂא אֶת בַּת אֲחוֹתוֹ, וְהַמַּלְוֶה סֶלַע לְעָנִי בִּשְׁעַת דּוֹחְקוֹ – עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״אָז תִּקְרָא וַה׳ יַעֲנֶה״.

The Sages taught: One who loves his neighbors, and one who brings his relatives close, and one who marries the daughter of his sister, an example of a woman that he knows and likes before taking her as his wife, and one who lends a sela to a poor man at his time of need, when he has no alternative source of funds, with regard to each of them the verse states: “Break your bread for the hungry, and the poor that are cast out bring to your house; when you see the naked, you shall clothe him, and hide not yourself from your own flesh…then shall you call, and the Lord will answer; you shall cry, and He will say: Here I am” (Isaiah 58:7–9).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אֹתוֹ וְאֶתְהֶן״ – אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אַחַת מֵהֶן, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת שְׁתֵּיהֶן.

§ The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14). What is the meaning of “both him and them”? It means him and one of them, as one woman is his wife. He is liable for engaging in intercourse with the other woman; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It means him and the two of them.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַשְׁמָעוּת דּוֹרְשִׁים אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? Clearly Rabbi Akiva does not hold that his wife is punished when he engages in intercourse with her relative. Abaye says: The difference between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael is with regard to the interpretation of the meaning of the verse.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: ״אֹתוֹ וְאֶתְהֶן״ – אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אַחַת מֵהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן בְּלָשׁוֹן יְוָנִי קוֹרִין לְאַחַת ״הִינָא״. וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ – מִדְּרָשָׁא אָתְיָא. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: ״אֹתוֹ וְאֶתְהֶן״ – אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת שְׁתֵּיהֶן, וְאֵם חֲמוֹתוֹ הָכָא כְּתִיבָא.

Rabbi Yishmael holds that the term “both him and them [et’hen]” means him and one of them, as in the Greek language one calls the number one heina. The prohibition in the verse is with regard to one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife. And the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law is derived through an interpretation of the verses and is not written explicitly in the Torah. Rabbi Akiva holds that the term “both him and them” means him and both of them; the prohibition in the verse is with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the prohibition for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law is also written here explicitly.

רָבָא אָמַר: חֲמוֹתוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: חֲמוֹתוֹ לְאַחַר מִיתָה בִּשְׂרֵפָה, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: אִיסּוּרָא בְּעָלְמָא.

Rava says: Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva agree that the prohibition with regard to the mother of his mother-in-law is derived through interpretation, and the difference between them is with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law after the death of his wife. Rabbi Yishmael holds that one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law after the death of his wife is executed by burning. The verse indicates: Both him and one of them, meaning that he is liable to be executed by burning even if only one of the pair of his wife and mother-in-law is alive, i.e., when his wife is deceased and he engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law. And Rabbi Akiva maintains that in that case, one violates a mere prohibition and is not liable to be executed.

מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ הַנֶּהֱרָגִין: הָרוֹצֵחַ, וְאַנְשֵׁי עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת.

MISHNA: And these are the transgressors who are killed by decapitation in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: The murderer; and the residents of an idolatrous city, all of whom engaged in idol worship.

רוֹצֵחַ שֶׁהִכָּה אֵת רֵעֵהוּ בְּאֶבֶן אוֹ בְּבַרְזֶל, וְכָבַשׁ עָלָיו לְתוֹךְ הַמַּיִם אוֹ לְתוֹךְ הָאוּר, וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַעֲלוֹת מִשָּׁם וָמֵת – חַיָּיב.

The mishna elaborates: In the case of a murderer who struck another with a stone or with iron, or held him in the water or in the fire, and the victim could not extricate himself from there and he died, the murderer is liable to be executed.

דְּחָפוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַמַּיִם אוֹ לְתוֹךְ הָאוּר, וְיָכוֹל לַעֲלוֹת מִשָּׁם וָמֵת – פָּטוּר. שִׁיסָּה בּוֹ אֶת הַכֶּלֶב, שִׁיסָּה בּוֹ אֶת הַנָּחָשׁ – פָּטוּר. הִשִּׁיךְ בּוֹ אֶת הַנָּחָשׁ: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

If one pushed another into the water or into the fire and that person could have extricated himself from there but failed to do so, and he died, the one who pushed him is exempt from punishment by a court, as he caused the death but did not actually kill the victim. For the same reason, if one set a dog against another and the dog killed him, or if one set a snake against another and the snake killed him, the one who set the dog or the snake is exempt from punishment. If he imbedded the snake’s fangs into another and caused the snake to bite him and kill him, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to be executed, as he is a murderer, and the Rabbis exempt him, as they maintain that he indirectly caused the individual’s death.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא נֶאֶמְרָה ״יָד״ בַּבַּרְזֶל? שֶׁהַבַּרְזֶל מֵמִית בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא.

