Horayot 8
Share this shiur:
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Horayot 8
וְשָׁוִין שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִפֶּר [עָלָיו] הַכֹּהֵן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״. רַבִּי סָבַר: מִי שֶׁכׇּל חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, יָצָא זֶה שֶׁאֵין [כׇּל] חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר.
The baraita teaches: And they agree that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the provisional guilt-offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” (Leviticus 5:18). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse, in accordance with their opinions. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: This is referring to one whose sin-offering for all transgressions is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude that anointed priest, as all of his sin-offerings are not for an unwitting act alone; rather, he brings a sin-offering only if that unwitting act is performed on the basis of absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling.
מִידֵּי ״כׇּל״ כְּתִיב? אִין דְּאִם כֵּן נִכְתּוֹב ״עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ״. לְמָה לִי ״אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״ הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּעַד דְּאִיכָּא כׇּל חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה. יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ שֶׁאֵין כׇּל חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה אֶלָּא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְלֹא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara asks: Is it written in the verse: For all his unwitting acts that he performed unwittingly? Only the phrase “for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” is written. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is as though the word: All, is written. As if it were so that the verse is not referring to all unwitting acts, let the Torah write only: “For his unwitting act.” Why do I need the additional phrase: “That he performed unwittingly”? This teaches us that there is no liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering unless liability to bring all his sin-offerings is for unwitting acts. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, all of whose liability to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act alone is only in cases of idol worship, but in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot there is liability only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְרַבָּנַן: מִי שֶׁחֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ, שֶׁאֵין חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה לֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְלֹא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת, אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
And the Rabbis interpret the verse in accordance with their opinion that an anointed priest, even in cases of idol worship, brings a sin-offering only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. They hold: This teaches us that there is liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering only for one whose liability to bring his sin-offerings is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose liability to bring a sin-offering is not for an unwitting act alone, neither in cases of idol worship, nor in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot, but rather for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ, וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And likewise the anointed priest is liable only for such a ruling. Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
גְּמָ׳ מִנָּלַן?
GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha?
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״עָלֶיהָ״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״עָלֶיהָ״. מָה לְהַלָּן – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word “that” is stated here in the verse: “And the sin that they sinned” (Leviticus 4:14), with regard to the offering brought by the court for the transgression of the public based on their erroneous ruling, and the word “that” is stated there in the verse: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, that is in her lifetime” (Leviticus 18:18), with regard to the prohibition against marrying two sisters. It is derived: Just as there it is a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the reference is to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן צִבּוּר, מָשִׁיחַ מְנָלַן? ״לְאַשְׁמַת הַעָם״, הֲרֵי מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling. From where do we derive that this is the halakha for an anointed priest? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the verse: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the transgression of the general public.
נָשִׂיא? יָלֵיף ״מִצְוֹת״ ״מִצְוֹת״, כְּתִיב גַּבֵּי נָשִׂיא: ״וְעָשָׂה אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת ה׳״, וּכְתִיב בְּצִבּוּר: ״וְעָשׂוּ אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת״ – מָה צִבּוּר – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף נָשִׂיא – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that this is the halakha with regard to the king? The Gemara answers: The tanna derives a verbal analogy between the term “commandments” written with regard to a king and the term “commandments” written with regard to the general public. It is written with regard to a king: “And he performed one of all the commandments of the Lord his God that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:22), and it is written with regard to the general public: “And performed one of all the commandments of the Lord that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as with regard to the general public there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, in the case of a king there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
יָחִיד? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ״, וְיִלְמַד תַּחְתּוֹן מֵעֶלְיוֹן.
The Gemara asks further: From where is it derived that an individual is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: The verse with regard to an individual states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:27). The verse begins with the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter vav. This indicates that one shall derive the halakha with regard to the lower verse, i.e., the verse written later in the passage, from that which is written in the upper verses, i.e., those written earlier. Just as in those verses earlier in the passage, addressing the public, priest, and king, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, so too, in the case of the individual addressed in this verse, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet.
וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ. בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָדוּן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין אֲפִילּוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת?
§ The mishna teaches: Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: In the case of idol worship, from where do we derive this halakha? It is derived as the Sages taught: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the priest would be liable even if it is not for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מֵעֵינֵי״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״מֵעֵינֵי״. מָה לְהַלָּן דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The baraita continues: Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן צִבּוּר. יָחִיד, נָשִׂיא, מָשִׁיחַ מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״, אֶחָד יָחִיד וְאֶחָד נָשִׂיא וְאֶחָד מָשִׁיחַ כּוּלָּן בִּכְלַל ״נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״ הֵן, וְיִלְמַד תַּחְתּוֹן מִן הָעֶלְיוֹן.
The baraita concludes: We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling; but from where do we derive that this is the halakha for an individual, a king, and an anointed priest who engage in idol worship? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if one soul sins unwittingly, then he shall offer a female goat of the first year as a sin-offering” (Numbers 15:27). And with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, they all are included in the category of “one soul.” And one shall derive the halakha with regard to that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verses concerning an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, from that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the transgression of the general public.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּמַפֵּיק לַהּ לְ״עָלֶיהָ״ לִגְזֵרָה שָׁוָה, כְּדַאֲמַרַן. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן דְּמַפְּקִי לַהּ לְ״עָלֶיהָ״ לַעֲרָיוֹת וְצָרוֹת, דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת – מְנָא לְהוּ?
