The rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether a humiliation payment is paid by one who humiliates a Canaanite slave. The basis of their debate depends on whether a Caananite slave falls under the term ‘your brother’ that is used in the verse in the Torah regarding the humiliation payment. How do their interpretations of ‘brother’ fit in with other Torah verses that use that term as well, such as false witnesses (eidim zomeim) who testify against ‘their brother’, a king that is chosen from among ‘your brothers’, and who is qualified to be a witness. The Gemara brings two different ways to learn that slaves cannot be witnesses. How is it different than a convert whose testimony is accepted? The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba wanted him to inherit her property when she died instead of her husband so she wrote a document bequeathing it to him. Since her husband had rights to the produce of the property while they were married when she wrote the document, did she have the right to pass on the property to her son? The rabbis disagreed about this and the Gemara explains the basis of their positions.
Bava Kamma 88
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Masechet Bava Kamma is sponsored by the Futornick Family in loving memory of their fathers and grandfathers, Phillip Kaufman and David Futornick.
Bava Kamma 88
דְּאַפְחֲתַהּ מִכַּסְפַּהּ; אֲבָל פְּצִיעָה – דְּלָא אַפְחֲתַהּ מִכַּסְפַּהּ, לָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ!
by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: שֶׁפְּצָעָהּ בְּפָנֶיהָ, וְאַפְחֲתַהּ מִכַּסְפַּהּ.
Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Rabbi Yoḥanan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.
הַחוֹבֵל בְּעֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים – חַיָּיב וְכוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו אִישׁ וְאָחִיו״ – בְּמִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ אַחְוָה, יָצָא עֶבֶד שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אַחְוָה. וְרַבָּנַן – אָחִיו הוּא בְּמִצְוֹת.
§ The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: “When men strive together, a man and his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation “and his brother” teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jews’ brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – זוֹמְמֵי עֶבֶד לֹא יֵהָרְגוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״! אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: “You shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall put away the evil from your midst,” indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבָּנַן – עֶבֶד יְהֵא כָּשֵׁר לַמַּלְכוּת! אָמְרִי: וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, תִּיקְשֵׁי לָךְ גֵּר – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל! אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ״ – מִמּוּבְחָר שֶׁבְּאַחֶיךָ.
The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,” which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבָּנַן – יְהֵא עֶבֶד כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִנֵּה עֵד שֶׁקֶר הָעֵד, שֶׁקֶר עָנָה בְאָחִיו״!
The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: “And behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?
אָמַר עוּלָּא: עֵדוּת לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ; אָתְיָא עֵדוּת בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵאִשָּׁה: וּמָה אִשָּׁה, שֶׁהִיא רְאוּיָה לָבֹא בַּקָּהָל – פְּסוּלָה לְעֵדוּת; עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָבֹא בַּקָּהָל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁפָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת?
Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?
מָה לְאִשָּׁה – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לְמִילָה; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְמִילָה?! קָטָן יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בְּמִילָה, וּפָסוּל לְעֵדוּת.
The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one’s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one’s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.
מָה לְקָטָן – שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד, שֶׁהוּא בְּמִצְוֹת?! אִשָּׁה תּוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָהּ בְּמִצְוֹת, וּפְסוּלָה לְעֵדוּת.
This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.
וְחָזַר הַדִּין: לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן בְּכׇל הַמִּצְוֹת, וּפְסוּלִין לְהָעִיד; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אֶת הָעֶבֶד – שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּכׇל הַמִּצְוֹת, וּפָסוּל לְהָעִיד.
And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶם – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ אִישׁ; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד, שֶׁהוּא אִישׁ?!
This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?
אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִגַּזְלָן. מָה לְגַזְלָן – שֶׁכֵּן מַעֲשָׂיו גָּרְמוּ לוֹ; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד – שֶׁאֵין מַעֲשָׂיו גָּרְמוּ לוֹ?!
The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?
אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִגַּזְלָן וּמֵחַד מֵהָנָךְ.
The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.
מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״ – לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי אָבוֹת שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס בָּנִים. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ כִּדְאָמְרִינַן: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״ – בְּעֵדוּת בָּנִים; לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בְּנֵיהֶם״! מַאי ״בָּנִים״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דְּלֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי אָבוֹת שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס בָּנִים.
Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children” (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [ḥayis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: “Children,” without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״ – הָכִי נָמֵי, לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי בָּנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס אָבוֹת? אֶלָּא גֵּר הָכִי נָמֵי דְּפָסוּל לְעֵדוּת?!
The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers” (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.
אָמְרִי: הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! גֵּר, נְהִי דְּאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לְמַעְלָה, לְמַטָּה יֵשׁ לוֹ חַיִיס; לְאַפּוֹקֵי עֶבֶד, דְּאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לֹא לְמַעְלָה וְלֹא לְמַטָּה.
The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.
דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ גֵּר פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בְּנֵיהֶם״ לְכִדְאָמְרִינַן – לֹא יוּמְתוּ בְּעֵדוּת בָּנִים; וְנִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״ – דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תְּרֵי: חֲדָא – לֹא יוּמְתוּ בָּנִים בְּעֵדוּת אָבוֹת, וְאִידַּךְ – לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי בָּנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס אָבוֹת!
The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers,” from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.
וְעֶבֶד – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִגֵּר; וּמָה גֵּר, דִּלְמַעְלָה הוּא דְּאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס, אֲבָל לְמַטָּה יֵשׁ לוֹ חַיִיס – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת; עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לֹא לְמַעְלָה וְלֹא לְמַטָּה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת?
The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?
אֶלָּא מִדִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״ – דְּמַשְׁמַע: לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי אָבוֹת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס בָּנִים; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לֹא לְמַעְלָה וְלֹא לְמַטָּה – הוּא דְּפָסוּל לְעֵדוּת; אֲבָל גֵּר, כֵּיוָן דְּיֵשׁ לוֹ חַיִיס לְמַטָּה – כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת.
The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אֲבוֹתֵיהֶם״, לְמָה לִי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״ – דְּמַשְׁמַע: לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי בָּנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס אָבוֹת? אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתַב: ״לָא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״, כְּתַב נָמֵי: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״.
And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers,” which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” He also wrote in the same manner: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers.”
חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן פְּגִיעָתָן רָעָה. אִימֵּיהּ דְּרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא הֲוָת נְסִיבָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַבָּא, כְּתַבְתִּינְהוּ (לְנִכְסֵי) [לְנִכְסַהּ] לְרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא בְּרַהּ. בָּתַר דִּשְׁכִיבָא,
§ The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,
אֲזַל רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא, אוֹקְמֵיהּ בְּנִכְסֵי. אֲזַל רַבִּי אַבָּא אַמְרַהּ לְמִילְּתָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא, אֲזַל רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא אַמְרַהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וָמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.
Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his mother’s property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the mother’s husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husband’s lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.
אַמְרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֲנָא מַתְנִיתָא יָדַעְנָא, דִּתְנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ לְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ – הַבֵּן אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב; וְהָאָב אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן כְּתוּבִין לַבֵּן. מָכַר הָאָב – מְכוּרִים עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת. מָכַר הַבֵּן – אֵין לוֹ לַלּוֹקֵחַ עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב.
The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the father’s death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the father’s possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.
כִּי מָיֵית אָב מִיהָא אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי אָב – דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵי הַבֵּן.
Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property never came into the son’s possession.
כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר: לָא שְׁנָא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן, לָא שְׁנָא מֵת הָאָב בְּחַיֵּי הַבֵּן – דַּאֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן; קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.
Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property never came into the son’s possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the son’s lifetime, where the property came into the son’s possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.
דְּאִתְּמַר: מָכַר הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, וּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.
The Gemara records a dispute between the amora’im with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the father’s lifetime, and the son died in the father’s lifetime, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ – אָמַר לָךְ: כִּי קָתָנֵי מַתְנִיתִין ״מָכַר הַבֵּן – לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב״, וְכִי מָיֵית הָאָב אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ – דְּלֹא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, דַּאֲתוֹ לִידֵי הַבֵּן. אֲבָל מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן – כִּי מָיֵית אָב נָמֵי לֵית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ.
