Shevuot 3
וְעַל הַזָּקָן שְׁתַּיִם מִיכָּן וּשְׁתַּיִם מִיכָּן וְאַחַת מִלְּמַטָּה;
And for marring the edges of his beard there are two edges from here, on one side of his face, and two from there, on the other side, and one from below.
חֲדָא דְּמִיחַיַּיב עֲלַהּ תַּרְתֵּי; תָּנֵא שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע.
The Gemara explains: As apparent from the mishna in Makkot, this is a case where there is one prohibition for which one is liable to receive two punishments. Continuing on this theme, the tanna taught in the beginning of tractate Shevuot examples of other sets of halakhot that can be formulated similarly, beginning with: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types.
מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּתָנֵי לְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוּ, וּמַאי שְׁנָא גַּבֵּי יְצִיאוֹת שַׁבָּת וּמַרְאוֹת נְגָעִים, דְּלָא קָתָנֵי לְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוּ?
The Gemara inquires: What is different here, in tractate Shevuot, that the mishna teaches all the sets of halakhot that can be formulated as: Two that are four, and what is different with regard to the chapter beginning: The acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, and the chapter beginning: And the shades of leprous marks, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Nega’im, where the mishna does not teach all of them, rather only the specific set of halakhot relevant to that tractate?
אָמְרִי: שְׁבוּעוֹת וִידִיעוֹת הַטּוּמְאָה דְּגַבֵּי הֲדָדֵי כְּתִיבָן, וְדָמְיָין אַהֲדָדֵי בְּקׇרְבַּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד – תָּנֵי לְהוּ גַּבֵּי הֲדָדֵי; וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא תַּרְתֵּי – תְּנָא כּוּלְּהוּ.
The Sages say in explanation: Since the passages of oaths and of liability based on one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are written together in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:2–4), and they are also similar to each other in that they can both incur liability to bring a sliding-scale offering, the mishna therefore taught both of them together here. And once it already taught two sets, it continued and taught all of them.
פְּתַח בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת, וּמְפָרֵשׁ יְדִיעוֹת הַטּוּמְאָה! אַיְּידֵי דְּזוּטְרָן מִילַּיְיהוּ, פָּסֵיק שָׁרֵי לְהוּ; וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי שְׁבוּעוֹת דִּנְפִישָׁן מִילַּיְיהוּ.
The Gemara inquires further: Tractate Shevuot opens with a reference to oaths, but then proceeds to explain the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, returning to discuss oaths only in the third chapter. Why? The Gemara explains: Since the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are relatively few, the tanna addressed them directly and dispensed with them, and then afterward returned to teach the halakhot of oaths, which have numerous details.
שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע: שְׁתַּיִם – ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״; שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע – ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי״.
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types. The Gemara explains: The two types are where one states: On my oath I will eat, and where he states: On my oath I will not eat. If he violates either oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. These two types are actually four types because they also include the cases where a person falsely states: On my oath I ate, and where he falsely states: On my oath I did not eat.
יְדִיעוֹת הַטּוּמְאָה שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע: שְׁתַּיִם – יְדִיעַת טוּמְאַת קֹדֶשׁ וִידִיעַת טוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ; שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע – קֹדֶשׁ וּמִקְדָּשׁ.
The mishna continues: With regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two cases that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two cases are where one’s lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to eat sacrificial food, and where one’s lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to enter the Temple. These two types are actually four types, because one is also liable where he was aware that he was impure, but had a lapse of awareness about the status of the sacrificial food or the identity of the Temple.
יְצִיאוֹת שַׁבָּת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע: שְׁתַּיִם – הוֹצָאָה דְעָנִי וְהוֹצָאָה דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת; שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע – הַכְנָסָה דְעָנִי וְהַכְנָסָה דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת.
The mishna continues: With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. The Gemara explains the cases by using the analogy of a poor person who remains in the public domain and a homeowner who remains in the private domain and one passes an item to the other: The two types are the carrying out by a poor person of an item from the private domain to the public domain and the carrying out by a homeowner of an item from the private domain to the public domain. These two types are actually four types because they also include the bringing in by a poor person of an item from the public domain to the private domain and the bringing in by a homeowner of an item from the public domain to the private domain.
מַרְאוֹת נְגָעִים שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבָּעָה: שְׁנַיִם – שְׂאֵת וּבַהֶרֶת; שֶׁהֵן אַרְבָּעָה – שְׂאֵת וְתוֹלַדְתָּהּ, בַּהֶרֶת וְתוֹלַדְתָּהּ.
The mishna’s final example: With regard to shades of leprous marks, there are two shades that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two shades are of a wool-white leprous mark [se’et] and of a snow-white leprous mark [baheret]. These two are actually four because they also include a se’et and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it, and a baheret and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it.
מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? לֹא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְלָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא! אִי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – הָאָמַר: אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבוֹא. אִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – הָאָמַר: עַל הֶעְלֵם טוּמְאָה הוּא חַיָּיב, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶעְלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ.
§ The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael nor the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If one suggests that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn’t he say with regard to oaths: One is liable only for oaths pertaining to the future, but not for those pertaining to the past? The mishna states that one is liable also for oaths pertaining to the past. And if one suggests it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn’t he say: For having defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods during a lapse of awareness of the fact that one is ritually impure one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but one is not liable for having done so during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple? The mishna states that one is liable also in such a case.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – מֵהֶן לְחִיּוּב וּמֵהֶן לִפְטוּר. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – מֵהֶן לְחִיּוּב וּמֵהֶן לִפְטוּר.
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four types of oaths, among them are types for which there is liability to bring an offering for one who violates them and among them are types for which there is exemption from liability for one who violates them. And if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four cases defined by one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, among them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering and among them are cases for which there is exemption from liability.
