Pesachim 23
לְרַבִּים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנָּטוּעַ לְרַבִּים.
for the public; all the details of the prohibition of orla apply to a tree planted for public purposes. Rabbi Yehuda says: This verse comes to exclude a tree planted for the public, i.e., it is exempt from the laws of orla.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא — דִּכְתִיב ״וּנְטַעְתֶּם״, לְיָחִיד מַשְׁמַע, לְרַבִּים לָא מַשְׁמַע. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לָכֶם״ — לְהָבִיא אֶת הַנָּטוּעַ לְרַבִּים. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: ״וּנְטַעְתֶּם״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין לְרַבִּים בֵּין לְיָחִיד, וְ״לָכֶם״ בֵּין יָחִיד בֵּין רַבִּים מַשְׁמַע. הָוֵי רִבּוּי אַחַר רִבּוּי — וְאֵין רִבּוּי אַחַר רִבּוּי אֶלָּא לְמַעֵט.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna? As it is written: “And you shall plant.” That the mitzva applies to an individual is indicated, since planting a tree is ordinarily an individual activity; however, that the mitzva of orla applies to a tree planted for the public is not indicated by the verse. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “for you” in the plural, to include within this prohibition that which is planted for the public. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the phrase “and you shall plant” indicates that orla applies both to a tree planted for the public and for an individual; and the phrase “for you” also indicates that orla applies both to a tree planted for an individual and for the public. If so, then this is one amplificatory expression after another, and there is a principle that one amplificatory expression after another is restrictive. Therefore, the term: “For you” comes to exclude from this prohibition a tree planted for the public.
וַהֲרֵי תְּרוּמָה, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״וְכׇל זָר לֹא יֹאכַל קֹדֶשׁ״, וּתְנַן: מְעָרְבִין לְנָזִיר בְּיַיִן, וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל בִּתְרוּמָה!
The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition that a non-priest shall not eat teruma, as the Merciful One says: “No stranger shall eat of the sacred food; a tenant of a priest, or a hired servant, shall not eat of the sacred food” (Leviticus 22:10). And we learned in a mishna: One may establish an eiruv, such as a joining of Shabbat boundaries, on behalf of a nazirite with wine, even though he may not drink it. And one may establish an eiruv on behalf of an Israelite with teruma, although it is prohibited for him to eat it. Apparently, it is permitted for an Israelite to derive benefit from the teruma even though the verse says: “He shall not eat.” This appears to be a challenge to the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״תְּרוּמַתְכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם תְּהֵא. וְאִידַּךְ? ״תְּרוּמַתְכֶם״ — דְּכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל קָאָמַר.
Rav Pappa said: It is different there, with regard to teruma, as the verse said: “And your teruma shall be reckoned unto you, as though it were the grain of the threshing floor, and as the fullness of the winepress” (Numbers 18:27). The Sages derived from the inclusion of the possessive pronoun “your” that the teruma shall be yours; therefore, it is permitted for an Israelite to benefit from teruma. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Ḥizkiya, derive from this phrase, as he holds that: “He shall not eat” already indicates that it is permitted to benefit from teruma? The Gemara answers: According to his opinion the phrase: “Your teruma” is referring to all of the teruma of the entire Jewish people. This is common biblical vernacular, and nothing may be derived from it.
וַהֲרֵי נָזִיר, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״מֵחַרְצַנִּים וְעַד זָג לֹא יֹאכֵל״, וּתְנַן: מְעָרְבִין לַנָּזִיר בְּיַיִן. אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״נִזְרוֹ״ — שֶׁלּוֹ יְהֵא.
The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition against the nazirite eating grape products, as the Merciful One says: “All the days of his naziriteship he shall eat nothing that is made of the grapevine, from the seeds to the grape skin” (Numbers 6:4). And we learned in the mishna: One may establish an eiruv on behalf of a nazirite with wine even though he may not drink it. Apparently, a nazirite may derive benefit from wine despite the fact that the verse says that he may not drink it. Mar Zutra said: It is different there, as the verse said: “His naziriteship.” He derives from this verse that it shall be his; in other words, the nazirite may continue to own wine and to benefit from it.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״קָדֹשׁ יִהְיֶה גַּדֵּל פֶּרַע שְׂעַר רֹאשׁוֹ״, גִּידּוּלוֹ קָדוֹשׁ, וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר קָדוֹשׁ. מִידֵּי ״וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר״ כְּתִיב?! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְמָר זוּטְרָא.