The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the father’s lifetime, so that the property came into the son’s possession upon the father’s death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the father’s lifetime, so that the property did not come into the son’s possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.
אַלְמָא קָא סָבַר: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת – כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, וְכִי זַבֵּין – לָאו דִּידֵיהּ זַבֵּין.
The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ – כִּי קָתָנֵי מַתְנִיתִין: ״מָכַר הַבֵּן אֵין לַלּוֹקֵחַ עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב״ – כִּי מָיֵית אָב מִיהַת אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ; לָא שְׁנָא לָא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – דַּאֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן, וְלָא שְׁנָא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן; קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.
The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the father’s lifetime, where the property came into the son’s possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property did not come into the son’s possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.
אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, וְכִי (קָא) זַבֵּין – דִּידֵיהּ (קָא) זַבֵּין.
The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.
וַאֲנַן הַשְׁתָּא, בֵּין רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא וּבֵין רַב יְהוּדָה – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ סְבִירָא לְהוּ. וְקָאָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, כִּי מָיֵית אָב וּמָיֵית הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, אַמַּאי אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ? כִּי (קָא) זַבֵּין הַאי – לָאו דִּידֵיהּ (קָא) זַבֵּין!
The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the father’s lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didn’t he sell property that did not belong to him?
אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי?
Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.
אַהְדְּרוּהָ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, אֲמַר לְהוּ, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ אֵינָהּ דּוֹמָה לְמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ.
The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי תָּנֵי אִיפְּכָא: ״הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְאָבִיו״ – אִיכָּא לְמִפְשַׁט מִינַּהּ דְּקִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.
The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his son’s lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.
אֶלָּא הַשְׁתָּא דְּקָתָנֵי: ״הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ״, מִשּׁוּם דְּרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ הוּא.
Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the woman’s property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַטּוּ בְּרָא יָרֵית אַבָּא, אַבָּא לָא יָרֵית בְּרָא?! אֶלָּא לְאַבְרוֹחִינְהוּ לְנִכְסֵי מִבְּרֵיהּ קָא אָתֵי; הָכָא נָמֵי, לְאַבְרוֹחִינְהוּ לְנִכְסֵי מֵאֲחוּהּ אָתֵי.
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the son’s reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the son’s brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishna’s choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.
אֶלָּא מַאי ״אֵינָהּ דּוֹמָה לְמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ״? מִשּׁוּם תַּקָּנַת אוּשָׁא. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: בְּאוּשָׁא הִתְקִינוּ, הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וּמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.
Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuel’s reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husband’s rights to his wife’s property. As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.
אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״מְעִידִים אָנוּ בְּאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁגֵּירַשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְנָתַן כְּתוּבָּתָהּ״,
Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,
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California, United States
I had tried to start after being inspired by the hadran siyum, but did not manage to stick to it. However, just before masechet taanit, our rav wrote a message to the shul WhatsApp encouraging people to start with masechet taanit, so I did! And this time, I’m hooked! I listen to the shiur every day , and am also trying to improve my skills.
Yad Binyamin, Israel
A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!
HUNTINGTON, United States
Since I started in January of 2020, Daf Yomi has changed my life. It connects me to Jews all over the world, especially learned women. It makes cooking, gardening, and folding laundry into acts of Torah study. Daf Yomi enables me to participate in a conversation with and about our heritage that has been going on for more than 2000 years.
Skokie, IL, United States
I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!
Maale Adumim, Israel
I started learning Daf in Jan 2020 with Brachot b/c I had never seen the Jewish people united around something so positive, and I wanted to be a part of it. Also, I wanted to broaden my background in Torah Shebal Peh- Maayanot gave me a great gemara education, but I knew that I could hold a conversation in most parts of tanach but almost no TSB. I’m so thankful for Daf and have gained immensely.
