סנהדרין פח

סנהדרין פח

לִפְרִיחָה בִּבְגָדִים, שֶׁהִיא טְהוֹרָה?

with regard to a case where there is a spread of leprosy in garments that culminates with the garment’s being completely covered with leprous marks that the garment is pure, just as it is with regard to leprosy of a person?

נֶאֶמְרָה קָרַחַת וְגַבַּחַת בָּאָדָם, וְנֶאֶמְרָה קָרַחַת וְגַבַּחַת בִּבְגָדִים. מָה לְהַלָּן – פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ טָהוֹר, אַף כָּאן – פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ טָהוֹר.

Karaḥat and gabbaḥat are stated with regard to leprosy of a person (see Leviticus 13:42), in the sense of baldness on the back of one’s head and forehead, and karaḥat and gabbaḥat are stated with regard to leprosy of garments (see Leviticus 13:55), in the sense of the newer and the older sections of the garment. Just as there, with regard to leprosy of a person, if the leprosy spread to his entire body he is pure, so too here, with regard to leprosy of garments, if the leprosy spread to the entire garment it is pure. The Rabbis disagree and hold that even if the leprosy spreads, the garment remains impure. Therefore, if one touches the garment throughout which the leprosy spread and enters the Temple, according to the Rabbis, he is liable to receive karet, while according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos, he is not liable.

״דִּבְרֵי״ – אֵלּוּ הָעֲרָכִין, וְהַחֲרָמִים, וְהַהֶקְדֵּישׁוֹת. הָעֲרָכִין – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבָּנַן, דִּתְנַן: הַמַּעֲרִיךְ פָּחוֹת מִבֶּן חֹדֶשׁ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן דָּמָיו, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

“Matters of”; these are the valuations, and the dedications, and the consecrations. The Gemara elaborates: In the case of valuations, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, as we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who valuates a child less than one month old, for whom the Torah does not specify a value, Rabbi Meir says: He gives the monetary value of the child, as it is apparent that his intent was to give a donation, not a valuation. And the Rabbis say: He did not say anything. If the money is consecrated and one betrothed a woman with it, she is not betrothed, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet.

הַחֲרָמִים – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָה וְרַבָּנַן. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָה אוֹמֵר: סְתַם חֲרָמִים לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כׇּל חֵרֶם קֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים הוּא לַה׳״.

In the case of dedications, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 28b): Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for Temple maintenance, as it is stated: “Every dedicated item is most sacred unto the Lord” (Leviticus 27:28).

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: סְתַם חֲרָמִים לַכֹּהֵן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּשְׂדֵה הַחֵרֶם לַכֹּהֵן תִּהְיֶה אֲחֻזָּתוֹ״. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הוּא לַה׳״? שֶׁחָל עַל קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים וְעַל קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.

And the Rabbis say: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for the priest, as it is stated with regard to one who consecrated a field and did not redeem it: “As a field dedicated; to the priest shall be its possession” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why must the verse state: “Every dedicated item is most sacred unto the Lord”? It is to teach that dedication takes effect on offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity. According to the Rabbis, the property is not consecrated, and if a woman is betrothed with that property, the betrothal takes effect, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, the property is consecrated and he is not liable.

הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב וְרַבָּנַן. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ צִינּוֹרָא שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ צְרִיכָה עֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם לִפְדּוֹתָהּ.

In the case of consecrations, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even a small fork that is consecrated property requires a court consisting of ten people in order to redeem it. The Rabbis say: A court of three judges is sufficient. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, if it is redeemed before a court of three, the property remains consecrated. According to the Rabbis, the property is not consecrated, and if a woman is betrothed with that property, the betrothal takes effect, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, the property is consecrated and he is not liable.

״רִיבֹת״ – זֶה הַשְׁקָאַת סוֹטָה, וַעֲרִיפַת הָעֶגְלָה, וְטׇהֳרַת מְצוֹרָע. הַשְׁקָאַת סוֹטָה – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, דִּתְנַן: הַמְקַנֵּא לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מְקַנֵּא עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וּמַשְׁקֶה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד אוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ.

