A final difficulty is raised against Rava’s explanation of the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai about the case where one cancels part of a vow. This difficulty is resolved as well. A braita is brought that is explained both according to Raba and according to Rava. The Mishna describes what is a vow of onasim, a vow that can’t be fulfilled because of circumstances beyond one’s control Rav Huna ruled in a case of one who was involved in a dispute with someone and when he went to search for more evidence in his favor, he handed in documents to the court that supported his claim and declared: If I don’t come back in thirty days, these documents will be void. In the end, he didn’t return due to circumstances beyond his control. Rav Huna ruled that the documents were void. Why is this case different from our Mishna – where circumstances beyond one’s control are enough to dissolve the vow? Rava held that circumstances beyond one’s control exempt one from responsibility. Why in a case of a get, though, is this not the case (when one says – this will be a get if I don’t return and he died)? Or why is it different from a case when the man gives a get if he doesn’t return within thirty days and on the thirtieth day he tries to get there but there is no ferry with which to cross the river? In both those cases, the get is valid. Returning to Rav Huna’s ruling, the Gemara asks why is it not considered asmachta, a transaction where one does not fully consent to the arrangement as the outcome is unclear, which is considered not to be a valid acquisition. Is it different as the court is already in possession of the documents? Is that a relevant factor? Or is it different because he explicitly said that the documents should be canceled? The Gemara concludes that regarding asmachta, we rule that it is a valid acquisition as long as there was no oness, unexpected circumstance, and an act of acquisition was performed in an important court. There are certain circumstances where one can make a vow that one never intends to keep, such as, to a tax collector or to a murderer.
Nedarim 27
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Nedarim 27
וְהָיוּ בָּהּ בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ, וְאָמַר: ״אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ בְּתוֹכָהּ, לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר״ — הַכַּלְכַּלָּה אֲסוּרָה, בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ מוּתָּרוֹת. עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְלִימֵּד: נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּתַּר מִקְצָתוֹ — הוּתַּר כּוּלּוֹ. מַאי לָאו, דְּאָמַר אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ בְּתוֹכָהּ, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר ״תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת וּלְבָנוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת, בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ מוּתָּרוֹת״, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, וּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן?
and there were benot shuaḥ in it, and he said: Had I known that there were benot shuaḥ in it I would not have taken a vow, the basket and the remaining figs inside are forbidden, while the benot shuaḥ are permitted. This was the accepted ruling until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. Therefore, all of the produce is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where one said: Had I known that benot shuaḥ were inside it, I would have said that black and white figs are forbidden, and benot shuaḥ are permitted, and this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the Rabbis disagree with him? But according to Rava everyone agrees that all the produce is permitted in a case like this.
לָא, בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ בְּתוֹכָהּ, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: ״כׇּל הַכַּלְכַּלָּה אֲסוּרָה, וּבְנוֹת שׁוּחַ מוּתָּרוֹת״.
The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to say that it is speaking of a case where he says: Had I known that there were benot shuaḥ in it I would have said that the entire basket is forbidden and the benot shuaḥ are permitted, which is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva according to Rava.
מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: נָדַר מֵחֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם כְּאֶחָד, הוּתַּר לְאֶחָד מֵהֶם — הוּתְּרוּ כּוּלָּן. ״חוּץ מֵאֶחָד מֵהֶן״ — הוּא מוּתָּר, וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught: With regard to one who took a vow, in one utterance, prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from five people, if the vow is dissolved for one of them, then the vow concerning all of them is dissolved; but if he retracted and said: I am prohibited to derive benefit from all of these individuals except for one of them, then he, i.e., that individual who was excluded, is permitted and they, the others, are forbidden?
אִי לְרַבָּה, רֵישָׁא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְסֵיפָא דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל. אִי לְרָבָא, סֵיפָא רַבָּנַן וְרֵישָׁא דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The Gemara explains two possibilities: If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rabba, then the first clause is referring to a case where after having taken a vow prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from all five people, he retracted and said: Benefit from this one and from that one are forbidden but benefit from one is permitted, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that a vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. And the latter clause is where he adds to the initial vow by stating: Except for one of them, and everyone agrees that only that one is permitted. If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rava, the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and everyone agrees with the ruling of the first clause.
מַתְנִי׳ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין, הִדִּירוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, וְחָלָה הוּא אוֹ שֶׁחָלָה בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁעִכְּבוֹ נָהָר — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין.