Rav Ashi said: This halakha is derived from another source. As the verse says: “He shall be sacred, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5). Rav Ashi reads the verse precisely to indicate that the growth of the nazirite’s hair is sacred and must be burned, but no other element of his naziriteship is sacred. In other words, he may derive benefit from the other elements prohibited to him during his naziriteship, i.e., from grape products. The Gemara challenges: And is it written: No other element of his naziriteship? There is no indication that this statement means that the prohibition against deriving benefit is limited to this one element. Rather, it is clear that the derivation of this halakha is in accordance with the explanation of Mar Zutra.
וַהֲרֵי חָדָשׁ, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֶחֶם וְקָלִי וְכַרְמֶל לֹא תֹאכְלוּ עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״, וּתְנַן: קוֹצֵר לְשַׁחַת, וּמַאֲכִיל לַבְּהֵמָה!
The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition of new grain, which was harvested before the bringing of the omer offering, as the Merciful One says: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh stalks until this day itself, until you have brought the offering of your God; it is a statute forever throughout your generations in all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:14). And we learned in a mishna: One may harvest grain before the omer as fodder and feed it to his animal. Apparently, one may derive benefit from this grain even though the verse says: “You shall not eat.”
אָמַר רַב שְׁמַעְיָה: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״קְצִירְכֶם״ — קְצִירְכֶם שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא. וְאִידַּךְ? ״קְצִירְכֶם״ — דְּכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל מַשְׁמַע.
Rav Shemaya said: It is different there, as the verse said: “Your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), indicating that your harvest will be yours. In other words, one may benefit from it, as it is still considered to be his. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Ḥizkiya, derive from this phrase? The Gemara answers that according to his opinion, “your harvest” is referring to the harvest of the entire Jewish people. This is common biblical vernacular, and nothing may be derived from it.
וַהֲרֵי שְׁרָצִים, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״שֶׁקֶץ הוּא לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וּתְנַן: צַיָּידֵי חַיָּה וְעוֹפוֹת וְדָגִים שֶׁנִּזְדַּמְּנוּ לָהֶם מִינִין טְמֵאִין — מוּתָּרִין לְמוֹכְרָן לְגוֹיִם. שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לָכֶם״ — שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא.
The Gemara challenges both opinions. And yet there is the prohibition against eating creeping animals, as the Merciful One says: “And every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41). And we learned in a mishna: If hunters of undomesticated animals, birds, and fish happen to catch non-kosher species that they did not intend to trap, it is permitted for them to sell them to gentiles. Apparently, one may derive benefit from non-kosher species even though the verse says: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse said: “For you” (Leviticus 11:10), indicating that they will be yours, that one may derive benefit from them.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה נָמֵי! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״יִהְיוּ״ — בַּהֲוָיָיתָן יְהוּ.
The Gemara asks: If so, that it is permitted to derive benefit from these creeping animals, then even if one intends to catch them it should also be permitted to sell them to gentiles ab initio. However, the mishna indicates that this is prohibited. The Gemara answers: It is different here, in the case of creeping animals, as the verse said: “They shall be” (Leviticus 11:11). It is derived from this that they shall be as they are. In other words, they should remain in their detestable state, and one should stay away from them.
וּלְחִזְקִיָּה, לְמָה לִי לְמִיכְתַּב ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וּמַיְיתֵי ״לָכֶם״ לְמִישְׁרְיֵיהּ? לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, וְלָא בָּעֵי ״לָכֶם״! אָמַר לָךְ חִזְקִיָּה, טַעְמָא דִּידִי נָמֵי מֵהָכָא.
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Ḥizkiya, why do I need the verse to write: “It shall not be eaten,” to teach that one may not derive benefit from them, and afterward to say: “For you,” to permit deriving benefit from them? Let the Merciful One not write: “It shall not be eaten,” and it will not need to say: “For you.” Ḥizkiya could have said to you: My reason is also derived from here, as this verse is a central source for my opinion. Since the verse needed to say explicitly: “For you,” it is evident that when the Torah writes only: “It shall not be eaten,” it is indicating that it is prohibited to benefit from the item as well.
וַהֲרֵי חָמֵץ, דְּרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל חָמֵץ״, וְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: תְּמַהּ עַל עַצְמְךָ הֵיאַךְ חָמֵץ אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה כׇּל שִׁבְעָה? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יֵרָאֶה לְךָ שְׂאוֹר״ — שֶׁלְּךָ יְהֵא.