“Disputes”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota to drink, and the heifer whose neck is broken, and the purification of a leper. In the case of giving the bitter waters to a sota to drink, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 2a): With regard to one who issues a warning to his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man, Rabbi Eliezer says: He issues a warning to her based on the presence of two witnesses; only then is the warning effective. And the husband gives her the bitter waters based on the testimony of one witness who saw the seclusion, or even based on his own testimony.

רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: מְקַנֵּא עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וּמַשְׁקֶה עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: He both issues a warning to her based on the presence of two witnesses and gives her the bitter waters to drink based on the testimony of two witnesses to the seclusion. If the seclusion took place in the presence of one witness, according to Rabbi Eliezer, she is a sota and not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, she is not a sota and she is entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. The difference is whether the money of her marriage contract is hers. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if she gave that money to another who betrothed a woman with it, it is a betrothal with stolen property and the woman is not betrothed. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the betrothal would not take effect.

עֲרִיפַת עֶגְלָה – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. דִּתְנַן: מֵאַיִן הָיוּ מוֹדְדִין? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִטִּיבּוּרוֹ, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מֵחוֹטְמוֹ, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁנַּעֲשֶׂה חָלָל – מִצַּוָּארוֹ.

In the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 45b): From where on the body of the murder victim would they measure the distance to determine which city is closest? Rabbi Eliezer says: From his navel. Rabbi Akiva says: From his nose. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From the place where he became a slain person, which is from his neck. According to all of these tanna’im, if the corpse was measured from a place on the body other than the place prescribed, the heifer is not consecrated for its purpose. According to Rabbi Akiva, if the measurement was taken from his navel, the heifer is not consecrated for its purpose, while according to Rabbi Eliezer, it is consecrated for its purpose. This has clear ramifications with regard to a situation in which one attempts to betroth a woman with that heifer.

טׇהֳרַת מְצוֹרָע – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן. דִּתְנַן: אֵין לוֹ בֹּהֶן יָד, בֹּהֶן רֶגֶל, אוֹזֶן יְמָנִית – אֵין לוֹ טׇהֳרָה עוֹלָמִית. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לוֹ עַל מְקוֹמוֹ וְיוֹצֵא. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן עַל שֶׁל שְׂמֹאל וְיוֹצֵא.

In the case of the purification of a leper, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 14:9): If a leper does not have a thumb, or a big toe, or a right ear upon which the Torah says that blood and oil must be placed as part of the purification process for a leper, he has no possibility of purification forever. Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest places the blood and oil for him on its place, i.e., where those body parts would have been if they were intact, and he fulfills his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: The priest places the blood and oil on his left thumb, toe, and ear, and he fulfills his obligation. Both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon maintain that it is possible to purify such a leper, who would then not be liable to be punished with karet if he were to enter the Temple. The Rabbis, who maintain that such a leper has no possibility of purification, hold that if he enters the Temple he is liable to be punished with karet.

״בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ״ – זֶה לֶקֶט, שִׁכְחָה, פֵּיאָה. לֶקֶט – דִּתְנַן: שְׁנֵי שִׁבֳּלִין – לֶקֶט, שְׁלֹשָׁה – אֵינָן לֶקֶט. שִׁכְחָה – שְׁנֵי עֳמָרִין – שִׁכְחָה, שְׁלֹשָׁה – אֵינָן שִׁכְחָה.

“In your gates”; this is gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a]. In the case of gleanings, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is as we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 6:5): Two stalks that were not cut with the sheaves and are then found in a field by a poor person are gleanings and belong to the poor person. Three stalks are not gleanings and the owner of the field can take them, if he chooses. In the case of forgotten sheaves, the same mishna teaches that if he forgot two sheaves, they are forgotten sheaves and belong to the poor, whereas three or more bundles are not forgotten sheaves and belong to the owner of the field.

וְעַל כּוּלָּן בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: שָׁלֹשׁ לְעָנִי, וְאַרְבַּע לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת.

And with regard to all of them, Beit Shammai say: If there are three, it belongs to the poor person, and if there are four, it belongs to the owner. According to Beit Hillel, if a poor person took three stalks or sheaves, they do not belong to him, and if he betrothed a woman with them, the betrothal does not take effect. According to Beit Shammai, she is betrothed.