MISHNA: What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.
גְּמָ׳ הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאַתְפֵּיס זָכְווֹתָא בְּבֵי דִינָא, וְאָמַר: אִי לָא אָתֵינָא עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין, לִיבַּטְלוּן הָנֵי זָכְווֹתַאי. אִיתְּנִיס וְלָא אֲתָא. אֲמַר רַב הוּנָא: בְּטִיל זָכְווֹתֵיהּ.
GEMARA: The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who had a dispute in court with another individual and wanted to postpone the trial to a later time in order to search for more evidence. Meanwhile, he deposited his documents for a favorable verdict, i.e., that supported his claim, in court, and since the other litigant did not believe that he would return, the man said: If I do not come back within thirty days, these documents for a favorable verdict will be void. He was impeded by circumstances beyond his control and did not come back. Rav Huna said: His documents for a favorable verdict are void since he did not return by the specified time.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אָנוּס הוּא, וְאָנוּס רַחֲמָנָא פַּטְרֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלַנַּעֲרָה לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה דָבָר״.
Rava said to him: He is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and the halakha is that the Merciful One exempted a victim of circumstances beyond his control from responsibility for his actions, as it is written concerning a young woman who was raped: “But unto the damsel you shall do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death” (Deuteronomy 22:26).
וְכִי תֵּימָא קְטָלָא שָׁאנֵי, וְהָתְנַן: נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין, הִדִּירוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, וְחָלָה הוּא אוֹ שֶׁחָלָה בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁעִיכְּבוֹ נָהָר — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין!
And if you would say that with regard to the penalty of death, which is extremely severe, the halakha is different, and she is treated leniently and not executed, but with regard to other transgressions one’s actions are treated as deliberate, but didn’t we learn in the mishna here: What are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control; they are not binding and do not require dissolution. This demonstrates that even here the exemption due to circumstances beyond one’s control should apply.
וּלְרָבָא, מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן עַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ״, וּמֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ — הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. אַמַּאי? וְהָא מֵינָס אִיתְּנִיס! אָמְרִי: דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם
The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, in what way is it different from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b): If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, this document is a valid bill of divorce from the time of his declaration. Why? But he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as death is the ultimate example of this? The Gemara answers: Say that perhaps it is different there,
דְּאִי הֲוָה יָדַע דְּמִית, מִן לְאַלְתַּר הֲוָה גָּמַר וְיָהֵיב גִּיטָּא.
for had he known that he would die within a year he would have immediately finalized his decision and given her the bill of divorce. Since he gave it to her initially so that she not require levirate marriage, it is assumed that his intent was to deliver it even in this case. By contrast, in the case where one stipulated about his rights, which he certainly did not intend to forfeit, it is assumed that he would not have wanted his statement to take effect in this situation.
מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי לָא אָתֵינָא מִכָּאן עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. אֲתָא וּפַסְקֵיהּ מַעְבָּרָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי, חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי! וַאֲמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לָא שְׁמֵיהּ מֵתְיָיא. אַמַּאי? וְהָא מֵינָס אֲנִיס!
The Gemara continues to question Rava: In what way is it different from the following case: There was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came on the thirtieth day but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. And Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, and the condition is considered to have been fulfilled. The Gemara asks: Why is it not considered an arrival; but he was impeded by circumstances beyond his control?
דִּלְמָא אוּנְסָא דְּמִיגַּלְּיָא שָׁאנֵי, וּמַעְבָּרָא מִיגַּלֵּי אוּנְסֵיהּ.
The Gemara responds: Perhaps the case of circumstances beyond one’s control that are apparent to everyone and could have been anticipated ahead of time is different, and a ferry is considered an apparent type of circumstance beyond one’s control, which he should have considered and stipulated explicitly. Since he did not do so, it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.
וּלְרַב הוּנָא, מִכְּדִי אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא. וְאַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּמִיתַּפְסָן זָכְוָתֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Huna, who said that his documents for a favorable verdict are rendered void if he does not return by the set time, it is difficult to understand why the stipulation is valid. After all, it is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], since he certainly assumed that he would return and intended to actually give away his documents, and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition. Even if a person performs an act of acquisition to that effect, he does not have the intention to actually follow through. The Gemara responds: Here it is different because his documents for a favorable verdict are being held by the court, so he certainly did intend to give them up in the event that he not return on time.