The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who derives the halakha by using the term “that” for a verbal analogy to teach that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, in accordance with that which we stated. But according to the Rabbis, who derive the halakha by using the term “that” to teach the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden and rival wives with regard to a yevama (see Yevamot 3b), from where do they derive the halakha of a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering in the case of the transgression of the general public?
נָפְקָא לְהוּ מִדְּמַתְנֵי לֵיהּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי לִבְרֵיהּ: ״תּוֹרָה אַחַת יִהְיֶה לָכֶם לָעֹשֶׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָד רָמָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הוּקְּשָׁה כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. מָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught to his son based on the verse: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30). The Sages understood the phrase “with an upraised hand” to be referring to idol worship (see Sanhedrin 99a). The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idol worship: Just as idol worship is a prohibition for which one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering, so too here, for the entire Torah one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן יָחִיד, נָשִׂיא, וּמָשִׁיחַ, בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בֵּין בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת. צִבּוּר מְנָלַן? יָלֵיף עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן.
The Gemara challenges: We found a source for this halakha with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, both with regard to idol worship and with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, as all those are included in the category of “one soul” and are juxtaposed to idol worship. But from where do we derive that the general public is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: One derives the halakha with regard to that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the general public, from that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verse concerning an individual.
וְרַבִּי, הָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ, לְכִדְתַנְיָא: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ שֶׁחִלֵּק הַכָּתוּב בֵּין רַבִּים לִיחִידִים – רַבִּים בְּסַיִיף וּמָמוֹנָן אָבֵד, יְחִידִים בִּסְקִילָה וּמָמוֹנָן פָּלֵט, יָכוֹל נַחְלוֹק בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תּוֹרָה אַחַת יִהְיֶה וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who derives this matter from the term “that,” what does he do with this verse, from which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught a halakha to his son? The Gemara answers: He derives a halakha, using the verse to teach that which is taught in a baraita: Due to the fact that we found that the verse distinguished with regard to idol worship between the many, who constitute the majority of a city, and individuals, as the many are executed through beheading with a sword and their property is lost, as the court destroys it, while individuals are executed through stoning and their property is spared, one might have thought that in the case of unwitting idol worship we would distinguish between the offerings that they are liable to bring. Therefore, the verse states: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord” (Numbers 15:29–30).
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב חִלְקִיָּה מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא: טַעְמָא דְּלֹא חָלַק הַכָּתוּב. הָא חָלַק, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא נַחְלוֹק. מַאי נַיְיתֵי?
Rav Ḥilkiya of Hagronya objects to it: The reason that both individuals and the general public are liable to bring the same offering for unwitting idol worship is that the verse did not distinguish between them. But had the verse distinguished between them, I would say: Let us distinguish between individuals and the general public, and the general public would bring a different offering for their unwitting idol worship. What different offering shall they bring?
נַיְיתֵי פַּר, צִבּוּר בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת הוּא דְּמַיְיתוּ! נַיְיתֵי פַּר לְעוֹלָה וְשָׂעִיר לְחַטָּאת, צִבּוּר בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הוּא דְּמַיְיתוּ! נַיְיתֵי שְׂעִיר, נָשִׂיא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת הוּא דְּמַיְיתֵי! נַיְיתֵי שְׂעִירָה, יָחִיד נָמֵי הַיְינוּ קׇרְבָּנוֹ!
If one would say: Let them bring a bull, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that the general public brings a bull. If one would say: Let them bring a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting idol worship that the general public brings those offerings in the case of an absence of awareness leading to an erroneous ruling by the court. If one would say: Let them bring a goat, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that a king brings a goat. If one will say: Let them bring a female goat, that is difficult, as that is the offering for an individual, too.
אַלְּמָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: צִבּוּר מַיְיתֵי פַּר לְעוֹלָה וְשָׂעִיר לְחַטָּאת, הָנֵי נַיְיתֵי אִיפְּכָא – פַּר לְחַטָּאת וְשָׂעִיר לְעוֹלָה. אִי נָמֵי: צָרִיךְ וְאֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara rejects this: Why do you say that the verse that equates the offerings of the individuals and the public is not necessary? Were it not for the verse, it might enter your mind to say: The general public brings a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, but this majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship shall bring the opposite: A bull for a sin-offering and a goat for a burnt-offering. Alternatively, perhaps the majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship must bring an offering, but it has no remedy, because there is no unique offering that it can bring. Therefore, the verse teaches us that there is no distinction between many people and individuals in this case.
דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהַת כִּי כְּתִיבִי הָנֵי קְרָאֵי – בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הוּא דִּכְתִיבִי, מַאי מַשְׁמַע? אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִי תֵּימָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי. אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כׇּל הַמִּצְוֹת הָאֵלֶּה״, אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוָה שֶׁהִיא שְׁקוּלָה כְּכׇל הַמִּצְוֹת? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
§ In any event, everyone agrees that where these verses are written, it is with regard to idol worship that they are written. The Gemara asks: As the verse does not mention idol worship explicitly, from where is this inferred? Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, and some say that the statement is unattributed, that the verse states: “And when you act unwittingly, and do not perform all these commandments [kol hamitzvot] that the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). Which is the mitzva that is the equivalent of all the mitzvot? You must say: It is the prohibition against idol worship.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי תָּנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה״, וּכְתִיב: ״אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה״, אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוָה שֶׁהִיא בְּדִיבּוּרוֹ שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא וְצִוָּה עַל יְדֵי מֹשֶׁה? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. דְּתָנָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״אָנֹכִי״ וְ״לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ״ מִפִּי הַגְּבוּרָה שְׁמַעְנוּם.