פֵּיאָה – בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבָּנַן. דִּתְנַן: מִצְוַת פֵּיאָה לְהַפְרִישׁ מִן הַקָּמָה. לֹא הִפְרִישׁ מִן הַקָּמָה – יַפְרִישׁ מִן הָעֳמָרִין. לֹא הִפְרִישׁ מִן הָעֳמָרִין – יַפְרִישׁ מִן הַכְּרִי עַד שֶׁלֹּא מֵירְחוֹ. מֵירְחוֹ – מְעַשֵּׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ.

In the case of pe’a, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis, as we learned in a baraita: The mitzva of pe’a is to designate it from the standing grain still growing from the ground. If he did not designate it from the standing grain, but reaped the entire field, he designates a portion from the sheaves as pe’a. If he did not designate it from the sheaves, he designates it from the pile where one places the kernels after threshing, before he smooths the pile, at which point the produce is considered grain from which one is obligated to take terumot and tithes. If he already smoothed the pile before designating the pe’a, he tithes the grain in the pile and then gives the pe’a to the poor. If he ground the kernels into flour, he no longer designates pe’a.

מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ: אַף מַפְרִישׁ מִן הָעִיסָּה.

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said: One designates pe’a even from the dough. If a poor person takes pe’a from the dough and betroths a woman with the dough, according to the Rabbis the betrothal does not take effect, while according to Rabbi Yishmael, she is betrothed.

שְׁלֹשָׁה בָּתֵּי דִינִין וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: הוּא אוֹמֵר מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִין מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה – אֵינוֹ נֶהֱרָג.

§ The mishna teaches: There were three courts there in Jerusalem. The mishna then details the procedure followed when a rebellious elder appeared before these courts. Rav Kahana says: If the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition he received from his teacher, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition they received from their teachers, the rebellious elder is not executed, because there is a legitimate basis for his ruling.

הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינַי״, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִין: ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינֵינוּ״ – אֵינוֹ נֶהֱרָג. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה״, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִין: ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינֵינוּ״ – אֵינוֹ נֶהֱרָג. עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינַי״, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִים: ״מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה״. תֵּדַע, שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא הָרְגוּ אֶת עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל.

If the rebellious elder says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and does not claim that his ruling is based on tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is not executed. And all the more so if he says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is not executed. He is not executed unless he flouts tradition on the basis of his understanding and says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition. Know that this is so, as Akavya ben Mahalalel was not executed despite the fact that he ruled contrary to the consensus ruling of his contemporaries, because he based his ruling on a tradition that he received.

וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הוּא אוֹמֵר ״מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה״, וְהֵן אוֹמְרִין ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינֵינוּ״ – נֶהֱרָג, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִרְבּוּ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. וְאִם תֹּאמַר: מִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא הָרְגוּ אֶת עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הוֹרָה הֲלָכָה לְמַעֲשֶׂה.

And Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is executed, so that discord will not proliferate among Israel and to ensure that there will be a standard halakhic ruling. And if you say: For what reason was Akavya ben Mahalalel not executed? It is due to the fact that he did not issue his ruling as practical halakha; he merely claimed that his understanding was correct in theory, which is always permitted.

תְּנַן: כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי, וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵירַי; כָּךְ לִמַּדְתִּי, וְכָךְ לִמְּדוּ חֲבֵירַי. מַאי לָאו? דְּהוּא אָמַר ״מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה״, וְהֵם אוֹמְרִין: ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינֵינוּ״? לָא, הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״כָּךְ הוּא בְּעֵינַי״, וְהֵם אוֹמְרִים מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה.

We learned in the mishna that the rebellious elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. The Gemara asks: What, is it not including a case where he says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes? The Gemara rejects this: No, the reference is to a case where he says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים סָח לִי זְעֵירָא מֵאַנְשֵׁי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם: בַּעַל שֶׁמָּחַל עַל קִינּוּיוֹ – קִינּוּיוֹ מָחוּל.

Come and hear proof from that which Rabbi Yoshiya says: There are three matters that Zeira, one of the residents of Jerusalem, said to me: The first is that in the case of a husband who, after warning his wife not to enter into seclusion with a certain man, retracted his warning, his warning is retracted, and if she enters into seclusion with that man, she is not rendered forbidden to her husband.

בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, שֶׁרָצוּ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ לִמְחוֹל לוֹ – מוֹחֲלִין לוֹ.

