Further discussions about where we derive the laws regarding sacrifices that are brought with the wrong intentions that they are sacrificed but as voluntary offerings and do not provide atonement for the original intent and a new sacrifice has to be brought.
Zevachim 5
09.19.2025 | כ״ו באלול תשפ״ה
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Zevachim 5
לָא יָדַע בְּמַאי; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה״. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לִיפַּסְלוּ; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״.
that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
רְמֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ עַל מְעוֹהִי בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא, וּמַקְשֵׁי: אִם כְּשֵׁרִים הֵם – יְרַצּוּ! וְאִם אֵין מְרַצִּין – לָמָּה בָּאִין?
§ Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי (אֱלִיעֶזֶר) [אֶלְעָזָר]: מָצִינוּ בְּבָאִין לְאַחַר מִיתָה, שֶׁהֵן כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין. דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהֵבִיאָה חַטָּאתָהּ וּמֵתָה – יָבִיאוּ יוֹרְשִׁין עוֹלָתָהּ. עוֹלָתָהּ וּמֵתָה – לֹא יָבִיאוּ יוֹרְשִׁין חַטָּאתָהּ.
Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ בְּעוֹלָה, דְּאָתְיָא לְאַחַר מִיתָה; אָשָׁם, דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה – מְנָלַן?
Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation, since it is brought even after its owner’s death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner’s death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner’s obligation?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי מַחְלוֹקְתְּךָ בְּצִידּוֹ – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם.
Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
אָמַר: זֶהוּ שֶׁאוֹמְרִין עָלָיו אָדָם גָּדוֹל הוּא?! קָאָמֵינָא אֲנָא מִשְׁנָה שְׁלֵימָה, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר?!
Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first tanna, which is the accepted halakha. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֶפְתַּח אֲנָא פִּתְחָא לְנַפְשַׁאי: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ וְגוֹ׳״ – הַאי נְדָבָה?! נֶדֶר הוּא! כּוּ׳ כְּדִלְעֵיל.
Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.
יָתֵיב רַבִּי זֵירָא וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא, וְיָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה, וְנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״; אֵימָא: הַבָּא בְּנֶדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה – לֵייתֵי וְלָא לִירַצֵּי, אָשָׁם – לָא לֵייתֵי כְּלָל!
Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner’s death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty?
אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מֵהָכָא פְּתַח: ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״; אוֹתָהּ – לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה; הָא שְׁאָר קֳדָשִׁים – שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִין. יָכוֹל יְרַצּוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״.
Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word “it” in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips,” from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
וְאֵימָא: הַבָּא בְּנֶדֶר וּנְדָבָה – לֵייתֵי וְלָא לִירַצֵּי, אָשָׁם (נָמֵי) – אַרְצוֹיֵי נָמֵי לִירַצֵּי!
Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse “that which has gone out of your lips” is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָשָׁם דְּמִירַצֵּי לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה; וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְכַפֶּרֶת – אֵינָהּ מְרַצָּה, אָשָׁם שֶׁמְּכַפֵּר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה?!
Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an a fortiori inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?
מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל!
The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no a fortiori inference can be derived from one to the other.
שְׁלָמִים יוֹכִיחוּ.
The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.
מָה לִשְׁלָמִים, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנִין נְסָכִין וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.
עוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁירִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה.
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.
תּוֹדָה תּוֹכִיחַ.
The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
מָה לְתוֹדָה, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים יוֹכִיחוּ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קֹדֶשׁ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה.
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁהֵן בָּאִין בְּנֶדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִשְׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִים וְאֵין מְרַצִּין; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ כּוּ׳.
Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.
מַאי חָזֵית דְּאַקֵּשְׁתְּ לִשְׁלָמִים? אַקֵּישׁ לְחַטָּאת!
The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?
הָא מַיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״אוֹתָהּ״.
The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).
(סִימָן: הנ״ש בש״ר)
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora’im who participated in the two following discussions: Heh, nun, shin; beit, shin, reish.
יָתֵיב רַב הוּנָא וְרַב נַחְמָן, וְיָתֵיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה; לֵימָא לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָשָׁם נָמֵי אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה!
Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner’s death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner’s death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָשָׁם לְמַאי קָרֵב – לְמוֹתָרוֹ; חַטָּאת נָמֵי מִיקְרָב קָרְבָה מוֹתָרַהּ!
Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner’s death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.
חַטָּאת – אַף עַל גַּב דְּקָרְבָה מוֹתָרַהּ, מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״הוּא״.
Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.
אָשָׁם נָמֵי כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״הוּא״!