NJ, United States
I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I started to listen to Michelle’s podcasts four years ago. The minute I started I was hooked. I’m so excited to learn the entire Talmud, and think I will continue always. I chose the quote “while a woman is engaged in conversation she also holds the spindle”. (Megillah 14b). It reminds me of all of the amazing women I learn with every day who multi-task, think ahead and accomplish so much.
Zichron Yakov, Israel
Jerusalem, Israel
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
In July, 2012 I wrote for Tablet about the first all women’s siyum at Matan in Jerusalem, with 100 women. At the time, I thought, I would like to start with the next cycle – listening to a podcast at different times of day makes it possible. It is incredible that after 10 years, so many women are so engaged!
Pittsburgh, United States
I started learning after the siyum hashas for women and my daily learning has been a constant over the last two years. It grounded me during the chaos of Corona while providing me with a community of fellow learners. The Daf can be challenging but it’s filled with life’s lessons, struggles and hope for a better world. It’s not about the destination but rather about the journey. Thank you Hadran!
אפרת, Israel
Oceanside NY, United States
In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.
Worcester, United States
A Gemara shiur previous to the Hadran Siyum, was the impetus to attend it.It was highly inspirational and I was smitten. The message for me was התלמוד בידינו. I had decided along with my Chahsmonaim group to to do the daf and take it one daf at time- without any expectations at all. There has been a wealth of information, insights and halachik ideas. It is truly exercise of the mind, heart & Soul
Hashmonaim, Israel
I started learning daf yomi at the beginning of this cycle. As the pandemic evolved, it’s been so helpful to me to have this discipline every morning to listen to the daf podcast after I’ve read the daf; learning about the relationships between the rabbis and the ways they were constructing our Jewish religion after the destruction of the Temple. I’m grateful to be on this journey!
Teaneck NJ, United States
Bava Kamma 88
דְּאַפְחֲתַהּ מִכַּסְפַּהּ; אֲבָל פְּצִיעָה – דְּלָא אַפְחֲתַהּ מִכַּסְפַּהּ, לָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ!
by which he lowered her monetary value, diminishing the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal. But with regard to a wound, by which he did not lower her monetary value, Rabbi Elazar did not even raise a dilemma.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: שֶׁפְּצָעָהּ בְּפָנֶיהָ, וְאַפְחֲתַהּ מִכַּסְפַּהּ.
Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Rabbi Yoḥanan is discussing a case where someone wounded her on her face, and he thereby lowered her monetary value, as this affects the amount of money that her father will receive for her betrothal.
הַחוֹבֵל בְּעֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים – חַיָּיב וְכוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו אִישׁ וְאָחִיו״ – בְּמִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ אַחְוָה, יָצָא עֶבֶד שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אַחְוָה. וְרַבָּנַן – אָחִיו הוּא בְּמִצְוֹת.
§ The mishna teaches: One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so one who injures a slave pays only the other four types of indemnity. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: The verse states with regard to the indemnity of humiliation: “When men strive together, a man and his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation “and his brother” teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood with a Jew. This is excluding a Canaanite slave, who does not have a relationship of brotherhood with Jews. And the Sages, who hold that a Canaanite slave is included in the halakhot of compensation for humiliation, maintain that he is the Jews’ brother with regard to the observance of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to observe most mitzvot.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – זוֹמְמֵי עֶבֶד לֹא יֵהָרְגוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״! אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaves are not in the category of brothers, conspiring witnesses who testify that a Canaanite slave committed a sin punishable by capital punishment should not be put to death by the court, as it is written: “You shall do unto him as he conspired to do unto his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and the slave is not considered a brother. Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The same verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall put away the evil from your midst,” indicating that the punishment for conspiring witnesses should be applied in any case, including when they testified about a slave.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבָּנַן – עֶבֶד יְהֵא כָּשֵׁר לַמַּלְכוּת! אָמְרִי: וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, תִּיקְשֵׁי לָךְ גֵּר – לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל! אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא: ״מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ״ – מִמּוּבְחָר שֶׁבְּאַחֶיךָ.