The Gemara further challenges the opinions of Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu: And yet there is the prohibition of leavened bread, as the Merciful One says: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten,” and it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Be astounded with yourself; how is it prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days? Apparently, he holds that it is permitted for one to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days of Passover and certainly afterward. The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse said: “Matzot shall be eaten throughout the seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7). The phrase “with you” indicates that it is yours, i.e., it is still considered to be in one’s possession, and it is permitted for him to derive benefit from it.
וְרַבָּנַן? שֶׁלְּךָ אִי אַתָּה רוֹאֶה, אֲבָל אַתָּה רוֹאֶה שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים וְשֶׁל גָּבוֹהַּ. וְאִידַּךְ? תְּרֵי ״לְךָ״ כְּתִיבִי.
The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis, who say that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread, learn from the phrase “with you”? The Gemara answers: They derive that you may not see your own leavened bread; however, you may see that of others and that which is consecrated to God but remained in one’s possession. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, say about this halakha? The Gemara answers: There are two occurrences of the phrase “with you” written. One indicates that it is permitted to see leavened bread that belongs to a gentile, and the other indicates that one may derive benefit from leavened bread.
וְאִידַּךְ? חַד — בְּגוֹי שֶׁכִּיבַּשְׁתּוֹ, וְחַד — בְּגוֹי שֶׁלֹּא כִּיבַּשְׁתּוֹ. וְאִידַּךְ? תְּלָתָא ״לְךָ״ כְּתִיבִי. וְאִידַּךְ? חַד — בִּשְׂאוֹר, וְחַד — בְּחָמֵץ. וּצְרִיכִי.
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the other Sages, the Rabbis, why is the phrase “with you” written twice? They explain: One is written with regard to a gentile whom he has conquered, i.e., who is under his control. And the other is written with regard to a gentile whom he has not conquered. In either case, one is permitted to keep the gentile’s leavened bread in his possession on Passover. And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, derive this halakha that one may see even the leavened bread of a gentile who is under his control? He points out that there are three occurrences of the phrase “with you” written. And what do the other Sages, the Rabbis, learn from the extra instance of the phrase “with you”? They learn that it is used once to teach about leaven, and once to teach about leavened bread. And they are both necessary and must be mentioned explicitly, as one cannot derive this principle with regard to leavened bread from leaven or vice versa.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי. ״יֵעָשֶׂה לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״, מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״, שֶׁיָּכוֹל לִמְלֶאכֶת גָּבוֹהַּ יְהֵא מוּתָּר, לִמְלֶאכֶת הֶדְיוֹט יְהֵא אָסוּר, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״ — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say this dispute between Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu with regard to the implication of the phrase: It shall not be eaten, is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The verse states: “And the fat of the animal carcass, and the fat of that which is torn of beasts, may be used for any other service; but you shall surely not eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24). What does it mean when the verse states: “For any other service”? I might have thought that with regard to the Temple service it should be permitted to use this fat for the following reason: Because fats may generally be offered on the altar, it is as though it is permitted to consume them; therefore, they may be used for other sacred purposes as well. However, I might have thought that with regard to common use it should be prohibited to use them, as the verse states: “You shall surely not eat of it.” Therefore, the verse states: “For any other service,” meaning that its use is permitted in all contexts. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: שֶׁיָּכוֹל לִמְלֶאכֶת הֶדְיוֹט יְהֵא טָהוֹר, לִמְלֶאכֶת גָּבוֹהַּ יְהֵא טָמֵא, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְכׇל מְלָאכָה״.
Rabbi Akiva says: Although its use is clearly permitted, I might have thought that despite the fact that an animal carcass is impure, with regard to common use its fat should be ritually pure; however, with regard to the Temple service it should be ritually impure. Therefore, the verse states: “For any other service,” meaning that it is considered pure in all contexts.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא. כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְאִיסּוּר וּלְהֶיתֵּר. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִיסּוּר וְהֶיתֵּר לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה.
The Gemara explains their dispute: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that with regard to purity and impurity no verse is necessary, as there is no reason to assume that the fat of an animal carcass is impure. The verse is necessary to establish the prohibited or permitted status of this fat. And Rabbi Akiva holds that to teach whether this fat is prohibited or permitted no separate verse is necessary; it is necessary to establish its status with regard to ritual purity or impurity.