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written with regard to a guilt offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?
הַהוּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִים הוּא דִּכְתִיב, כִּדְתַנְיָא; אֲבָל אָשָׁם לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ – אִם לֹא הַקְטִירוּ אֵימוּרִין כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering’s sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term “It is a guilt offering” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
וְאֶלָּא ״הוּא״ לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: אָשָׁם שֶׁנִּיתַּק לִרְעִיָּה, וּשְׁחָטוֹ סְתָם – כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “It is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.
נִיתַּק – אִין, לֹא נִיתַּק – לָא; מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״ – בַּהֲוָויָיתוֹ יְהֵא.
The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.
יָתְבִי רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְיָתֵיב רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: הָא דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מָצִינוּ בְּבָאִין לְאַחַר מִיתָה שֶׁהֵן כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין – לֵימָא לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָנְהוּ נָמֵי לֵייתוֹ וְלִירַצּוֹ!
§ Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners’ death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?
אָמַר לָהֶן רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה: יוֹלֶדֶת – אִם הִיא יָלְדָה, בָּנֶיהָ מִי יָלְדוּ?!
Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַסִּי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּאִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבַּהּ לָא מִיתְכַּפְּרָא? וְכֵיוָן דְּכִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבַּהּ מִיכַּפְּרָא, יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ נָמֵי מִיכַּפַּר.
Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.
לְמֵימְרָא דְּקַנְיָא לְהוּ?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ מִנְחָה לִשְׁנֵי בָנָיו וָמֵת – קְרֵיבָה, וְאֵין בּוֹ שׁוּתָּפוּת. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ קַנְיָא לְהוּ, ״נֶפֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא!
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.
וְלָא קַנְיָא לְהוּ?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ בְּהֵמָה לִשְׁנֵי בָנָיו וָמֵת – קְרֵיבָה, וְאֵין מְמִירִין בָּהּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא קַנְיָא לְהוּ – הַיְינוּ דְּאֵין מְמִירִין בָּהּ, דְּהָוְיָא לְהוּ כְּשׁוּתָּפִין,
The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,
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Hearing and reading about the siyumim at the completion of the 13 th cycle Daf Yomi asked our shul rabbi about starting the Daf – he directed me to another shiur in town he thought would allow a woman to join, and so I did! Love seeing the sources for the Divrei Torah I’ve been hearing for the past decades of living an observant life and raising 5 children .
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I learned daf more off than on 40 years ago. At the beginning of the current cycle, I decided to commit to learning daf regularly. Having Rabanit Michelle available as a learning partner has been amazing. Sometimes I learn with Hadran, sometimes with my husband, and sometimes on my own. It’s been fun to be part of an extended learning community.
Miriam Pollack
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!
Wendy Dickstein
Jerusalem, Israel
I started learning after the siyum hashas for women and my daily learning has been a constant over the last two years. It grounded me during the chaos of Corona while providing me with a community of fellow learners. The Daf can be challenging but it’s filled with life’s lessons, struggles and hope for a better world. It’s not about the destination but rather about the journey. Thank you Hadran!
Dena Lehrman
אפרת, Israel
I LOVE learning the Daf. I started with Shabbat. I join the morning Zoom with Reb Michelle and it totally grounds my day. When Corona hit us in Israel, I decided that I would use the Daf to keep myself sane, especially during the days when we could not venture out more than 300 m from our home. Now my husband and I have so much new material to talk about! It really is the best part of my day!
Batsheva Pava
Hashmonaim, Israel
I tried Daf Yomi in the middle of the last cycle after realizing I could listen to Michelle’s shiurim online. It lasted all of 2 days! Then the new cycle started just days before my father’s first yahrzeit and my youngest daughter’s bat mitzvah. It seemed the right time for a new beginning. My family, friends, colleagues are immensely supportive!
Catriella Freedman
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
I was inspired to start learning after attending the 2020 siyum in Binyanei Hauma. It has been a great experience for me. It’s amazing to see the origins of stories I’ve heard and rituals I’ve participated in my whole life. Even when I don’t understand the daf itself, I believe that the commitment to learning every day is valuable and has multiple benefits. And there will be another daf tomorrow!
Khaya Eisenberg
Jerusalem, Israel
Since I started in January of 2020, Daf Yomi has changed my life. It connects me to Jews all over the world, especially learned women. It makes cooking, gardening, and folding laundry into acts of Torah study. Daf Yomi enables me to participate in a conversation with and about our heritage that has been going on for more than 2000 years.
Shira Eliaser
Skokie, IL, United States
I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.