The second matter is that in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son whose father and mother sought to forgive him for his gluttonous and drunken conduct and decided not to bring him to court, they can forgive him.

זָקֵן מַמְרֵא שֶׁרָצוּ בֵּית דִּינוֹ לִמְחוֹל לוֹ – מוֹחֲלִין לוֹ. וּכְשֶׁבָּאתִי אֵצֶל חֲבֵירַי שֶׁבַּדָּרוֹם, עַל שְׁנַיִם הוֹדוּ לִי, עַל זָקֵן מַמְרֵא לֹא הוֹדוּ לִי, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִרְבּוּ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The third is that in the case of a rebellious elder whom his court sought to forgive for his deviation from their ruling, they can forgive him. And when I came to my colleagues in the South, with regard to two of the cases they agreed with me, but with regard to a rebellious elder they did not agree with me, so that discord would not proliferate in Israel. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Kahana.

תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: מִתְּחִילָּה לֹא הָיוּ (מַרְבִּין) מַחְלוֹקוֹת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, אֶלָּא בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד יוֹשְׁבִין בְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית, וּשְׁנֵי בָּתֵּי דִינִין שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה, וּשְׁאָר בָּתֵּי דִינִין שֶׁל עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה יוֹשְׁבִין בְּכׇל עַיְירוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל.

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: Initially, discord would not proliferate among Israel. Rather, the court of seventy-one judges would sit in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. And there were two additional courts each consisting of twenty-three judges; one would convene at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one would convene at the entrance to the Temple courtyard. And all the other courts consisting of twenty-three judges would convene in all cities inhabited by the Jewish people.

הוּצְרַךְ הַדָּבָר לִשְׁאוֹל, שׁוֹאֲלִין מִבֵּית דִּין שֶׁבְּעִירָן. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶן. וְאִם לָאו, בָּאִין לָזֶה שֶׁסָּמוּךְ לְעִירָן. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶם. וְאִם לָאו, בָּאִין לָזֶה שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶם. וְאִם לָאו, בָּאִין לָזֶה שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה.

If the matter was unclear and it was necessary to ask and clarify it, those uncertain of the halakha would ask the court that is in their city. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to a court that is adjacent to their city. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to the court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard.

וְאוֹמֵר: כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵירַי, כָּךְ לִמַּדְתִּי וְכָךְ לִמְּדוּ חֲבֵירַי. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶם. וְאִם לָאו, אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ בָּאִין לְלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית, שֶׁשָּׁם יוֹשְׁבִין מִתָּמִיד שֶׁל שַׁחַר עַד תָּמִיד שֶׁל בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם.

And the elder whose ruling deviated from the ruling of his colleagues says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, these judges and those judges would come to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, where the Sanhedrin would be convened from the time that the daily morning offering is sacrificed until the time that the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed.

וּבְשַׁבָּתוֹת וּבְיָמִים טוֹבִים, יוֹשְׁבִין בַּחֵיל. נִשְׁאֲלָה שְׁאֵלָה בִּפְנֵיהֶם, אִם שָׁמְעוּ – אָמְרוּ לָהֶם, וְאִם לָאו – עוֹמְדִין לַמִּנְיָן. רַבּוּ הַמְטַמְּאִים – טִמְּאוּ, רַבּוּ הַמְּטַהֲרִין – טִהֲרוּ.

And on Shabbatot and Festivals, when court is not in session, the members of the court would sit at the rampart. When a question was asked before them, if the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they would say it to them, and if not they would stand for a vote on the matter. If the judges who deemed the item in question ritually impure outnumbered those who deemed it pure, the court would deem the item impure. If the judges who deemed the item in question ritually pure outnumbered those who deemed it impure, the court would deem the item pure.

מִשֶּׁרַבּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי שַׁמַּאי וְהִלֵּל שֶׁלֹּא שִׁמְּשׁוּ כׇּל צָרְכָּן, רַבּוּ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְנַעֲשֵׂית תּוֹרָה כִּשְׁתֵּי תוֹרוֹת.

From the time that the disciples of Shammai and Hillel grew in number, and they were disciples who did not attend to their masters to the requisite degree, dispute proliferated among the Jewish people and the Torah became like two Torahs. Two disparate systems of halakha developed, and there was no longer a halakhic consensus with regard to every matter.