The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that the verse states: “That the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22), and it is written: “That the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was introduced in the speech of the Holy One, Blessed be He, heard by the Jewish people, and which He commanded in the Torah by means of Moses? You must say: This is idol worship, as Rabbi Yishmael taught concerning the first two commandments: “I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3): We, the Jewish people, heard them from the mouth of the Almighty.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא:
The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught
״לְמִן הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ וָהָלְאָה לְדוֹרוֹתֵיכֶם״, אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוָה שֶׁהִיא נֶאֶמְרָה בִּתְחִלָּה? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְהָא אָמַר מָר: עֶשֶׂר מִצְוֹת נִצְטַוּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמָרָה (דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָיָה אִם שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע לְקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ״)? אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.
that it is derived from the verse: “All that the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses, from the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was stated at the beginning of all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idol worship, as it is the first mitzva in the Ten Commandments. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: The Jewish people were commanded ten mitzvot in Marah soon after leaving Egypt, prior to the revelation at Sinai, as it is written: “If you shall hearken to the voice of the Lord your God…and listen to His mitzvot” (Exodus 15:26)? Evidently, there were mitzvot that preceded the prohibition against idol worship. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, וְאֵין מְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ.
MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering for issuing a ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple by one being there while ritually impure, or the defiling of its sacrificial foods by one partaking of them while ritually impure. There is a positive mitzva to remove impure people from the Temple, and there is a prohibition against entering the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity. And one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.
אֲבָל חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּנִּדָּה, וּמְבִיאִים אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּנִּדָּה. אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבַּנִּדָּה? פְּרוֹשׁ מִן הַנִּדָּה. וּמִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? אַל תָּבֹא עַל הַנִּדָּה.
But the court is liable to bring a bull for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman, and one brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman. What is the positive mitzva that is related to a menstruating woman? Distance yourself from the menstruating woman. If a man engages in intercourse with a woman and she begins menstruating, he is required to separate from her. And what is the prohibition? Do not engage in intercourse with a woman whom you know is a menstruating woman.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּצִבּוּר לָא מְחַיְּיבִי קׇרְבָּן בְּעָלְמָא, וְיָחִיד אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי לָא?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? That is, from where is it derived that the general public is not liable to bring any offering at all for a sin like the defiling of the Temple, which carries no liability for an individual to bring a fixed sin-offering for violating it unwittingly, and from where is it derived that an individual too is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for the defiling of the Temple?
אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי: נֶאֱמַר ״וְאָשֵׁם״ בְּחַטָּאת וּבְאָשָׁם תָּלוּי, וְנֶאֱמַר ״וְאָשֵׁמוּ״ בְּצִבּוּר. מָה ״וְאָשֵׁם״ בְּיָחִיד – בְּחַטָּאת קְבוּעָה, אַף ״וְאָשֵׁמוּ״ בְּצִבּוּר – בְּחַטָּאת קְבוּעָה,
Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: The term “and he is guilty” is stated with regard to a sin-offering (Leviticus 4:27) and with regard to a provisional guilt-offering (Leviticus 5:17), and the similar term: “And they are guilty” (Leviticus 4:13), is stated with regard to the general public. Just as the term “and he is guilty” that is stated with regard to an individual is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering, as it is written there, so too, the term “and they are guilty” that is stated with regard to the general public is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. For the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, not a fixed offering.
וּמָה צִבּוּר בְּחַטָּאת קְבוּעָה, אַף אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי אֵין בָּא אֶלָּא עַל סְפֵק חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה. אָמְרִי: אִי הָכִי, קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״וְהָיָה כִּי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״! דָּנִין (״אָשֵׁם״ מִן ״אָשֵׁמוּ״) [״אָשֵׁמוּ״ מִן ״אָשֵׁם״], וְאֵין דָּנִין ״אָשֵׁם״ מִן ״יֶאְשַׁם״.
And just as with regard to a transgression performed by the general public the liability is to bring a fixed sin-offering, so too, a provisional guilt-offering comes only for uncertainty with regard to a transgression that renders one obligated to bring a fixed sin-offering. This is the source for the fact that there is no liability to bring a sin-offering if the general public defiles the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and individuals are not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for those transgressions. The Sages say: If so, and the derivation is based on that term, this is difficult, as isn’t it also written with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5)? The Gemara responds: One derives the meaning of “they are guilty” from the meaning of “he is guilty,” but one does not derive the meaning of “he is guilty” from the meaning of “he shall be guilty,” even though both are stated in the singular.
וּמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? וְהָא תָּנֵי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן״ וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן״ – זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה, זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה! וְעוֹד: נֵילַף מִן ״וְאָשֵׁם״ מִטּוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהוּא טָמֵא וְאָשֵׁם״!
The Gemara asks: And what difference is there between the different verb conjugations? But didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav]” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. If a verbal analogy can be derived between two different terms, it can certainly be derived from two conjugations of the same term. And furthermore, let us derive the halakha from the term “and he is guilty,” written with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, as it is written: “And he is ritually impure and he is guilty” (Leviticus 5:2), which is a verbal analogy between identical terms.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דָּנִין ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳״ מִן ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי לְרַב פָּפָּא: וְנֵילַף ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּנְשִׂיאַת עָוֹן מִן ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּנְשִׂיאַת עָוֹן!