וְהֵיכָא דְּמִיתַּפְסִין לָאו אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא? וְהָתְנַן: מִי שֶׁפָּרַע מִקְצָת חוֹבוֹ, וְהִשְׁלִישׁ אֶת שְׁטָרוֹ, וְאָמַר: אִם אֵין אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לוֹ מִכָּאן עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — תֵּן לוֹ שְׁטָרוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And in a case where his rights are held by another party, is it not considered an asmakhta? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 168a): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, and deposited his loan document with a third party for purposes of security, and said: If I do not give him the remainder of the debt from now until thirty days, give him his loan document and he can collect the entire amount.
הִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נָתַן, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יִתֵּן. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לֹא יִתֵּן. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי דְּאָמַר אַסְמַכְתָּא קָנְיָא!
If the time arrived and he did not give the remainder of the debt to the creditor, Rabbi Yosei says: The third party should give the document to the debtor. And Rabbi Yehuda says: He should not give it. And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that an asmakhta effects acquisition. The reason for this is that the one who deposited the document believes he will return in time and never intended to give over the document. It can be seen in the mishna that even in a case where the document was held by a third party, it is still considered an asmakhta and is not valid.
שָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּאָמַר לִבַּטְלָן זָכְוָתֵיהּ.
The Gemara responds: It is different here because the one who deposited his documents with the court explicitly said that documents for a favorable verdict should be void, which demonstrates that he intended to uphold his stipulation.
וְהִלְכְתָא: אַסְמַכְתָּא קָנְיָא. וְהוּא דְּלָא אֲנִיס, וְהוּא דִּקְנוֹ מִינֵּיהּ בְּבֵית דִּין חָשׁוּב.
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in these cases is as follows: An asmakhta effects acquisition even if it is dependent on a condition that may not be fulfilled, but this is true only if the one who had stated the obligation dependent upon the asmakhta was not impeded by circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, and instead deliberately chose not to fulfill the stipulation. In addition, this is the halakha only if he effected an acquisition from the other party for this asmakhta in an eminent court, but not for an agreement that takes place not in an eminent court.
מַתְנִי׳ נוֹדְרִין לֶהָרָגִין וְלֶחָרָמִין וְלַמּוֹכְסִין. שֶׁהִיא תְּרוּמָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ תְּרוּמָה. שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: בַּכֹּל נוֹדְרִין,
MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people,
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עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
מיתר, ישראל
I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!
Maale Adumim, Israel
I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.
Givat Zev, Israel
I had dreamed of doing daf yomi since I had my first serious Talmud class 18 years ago at Pardes with Rahel Berkovitz, and then a couple of summers with Leah Rosenthal. There is no way I would be able to do it without another wonderful teacher, Michelle, and the Hadran organization. I wake up and am excited to start each day with the next daf.
Irvine, United States
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
Jerusalem, Israel
Geri Goldstein got me started learning daf yomi when I was in Israel 2 years ago. It’s been a challenge and I’ve learned a lot though I’m sure I miss a lot. I quilt as I listen and I want to share what I’ve been working on.
Ottawa, Canada
Berlin, Germany
I started to listen to Michelle’s podcasts four years ago. The minute I started I was hooked. I’m so excited to learn the entire Talmud, and think I will continue always. I chose the quote “while a woman is engaged in conversation she also holds the spindle”. (Megillah 14b). It reminds me of all of the amazing women I learn with every day who multi-task, think ahead and accomplish so much.
Zichron Yakov, Israel
Nedarim 27
וְהָיוּ בָּהּ בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ, וְאָמַר: ״אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ בְּתוֹכָהּ, לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר״ — הַכַּלְכַּלָּה אֲסוּרָה, בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ מוּתָּרוֹת. עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְלִימֵּד: נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּתַּר מִקְצָתוֹ — הוּתַּר כּוּלּוֹ. מַאי לָאו, דְּאָמַר אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ בְּתוֹכָהּ, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר ״תְּאֵנִים שְׁחוֹרוֹת וּלְבָנוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת, בְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ מוּתָּרוֹת״, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, וּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן?
and there were benot shuaḥ in it, and he said: Had I known that there were benot shuaḥ in it I would not have taken a vow, the basket and the remaining figs inside are forbidden, while the benot shuaḥ are permitted. This was the accepted ruling until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. Therefore, all of the produce is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where one said: Had I known that benot shuaḥ were inside it, I would have said that black and white figs are forbidden, and benot shuaḥ are permitted, and this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the Rabbis disagree with him? But according to Rava everyone agrees that all the produce is permitted in a case like this.