מִשָּׁם כּוֹתְבִין וְשׁוֹלְחִין בְּכׇל מְקוֹמוֹת: כׇּל מִי שֶׁהוּא חָכָם, וּשְׁפַל בֶּרֶךְ, וְדַעַת הַבְּרִיּוֹת נוֹחָה הֵימֶנּוּ – יְהֵא דַּיָּין בְּעִירוֹ. מִשָּׁם מַעֲלִין אוֹתוֹ לְהַר הַבַּיִת, מִשָּׁם לָעֲזָרָה, מִשָּׁם לְלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית.

The baraita continues its discussion of the workings of the Sanhedrin: From there, the Sanhedrin writes and dispatches the following statement to all places: Anyone who is wise and humble and the minds of people are at ease with him shall be a judge in his city. If he is successful in his city, from there, they promote him to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount if there is a vacant seat on the court, and from there they promote him to the court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and from there to the court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: אֵיזֶהוּ בֶּן הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא? עַנְוְותָן וּשְׁפַל בֶּרֶךְ, שָׁיֵיף עָיֵיל שָׁיֵיף וְנָפֵיק, וְגָרֵיס בְּאוֹרָיְיתָא תְּדִירָא, וְלָא מַחְזֵיק טֵיבוּתָא לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ. יְהַבוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן עֵינַיְיהוּ בְּרַב עוּלָּא בַּר אַבָּא.

Apropos the appointment of judges, the Gemara relates that they sent the following statement from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael: Who is the one destined to receive a place in the World-to-Come? It is one who is modest and humble, who bows and enters and bows and exits, and who studies Torah regularly, and who does not take credit for himself. The Sages cast their eyes on Rav Ulla bar Abba, as they perceived him as the embodiment of all these characteristics.

חָזַר לְעִירוֹ וְשָׁנָה. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה כְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁיּוֹרֶה לַאֲחֵרִים וְיַעֲשׂוּ כְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ.

The mishna teaches: If the rebellious elder returned to his city and he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment, unless he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling. The Sages taught: He is not liable unless he acts in accordance with his ruling, or he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling.

בִּשְׁלָמָא יוֹרֶה לַאֲחֵרִים וְיַעֲשׂוּ כְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ – מֵעִיקָּרָא לָאו בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא, וְהַשְׁתָּא בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא. אֶלָּא שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה כְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ? מֵעִיקָּרָא נָמֵי בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא! הָתִינַח הֵיכָא דְּאוֹרִי בְּחֵלֶב וָדָם, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לָאו בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא וְהַשְׁתָּא בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא. אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאוֹרִי בְּחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין, מֵעִיקָּרָא נָמֵי בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא!

The Gemara challenges: Granted, if he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling there is a novel element in the fact that he is liable to be executed, as initially, before he was deemed a rebellious elder, he is not liable to receive the death penalty for instructing others to perform the transgression, and now, he is to receive the death penalty. But if he acts in accordance with his ruling, initially, before he was deemed a rebellious elder, he is also liable to receive the death penalty for performing that action. The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This works out well in a case where he ruled with regard to forbidden fat and blood, as initially he would not have been liable to receive the death penalty; rather, he would have been liable to receive karet, and now he is liable to receive the death penalty. But in a case where he ruled with regard to a transgression for which one is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, initially, he is also liable to receive the death penalty.

מֵעִיקָּרָא – בָּעֵי הַתְרָאָה, הַשְׁתָּא – לָא בָּעֵי הַתְרָאָה.

The Gemara explains: There is a novel element even in a case where he acts in accordance with his ruling, as initially, before he is deemed a rebellious elder, he requires forewarning in order to be executed; now, he does not require forewarning in order to be executed.

מֵסִית, דְּלָא בָּעֵי הַתְרָאָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? מֵעִיקָּרָא, אִי אָמַר טַעְמָא – מְקַבְּלִינַן מִינֵּיהּ. הַשְׁתָּא, אִי אָמַר טַעְמָא – לָא מְקַבְּלִינַן מִינֵּיהּ.