Rav Pappa says: One derives the meaning of: “And he is guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:17), which are written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: “And they are guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:13), which are written with regard to the unwitting communal sin-offering. The phrase: The commandments of the Lord, is not written with regard to the sliding-scale offering. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: Let us derive the meaning of: “And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity” (see Leviticus 5:1, 4), from the meaning of: “And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17).
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: דָּנִין ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה״ – מִ״וְאָשֵׁם וּמִצְוֹת ה׳ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה״. וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ שְׁמִיעַת קוֹל וּבִיטּוּי שְׂפָתַיִם וְטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱמַר בָּהֶם ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה״.
Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: One derives the meaning of “and he is guilty” and “the commandments of the Lord that shall not be done” written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: “And he is guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done” (Leviticus 4:27), written with regard to a fixed sin-offering. And the cases of hearing of a voice, i.e., an oath of testimony, and a statement of the lips, i.e., an oath on an utterance, and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, shall not prove otherwise, as it is not stated concerning them: And he is guilty, and: The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל שְׁמִיעַת קוֹל, וְעַל בִּיטּוּי שְׂפָתַיִם, וְעַל טוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו. וְהַנָּשִׂיא כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הַנָּשִׂיא חַיָּיב בְּכוּלָּן חוּץ מִשְּׁמִיעַת הַקּוֹל, שֶׁהַמֶּלֶךְ לֹא דָּן וְלֹא דָּנִין אוֹתוֹ [לֹא מֵעִיד וְלֹא מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ].
MISHNA: The court is not liable for issuing a ruling with regard to hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony taken by a witness who refuses to testify on behalf of a litigant who demands that he testify, or for an utterance of the lips, i.e., a false oath stated about some matter, or for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And the status of the king is like that of the court, and he is exempt from bringing an offering in those cases; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: The king is liable in all of those cases except for the case of hearing of a voice, and even in that case, his exemption is not intrinsic to the mitzva. Rather, it is for technical reasons, as the king neither judges others nor do others judge him; he does not testify nor do others testify against him. Therefore, a demand that he testify is not applicable.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר עוּלָּא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהָיָה כִי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״, כֹּל שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּיב בְּאַחַת – מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּכוּלָּן, וְשֶׁאֵין מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּאַחַת – אֵין מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּכוּלָּן.
GEMARA: Ulla said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as the verse states with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5), indicating that anyone who becomes liable in every one of the instances for which one brings a sliding-scale offering becomes liable in all of those instances; and anyone who does not become liable in every one of the instances to bring a sliding-scale offering does not become liable in any of those instances. Since the king is exempt from taking an oath of testimony, he is exempt in the other cases as well.
וְאֵימָא: מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּכוּלָּן!
The Gemara asks: Why say this? And say an alternative interpretation of the verse: Anyone who becomes liable in any one of these instances brings a sliding-scale offering, and this is the halakha even though he does not become liable in all of them.
אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מֵהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא, הָיָה רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר
Rather, the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is from here, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yirmeya would say: It is stated:
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
What a great experience to learn with Rabbanit Michelle Farber. I began with this cycle in January 2020 and have been comforted by the consistency and energy of this process throughout the isolation period of Covid. Week by week, I feel like I am exploring a treasure chest with sparkling gems and puzzling antiquities. The hunt is exhilarating.
Pennsylvania, United States
I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Givat Zev, Israel
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Cambridge, United Kingdom
The first month I learned Daf Yomi by myself in secret, because I wasn’t sure how my husband would react, but after the siyyum on Masechet Brachot I discovered Hadran and now sometimes my husband listens to the daf with me. He and I also learn mishnayot together and are constantly finding connections between the different masechtot.
Silver Spring, Maryland, United States
I learned Mishnayot more than twenty years ago and started with Gemara much later in life. Although I never managed to learn Daf Yomi consistently, I am learning since some years Gemara in depth and with much joy. Since last year I am studying at the International Halakha Scholars Program at the WIHL. I often listen to Rabbanit Farbers Gemara shiurim to understand better a specific sugyiah. I am grateful for the help and inspiration!
Berlin, Germany
With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
Haifa, Israel
I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
I was moved to tears by the Hadran Siyyum HaShas. I have learned Torah all my life, but never connected to learning Gemara on a regular basis until then. Seeing the sheer joy Talmud Torah at the siyyum, I felt compelled to be part of it, and I haven’t missed a day!
It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I LOVE learning the Daf. I started with Shabbat. I join the morning Zoom with Reb Michelle and it totally grounds my day. When Corona hit us in Israel, I decided that I would use the Daf to keep myself sane, especially during the days when we could not venture out more than 300 m from our home. Now my husband and I have so much new material to talk about! It really is the best part of my day!
Hashmonaim, Israel
My Daf journey began in August 2012 after participating in the Siyum Hashas where I was blessed as an “enabler” of others. Galvanized into my own learning I recited the Hadran on Shas in January 2020 with Rabbanit Michelle. That Siyum was a highlight in my life. Now, on round two, Daf has become my spiritual anchor to which I attribute manifold blessings.
Englewood NJ, United States
I decided to give daf yomi a try when I heard about the siyum hashas in 2020. Once the pandemic hit, the daily commitment gave my days some much-needed structure. There have been times when I’ve felt like quitting- especially when encountering very technical details in the text. But then I tell myself, “Look how much you’ve done. You can’t stop now!” So I keep going & my Koren bookshelf grows…
Huntington, United States
After being so inspired by the siyum shas two years ago, I began tentatively learning daf yomi, like Rabbanut Michelle kept saying – taking one daf at a time. I’m still taking it one daf at a time, one masechet at a time, but I’m loving it and am still so inspired by Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran community, and yes – I am proud to be finishing Seder Mo’ed.