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר: ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה בֵּין אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא לְמִישְׁרְיַיהּ לִנְבֵילָה — בַּהֲנָאָה הוּא דַּאֲתָא. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה לָא מַשְׁמַע. וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא — לְטוּמְאָה וְטׇהֳרָה.
The Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree about this, the following issue? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds: “You shall not eat” indicates both the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of deriving benefit; therefore, one may not derive benefit from an animal carcass. And when the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to permit one to derive benefit from an animal carcass. And Rabbi Akiva holds: “You shall not eat” indicates that there is only a prohibition of eating; it does not indicate a prohibition of deriving benefit. Therefore, no verse is necessary to learn that it is permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass. When the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to teach about the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity. Apparently, there is a tannaitic dispute about the meaning of the words: “You shall not eat.”
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״ מַשְׁמַע בֵּין אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה בֵּין אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה. וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר: כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה נְבֵילָה — הִיא הוּתְּרָה, חֶלְבָּהּ וְגִידָהּ — לֹא הוּתְּרוּ. וְכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְהֶיתֵּר הֲנָאָה הוּא דַּאֲתָא. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: כְּשֶׁהוּתְּרָה נְבֵילָה — חֶלְבָּהּ וְגִידָהּ נָמֵי הוּתְּרוּ. וְכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא — לְטוּמְאָה וְטׇהֳרָה.
The Gemara rejects this assumption. No, it is possible to say that everyone holds that “You shall not eat” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit. And here, they disagree about this: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that when it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, the carcass itself was permitted; however, its fat and its sinews were not permitted. And the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary to permit one to derive benefit from this fat. However, Rabbi Akiva holds: When it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, it was also permitted to derive benefit from its fat and sinews. Therefore, the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary for the issue of purity and impurity.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, אַשְׁכְּחַן חֵלֶב דְּשַׁרְיֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בַּהֲנָאָה, אֶלָּא גִּיד נֵימָא דְּאָסוּר! אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאָסוּר. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, מַיְיתֵי לַהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה חֵלֶב שֶׁעָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת — מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, גִּיד שֶׁאֵינוֹ עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן.
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, we find that the Merciful One explicitly permits one to derive benefit from fat; however, let us say that the sinew of the sciatic nerve is prohibited. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that it is indeed so that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve. And if you wish, say instead that one is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives that the sciatic nerve is permitted through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to forbidden fat, for which one is punished with karet if he eats it intentionally, it is permitted to derive benefit, with regard to the sciatic nerve, for which the punishment for one who eats it is not karet, all the more so is it not clear that it is permitted to derive benefit?
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָסַר? אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ, מָה לְחֵלֶב שֶׁכֵּן הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל חַיָּה, תֹּאמַר בְּגִיד שֶׁלֹּא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל חַיָּה.
The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Shimon, who prohibits deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve, not accept this a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: This inference can be refuted, as it is possible to say: What is unique to fat? It is that it is released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals, as the prohibition only applies to the fats of kosher domesticated animals. Can you say the same with regard to the sciatic nerve, which is not released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals and remains prohibited? Apparently, in some ways the prohibition of the sciatic nerve is more stringent than that of fat.
וְאִידַּךְ? בִּבְהֵמָה קָאָמְרִינַן — בִּבְהֵמָה מִיהַת לָא אִישְׁתְּרִי.
The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, who permits one to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve based on this a fortiori inference, respond? The Gemara says: When we state this a fortiori inference, it is with regard to a domesticated animal; in any case, with regard to a domesticated animal its fat is not permitted. Since with regard to a domesticated animal the prohibition of fat is more stringent than that of the sciatic nerve, the a fortiori inference is valid.
מִכְּדֵי אוֹתְבִינְהוּ כׇּל הָנֵי קְרָאֵי וְשַׁנִּינְהוּ. חִזְקִיָּה וְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי! בְּחָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח וְאַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן, בְּשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל. חִזְקִיָּה נָפֵיק לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל״, וְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ נָפֵיק לֵיהּ מִנְּבֵילָה.