The Gemara asks: If the rebellious elder’s ruling was with regard to one who instigates others to engage in idol worship, who does not require forewarning, what is there to say? Both before and after he is deemed a rebellious elder he is executed without forewarning. The Gemara answers: Initially, before the rebellious elder ruled that instigating others to engage in idol worship is permitted, if after he instigated others, he stated a reason why he thought that it is permitted, we accept his explanation from him and exempt him. Now, after he issued the divergent ruling, if he stated a reason, we do not accept the explanation from him, since he already indicated that he holds that instigating others to engage in idol worship incitement is permitted and that is the reason that he engaged in instigation.

מַתְנִי׳ חוֹמֶר בְּדִבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים מִבְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה. הָאוֹמֵר: ״אֵין תְּפִילִּין״, כְּדֵי לַעֲבוֹר עַל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה – פָּטוּר. ״חָמֵשׁ טוֹטָפוֹת״, לְהוֹסִיף עַל דִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: With regard to the rulings of the rebellious elder the mishna states: There is greater stringency with regard to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah than with regard to matters of Torah. If one states: There is no mitzva to don phylacteries, and his intention is in order to have others violate matters of Torah, he is exempt from punishment as a rebellious elder. One who disputes matters written explicitly in the Torah is not considered an elder and a Torah scholar, and therefore does not assume the status of a rebellious elder. If, however, he disputed a matter based on rabbinic tradition, e.g., he stated that there should be five compartments in the phylacteries of the head, in order to add an extra compartment to the four established according to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah, he is liable.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁעִיקָּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וּפֵירוּשׁוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים, וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ לְהוֹסִיף, וְאִם הוֹסִיף גּוֹרֵעַ. וְאֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא תְּפִילִּין, אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: One is liable only for issuing a ruling with regard to a matter whose essence, whose basic obligation, is from matters of Torah and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah and which includes the possibility to add to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation. And we have only the mitzva to don phylacteries that meets those criteria. And Rabbi Oshaya’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A rebellious elder is liable only for a matter whose essence is from matters of Torah and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah.

וְהָאִיכָּא לוּלָב, דְּעִיקָּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וּפֵירוּשׁוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים, וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ לְהוֹסִיף, וְאִם הוֹסִיף – גּוֹרֵעַ?

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of lulav and the other species that one takes on the festival of Sukkot, whose essence is from matters of Torah, and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations that establish the identity and the number of the four species enumerated in the Torah, and which includes the possibility to add other species to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation?

בְּלוּלָב, מַאי סְבִירָא לַן? אִי סְבִירָא לַן דְּלוּלָב אֵין צָרִיךְ אֶגֶד, הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי. וְאִי סְבִירָא לַן דְּצָרִיךְ אֶגֶד, גָּרוּעַ וְעוֹמֵד הוּא.

The Gemara rejects this possibility: That is not the case, as with regard to the mitzva of lulav, what do we hold? If we hold that fundamentally a lulav does not require binding of the species together in order to fulfill the mitzva, then adding an additional species is inconsequential, as these species with which he fulfills the mitzva stand alone and that additional species stands alone. It is as though he were holding the species of the mitzva and an additional unrelated item that does not affect fulfillment of the mitzva. And if we hold that a lulav requires binding of the four species together in order to fulfill the mitzva, fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset. The rebellious elder is liable only when the object of the mitzva was as it should be and the addition compromised that object and disqualifies it. In this case, the object was never as it should be.

וְהָאִיכָּא צִיצִית, דְּעִיקָּרוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וּפֵירוּשׁוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים, וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ לְהוֹסִיף, וְאִם הוֹסִיף – גּוֹרֵעַ?

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of ritual fringes, whose essence is from matters of Torah, and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations that establish the number of fringes enumerated in the Torah and the number of threads in each fringe, and which includes the possibility to add fringes or threads to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation?

בְּצִיצִית, מַאי סְבִירָא לַן? אִי סְבִירָא לַן דְּקֶשֶׁר הָעֶלְיוֹן לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי. וְאִי סְבִירָא לַן

The Gemara rejects this possibility: That is not the case, as with regard to ritual fringes, what do we hold? If we hold that the upper knot is not mandated by Torah law, and one fulfills his obligation by placing the threads on the corner of the garment, these threads with which he fulfills the mitzva are independent and that additional thread is independent and does not compromise fulfillment of the mitzva. The additional string is not considered as joined to the required strings. And if we hold