GEMARA: The verses state with regard to a murderer: “And if he struck him with a stone in hand, by which a man may die…or if he struck him with an instrument of wood in hand, by which a man may die, and he died, he is a murderer; the murderer shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:17-18). The term “in hand” indicates that one is liable for murder only if he utilized a stone or a wooden instrument that was of at least a certain measure. Shmuel says: For what reason was the term “in hand” not stated with regard to the iron instrument, as it is written: “But if he struck him with an instrument of iron, so that he died” (Numbers 35:16)? The reason is that an iron instrument of any size kills.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר, גָּלוּי וְיָדוּעַ לִפְנֵי מִי שֶׁאָמַר וְהָיָה הָעוֹלָם שֶׁהַבַּרְזֶל מֵמִית בְּכׇל שֶׁהוּא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא נָתְנָה תּוֹרָה בּוֹ שִׁיעוּר. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּבַרְזֵיהּ מִיבְרָז.

This is also taught in a baraita. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is revealed and known before He Who spoke and the world came into being that an iron instrument of any size kills. Therefore, the Torah did not provide a measure for it. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only when the murderer stabbed him with the iron instrument. But in a case where the murderer struck another with an iron instrument, he is liable only if the instrument was at least a certain measure capable of causing death.

וְכָבַשׁ עָלָיו לְתוֹךְ הַמַּיִם. רֵישָׁא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, וְסֵיפָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רֵישָׁא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו אִיהוּ דְּחָפוֹ, כֵּיוָן דְּאֵין יָכוֹל לַעֲלוֹת מִשָּׁם וָמֵת – חַיָּיב. סֵיפָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: אַף עַל גַּב דִּדְחָפוֹ, כֵּיוָן דְּיָכוֹל לַעֲלוֹת מִשָּׁם וָמֵת – פָּטוּר.

§ The mishna teaches: Or held him in the water and that other person died, the murderer is liable. The Gemara comments: The first clause of the mishna teaches us a novel element, and the latter clause of the mishna teaches us a novel element. The first clause teaches us a novel element: Even though it was not he who pushed the individual into the water, since he held the victim and the victim could not extricate himself from there and he died, the one who held him in the water is liable to be executed. The latter clause teaches us a novel element: Even though he pushed the individual into the water, since the victim could have extricated himself from there but failed to do so and he died, the one who pushed him is exempt from punishment.

כָּבַשׁ – מְנָלַן? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״אוֹ בְאֵיבָה״, לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמְצַמְצֵם.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one who held another in the water is liable to be executed? Shmuel says: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Or in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). The phrase “or in enmity” serves to include one who confines another in a place where he cannot survive.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּצַמְצְמַהּ לְחֵיוְתָא דְּחַבְרֵיהּ בְּשִׁימְשָׁא, וּמִתָה. רָבִינָא מְחַיֵּיב, רַב אַחָא בַּר רַב פָּטַר.

There was a certain man who confined the animal of another in a place in the sun and it died from exposure to the sun. Ravina deemed the man liable to recompense the owner as though his action caused the death of the animal. Rav Aḥa bar Rav deemed him exempt from recompensing the owner, as it was not his action that caused the death of the animal.

רָבִינָא מְחַיֵּיב, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה רוֹצֵחַ שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בּוֹ שׁוֹגֵג כְּמֵזִיד וְאוֹנֶס כְּרָצוֹן, חִיֵּיב בּוֹ אֶת הַמְצַמְצֵם.

The Gemara elaborates: Ravina deemed him liable to recompense the owner, and he derived it by means of an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to a murderer, where the Torah did not render the legal status of one who kills unwittingly, who is exiled, like that of one who kills intentionally, who is executed, and did not render the status of one who kills due to circumstances beyond his control, who is exempt from punishment, like that of one who kills with intent, who is liable, nevertheless the Torah rendered one who confines another in a place where he cannot survive liable to be executed, even though he did not perform an action;