The Gemara raises another challenge: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit for kingship, as it is written: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15). The Sages say in response: But according to your reasoning, the halakha disqualifying a convert from being king should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions, both according to the opinion of the Sages and of Rabbi Yehuda: Why is a convert not fit to be a king, as he is certainly in the category of brother? The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “One from among your brothers shall you set a king over you,” which indicates that the king must be from the choicest among your brothers, which disqualifies both converts and slaves.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לְרַבָּנַן – יְהֵא עֶבֶד כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִנֵּה עֵד שֶׁקֶר הָעֵד, שֶׁקֶר עָנָה בְאָחִיו״!
The Gemara challenges further: If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness, as it is written: “And behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?
אָמַר עוּלָּא: עֵדוּת לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ; אָתְיָא עֵדוּת בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵאִשָּׁה: וּמָה אִשָּׁה, שֶׁהִיא רְאוּיָה לָבֹא בַּקָּהָל – פְּסוּלָה לְעֵדוּת; עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָבֹא בַּקָּהָל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁפָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת?
Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness, because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman: And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness, so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?
מָה לְאִשָּׁה – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לְמִילָה; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְמִילָה?! קָטָן יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בְּמִילָה, וּפָסוּל לְעֵדוּת.
The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one’s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one’s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.
מָה לְקָטָן – שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד, שֶׁהוּא בְּמִצְוֹת?! אִשָּׁה תּוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָהּ בְּמִצְוֹת, וּפְסוּלָה לְעֵדוּת.
This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot? The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.
וְחָזַר הַדִּין: לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן בְּכׇל הַמִּצְוֹת, וּפְסוּלִין לְהָעִיד; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אֶת הָעֶבֶד – שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּכׇל הַמִּצְוֹת, וּפָסוּל לְהָעִיד.
And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha. Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶם – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ אִישׁ; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד, שֶׁהוּא אִישׁ?!
This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?
אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִגַּזְלָן. מָה לְגַזְלָן – שֶׁכֵּן מַעֲשָׂיו גָּרְמוּ לוֹ; תֹּאמַר בְּעֶבֶד – שֶׁאֵין מַעֲשָׂיו גָּרְמוּ לוֹ?!
The Gemara offers a different derivation: Rather, derive the halakha that a slave is disqualified from bearing witness from that of a robber, who is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara objects: What is notable about a robber? He is notable in that his actions caused him to be disqualified. Would you say that from the fact that a robber is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, whose actions did not cause him to be unfit?
אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִגַּזְלָן וּמֵחַד מֵהָנָךְ.
The Gemara answers: Rather, derive the halakha from a robber and from one of these other two, either a woman or a minor. Their common denominator is that they do not observe all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness. So too, a slave does not observe all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.
מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״ – לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי אָבוֹת שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס בָּנִים. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ כִּדְאָמְרִינַן: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״ – בְּעֵדוּת בָּנִים; לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בְּנֵיהֶם״! מַאי ״בָּנִים״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דְּלֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי אָבוֹת שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס בָּנִים.
Mar, son of Ravina, said another derivation. The verse states: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children” (Deuteronomy 24:16), meaning that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage [ḥayis] with their children. This is referring to Canaanite slaves, whose children are not considered to be related to them. For if it enters your mind to interpret the verse according to its straightforward meaning, as we say: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” meaning by the testimony of their children, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children. What does the verse teach by stating only: “Children,” without the word their? Learn from this formulation that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״ – הָכִי נָמֵי, לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי בָּנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס אָבוֹת? אֶלָּא גֵּר הָכִי נָמֵי דְּפָסוּל לְעֵדוּת?!
The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, when the end of the verse states: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers” (Deuteronomy 24:16), does this also mean that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? But if that were the case, it would also be the case that a convert would be disqualified from bearing witness, as one who converts no longer shares common lineage with his parents.
אָמְרִי: הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! גֵּר, נְהִי דְּאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לְמַעְלָה, לְמַטָּה יֵשׁ לוֹ חַיִיס; לְאַפּוֹקֵי עֶבֶד, דְּאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לֹא לְמַעְלָה וְלֹא לְמַטָּה.