After discussing numerous cases that involve prohibitions of eating and deriving benefit, the Gemara asks: Since we raised objections from all of these verses and answered them, and in every case it is apparent that despite the fact that the verse said: “You shall not eat” there was no dispute as to whether or not one may derive benefit from these items, then with regard to what issue do Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to leavened bread on Passover, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who prohibit one to derive benefit from it; and they disagree with regard to an ox that is stoned, in accordance with everyone. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya derived that it is prohibited to derive benefit in this case from the words: “It shall not be eaten,” and Rabbi Abbahu derived that it is prohibited from the fact that the Torah explicitly had to permit one to derive benefit in the case of an animal carcass.
מִכְּדִי בֵּין לְמָר וּבֵין לְמָר אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה, מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בָּעֲזָרָה. חִזְקִיָּה סָבַר: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ — לְמַעוֹטֵי הָנֵי, ״אֹתוֹ״ — לְמַעוֹטֵי חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה.
The Gemara asks: Now, both according to the one Master and according to the other Master, it is prohibited to derive benefit from these items. The fact that they disagree about the source of this halakha notwithstanding, what is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Ḥizkiya holds: “It shall not be eaten” comes to exclude these cases of leavened bread and the ox that is stoned. Although in most cases a prohibition against eating does not extend to a prohibition against deriving benefit, the language of the verse in these cases indicates that there is a prohibition against deriving benefit as well. Furthermore, “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, indicating that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them.
רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ סָבַר: ״אֹתוֹ״ — לְמַעוֹטֵי הָנֵי, חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא נִינְהוּ.
However, Rabbi Abbahu holds that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintained that the prohibition against eating an animal carcass cannot be used to derive the prohibition against deriving benefit: “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude these two cases, leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, where deriving benefit is prohibited. And the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law, as there is no source from which to derive this prohibition. Therefore, the only practical difference between them is whether the prohibition of deriving benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law or by rabbinic law.
יָתֵיב הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: מִנַּיִן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה דְּכִי הֵיכִי דַּאֲסוּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה הָכִי נָמֵי אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה? וּמַאי נִיהוּ — חָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל. מִנַּיִן?! תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל״! ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״, אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה — מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה — לָא מַשְׁמַע לֵיהּ.
The Gemara relates: One of the Sages sat before Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, and he sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: From where is it derived with regard to all the prohibitions in the Torah that just as it is prohibited to eat them, so too, it is prohibited to benefit from them? And what are the prohibited objects to which this statement refers? They are leavened bread on Passover and an ox that is stoned. The Gemara asks: Why ask from where? Derive the prohibition from the phrase: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers that he derived a prohibition of eating this item from: “It shall not be eaten”; however, he did not derive a prohibition of deriving benefit from this phrase.
תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִנְּבֵילָה?! סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר: דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן.
The Gemara challenges: Derive this general prohibition against deriving benefit from the fact that the Torah had to explicitly permit one to benefit from an animal carcass. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said with regard to an animal carcass: The matters are as they are written, and the words in the verse do not indicate anything beyond their simple meaning.
אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מֵהֵיכָא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מִ״לַּכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִיכוּן אֹתוֹ״!
The Gemara challenges: If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then let him derive this halakha from where Rabbi Yehuda derives it, i.e., from the verse: “And you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dog” (Exodus 22:30). Rabbi Yehuda expounded that one may throw it to a dog, but one may not throw any of the other prohibited items mentioned in the Torah to a dog. From this he infers that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover or from other similar items.
קָסָבַר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בָּעֲזָרָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. מִנַּיִן, דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל חַטָּאת אֲשֶׁר יוּבָא מִדָּמָהּ וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara responds: This Sage holds that the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law, and that it is the word “it” in the verse that indicates they are prohibited. And from where is it derived that this prohibition against deriving benefit applies to leavened bread and to an ox that is stoned as well? As it is written: “And no sin-offering, of which any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the sacred place, shall be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23).
שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בָּאֵשׁ תִּשָּׂרֵף״, וּמָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בָּאֵשׁ תִּשָּׂרֵף״? אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְגוּפוֹ, דִּכְתִיב ״וְהִנֵּה שֹׂרָף״, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה.
As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall be burnt with fire”; And for what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall be burnt with fire”? If it does not apply to the subject matter itself in its context, as it is already written: “And Moshe diligently inquired about the goat of the sin-offering, and, behold, it was burnt” (Leviticus 10:16), apply it to the matter of all the prohibitions in the Torah.
