Pesachim 6
הַיְינוּ דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ ״לֹא יִמָּצֵא״. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי — ״לֹא יִמָּצֵא״ לְמָה לִי? אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְכִי אִיתֵיהּ הָדַר בְּעֵינֵיהּ — לָאו בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ קָאֵי, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
That is the reason that it is necessary for the Torah to write: It shall not be found, to indicate that there is a halakha unique to leaven. In this case, it is considered as though it were in his possession. However, according to the one who said: The legal status of an object that effects monetary loss is like that of money, why do I need the phrase: It shall not be found? Obviously, the leaven is prohibited, as it is considered his property. The Gemara answers: It is nonetheless necessary, as it could enter your mind to say: Since when the leaven is intact it returns to the gentile in its pure, unadulterated form, it retroactively did not stand in the Jew’s possession and the Jew did not violate the prohibition against having leaven found on his property. Therefore, the verse teaches us that it is considered as though the leaven belonged to the Jew.
בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרָבָא: בֶּהֱמַת אַרְנוֹנָא חַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה, אוֹ אֵין חַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה? כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּמָצֵי מְסַלֵּק לֵיהּ בְּזוּזֵי — לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לַן דְּחַיָּיב.
They raised a dilemma before Rava: Is the owner of an animal born into a herd from which the royal tax [arnona] is collected obligated in the mitzva to give the firstborn animal to a priest, as the animal still belongs to a Jew? Or perhaps he is not obligated to give the firstborn animal to the priest, as the obligation does not take effect on an animal partly owned by a gentile. The Gemara elaborates on the parameters of raising the dilemma: In any case where the Jew could dismiss the gentile tax collector with money in lieu of the animals, we do not raise the dilemma, as he is clearly obligated in the mitzva of the firstborn. The authorities own no part of the animal; the Jew merely owes them a monetary debt. Therefore, the animal is the property of the Jew exclusively.
כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לַן — הֵיכָא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְסַלֵּק לֵיהּ בְּזוּזֵי, מַאי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: פְּטוּרָה. וְהָתַנְיָא: חַיֶּיבֶת! הָתָם דְּמָצֵי מְסַלֵּק לֵיהּ.
The situation when we do raise the dilemma is specifically where the Jew cannot dismiss the gentile tax collector with money. What is the halakha is this case? He said to them: The owner is exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. The Sages raised a difficulty: But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that he is obligated in the mitzva of the firstborn? He replied: There it is speaking of a case where the Jew could dismiss the gentile tax collector with money.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: בֶּהֱמַת אַרְנוֹנָא פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמָצֵי מְסַלֵּק לֵיהּ. עִיסַּת אַרְנוֹנָא חַיֶּיבֶת בְּחַלָּה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מָצֵי מְסַלֵּק לֵיהּ.
Some say that Rava said: The owner of an animal born into a herd from which the royal tax is collected is exempt from the mitzva of a firstborn, even though the Jew could dismiss the gentile tax collector with money. However, the owner of dough from which the royal tax is collected is obligated in ḥalla, despite the fact that the owner of dough partially owned by a gentile is generally not obligated. This is the halakha even though the Jew cannot dismiss the gentile tax collector by paying him the value of the dough.
מַאי טַעְמָא: בְּהֵמָה אִית לַהּ קָלָא, עִיסָּה לֵית לַהּ קָלָא.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the halakha of a firstborn animal and the halakha of ḥalla? An animal generates publicity; as everyone knows that this Jew’s animal was confiscated by the authorities, no one will suspect him of intentionally refraining from fulfilling the mitzva. In contrast, dough does not generate publicity. Since not everyone knows that the dough is partially owned by a gentile, those who see a Jew failing to separate ḥalla will suspect him of neglecting the mitzva.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: גּוֹי שֶׁנִּכְנַס לַחֲצֵירוֹ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבְצֵיקוֹ בְּיָדוֹ — אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר. הִפְקִידוֹ אֶצְלוֹ — זָקוּק לְבַעֵר. יִחֵד לוֹ בַּיִת — אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יִמָּצֵא״.