The Sages say in response: How can these cases be compared? With regard to a convert, although he has no common lineage with those above him, i.e., his parents, he does have common lineage with those below him, i.e., his children. This serves to exclude a slave, who has no common lineage either with those above him or with those below him.
דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ גֵּר פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בְּנֵיהֶם״ לְכִדְאָמְרִינַן – לֹא יוּמְתוּ בְּעֵדוּת בָּנִים; וְנִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״ – דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תְּרֵי: חֲדָא – לֹא יוּמְתוּ בָּנִים בְּעֵדוּת אָבוֹת, וְאִידַּךְ – לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי בָּנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס אָבוֹת!
The Sages prove that a convert is fit to bear witness: As, if it enters your mind that a convert is disqualified from bearing witness, then let the Merciful One write: Fathers shall not be put to death for their children, according to the interpretation that we say: Fathers shall not be put to death based on the testimony of their children; and let the Merciful One also write: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers,” from which you learn two halakhot: One, that children shall not be put to death by the testimony of their fathers, and another, that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers, i.e., converts.
וְעֶבֶד – נָפְקָא לֵיהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִגֵּר; וּמָה גֵּר, דִּלְמַעְלָה הוּא דְּאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס, אֲבָל לְמַטָּה יֵשׁ לוֹ חַיִיס – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת; עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לֹא לְמַעְלָה וְלֹא לְמַטָּה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת?
The Gemara continues the statement: And the halakha with regard to a slave being disqualified from bearing witness is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a convert: And just as with regard to a convert, that it is the case concerning those above him that he has no common lineage, but with those below him he does have common lineage, and he is disqualified from bearing witness, then with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, all the more so is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?
אֶלָּא מִדִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״ – דְּמַשְׁמַע: לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי אָבוֹת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס בָּנִים; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חַיִיס לֹא לְמַעְלָה וְלֹא לְמַטָּה – הוּא דְּפָסוּל לְעֵדוּת; אֲבָל גֵּר, כֵּיוָן דְּיֵשׁ לוֹ חַיִיס לְמַטָּה – כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת.
The Gemara continues the statement: Rather, due to the fact that the Merciful One did not write the verse that way, but instead wrote: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of fathers who do not have common lineage with their children, learn from this formulation that with regard to a slave, who has no common lineage with those above him or those below him, he is the one who is disqualified from bearing witness. But with regard to a convert, since he has common lineage with those below him, he is fit to bear witness.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אֲבוֹתֵיהֶם״, לְמָה לִי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״ – דְּמַשְׁמַע: לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל פִּי בָּנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חַיִיס אָבוֹת? אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתַב: ״לָא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים״, כְּתַב נָמֵי: ״וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת״.
And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write: Nor shall children be put to death for their fathers, why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers,” which indicates that people shall not be put to death based on the testimony of children who do not have common lineage with their fathers? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote: “Fathers shall not be put to death for children,” He also wrote in the same manner: “Nor shall children be put to death for fathers.”
חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן פְּגִיעָתָן רָעָה. אִימֵּיהּ דְּרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא הֲוָת נְסִיבָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַבָּא, כְּתַבְתִּינְהוּ (לְנִכְסֵי) [לְנִכְסַהּ] לְרַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא בְּרַהּ. בָּתַר דִּשְׁכִיבָא,
§ The mishna (87a) teaches: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured, they are exempt. The Gemara relates an incident: The mother of Rav Shmuel bar Abba from the city of Hagroneya was married to Rabbi Abba. She wrote, i.e., signed over, her property to Rav Shmuel bar Abba, her son. After she died,
אֲזַל רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא, אוֹקְמֵיהּ בְּנִכְסֵי. אֲזַל רַבִּי אַבָּא אַמְרַהּ לְמִילְּתָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא, אֲזַל רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא אַמְרַהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וָמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.