Bet Shemesh, Israel
After experiences over the years of asking to join gemara shiurim for men and either being refused by the maggid shiur or being the only women there, sometimes behind a mechitza, I found out about Hadran sometime during the tail end of Masechet Shabbat, I think. Life has been much better since then.
London, United Kingdom
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
Jerusalem, Israel
Shortly after the death of my father, David Malik z”l, I made the commitment to Daf Yomi. While riding to Ben Gurion airport in January, Siyum HaShas was playing on the radio; that was the nudge I needed to get started. The “everyday-ness” of the Daf has been a meaningful spiritual practice, especial after COVID began & I was temporarily unable to say Kaddish at daily in-person minyanim.
Wynnewood, United States
Blacksburg, United States
I learned Mishnayot more than twenty years ago and started with Gemara much later in life. Although I never managed to learn Daf Yomi consistently, I am learning since some years Gemara in depth and with much joy. Since last year I am studying at the International Halakha Scholars Program at the WIHL. I often listen to Rabbanit Farbers Gemara shiurim to understand better a specific sugyiah. I am grateful for the help and inspiration!
Berlin, Germany
I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.
Elkins Park, United States
Hearing and reading about the siyumim at the completion of the 13 th cycle Daf Yomi asked our shul rabbi about starting the Daf – he directed me to another shiur in town he thought would allow a woman to join, and so I did! Love seeing the sources for the Divrei Torah I’ve been hearing for the past decades of living an observant life and raising 5 children .
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States
Margo
I started my Talmud journey in 7th grade at Akiba Jewish Day School in Chicago. I started my Daf Yomi journey after hearing Erica Brown speak at the Hadran Siyum about marking the passage of time through Daf Yomi.
Carolyn
I started my Talmud journey post-college in NY with a few classes. I started my Daf Yomi journey after the Hadran Siyum, which inspired both my son and myself.
Merion Station, USA
Beit Shemesh, Israel
Horayot 8
וְשָׁוִין שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִפֶּר [עָלָיו] הַכֹּהֵן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״. רַבִּי סָבַר: מִי שֶׁכׇּל חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, יָצָא זֶה שֶׁאֵין [כׇּל] חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר.
The baraita teaches: And they agree that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the provisional guilt-offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” (Leviticus 5:18). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse, in accordance with their opinions. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: This is referring to one whose sin-offering for all transgressions is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude that anointed priest, as all of his sin-offerings are not for an unwitting act alone; rather, he brings a sin-offering only if that unwitting act is performed on the basis of absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling.
מִידֵּי ״כׇּל״ כְּתִיב? אִין דְּאִם כֵּן נִכְתּוֹב ״עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ״. לְמָה לִי ״אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״ הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּעַד דְּאִיכָּא כׇּל חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה. יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ שֶׁאֵין כׇּל חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה אֶלָּא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְלֹא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara asks: Is it written in the verse: For all his unwitting acts that he performed unwittingly? Only the phrase “for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” is written. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is as though the word: All, is written. As if it were so that the verse is not referring to all unwitting acts, let the Torah write only: “For his unwitting act.” Why do I need the additional phrase: “That he performed unwittingly”? This teaches us that there is no liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering unless liability to bring all his sin-offerings is for unwitting acts. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, all of whose liability to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act alone is only in cases of idol worship, but in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot there is liability only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְרַבָּנַן: מִי שֶׁחֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ, שֶׁאֵין חֶטְאוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה לֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְלֹא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת, אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
And the Rabbis interpret the verse in accordance with their opinion that an anointed priest, even in cases of idol worship, brings a sin-offering only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. They hold: This teaches us that there is liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering only for one whose liability to bring his sin-offerings is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose liability to bring a sin-offering is not for an unwitting act alone, neither in cases of idol worship, nor in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot, but rather for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ, וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And likewise the anointed priest is liable only for such a ruling. Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
גְּמָ׳ מִנָּלַן?
GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha?
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״עָלֶיהָ״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״עָלֶיהָ״. מָה לְהַלָּן – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word “that” is stated here in the verse: “And the sin that they sinned” (Leviticus 4:14), with regard to the offering brought by the court for the transgression of the public based on their erroneous ruling, and the word “that” is stated there in the verse: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, that is in her lifetime” (Leviticus 18:18), with regard to the prohibition against marrying two sisters. It is derived: Just as there it is a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the reference is to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן צִבּוּר, מָשִׁיחַ מְנָלַן? ״לְאַשְׁמַת הַעָם״, הֲרֵי מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling. From where do we derive that this is the halakha for an anointed priest? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the verse: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the transgression of the general public.
נָשִׂיא? יָלֵיף ״מִצְוֹת״ ״מִצְוֹת״, כְּתִיב גַּבֵּי נָשִׂיא: ״וְעָשָׂה אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת ה׳״, וּכְתִיב בְּצִבּוּר: ״וְעָשׂוּ אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת״ – מָה צִבּוּר – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף נָשִׂיא – דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that this is the halakha with regard to the king? The Gemara answers: The tanna derives a verbal analogy between the term “commandments” written with regard to a king and the term “commandments” written with regard to the general public. It is written with regard to a king: “And he performed one of all the commandments of the Lord his God that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:22), and it is written with regard to the general public: “And performed one of all the commandments of the Lord that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as with regard to the general public there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, in the case of a king there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
יָחִיד? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ״, וְיִלְמַד תַּחְתּוֹן מֵעֶלְיוֹן.