The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a gentile who enters the courtyard of a Jew with his dough in his hand, the Jew need not remove the leaven by evicting the gentile from his property. However, if the gentile deposited the leaven with him, and the Jew accepted responsibility, he must remove it. If he designated a room in his house for the gentile to place his leavened food, he need not remove it, as it is stated: “It shall not be found” (Exodus 12:19).
מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אַרֵישָׁא קָאֵי, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: הִפְקִידוֹ אֶצְלוֹ — זָקוּק לְבַעֵר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יִמָּצֵא״.
The Gemara asks: What is the tanna of the baraita saying? How does the verse: It shall not be found, prove this halakha? Rav Pappa said: The verse cited is referring to the first clause of the baraita, and this is what the tanna is saying: If the gentile deposited the leavened dough with the Jew, he, i.e., the Jew, must remove the dough from his property, as it is stated: It shall not be found.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אַסֵּיפָא קָאֵי, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: יִחֵד לוֹ בַּיִת — אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יִמָּצֵא בְּבָתֵּיכֶם״, וְהָא לָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, דְּגוֹי כִּי קָא מְעַיֵּיל — לְבֵיתָא דְנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָא מְעַיֵּיל.
Rav Ashi said: Actually, the verse cited is referring to the last clause of the baraita, and this is what the tanna is saying: If he designated a room in his house for the gentile to place the leavened dough, he need not remove it, as it is stated: It shall not be found in your houses, and that house is not his; since when the gentile brings the dough into the house, he brings it into his own house, as the space was designated for his use.
לְמֵימְרָא דִּשְׂכִירוּת קָנְיָא?! וְהָתְנַן: אַף בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאָמְרוּ לְהַשְׂכִּיר — לֹא לְבֵית דִּירָה אָמְרוּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּכְנִיסִין לְתוֹכוֹ עֲבוֹדַת גִּלּוּלִים. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ דִּשְׂכִירוּת קָנְיָא, כִּי קָא מְעַיֵּיל — לְבֵיתֵיהּ דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָא מְעַיֵּיל?
The Gemara asks: Is that to say that rental denotes that the renter acquires the rented space as he would a full-fledged acquisition with regard to responsibility for that space? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: Even in a place with regard to which they said it is permitted for a Jew to rent houses to gentiles, e.g., in Syria, they did not say that one may rent it for use as a residence, because the gentiles will bring idolatry into it. And if it enters your mind to say that rental denotes that the renter acquires the rented space as he would a full-fledged acquisition, when the gentile brings the idols into the house he brings them into his own house. Why, then, is it prohibited for the owner to rent it to a gentile?
שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאַפְּקֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן ״לֹא יִמָּצֵא״ — מִי שֶׁמָּצוּי בְּיָדְךָ, יָצָא זֶה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָצוּי בְּיָדְךָ.
The Gemara answers: It is different here with regard to leaven, as the Merciful One expresses it using the language: It shall not be found, meaning, that which is found in your possession is prohibited, excluding this leaven, which is not found in your possession. However, with regard to other prohibitions, one who rents a place to others remains somewhat responsible for his property, despite the fact that he does not live there.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הַמּוֹצֵא חָמֵץ בְּבֵיתוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב — כּוֹפֶה עָלָיו אֶת הַכְּלִי. אָמַר רָבָא: אִם שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ הוּא — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. מַאי טַעְמָא — מִיבְדָּל בְּדִילִי מִינֵּיהּ.
Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who finds leavened bread in his house on the Festival, i.e., the first day of Passover, covers it with a vessel and burns it at the conclusion of the Festival day. Rava said: If that leaven is consecrated, he need not cover it. What is the reason for this difference? The reason is that people distance themselves from consecrated food in any case, due to the severity of the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property. Therefore, there is no concern that he will eat it.
וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: חֲמֵצוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי, עוֹשֶׂה לוֹ מְחִיצָה עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים מִשּׁוּם הֶיכֵּר. וְאִם שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ הוּא — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. מַאי טַעְמָא? מִיבְדָּל בְּדִילִי אִינָשֵׁי מִינֵּיהּ.