Rav Shmuel bar Abba went before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba to claim his mother’s property. Rabbi Yirmeya established him as the owner of the property, in accordance with what was written in the document. Rabbi Abba, the mother’s husband, went and said a report of the matter before Rav Hoshaya. Rav Hoshaya went and said a report of the matter before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to Rav Hoshaya: This is what Shmuel says: In a case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which belongs to her but whose profits her husband garners, in her husband’s lifetime, and then she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The granting of her property by means of the document is analogous to a sale, and Rabbi Abba can repossess the property from Rav Shmuel bar Abba.
אַמְרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֲנָא מַתְנִיתָא יָדַעְנָא, דִּתְנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ לְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ – הַבֵּן אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב; וְהָאָב אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן כְּתוּבִין לַבֵּן. מָכַר הָאָב – מְכוּרִים עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת. מָכַר הַבֵּן – אֵין לוֹ לַלּוֹקֵחַ עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב.
The Sages said that halakha before Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who had ruled that the property belongs to Rav Shmuel bar Abba. He said to them: I know the mishna that supports my opinion, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 136a): In the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, stating that the transfer should take effect immediately but the son will have use of it only after the father’s death, the son cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is still in the father’s possession. And the father, even though he retained the right to use the property, cannot sell the property due to the fact that it is written as belonging to the son. If the father sold the property, then it is sold to the extent that the purchaser may use it until the father dies. If the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser does not have the right to use the property until the father dies.
כִּי מָיֵית אָב מִיהָא אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי אָב – דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵי הַבֵּן.
Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba infers: In any event, if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property. And this would be so even though it is a case where the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property never came into the son’s possession.
כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר: לָא שְׁנָא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן, לָא שְׁנָא מֵת הָאָב בְּחַיֵּי הַבֵּן – דַּאֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן; קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.
Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s analysis is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: There is no difference if the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property never came into the son’s possession, and there is no difference if the father died in the son’s lifetime, where the property came into the son’s possession. In any event, the purchaser acquired the property.
דְּאִתְּמַר: מָכַר הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, וּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.
The Gemara records a dispute between the amora’im with regard to this point. As was stated: In a case where the son sold the property in the father’s lifetime, and the son died in the father’s lifetime, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ – אָמַר לָךְ: כִּי קָתָנֵי מַתְנִיתִין ״מָכַר הַבֵּן – לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב״, וְכִי מָיֵית הָאָב אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ – דְּלֹא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, דַּאֲתוֹ לִידֵי הַבֵּן. אֲבָל מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן – כִּי מָיֵית אָב נָמֵי לֵית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ.
The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, because he could have said to you: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime the purchaser does not acquire any rights to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna is discussing a case where the son did not die during the father’s lifetime, so that the property came into the son’s possession upon the father’s death, before the purchaser acquired it. But if the son died in the father’s lifetime, so that the property did not come into the son’s possession, then even when the father dies the purchaser does not have rights to the property.
אַלְמָא קָא סָבַר: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת – כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, וְכִי זַבֵּין – לָאו דִּידֵיהּ זַבֵּין.
The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, when the son sold the property, he sold property that did not belong to him.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ – כִּי קָתָנֵי מַתְנִיתִין: ״מָכַר הַבֵּן אֵין לַלּוֹקֵחַ עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב״ – כִּי מָיֵית אָב מִיהַת אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ; לָא שְׁנָא לָא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – דַּאֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן, וְלָא שְׁנָא מֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב – דְּלָא אֲתוֹ לִידֵיהּ דְּבֵן; קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.
The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the purchaser acquired the property based on this claim: When the mishna teaches that if the son sold the property during his father’s lifetime the purchaser does not have any right to use the property until the father dies, and one could infer that in any event, when the father dies the purchaser has rights to the property, the mishna means that there is no difference if the son did not die in the father’s lifetime, where the property came into the son’s possession, and there is no difference if the son died in the father’s lifetime, where the property did not come into the son’s possession. In either case, the purchaser acquired the property.
אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, וְכִי (קָא) זַבֵּין – דִּידֵיהּ (קָא) זַבֵּין.
The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And therefore when the son sold the property, he sold property that belonged to him.