The Gemara asks further: From where is it derived that an individual is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: The verse with regard to an individual states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:27). The verse begins with the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter vav. This indicates that one shall derive the halakha with regard to the lower verse, i.e., the verse written later in the passage, from that which is written in the upper verses, i.e., those written earlier. Just as in those verses earlier in the passage, addressing the public, priest, and king, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, so too, in the case of the individual addressed in this verse, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet.
וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ. בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָדוּן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין אֲפִילּוּ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת?
§ The mishna teaches: Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: In the case of idol worship, from where do we derive this halakha? It is derived as the Sages taught: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the priest would be liable even if it is not for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מֵעֵינֵי״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״מֵעֵינֵי״. מָה לְהַלָּן דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The baraita continues: Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן צִבּוּר. יָחִיד, נָשִׂיא, מָשִׁיחַ מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״, אֶחָד יָחִיד וְאֶחָד נָשִׂיא וְאֶחָד מָשִׁיחַ כּוּלָּן בִּכְלַל ״נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״ הֵן, וְיִלְמַד תַּחְתּוֹן מִן הָעֶלְיוֹן.
The baraita concludes: We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling; but from where do we derive that this is the halakha for an individual, a king, and an anointed priest who engage in idol worship? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if one soul sins unwittingly, then he shall offer a female goat of the first year as a sin-offering” (Numbers 15:27). And with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, they all are included in the category of “one soul.” And one shall derive the halakha with regard to that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verses concerning an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, from that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the transgression of the general public.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּמַפֵּיק לַהּ לְ״עָלֶיהָ״ לִגְזֵרָה שָׁוָה, כְּדַאֲמַרַן. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן דְּמַפְּקִי לַהּ לְ״עָלֶיהָ״ לַעֲרָיוֹת וְצָרוֹת, דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת – מְנָא לְהוּ?
The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who derives the halakha by using the term “that” for a verbal analogy to teach that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, in accordance with that which we stated. But according to the Rabbis, who derive the halakha by using the term “that” to teach the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden and rival wives with regard to a yevama (see Yevamot 3b), from where do they derive the halakha of a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering in the case of the transgression of the general public?
נָפְקָא לְהוּ מִדְּמַתְנֵי לֵיהּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי לִבְרֵיהּ: ״תּוֹרָה אַחַת יִהְיֶה לָכֶם לָעֹשֶׂה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָד רָמָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הוּקְּשָׁה כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. מָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.
The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught to his son based on the verse: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30). The Sages understood the phrase “with an upraised hand” to be referring to idol worship (see Sanhedrin 99a). The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idol worship: Just as idol worship is a prohibition for which one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering, so too here, for the entire Torah one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering.
אַשְׁכְּחַן יָחִיד, נָשִׂיא, וּמָשִׁיחַ, בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בֵּין בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת. צִבּוּר מְנָלַן? יָלֵיף עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן.
The Gemara challenges: We found a source for this halakha with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, both with regard to idol worship and with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, as all those are included in the category of “one soul” and are juxtaposed to idol worship. But from where do we derive that the general public is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: One derives the halakha with regard to that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the general public, from that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verse concerning an individual.
וְרַבִּי, הָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ, לְכִדְתַנְיָא: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ שֶׁחִלֵּק הַכָּתוּב בֵּין רַבִּים לִיחִידִים – רַבִּים בְּסַיִיף וּמָמוֹנָן אָבֵד, יְחִידִים בִּסְקִילָה וּמָמוֹנָן פָּלֵט, יָכוֹל נַחְלוֹק בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תּוֹרָה אַחַת יִהְיֶה וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who derives this matter from the term “that,” what does he do with this verse, from which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught a halakha to his son? The Gemara answers: He derives a halakha, using the verse to teach that which is taught in a baraita: Due to the fact that we found that the verse distinguished with regard to idol worship between the many, who constitute the majority of a city, and individuals, as the many are executed through beheading with a sword and their property is lost, as the court destroys it, while individuals are executed through stoning and their property is spared, one might have thought that in the case of unwitting idol worship we would distinguish between the offerings that they are liable to bring. Therefore, the verse states: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord” (Numbers 15:29–30).
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב חִלְקִיָּה מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא: טַעְמָא דְּלֹא חָלַק הַכָּתוּב. הָא חָלַק, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא נַחְלוֹק. מַאי נַיְיתֵי?
Rav Ḥilkiya of Hagronya objects to it: The reason that both individuals and the general public are liable to bring the same offering for unwitting idol worship is that the verse did not distinguish between them. But had the verse distinguished between them, I would say: Let us distinguish between individuals and the general public, and the general public would bring a different offering for their unwitting idol worship. What different offering shall they bring?
נַיְיתֵי פַּר, צִבּוּר בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת הוּא דְּמַיְיתוּ! נַיְיתֵי פַּר לְעוֹלָה וְשָׂעִיר לְחַטָּאת, צִבּוּר בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הוּא דְּמַיְיתוּ! נַיְיתֵי שְׂעִיר, נָשִׂיא בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת הוּא דְּמַיְיתֵי! נַיְיתֵי שְׂעִירָה, יָחִיד נָמֵי הַיְינוּ קׇרְבָּנוֹ!