Linda Brownstein
Mitspe, Israel
My curiosity was peaked after seeing posts about the end of the last cycle. I am always looking for opportunities to increase my Jewish literacy & I am someone that is drawn to habit and consistency. Dinnertime includes a “Guess what I learned on the daf” segment for my husband and 18 year old twins. I also love the feelings of connection with my colleagues who are also learning.
Diana Bloom
Tampa, United States
When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.
Shira Krebs
Minnesota, United States
Attending the Siyyum in Jerusalem 26 months ago inspired me to become part of this community of learners. So many aspects of Jewish life have been illuminated by what we have learned in Seder Moed. My day is not complete without daf Yomi. I am so grateful to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Community.
Nancy Kolodny
Newton, United States
I started learning Talmud with R’ Haramati in Yeshivah of Flatbush. But after a respite of 60 years, Rabbanit Michelle lit my fire – after attending the last three world siyumim in Miami Beach, Meadowlands and Boca Raton, and now that I’m retired, I decided – “I can do this!” It has been an incredible journey so far, and I look forward to learning Daf everyday – Mazal Tov to everyone!
Roslyn Jaffe
Florida, United States
Since I started in January of 2020, Daf Yomi has changed my life. It connects me to Jews all over the world, especially learned women. It makes cooking, gardening, and folding laundry into acts of Torah study. Daf Yomi enables me to participate in a conversation with and about our heritage that has been going on for more than 2000 years.
Shira Eliaser
Skokie, IL, United States
The first month I learned Daf Yomi by myself in secret, because I wasn’t sure how my husband would react, but after the siyyum on Masechet Brachot I discovered Hadran and now sometimes my husband listens to the daf with me. He and I also learn mishnayot together and are constantly finding connections between the different masechtot.
Laura Warshawsky
Silver Spring, Maryland, United States
In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).
Sara Averick
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In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.
Reena Slovin
Worcester, United States
I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
Sarene Shanus
Mamaroneck, NY, United States
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
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Zevachim 5
לָא יָדַע בְּמַאי; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה״. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לִיפַּסְלוּ; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״.
that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
רְמֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ עַל מְעוֹהִי בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא, וּמַקְשֵׁי: אִם כְּשֵׁרִים הֵם – יְרַצּוּ! וְאִם אֵין מְרַצִּין – לָמָּה בָּאִין?
§ Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי (אֱלִיעֶזֶר) [אֶלְעָזָר]: מָצִינוּ בְּבָאִין לְאַחַר מִיתָה, שֶׁהֵן כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין. דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהֵבִיאָה חַטָּאתָהּ וּמֵתָה – יָבִיאוּ יוֹרְשִׁין עוֹלָתָהּ. עוֹלָתָהּ וּמֵתָה – לֹא יָבִיאוּ יוֹרְשִׁין חַטָּאתָהּ.
Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מוֹדֵינָא לָךְ בְּעוֹלָה, דְּאָתְיָא לְאַחַר מִיתָה; אָשָׁם, דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה – מְנָלַן?
Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation, since it is brought even after its owner’s death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner’s death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner’s obligation?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי מַחְלוֹקְתְּךָ בְּצִידּוֹ – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַף הָאָשָׁם.
Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
אָמַר: זֶהוּ שֶׁאוֹמְרִין עָלָיו אָדָם גָּדוֹל הוּא?! קָאָמֵינָא אֲנָא מִשְׁנָה שְׁלֵימָה, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ לִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר?!
Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first tanna, which is the accepted halakha. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֶפְתַּח אֲנָא פִּתְחָא לְנַפְשַׁאי: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ וְגוֹ׳״ – הַאי נְדָבָה?! נֶדֶר הוּא! כּוּ׳ כְּדִלְעֵיל.
Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.
יָתֵיב רַבִּי זֵירָא וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא, וְיָתֵיב אַבָּיֵי גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה, וְנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״; אֵימָא: הַבָּא בְּנֶדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה – לֵייתֵי וְלָא לִירַצֵּי, אָשָׁם – לָא לֵייתֵי כְּלָל!
Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner’s death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty?
אֲמַר לְהוּ אַבָּיֵי, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מֵהָכָא פְּתַח: ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״; אוֹתָהּ – לִשְׁמָהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ פְּסוּלָה; הָא שְׁאָר קֳדָשִׁים – שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִין. יָכוֹל יְרַצּוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״.
Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word “it” in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips,” from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
וְאֵימָא: הַבָּא בְּנֶדֶר וּנְדָבָה – לֵייתֵי וְלָא לִירַצֵּי, אָשָׁם (נָמֵי) – אַרְצוֹיֵי נָמֵי לִירַצֵּי!
Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse “that which has gone out of your lips” is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָשָׁם דְּמִירַצֵּי לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵעוֹלָה; וּמָה עוֹלָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְכַפֶּרֶת – אֵינָהּ מְרַצָּה, אָשָׁם שֶׁמְּכַפֵּר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה?!
Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an a fortiori inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?
מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן כָּלִיל!
The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no a fortiori inference can be derived from one to the other.
שְׁלָמִים יוֹכִיחוּ.
The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.
מָה לִשְׁלָמִים, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנִין נְסָכִין וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.
עוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁירִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה.
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּצִיבּוּר!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.
תּוֹדָה תּוֹכִיחַ.
The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
מָה לְתוֹדָה, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים יוֹכִיחוּ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין. לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קֹדֶשׁ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה.
The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this halakha, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.
מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁהֵן בָּאִין בְּנֶדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה!
The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה וְגוֹ׳״ – הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב לִשְׁלָמִים; מָה שְׁלָמִים שֶׁהֵן קֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁחָטָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁרִים וְאֵין מְרַצִּין; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ כּוּ׳.
Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.
מַאי חָזֵית דְּאַקֵּשְׁתְּ לִשְׁלָמִים? אַקֵּישׁ לְחַטָּאת!
The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?
הָא מַיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״אוֹתָהּ״.
The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the halakha concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).
(סִימָן: הנ״ש בש״ר)
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the amora’im who participated in the two following discussions: Heh, nun, shin; beit, shin, reish.
יָתֵיב רַב הוּנָא וְרַב נַחְמָן, וְיָתֵיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – אָשָׁם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה; לֵימָא לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָשָׁם נָמֵי אָתֵי לְאַחַר מִיתָה!
Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner’s death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner’s death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָשָׁם לְמַאי קָרֵב – לְמוֹתָרוֹ; חַטָּאת נָמֵי מִיקְרָב קָרְבָה מוֹתָרַהּ!
Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner’s death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.
חַטָּאת – אַף עַל גַּב דְּקָרְבָה מוֹתָרַהּ, מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״הוּא״.
Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.
אָשָׁם נָמֵי כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״הוּא״!
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written with regard to a guilt offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?
הַהוּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִים הוּא דִּכְתִיב, כִּדְתַנְיָא; אֲבָל אָשָׁם לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ ״הוּא״ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר הַקְטָרַת אֵימוּרִין, וְהוּא עַצְמוֹ – אִם לֹא הַקְטִירוּ אֵימוּרִין כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering’s sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a baraita: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term “It is a guilt offering” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
וְאֶלָּא ״הוּא״ לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: אָשָׁם שֶׁנִּיתַּק לִרְעִיָּה, וּשְׁחָטוֹ סְתָם – כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “It is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.
נִיתַּק – אִין, לֹא נִיתַּק – לָא; מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״ – בַּהֲוָויָיתוֹ יְהֵא.
The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.
יָתְבִי רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְיָתֵיב רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה גַּבַּיְיהוּ, וְיָתְבִי וְקָאָמְרִי: הָא דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מָצִינוּ בְּבָאִין לְאַחַר מִיתָה שֶׁהֵן כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין – לֵימָא לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָנְהוּ נָמֵי לֵייתוֹ וְלִירַצּוֹ!
§ Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners’ death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?
אָמַר לָהֶן רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה: יוֹלֶדֶת – אִם הִיא יָלְדָה, בָּנֶיהָ מִי יָלְדוּ?!
Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַסִּי: וּמַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּאִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבַּהּ לָא מִיתְכַּפְּרָא? וְכֵיוָן דְּכִי אִיכָּא כַּמָּה עֲשֵׂה גַּבַּהּ מִיכַּפְּרָא, יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ נָמֵי מִיכַּפַּר.
Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.
לְמֵימְרָא דְּקַנְיָא לְהוּ?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ מִנְחָה לִשְׁנֵי בָנָיו וָמֵת – קְרֵיבָה, וְאֵין בּוֹ שׁוּתָּפוּת. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ קַנְיָא לְהוּ, ״נֶפֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא!
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.
וְלָא קַנְיָא לְהוּ?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ בְּהֵמָה לִשְׁנֵי בָנָיו וָמֵת – קְרֵיבָה, וְאֵין מְמִירִין בָּהּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא קַנְיָא לְהוּ – הַיְינוּ דְּאֵין מְמִירִין בָּהּ, דְּהָוְיָא לְהוּ כְּשׁוּתָּפִין,
The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,
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