And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: If leavened bread belonging to a gentile is in a Jew’s house, he, i.e., the Jew, should erect a barrier ten handbreadths high around it on the fourteenth of Nisan, as a conspicuous marker, so that he will not mistakenly eat it. And if the leaven is consecrated, he need not do so. What is the reason for this halakha? Since people distance themselves from consecrated food, they will not mistakenly eat it.
וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הַמְפָרֵשׁ, וְהַיּוֹצֵא בִּשְׁיָירָא, קוֹדֶם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר, תּוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — זָקוּק לְבַעֵר. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ תּוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — זָקוּק לְבַעֵר, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁדַּעְתּוֹ לַחֲזוֹר, אֲבָל אֵין דַּעְתּוֹ לַחֲזוֹר — אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר.
And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With regard to one who sets sail, or one who departs in a caravan traveling to a distant place; if he did so before it was thirty days prior to Passover, he need not remove the leaven from his possession. If he departs within thirty days of the Festival, he must remove the leaven. Abaye said: That which you said, that within thirty days one must remove the leaven, we only said this in a case where his intention is to return home adjacent to Passover (Ran). However, in a case where it is not his intention to return before Passover, he need not remove the leaven.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְאִי דַּעְתּוֹ לַחֲזוֹר, אֲפִילּוּ מֵרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה נָמֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ קוֹדֶם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין דַּעְתּוֹ לַחֲזוֹר, אֲבָל דַּעְתּוֹ לַחֲזוֹר — אֲפִילּוּ מֵרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה זָקוּק לְבַעֵר.
Rava said to him: But if he intends to return home shortly before the Festival, even if he was gone from Rosh HaShana, shouldn’t he remove the leaven, as failure to do so will lead to his arriving home and discovering leaven in his house just before the Festival? Rather, Rava said: According to that which you said, i.e., that if he leaves before it was thirty days prior to Passover he need not remove the leaven, we said this halakha only if he does not intend to return before Passover. However, if he intends to return, even if he was gone from Rosh HaShana, he must remove the leaven.
וְאַזְדָּא רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הָעוֹשֶׂה בֵּיתוֹ אוֹצָר, קוֹדֶם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — אֵין זָקוּק לְבַעֵר. תּוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — זָקוּק לְבַעֵר.
And Rava followed his line of reasoning stated elsewhere, as Rava maintains that one must remove all leaven from his possession within thirty days of Passover, even if he will not be there on the Festival itself. As Rava said: With regard to one who turns his house into a storehouse, and there is leaven beneath the stored grain, if he does so before it was thirty days prior to Passover, he need not remove the leaven. Since the leaven is concealed, it is considered removed after the fact. If it is within thirty days, he must remove the leaven, as it is not considered removed ab initio.
וְקוֹדֶם שְׁלֹשִׁים נָמֵי, לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין דַּעְתּוֹ לְפַנּוֹתוֹ, אֲבָל דַּעְתּוֹ לְפַנּוֹתוֹ — אֲפִילּוּ קוֹדֶם שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם נָמֵי זָקוּק לְבַעֵר.
And even if this occurred before it was thirty days prior to Passover, we only said that he is not obligated to remove the leaven if it is not his intention to clear away the stored grain before Passover. However, if his intention is to clear away the grain before Passover, he must remove the leaven even before it was thirty days prior to Passover, as perhaps he will not have time to remove the leaven before the Festival.
הָנֵי שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, מַאי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? כִּדְתַנְיָא: שׁוֹאֲלִין וְדוֹרְשִׁין בְּהִלְכוֹת הַפֶּסַח קוֹדֶם הַפֶּסַח שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא —
The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of this period of thirty days that renders it significant? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita: One asks about and teaches the halakhot of Passover thirty days before Passover. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One begins studying those halakhot two weeks before the Festival. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna, that one begins studying the halakhot of Passover thirty days before the Festival?
שֶׁהֲרֵי מֹשֶׁה עוֹמֵד בְּפֶסַח רִאשׁוֹן, וּמַזְהִיר עַל הַפֶּסַח שֵׁנִי, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְיַעֲשׂוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַפָּסַח בְּמוֹעֲדוֹ״, וּכְתִיב: ״וַיְהִי אֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ טְמֵאִים לְנֶפֶשׁ אָדָם״.