If one would say: Let them bring a bull, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that the general public brings a bull. If one would say: Let them bring a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting idol worship that the general public brings those offerings in the case of an absence of awareness leading to an erroneous ruling by the court. If one would say: Let them bring a goat, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that a king brings a goat. If one will say: Let them bring a female goat, that is difficult, as that is the offering for an individual, too.
אַלְּמָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: צִבּוּר מַיְיתֵי פַּר לְעוֹלָה וְשָׂעִיר לְחַטָּאת, הָנֵי נַיְיתֵי אִיפְּכָא – פַּר לְחַטָּאת וְשָׂעִיר לְעוֹלָה. אִי נָמֵי: צָרִיךְ וְאֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara rejects this: Why do you say that the verse that equates the offerings of the individuals and the public is not necessary? Were it not for the verse, it might enter your mind to say: The general public brings a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, but this majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship shall bring the opposite: A bull for a sin-offering and a goat for a burnt-offering. Alternatively, perhaps the majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship must bring an offering, but it has no remedy, because there is no unique offering that it can bring. Therefore, the verse teaches us that there is no distinction between many people and individuals in this case.
דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִיהַת כִּי כְּתִיבִי הָנֵי קְרָאֵי – בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הוּא דִּכְתִיבִי, מַאי מַשְׁמַע? אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִי תֵּימָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי. אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כׇּל הַמִּצְוֹת הָאֵלֶּה״, אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוָה שֶׁהִיא שְׁקוּלָה כְּכׇל הַמִּצְוֹת? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
§ In any event, everyone agrees that where these verses are written, it is with regard to idol worship that they are written. The Gemara asks: As the verse does not mention idol worship explicitly, from where is this inferred? Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, and some say that the statement is unattributed, that the verse states: “And when you act unwittingly, and do not perform all these commandments [kol hamitzvot] that the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). Which is the mitzva that is the equivalent of all the mitzvot? You must say: It is the prohibition against idol worship.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי תָּנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה״, וּכְתִיב: ״אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה״, אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוָה שֶׁהִיא בְּדִיבּוּרוֹ שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא וְצִוָּה עַל יְדֵי מֹשֶׁה? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. דְּתָנָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״אָנֹכִי״ וְ״לֹא יִהְיֶה לְךָ״ מִפִּי הַגְּבוּרָה שְׁמַעְנוּם.
The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that the verse states: “That the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22), and it is written: “That the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was introduced in the speech of the Holy One, Blessed be He, heard by the Jewish people, and which He commanded in the Torah by means of Moses? You must say: This is idol worship, as Rabbi Yishmael taught concerning the first two commandments: “I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3): We, the Jewish people, heard them from the mouth of the Almighty.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא:
The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught
״לְמִן הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳ וָהָלְאָה לְדוֹרוֹתֵיכֶם״, אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוָה שֶׁהִיא נֶאֶמְרָה בִּתְחִלָּה? הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר: זוֹ עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְהָא אָמַר מָר: עֶשֶׂר מִצְוֹת נִצְטַוּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמָרָה (דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָיָה אִם שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע לְקוֹל ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ״)? אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.
that it is derived from the verse: “All that the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses, from the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was stated at the beginning of all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idol worship, as it is the first mitzva in the Ten Commandments. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: The Jewish people were commanded ten mitzvot in Marah soon after leaving Egypt, prior to the revelation at Sinai, as it is written: “If you shall hearken to the voice of the Lord your God…and listen to His mitzvot” (Exodus 15:26)? Evidently, there were mitzvot that preceded the prohibition against idol worship. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, וְאֵין מְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ.
MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering for issuing a ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple by one being there while ritually impure, or the defiling of its sacrificial foods by one partaking of them while ritually impure. There is a positive mitzva to remove impure people from the Temple, and there is a prohibition against entering the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity. And one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.
אֲבָל חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּנִּדָּה, וּמְבִיאִים אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּנִּדָּה. אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבַּנִּדָּה? פְּרוֹשׁ מִן הַנִּדָּה. וּמִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? אַל תָּבֹא עַל הַנִּדָּה.
But the court is liable to bring a bull for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman, and one brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman. What is the positive mitzva that is related to a menstruating woman? Distance yourself from the menstruating woman. If a man engages in intercourse with a woman and she begins menstruating, he is required to separate from her. And what is the prohibition? Do not engage in intercourse with a woman whom you know is a menstruating woman.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּצִבּוּר לָא מְחַיְּיבִי קׇרְבָּן בְּעָלְמָא, וְיָחִיד אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי לָא?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? That is, from where is it derived that the general public is not liable to bring any offering at all for a sin like the defiling of the Temple, which carries no liability for an individual to bring a fixed sin-offering for violating it unwittingly, and from where is it derived that an individual too is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for the defiling of the Temple?
אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי: נֶאֱמַר ״וְאָשֵׁם״ בְּחַטָּאת וּבְאָשָׁם תָּלוּי, וְנֶאֱמַר ״וְאָשֵׁמוּ״ בְּצִבּוּר. מָה ״וְאָשֵׁם״ בְּיָחִיד – בְּחַטָּאת קְבוּעָה, אַף ״וְאָשֵׁמוּ״ בְּצִבּוּר – בְּחַטָּאת קְבוּעָה,
Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: The term “and he is guilty” is stated with regard to a sin-offering (Leviticus 4:27) and with regard to a provisional guilt-offering (Leviticus 5:17), and the similar term: “And they are guilty” (Leviticus 4:13), is stated with regard to the general public. Just as the term “and he is guilty” that is stated with regard to an individual is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering, as it is written there, so too, the term “and they are guilty” that is stated with regard to the general public is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. For the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, not a fixed offering.