וַאֲנַן הַשְׁתָּא, בֵּין רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא וּבֵין רַב יְהוּדָה – כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ סְבִירָא לְהוּ. וְקָאָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, כִּי מָיֵית אָב וּמָיֵית הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, אַמַּאי אִית לֵיהּ לְלוֹקֵחַ? כִּי (קָא) זַבֵּין הַאי – לָאו דִּידֵיהּ (קָא) זַבֵּין!
The Gemara returns to the discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba. And now for us, whether if one discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba and whether one discusses the opinion of Rav Yehuda, they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: If it enters your mind that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is considered to be like ownership of the item itself, then when the father dies and the son had died in the father’s lifetime, why does the purchaser have rights to the property? When the son sold it, didn’t he sell property that did not belong to him?
אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי?
Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself? Therefore, Rav Shmuel bar Abba should receive the property transferred to him by his mother, as the fact that the husband owned the rights to its produce does not limit her ability to transfer her property to her son.
אַהְדְּרוּהָ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, אֲמַר לְהוּ, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ אֵינָהּ דּוֹמָה לְמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ.
The Sages brought back Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s reply before Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda said to them: This is what Shmuel said: This halakha, that a husband can repossess the property that his wife sold before she died, is not similar to the halakha of our mishna concerning a father who transfers his property to his son while retaining the right to garner the profits.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי תָּנֵי אִיפְּכָא: ״הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְאָבִיו״ – אִיכָּא לְמִפְשַׁט מִינַּהּ דְּקִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.
The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for distinguishing between the two cases? Rav Yosef said: Granted, if the mishna had taught the opposite and stated that in the case of one who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his father after his death, with the son retaining the right to garner the profits until then, and the father sold the property during his son’s lifetime, the purchaser has rights to the property after the son dies, then it is possible to resolve from the mishna that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself.
אֶלָּא הַשְׁתָּא דְּקָתָנֵי: ״הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ״, מִשּׁוּם דְּרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ הוּא.
Rav Yosef continues: But now that the mishna teaches specifically: One who writes a document transferring ownership of his property to his son, the ability of the son to sell the property is due to the fact that the son is fit to inherit from him and already has a right to the property, and not just due to the existence of the document. In the case of Rav Shmuel bar Abba as well, the woman’s property is inherited by her husband, not her son, so she cannot transfer it to Rav Shmuel bar Abba.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַטּוּ בְּרָא יָרֵית אַבָּא, אַבָּא לָא יָרֵית בְּרָא?! אֶלָּא לְאַבְרוֹחִינְהוּ לְנִכְסֵי מִבְּרֵיהּ קָא אָתֵי; הָכָא נָמֵי, לְאַבְרוֹחִינְהוּ לְנִכְסֵי מֵאֲחוּהּ אָתֵי.
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is this to say that a son inherits from a father, but a father does not inherit from a son? There is no difference between their rights to inherit from one another. Rather, even if the mishna taught a halakha concerning a son transferring his property to his father, the son’s reason for doing so could have been that he comes to hide his property from his own son and wants his father to inherit from him instead. Here too, when a father transfers his property to his son, he comes to hide his property from the son’s brothers, as the father has other sons but does not want them to inherit from him. Therefore, the mishna’s choice of case cannot serve as a basis for inference.
אֶלָּא מַאי ״אֵינָהּ דּוֹמָה לְמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ״? מִשּׁוּם תַּקָּנַת אוּשָׁא. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: בְּאוּשָׁא הִתְקִינוּ, הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ, וּמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.
Abaye continues: Rather, what was Shmuel’s reason for saying that the right of a husband to the property that his wife sold before she died is not similar to our mishna that states that a father does not have rights to property sold by his son? The difference is due to the rabbinic ordinance of Usha, an ordinance instituted with regard to a husband’s rights to his wife’s property. As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In the town of Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This ordinance was instituted only for the benefit of a husband, but not for the benefit of a father or son.
אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״מְעִידִים אָנוּ בְּאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁגֵּירַשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְנָתַן כְּתוּבָּתָהּ״,
Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too learn of the ordinance of Usha in the baraita: If witnesses said: We testify about so-and-so that he divorced his wife and gave her the full value of the obligations recorded in her marriage contract,