The Gemara explains that this halakha is derived from the fact that Moses was standing at the time of the first Pesaḥ, on the fourteenth of Nisan, and warning the people about the halakhot of the second Pesaḥ, which occurred a month later, on the fourteenth of Iyyar. As it is stated that God said to Moses: “Let the children of Israel perform the Pesaḥ at its appointed time” (Numbers 9:2). A subsequent verse says: “And Moses told the children of Israel to perform the Pesaḥ, and they performed the Pesaḥ in the first month on the fourteenth of the month in the evening, in the desert of Sinai” (Numbers 9:4–5). And it is written in the next verse: “And there were people who were impure due to a dead body and could not perform the Passover on that day, and they came before Moses and before Aaron on that day” (Numbers 9:6), at which point Moses explained the halakhot of the second Pesaḥ to them. This proves that one begins studying the halakhot of the Festival thirty days beforehand.
וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אָמַר לָךְ: אַיְּידֵי דְּאַיְירִי בְּמִילֵּי דְפִסְחָא, מַסִּיק לְהוּ לְכׇל מִילֵּי דְפִסְחָא.
And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel could have said to you in rejecting that proof: Since Moses was speaking with regard to the laws of Passover, he completed teaching all the matters of Passover, including those of the second Pesaḥ. Consequently, one cannot derive a principle from this case.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל? שֶׁהֲרֵי מֹשֶׁה עוֹמֵד בְּרֹאשׁ הַחֹדֶשׁ, וּמַזְהִיר עַל הַפֶּסַח, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הַחֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה לָכֶם רֹאשׁ חֳדָשִׁים״, וּכְתִיב: ״דַּבְּרוּ אֶל כׇּל עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר בֶּעָשֹׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה וְיִקְחוּ לָהֶם אִישׁ שֶׂה לְבֵית אָבוֹת וְגוֹ׳״.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ruling? He explains that Moses was standing on the first day of Nisan and warning about the performance of the first Pesaḥ, as it is stated: “This month shall be for you the beginning of the months, the first of the months of the year” (Exodus 12:2). And it is written in the next verse: “Speak to the entire congregation of Israel, saying: On the tenth day of this month they shall take for them every man a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for each household” (Exodus 12:3). The Torah proceeds to detail the halakhot of the Paschal lamb sacrificed on the fourteenth day of that month.
מִמַּאי דִּבְרֵישׁ יַרְחָא קָאֵי? דִּילְמָא בְּאַרְבְּעָה בְּיַרְחָא אוֹ בְּחַמְשָׁה בְּיַרְחָא קָאֵי?
The Gemara asks: Although this source does indicate that one should study the halakhot of Passover prior to the Festival, from where is it derived that he was standing and saying these matters on the day of the New Moon? Perhaps he was standing on the fourth of the month or on the fifth of the month of Nisan?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר שִׁימִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא, מֵהָכָא: ״וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה בְמִדְבַּר סִינַי בַּשָּׁנָה הַשֵּׁנִית בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְיַעֲשׂוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַפָּסַח בְּמוֹעֲדוֹ״. הָכָא נָמֵי, מִמַּאי דִּבְרֵישׁ יַרְחָא קָאֵי? דִּילְמָא בְּאַרְבְּעָה בְּיַרְחָא אוֹ בְּחַמְשָׁה בְּיַרְחָא קָאֵי?
Rather, Rabba bar Shimi said in the name of Ravina: The halakha is derived from here: “And God spoke to Moses in the wilderness of Sinai, in the first month of the second year after they came out of the land of Egypt” (Numbers 9:1), and it is written: “And let the children of Israel perform the Pesaḥ at its appointed time” (Numbers 9:2). Evidently, Moses taught the halakhot of Passover two weeks prior to the Festival. The Gemara asks: Here too, from where is it derived that he was standing on the day of the New Moon? Perhaps he was standing on the fourth of the month or on the fifth of the month?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַתְיָא ״מִדְבָּר״ מִ״מִּדְבָּר״. כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״בְּמִדְבַּר סִינַי״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה בְּמִדְבַּר סִינַי בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ הַשֵּׁנִי״. מָה לְהַלָּן בְּרֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ — אַף כָּאן בְּרֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The halakha is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term wilderness written here and the term wilderness written previously. It is written here: “In the wilderness of Sinai,” and it is written there: “And God spoke to Moses in the wilderness of Sinai in the Tent of Meeting on the first of the second month” (Numbers 1:1). Just as there it occurred on the day of the New Moon, on the first of the month, so too here, with regard to Passover, it was on the day of the New Moon.
וְנִיכְתּוֹב בְּרֵישָׁא דְּחֹדֶשׁ רִאשׁוֹן, וַהֲדַר נִיכְתּוֹב דְּחֹדֶשׁ שֵׁנִי. אָמַר רַב מְנַשְּׁיָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת אֵין מוּקְדָּם וּמְאוּחָר בַּתּוֹרָה.
The Gemara asks: If so, let the Torah write first that which occurred in the first month and then let it write that which occurred in the second month, as the portion of the Paschal lamb preceded the beginning of the book of Numbers chronologically. Rav Menashiya bar Taḥlifa said in the name of Rav: That is to say that there is no earlier and later, i.e., there is no absolute chronological order, in the Torah, as events that occurred later in time can appear earlier in the Torah.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא בִּתְרֵי עִנְיָינֵי, אֲבָל בְּחַד עִנְיָינָא, מַאי דְּמוּקְדָּם — מוּקְדָּם, וּמַאי דִּמְאוּחָר — מְאוּחָר. דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, ״כְּלָל וּפְרָט — אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט״, דִּילְמָא פְּרָט וּכְלָל הוּא!
Rav Pappa said: This principle applies only when the Torah deals with two separate matters, but within one matter, that which is written earlier occurred earlier, and that which is written later occurred later; as, if you do not say so but you claim that there is no definite order within each matter, then the hermeneutic principle: When a generalization is followed by a detail the generalization refers only to that which is specified in the detail, is problematic. This principle is valid only if there is a definite order to the verses and words in each matter. If there is no definite order, perhaps it is actually a detail followed by a generalization, which is interpreted by means of an alternate hermeneutic principle with different results.
וְתוּ, ״פְּרָט וּכְלָל נַעֲשֶׂה כְּלָל מוּסָף עַל הַפְּרָט״, דִּילְמָא כְּלָל וּפְרָט הוּא!
And furthermore, this is equally difficult with regard to the hermeneutic principle: “When a detail is followed by a generalization, the generalization becomes an addition to the detail, adding cases dissimilar to the detail. Here too, perhaps it is a generalization followed by a detail, as there is no defined order. Apparently, there must be a fixed order within a given matter.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ בִּתְרֵי עִנְיָינֵי נָמֵי! הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה — אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתוֹ בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט״, שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״דָּנִין״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara asks: If so, based on the above reasoning one cannot apply these principles even with regard to two matters. This statement works out well according to the opinion of the one who said: With regard to a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah removed from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from it with the principle of a generalization and a detail. However, according to the one who said: One derives from a generalization and a detail that are removed from one another by means of said principle, what is there to say?
אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״דָּנִין״, הָנֵי מִילֵּי — בְּחַד עִנְיָינָא. אֲבָל בִּתְרֵי עִנְיָינֵי — אֵין דָּנִין.
The Gemara answers: Even according to the one who said that one derives a halakha from a generalization and a detail that are removed from one another, this applies only with regard to one matter, i.e., verses dealing with the same issue, even if they do not appear together. However, if they address two different matters, one cannot derive a halakha from a generalization and a detail, as the Torah is not written in absolute chronological order.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הַבּוֹדֵק צָרִיךְ שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל. מַאי טַעְמָא, אִי נֵימָא מִשּׁוּם פֵּירוּרִין — הָא לָא חֲשִׁיבִי.
Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who searches for leaven must render all his leaven null and void, cognitively and verbally. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? If you say it is due to crumbs that he failed to detect in his search, they are inherently insignificant, and null and void by definition.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: כֵּיוָן דִּמְינַטַּר לְהוּ אַגַּב בֵּיתֵיהּ — חֲשִׁיבִי, וְהָתַנְיָא: סוֹפֵי תְאֵנִים, וּמְשַׁמֵּר שָׂדֵהוּ מִפְּנֵי עֲנָבִים. סוֹפֵי עֲנָבִים, וּמְשַׁמֵּר שָׂדֵהוּ מִפְּנֵי מִקְשָׁאוֹת וּמִפְּנֵי מִדְלָעוֹת,
And lest you say: Since they are protected on account of their very presence in his house, whose protection is important to him, they are significant and are not null and void, wasn’t it taught in the Tosefta that this is not the case? When the end of the fig season arrives, and those remaining figs on the trees are few and of inferior quality, there is room to assume that the owner has renounced his ownership over them. However, he continues to guard his field due to the grapes, which are harvested at that time. Similarly, when the end of the grape season arrives, those few remaining grapes are of inferior quality and the owner guards his field due to the cucumbers and due to the gourds, which have not yet been harvested.
בִּזְמַן שֶׁבַּעַל הַבַּיִת מַקְפִּיד עֲלֵיהֶן — אֲסוּרִין מִשּׁוּם גֵּזֶל, וְחַיָּיבִין בְּמַעֲשֵׂר. בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין בַּעַל הַבַּיִת מַקְפִּיד עֲלֵיהֶן — מוּתָּרִין מִשּׁוּם גֵּזֶל, וּפְטוּרִין מִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֵׂר.
When the owner is particular about the figs and the grapes respectively, it is prohibited to take them, due to the prohibition against robbery, and one with permission to eat them is obligated due to the mitzva to separate the tithe from them, as they are considered like any other fruit. When the owner is not particular about them, it is permitted to eat them due to the fact that the prohibition against robbery does not apply, and one who eats them is exempt due to the fact that the obligation to separate the tithe does not apply, as they are ownerless property. This indicates that if one is not particular about an object, even if it is located in property that he is guarding for another purpose, that object is not thereby rendered significant. The same reasoning applies to breadcrumbs that remain in one’s house.
אָמַר רָבָא: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִמְצָא גְּלוּסְקָא יָפָה וְדַעְתֵּיהּ עִילָּוֵיהּ. וְכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ לְבַטְּלֵיהּ!
Rava said: The reason for the requirement to render leaven null and void is based on a decree lest he find a fine cake [geluska] among the leaven that he did not destroy and his thoughts are upon it. Due to its significance, he will hesitate before removing it and will be in violation of the prohibition against owning leaven. The Gemara asks: And let him nullify it when he finds it.
דִּילְמָא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ לְבָתַר אִיסּוּרָא, וְלָאו בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ קָיְימָא, וְלָא מָצֵי מְבַטֵּיל. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שְׁנֵי דְבָרִים אֵינָן בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם, וַעֲשָׂאָן הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְחָמֵץ מִשֵּׁשׁ שָׁעוֹת וּלְמַעְלָה.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Perhaps he will find it only after it is already forbidden, and at that time it is no longer in his possession and he is therefore unable to nullify leaven when it is already Passover, as Rabbi Elazar said: Two items are not in a person’s possession in terms of legal ownership, and yet the Torah rendered him responsible for them as though they were in his property. And these are they: An open pit in the public domain, for which the one who excavated it is liable to pay any damages it causes even though it does not belong to him; and leaven in one’s house from the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nisan and onward. As this leaven has no monetary value, since it is prohibited to eat or to derive benefit from it, it is not his property, and nevertheless he violates a prohibition if it remains in his domain.
וְנִיבַטְּלֵיהּ בְּאַרְבַּע, וְנִיבַטְּלֵיהּ בְּחָמֵשׁ? כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו זְמַן אִיסּוּרָא הוּא וְלָאו זְמַן בִּיעוּרָא הוּא, דִּילְמָא פָּשַׁע וְלָא מְבַטֵּל לֵיהּ.
The Gemara returns to the issue of the nullification of leaven. If so, let him render the leaven null and void during the fourth hour or let him render it null and void during the fifth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan. Why is he required to do so when he searches for leaven on the evening of the fourteenth? The Gemara answers: Since the fourth hour is neither the time of the prohibition of the leaven nor the time of its removal, it is a nondescript point in time. There is concern that perhaps he will be negligent and will not render it null and void, and the leaven will remain in his possession.