לָא, בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁבְּנוֹת שׁוּחַ בְּתוֹכָהּ, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: ״כׇּל הַכַּלְכַּלָּה אֲסוּרָה, וּבְנוֹת שׁוּחַ מוּתָּרוֹת״.
The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to say that it is speaking of a case where he says: Had I known that there were benot shuaḥ in it I would have said that the entire basket is forbidden and the benot shuaḥ are permitted, which is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva according to Rava.
מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: נָדַר מֵחֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם כְּאֶחָד, הוּתַּר לְאֶחָד מֵהֶם — הוּתְּרוּ כּוּלָּן. ״חוּץ מֵאֶחָד מֵהֶן״ — הוּא מוּתָּר, וְהֵן אֲסוּרִין.
The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught: With regard to one who took a vow, in one utterance, prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from five people, if the vow is dissolved for one of them, then the vow concerning all of them is dissolved; but if he retracted and said: I am prohibited to derive benefit from all of these individuals except for one of them, then he, i.e., that individual who was excluded, is permitted and they, the others, are forbidden?
אִי לְרַבָּה, רֵישָׁא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְסֵיפָא דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל. אִי לְרָבָא, סֵיפָא רַבָּנַן וְרֵישָׁא דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
The Gemara explains two possibilities: If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rabba, then the first clause is referring to a case where after having taken a vow prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from all five people, he retracted and said: Benefit from this one and from that one are forbidden but benefit from one is permitted, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that a vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. And the latter clause is where he adds to the initial vow by stating: Except for one of them, and everyone agrees that only that one is permitted. If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rava, the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and everyone agrees with the ruling of the first clause.
מַתְנִי׳ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין, הִדִּירוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, וְחָלָה הוּא אוֹ שֶׁחָלָה בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁעִכְּבוֹ נָהָר — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין.
MISHNA: What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.
גְּמָ׳ הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאַתְפֵּיס זָכְווֹתָא בְּבֵי דִינָא, וְאָמַר: אִי לָא אָתֵינָא עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין, לִיבַּטְלוּן הָנֵי זָכְווֹתַאי. אִיתְּנִיס וְלָא אֲתָא. אֲמַר רַב הוּנָא: בְּטִיל זָכְווֹתֵיהּ.
GEMARA: The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who had a dispute in court with another individual and wanted to postpone the trial to a later time in order to search for more evidence. Meanwhile, he deposited his documents for a favorable verdict, i.e., that supported his claim, in court, and since the other litigant did not believe that he would return, the man said: If I do not come back within thirty days, these documents for a favorable verdict will be void. He was impeded by circumstances beyond his control and did not come back. Rav Huna said: His documents for a favorable verdict are void since he did not return by the specified time.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אָנוּס הוּא, וְאָנוּס רַחֲמָנָא פַּטְרֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלַנַּעֲרָה לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה דָבָר״.
Rava said to him: He is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and the halakha is that the Merciful One exempted a victim of circumstances beyond his control from responsibility for his actions, as it is written concerning a young woman who was raped: “But unto the damsel you shall do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death” (Deuteronomy 22:26).
וְכִי תֵּימָא קְטָלָא שָׁאנֵי, וְהָתְנַן: נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין, הִדִּירוֹ חֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁיֹּאכַל אֶצְלוֹ, וְחָלָה הוּא אוֹ שֶׁחָלָה בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁעִיכְּבוֹ נָהָר — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי אוֹנָסִין!
And if you would say that with regard to the penalty of death, which is extremely severe, the halakha is different, and she is treated leniently and not executed, but with regard to other transgressions one’s actions are treated as deliberate, but didn’t we learn in the mishna here: What are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control; they are not binding and do not require dissolution. This demonstrates that even here the exemption due to circumstances beyond one’s control should apply.
וּלְרָבָא, מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן עַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ״, וּמֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ — הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. אַמַּאי? וְהָא מֵינָס אִיתְּנִיס! אָמְרִי: דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם
The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, in what way is it different from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b): If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, this document is a valid bill of divorce from the time of his declaration. Why? But he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as death is the ultimate example of this? The Gemara answers: Say that perhaps it is different there,
דְּאִי הֲוָה יָדַע דְּמִית, מִן לְאַלְתַּר הֲוָה גָּמַר וְיָהֵיב גִּיטָּא.
for had he known that he would die within a year he would have immediately finalized his decision and given her the bill of divorce. Since he gave it to her initially so that she not require levirate marriage, it is assumed that his intent was to deliver it even in this case. By contrast, in the case where one stipulated about his rights, which he certainly did not intend to forfeit, it is assumed that he would not have wanted his statement to take effect in this situation.
מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: אִי לָא אָתֵינָא מִכָּאן עַד תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין לֶיהֱוֵי גִּיטָּא. אֲתָא וּפַסְקֵיהּ מַעְבָּרָא. אֲמַר לְהוּ: חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי, חֲזוֹ דַּאֲתַאי! וַאֲמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לָא שְׁמֵיהּ מֵתְיָיא. אַמַּאי? וְהָא מֵינָס אֲנִיס!
The Gemara continues to question Rava: In what way is it different from the following case: There was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came on the thirtieth day but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. And Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, and the condition is considered to have been fulfilled. The Gemara asks: Why is it not considered an arrival; but he was impeded by circumstances beyond his control?
דִּלְמָא אוּנְסָא דְּמִיגַּלְּיָא שָׁאנֵי, וּמַעְבָּרָא מִיגַּלֵּי אוּנְסֵיהּ.
The Gemara responds: Perhaps the case of circumstances beyond one’s control that are apparent to everyone and could have been anticipated ahead of time is different, and a ferry is considered an apparent type of circumstance beyond one’s control, which he should have considered and stipulated explicitly. Since he did not do so, it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.
וּלְרַב הוּנָא, מִכְּדִי אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא. וְאַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּמִיתַּפְסָן זָכְוָתֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Huna, who said that his documents for a favorable verdict are rendered void if he does not return by the set time, it is difficult to understand why the stipulation is valid. After all, it is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], since he certainly assumed that he would return and intended to actually give away his documents, and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition. Even if a person performs an act of acquisition to that effect, he does not have the intention to actually follow through. The Gemara responds: Here it is different because his documents for a favorable verdict are being held by the court, so he certainly did intend to give them up in the event that he not return on time.
וְהֵיכָא דְּמִיתַּפְסִין לָאו אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא? וְהָתְנַן: מִי שֶׁפָּרַע מִקְצָת חוֹבוֹ, וְהִשְׁלִישׁ אֶת שְׁטָרוֹ, וְאָמַר: אִם אֵין אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לוֹ מִכָּאן עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — תֵּן לוֹ שְׁטָרוֹ.
The Gemara asks: And in a case where his rights are held by another party, is it not considered an asmakhta? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 168a): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, and deposited his loan document with a third party for purposes of security, and said: If I do not give him the remainder of the debt from now until thirty days, give him his loan document and he can collect the entire amount.
הִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נָתַן, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יִתֵּן. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לֹא יִתֵּן. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי דְּאָמַר אַסְמַכְתָּא קָנְיָא!
If the time arrived and he did not give the remainder of the debt to the creditor, Rabbi Yosei says: The third party should give the document to the debtor. And Rabbi Yehuda says: He should not give it. And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that an asmakhta effects acquisition. The reason for this is that the one who deposited the document believes he will return in time and never intended to give over the document. It can be seen in the mishna that even in a case where the document was held by a third party, it is still considered an asmakhta and is not valid.
שָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּאָמַר לִבַּטְלָן זָכְוָתֵיהּ.
The Gemara responds: It is different here because the one who deposited his documents with the court explicitly said that documents for a favorable verdict should be void, which demonstrates that he intended to uphold his stipulation.
וְהִלְכְתָא: אַסְמַכְתָּא קָנְיָא. וְהוּא דְּלָא אֲנִיס, וְהוּא דִּקְנוֹ מִינֵּיהּ בְּבֵית דִּין חָשׁוּב.
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in these cases is as follows: An asmakhta effects acquisition even if it is dependent on a condition that may not be fulfilled, but this is true only if the one who had stated the obligation dependent upon the asmakhta was not impeded by circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, and instead deliberately chose not to fulfill the stipulation. In addition, this is the halakha only if he effected an acquisition from the other party for this asmakhta in an eminent court, but not for an agreement that takes place not in an eminent court.
מַתְנִי׳ נוֹדְרִין לֶהָרָגִין וְלֶחָרָמִין וְלַמּוֹכְסִין. שֶׁהִיא תְּרוּמָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ תְּרוּמָה. שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן שֶׁל בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: בַּכֹּל נוֹדְרִין,
MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people,