לִפְטוּר?!
The Gemara asks: How can one say that the mishna teaches types for which there is exemption from liability?
הָא דּוּמְיָא דְּמַרְאוֹת נְגָעִים קָתָנֵי – מָה הָתָם כּוּלְּהוּ לְחִיּוּבָא, אַף הָכָא נָמֵי כּוּלְּהוּ לְחִיּוּבָא!
But the mishna teaches these cases similar to the different shades of leprous marks, which indicates that just as there, all four of them are shades for which there is liability to bring an offering, so too here, with regard to oaths and the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, all four of them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering.
לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; וְכִי לָא מְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל לְשֶׁעָבַר – קׇרְבָּן; אֲבָל מַלְקוֹת חַיּוֹבֵי מְחַיֵּיב.
The Gemara suggests a different resolution: Actually, the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And while Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for oaths pertaining to the past, that is only with regard to liability to bring an offering; but he does deem one liable to be administered lashes.
וְכִדְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רָבָא: בְּפֵירוּשׁ רִיבְּתָה תּוֹרָה שְׁבוּעַת שֶׁקֶר דּוּמְיָא דִּשְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא; מָה שָׁוְא לְשֶׁעָבַר, אַף שֶׁקֶר נָמֵי לְשֶׁעָבַר.
And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: The Torah explicitly amplifies the prohibition of taking a false oath to be similar to the prohibition of an oath taken in vain, to teach that one is flogged for its violation. It follows that just as an oath taken in vain pertains to the past and renders one liable to receive lashes, so too, taking a false oath that pertains to the past renders one liable to receive lashes.
בִּשְׁלָמָא ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – כִּדְרָבָא; ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ וְאָכַל נָמֵי – לָאו שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא; אֶלָּא ״אוֹכַל״ וְלֹא אָכַל – אַמַּאי? לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא!
The Gemara asks: Granted that one who stated: On my oath I ate, but in fact he did not eat, or one who stated: On my oath I did not eat, but in fact he ate, is liable to receive lashes, as this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. And also if one stated: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate in violation of his oath, he is liable to receive lashes, as it is a prohibition that involves an action, and, in general, such prohibitions are punishable by flogging. But if one stated: On my oath I will eat, and in violation of his oath he did not eat, why should he be liable to receive lashes? It is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The generally accepted principle is that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition without performing an action.
קָסָבַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – לוֹקִין עָלָיו.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the generally accepted principle and holds that one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action.
אִי הָכִי, קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
The Gemara challenges: If so, then a difficulty arises between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה;
As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is always in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. Since the mishna here is unattributed and assumes that one is flogged for taking a false oath, Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule that this is the halakha.
וְאִתְּמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ הַיּוֹם״, וְעָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא אֲכָלָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הִיא, וְהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
And an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the oath by failing to perform an action rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. And Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain forewarning, as one cannot forewarn him before he fails to fulfill the oath because as long as time remains in the day he can still later eat the loaf and fulfill the oath; and an uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not rule in accordance with the mishna here.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן סְתָמָא אַחֲרִינָא אַשְׁכַּח.
The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which holds that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and he rules in accordance with that mishna.
הֵי סְתָמָא? אִילֵּימָא הַאי סְתָמָא – דִּתְנַן: אֲבָל הַמּוֹתִיר בַּטָּהוֹר וְהַשּׁוֹבֵר בַּטָּמֵא – אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים;
The Gemara asks: Which other unattributed mishna did he find? If we say he found this unattributed mishna, as we learned (Pesaḥim 84a): But one who leaves over some of the meat of a ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering are not flogged with the forty lashes, that is difficult.
בִּשְׁלָמָא שׁוֹבֵר בַּטָּמֵא, דִּכְתִיב ״וְעֶצֶם לֹא תִשְׁבְּרוּ בּוֹ״ – בְּכָשֵׁר וְלֹא בְּפָסוּל. אֲבָל הַמּוֹתִיר בַּטָּהוֹר, מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִים עָלָיו?
First, the Gemara explains how this mishna demonstrates Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Granted that breaking a bone of an impure Paschal offering does not incur lashes, as it is written: “Nor shall you break a bone in it” (Exodus 12:46). The term “in it” indicates that the verse refers only to a valid Paschal offering, but not to a disqualified one, such as one that is impure. But in the case of one who leaves over some of the meat of a pure Paschal offering, what is the reason he is not flogged? Is it not because it is a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged?
וּמִמַּאי דְּרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב הִיא – דְּאָמַר לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא – וּמִשּׁוּם דְּבָא הַכָּתוּב לִיתֵּן עֲשֵׂה אַחַר לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה; הָא לָאו הָכִי, לָקֵי!
The Gemara now questions this explanation of the mishna: But from where is it apparent that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who says that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he holds that the reason the mishna rules that one is not flogged is due to the fact that the verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition of leaving over the meat, and one is not flogged for a prohibition whose violation obligates one in a positive mitzva. But were it not for this, one would be flogged, despite the fact it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. Since the unattributed mishna is not necessarily in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov’s opinion, it cannot be the basis of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.
דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר, וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרֹפוּ״ – בָּא הַכָּתוּב לִיתֵּן עֲשֵׂה אַחַר לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה, לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִן הַשֵּׁם הוּא זֶה, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְלָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִים עָלָיו.
The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yaakov’s and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinions: As it is taught in a baraita: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.
אֶלָּא הַאי סְתָמָא אַשְׁכַּח: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכְלֶנָּה״, וַאֲכָלָהּ –
Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan found this unattributed mishna, which teaches (27b): If one states: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and immediately states: On my oath I will not eat it, and then he ate it,