וּמָה צִבּוּר בְּחַטָּאת קְבוּעָה, אַף אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי אֵין בָּא אֶלָּא עַל סְפֵק חַטָּאת קְבוּעָה. אָמְרִי: אִי הָכִי, קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״וְהָיָה כִּי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״! דָּנִין (״אָשֵׁם״ מִן ״אָשֵׁמוּ״) [״אָשֵׁמוּ״ מִן ״אָשֵׁם״], וְאֵין דָּנִין ״אָשֵׁם״ מִן ״יֶאְשַׁם״.
And just as with regard to a transgression performed by the general public the liability is to bring a fixed sin-offering, so too, a provisional guilt-offering comes only for uncertainty with regard to a transgression that renders one obligated to bring a fixed sin-offering. This is the source for the fact that there is no liability to bring a sin-offering if the general public defiles the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and individuals are not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for those transgressions. The Sages say: If so, and the derivation is based on that term, this is difficult, as isn’t it also written with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5)? The Gemara responds: One derives the meaning of “they are guilty” from the meaning of “he is guilty,” but one does not derive the meaning of “he is guilty” from the meaning of “he shall be guilty,” even though both are stated in the singular.
וּמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? וְהָא תָּנֵי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן״ וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן״ – זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה, זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה! וְעוֹד: נֵילַף מִן ״וְאָשֵׁם״ מִטּוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהוּא טָמֵא וְאָשֵׁם״!
The Gemara asks: And what difference is there between the different verb conjugations? But didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav]” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. If a verbal analogy can be derived between two different terms, it can certainly be derived from two conjugations of the same term. And furthermore, let us derive the halakha from the term “and he is guilty,” written with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, as it is written: “And he is ritually impure and he is guilty” (Leviticus 5:2), which is a verbal analogy between identical terms.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דָּנִין ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳״ מִן ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי לְרַב פָּפָּא: וְנֵילַף ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּנְשִׂיאַת עָוֹן מִן ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּנְשִׂיאַת עָוֹן!
Rav Pappa says: One derives the meaning of: “And he is guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:17), which are written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: “And they are guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:13), which are written with regard to the unwitting communal sin-offering. The phrase: The commandments of the Lord, is not written with regard to the sliding-scale offering. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: Let us derive the meaning of: “And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity” (see Leviticus 5:1, 4), from the meaning of: “And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17).
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: דָּנִין ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה״ – מִ״וְאָשֵׁם וּמִצְוֹת ה׳ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה״. וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ שְׁמִיעַת קוֹל וּבִיטּוּי שְׂפָתַיִם וְטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱמַר בָּהֶם ״וְאָשֵׁם״ וּ״מִצְוֹת ה׳ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה״.
Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: One derives the meaning of “and he is guilty” and “the commandments of the Lord that shall not be done” written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: “And he is guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done” (Leviticus 4:27), written with regard to a fixed sin-offering. And the cases of hearing of a voice, i.e., an oath of testimony, and a statement of the lips, i.e., an oath on an utterance, and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, shall not prove otherwise, as it is not stated concerning them: And he is guilty, and: The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל שְׁמִיעַת קוֹל, וְעַל בִּיטּוּי שְׂפָתַיִם, וְעַל טוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו. וְהַנָּשִׂיא כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הַנָּשִׂיא חַיָּיב בְּכוּלָּן חוּץ מִשְּׁמִיעַת הַקּוֹל, שֶׁהַמֶּלֶךְ לֹא דָּן וְלֹא דָּנִין אוֹתוֹ [לֹא מֵעִיד וְלֹא מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ].
MISHNA: The court is not liable for issuing a ruling with regard to hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony taken by a witness who refuses to testify on behalf of a litigant who demands that he testify, or for an utterance of the lips, i.e., a false oath stated about some matter, or for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And the status of the king is like that of the court, and he is exempt from bringing an offering in those cases; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: The king is liable in all of those cases except for the case of hearing of a voice, and even in that case, his exemption is not intrinsic to the mitzva. Rather, it is for technical reasons, as the king neither judges others nor do others judge him; he does not testify nor do others testify against him. Therefore, a demand that he testify is not applicable.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר עוּלָּא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהָיָה כִי יֶאְשַׁם לְאַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה״, כֹּל שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּיב בְּאַחַת – מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּכוּלָּן, וְשֶׁאֵין מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּאַחַת – אֵין מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּכוּלָּן.
GEMARA: Ulla said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as the verse states with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5), indicating that anyone who becomes liable in every one of the instances for which one brings a sliding-scale offering becomes liable in all of those instances; and anyone who does not become liable in every one of the instances to bring a sliding-scale offering does not become liable in any of those instances. Since the king is exempt from taking an oath of testimony, he is exempt in the other cases as well.
וְאֵימָא: מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּכוּלָּן!
The Gemara asks: Why say this? And say an alternative interpretation of the verse: Anyone who becomes liable in any one of these instances brings a sliding-scale offering, and this is the halakha even though he does not become liable in all of them.
אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מֵהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא, הָיָה רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר
Rather, the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is from here, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yirmeya would say: It is stated:
